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PART I
THE NATIONAL SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 1
CRAFTING NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Alan G. Stolberg1
When you’re asking Americans to die, you have to be able to explain it in terms of the national interest.2
											

Henry Kissinger

The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation’s national interests. Once they
are identified, they drive a nation’s foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction
that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ
them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national interests play, they must be carefully justified, not
merely assumed.3
											

Robert J. Art

Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interests
is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential to establishing the
objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. “Interests are the foundation and
starting point for policy prescriptions.” They help answer questions concerning why a policy is
important.4 National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power
employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy.
The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been
a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. Despite what many academics have
maintained, national interests are not only a factor for nation states. All actors in the international
system possess interests. Using Buzan, Waever, and Wilde’s units of analysis, the need to have
interests is equally applicable to international subsystems (groups or units that can be distinguished
from the overall system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or independence on
each other) like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, individual units (actors consisting of various subgroups, organizations,
and communities) such as nations of people that transcend state boundaries and multinational
corporations, subunits (organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect
the behavior of the unit as a whole) like bureaucracies and lobbies, and finally, individuals that
all possess separate personal interests as they participate in the overall system.5 Some academics
choose to distinguish between national interests (interests involved in the external relations of the
actor) and public interests (interests related within the boundaries of the actor).6 For purposes of
this essay, given the closing gap between the influence of external and internal issues in the 21st
century international system brought about by the associated components of a rapidly globalized
world, there will be no distinction made between external and internal interests. In effect, they all
fall under the concept of the national interest.
There is a generally accepted consensus among academics that interests are designed to be of
value to the entity or actor responsible for determining the interest for itself. This could include those
interests that are intended to be “a standard of conduct or a state of affairs worthy of achievement
by virtue of its universal moral value.”7 However, there is less agreement over the question of
whether all nation-state interests are enduring, politically bi-partisan, permanent conditions that
represent core interests that transcend changes in government,8 in contrast to those interests that
may be altered over time and or respond to change in the international system.9
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There is also disagreement over whether national interests are designed purely for the sake
of advancing the power of an actor with the object of attaining greater security for that actor,10 or
whether interests can be guided by values and ethics with the intent of doing some type of good for
parts of the international system, or the overall system in general. This might include collaboration
and coordination with other actors in the international system.11 It may also require the interestcrafting actor to subordinate certain interests that only benefit it for the sake of other interests that
are of greater value to additional actors in the system.
Finally, there is disagreement over the categorization and determination of intensity or
prioritization of interests. Terms like survival, vital, critical, major, serious, secondary, extremely
important, important, less important, humanitarian, and peripheral have been used to categorize
interests in academic writings and official government documents.12 Some categorize how significant
the interest is in terms of chronological relationship to the actor that determines the interest (near
term versus longer term impact), while others relate categories to the intensity of the substantive
influence that the interest is determined to have on the actor. Categorization is directly related to
the question of prioritizing interests based on intensity, deciding which types of interests are more
important than others. Perhaps of equal importance is the amount of distinction made between the
categories in the prioritization process. In a zero-sum environment, this distinction could determine
whether or not an actor’s resources, and in what amount, would be allocated toward the attainment
of the interest.
After developing a detailed definition of national interests and analyzing their uses, this chapter
will propose a process that future policymakers can use to craft reasonably attainable statements
of national interests. The chapter assesses the issue of fixed or adjustable interests over time to
understand what degree of flexibility that crafters of interests might have. Similarly, it examines
whether policymakers create interests only for the purpose of advancing the power, and thus
security, of a state, or if they can also be developed based on ethical and value-driven intent. Finally,
the essay examines the creation of a set of category definitions that will provide necessary flexibility
for a 21st century policymaker.
In the end, the focus of this chapter will be the development of a series of issues or questions
that any policymaker can use as a guideline to assist in the development of national interests that
are within the realm of the possible.
DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTEREST
In a very generic sense, national interests are “that which is deemed by a particular state (actor)
to be a . . . desirable goal.”13 The attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor
believes will have a positive impact on itself. Realization of the interest could enhance the political,
economic, security, environmental, and/or moral well being of a populace and the state (actor) or
national enterprise to which they belong.14 This holds true within the territory of the actor, as well
as in any external relations that the actor may undertake outside of the administrative control of
that actor.15
Interests would be the concern of the actor as a whole, “or at least (for) a sufficiently substantial
subset of its membership to transcend the specific interests of (any) particular groups” within
the actor.16 For the United States, the executive body of the federal government, rather than the
legislative or judicial, has the primary responsibility for determining the national interests that
address perceived needs and aspirations external to the geographic borders of the nation. The
determination of internal or domestic interests is more complex with executive and legislative
bodies at federal, state, and local levels interacting in the political process to reach decisions.
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USES FOR NATIONAL INTERESTS
Interests serve as the foundation and guiding direction for the formulation of policy. For
a nation state, there is more often than not a direct correlation between the nation’s interests and
foreign policy. In most cases, “statesmen think and act in terms of interest.”17 Those interests believed
to be the most significant for the attainment of a policy objective (the actor’s wants and needs)18
will earn the greatest amount of emphasis during the policy formulation process. They should
be designed to tell the policymaker why and how much he should care about an issue. Interests
help determine what kind and how much attention should be given to both challenges or threats
and opportunities. They also assist the policymaker in identifying key issues during the policy
formulation process. Examples could include: How are current developments affecting interests?
Are hostile forces able to negatively impact the interests? Is there sufficient power (both military
and non-military) available to protect the interests? How much of that power must be used to
defend the interests?19 In effect, the understanding of an actor’s interests helps the actor determine
the degree of importance to be given to an issue.20
FIXED OR CHANGING INTERESTS
Some political scientists, like Hans Morgenthau, believe that national interests are permanent
features of the international system. Regardless of what government is in power, the interests of
a nation state remain fixed components of the policymaking process. They are “unaffected by the
circumstances of time and place.”21 Some interpret this to mean that nation states possess permanent,
unchanging core interests. This would imply that the United States has core interests, potentially
in existence since the beginning of the republic in the later part of the eighteenth century, that have
never changed since their inception. This analysis will suggest that adjustments have, in fact, taken
place over the course of time.
Morgenthau, himself, indicates that the key concept of interest is not to be defined “with a
meaning that is fixed once and for all.”22 Morgenthau believed the generic concept of interest was
unchanging in terms of its importance to the international system. But this did not mean that
individual interests could not be adjusted or newly created in order to take into account changes in
the international system.
Other theorists have argued that interests are likely to be “a diverse, pluralistic set of subjective
preferences that change periodically, both in response to the domestic political process itself and
in response to shifts in the international environment. The national interest therefore is more likely
to be what the policymakers say it is at any particular time.”23 Like most actors in the international
system, the United States has had both changing and unchanging national interests over an extended
period of time. Some interests have been a more consistent focus of various policies and strategies
than others, and all have had different degrees of importance over both the long and short terms.
Some of these interests changed or adjusted because of shifting world conditions and/or domestic
political considerations.24
Using a portion of the preamble of the Constitution, all seven national security strategies drafted
during the course of the Clinton administration identified three core interests that have remained
timeless in some manner, shape, or form for the United States: “provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”
These were translated in those national security strategies into the modern day interests of:
enhancing security at home and abroad (security), promoting prosperity (economic well-being),
and promoting democracy and human rights (democratic values).25
5

For purposes of 21st century America, these three core interests may be defined as:
Security: “Protection of the people (both home and abroad), territory, and institutions of the
United States against potential foreign dangers.”26 This has always included defense of the American
homeland. Domestically, it would now include protection of critical infrastructure such as energy,
banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, and cyber networks.27
America’s expansion into the world that began in the 19th century resulted in a broadening of
the external portion of this core interest to now include components like protection against WMD
proliferation, freedom of movement, access to key facilities, and assurance that U.S. national security
institutions are transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
Economic Well-Being: “Promotion of (American) international trade and investment, including
protection of United States private economic interests in foreign countries.”28 The 19th century
American entry onto the world stage also ensured that this core interest would evolve to now
incorporate expanded global economic growth through free markets and trade, to include the
advance of globalization.29
Democratic Values: Until the 20th century, this core interest was confined to ensuring that the
domestic democratic process and associated values framed the traditional American tenets of “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The nation’s continued expansion into the world witnessed a
change that in the 21st century can be said to include the promotion of democracy and human rights
abroad.30
All three of these, now 21st century core interests, have also evolved as a result of the American
experience in the aftermath of the two world wars of the 20th century into what can be considered
a fourth core interest for the United States:
Stable and Secure World Order: A favorable world order based on the “establishment of a peaceful
international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to
war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or cope with
aggression.”31 Requirements for global stability in the 21st century world would also include secure
alliances and coalitions, the security of regions or countries in which the U.S. has a sizable economic
stake, and the need to respond to humanitarian or other concerns, such as response to natural and
manmade disasters, protecting the global environment, minimizing destabilizing refugee flows,
and support for health problems like HIV/AIDS and food and water shortages.32
REALISM OR MORALITY-BASED INTERESTS
Once the appropriate interests have been determined, the next question is why should the actor
care enough to do anything about them. Is the underlying rationale for any kind of action to be one
of realism or morality, or can both be utilized to explain the need to pursue certain interests? The
complexity of the international system creates a decision-making problem that forces the crafter of
national interests to make hard “choices concerning moral and national values; national treasure and
even blood; and the time, energy, and influence that a government expends on external matters.”33
The realist school of thought is founded on the premise that as a tool for the policymaker the
national interest is intended to identify what is in the best interest of his state in its relations with
other states.34 The term “best” is defined in terms of power and security. Realists view national
security as the primary basis of a state’s national interest because of the threat of anarchy and
constraints on sovereign states that are part of the international system. Anarchy in the international
system would be manifested as “disorder, disarray, confusion, or chaos.” This could either be
interpreted as a description of the general condition of the international system, or as the absence of
any authoritative institutions, rules, or norms that are more powerful than any sovereign state actor
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and, thus, have the ability to ensure security in the overall system.35 The result is a lack of security
for the actors that are members of the system.
In addition to anarchy, realists are also very sensitive to threats to a state’s interests that are posed
by “external constraints on their freedom of maneuver from international treaties, the interests and
power of other states, and other factors beyond the control of the (state) such as geographic location
and dependence on foreign trade.”36
According to realism, the absence of security caused by anarchy and constraints in the system
causes states to orient their interests on “the acquisition and management of power,” more
often than not to be related to some form of the military element of national power.37 The result,
according to Morgenthau, is the need to focus an actor’s national interests on meeting its security
requirements by “protect(ing) (its) physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments
by other nations.”38
For the national interest, the emphasis in realism is on doing what is primarily and almost
solely to the advantage of that particular state actor. It is done with an express focus on power and
security. In contrast, morality-based interests are defined “more broadly to encompass intangible
values like human rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease.” While
military power could still be the national power element of choice, morality-based interests would
promote concepts such as “the values of national self-determination and economic egalitarianism.”39
The last part of the 20th century witnessed a surge in support for these kinds of morality-based
interests through the execution of humanitarian intervention in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and Kosovo. Humanitarian intervention is “armed interference in a sovereign state by [other states]
with the . . . objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the
result of civil war, humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state including genocide.”40 Moralitybased interests are not developed only to benefit the actor that crafts the interest. Rather, they are
designed so other actors in the international system are also likely to benefit.
Given the complex world of the 21st century, neither one of these approaches is likely to be
the sole rationale for why any given interest will be developed to guide policymaking. The bipartisan Commission on America’s National Interests assessed that the difference between realism
and morality-based interests was more an alternative expression of valuation between the two
as opposed to two dichotomous poles in contraposition to each other. The American people are
oriented on the survival and well being of the United States, while at the same time, owing much to
historically embedded values, they are concerned about human rights and the welfare of individuals
in other countries.41
In addition, Joseph Nye, the Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard and clear promoter of the
morality component through his advocacy of soft power, argues that national interests are a set of
shared priorities that often include issues of human rights and democracy. “A democratic definition
of the national interest does not accept the difference between a morality-based and an interest
[realism]-based foreign policy.”42 There is both constant tension and constant cooperation between
the two underlying rationales that help guide the formation of interests. Given the situation of the
moment, each one will have its own applicability. Henry Kissinger, a most noted supporter of the
realist school, described it best when he stated that:
The alleged dichotomy of pragmatism (realism) and morality seems to me a misleading choice. Pragmatism
without a moral element leads to random activism, brutality, or stagnation. We must always be pragmatic
about our national security. We cannot abandon national security in pursuit of virtue. But beyond this bedrock
of all policy, our challenge is to advance our principles in a way that does not isolate us in the long run.43
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The issues associated with the 21st century world will require the crafter of national interests to
simultaneously be both a pragmatic realist and an advocate of morality. Based on circumstances,
sometimes one theoretical foundation will have greater influence than the other for the development
of interests. With all of the many complex issues that will be present in the 21st century, this is likely
to be true for American policymakers so long as the United States intends to maximize its influence
on a global basis.
CATEGORIZATION AND INTENSITY OF INTERESTS
In order for the crafter of national interests to determine what types of resources to allocate
in what amount toward the attainment of an interest, he must understand the categorization and
determination of the intensity of the interest. This part of the crafting process is necessary to address
key policy questions like: Which issues matter most? Why should people care? How much should
the populace be willing to pay to deal with identified threats or take advantage of recognized
opportunities?44
The determination of priority—usually expressed in terms of the intensity of an interest—is
crucial because, from the perspective of the policymaker, interests may very well come into conflict
with each other. This conflict could be over the resources that an actor would require to attain the
interests, including the time and attention of key decision makers.45 Such resources are likely to
be limited in some manner for any decision making body, thus requiring prioritization before the
interest crafting process is complete.
The most difficult problem in this part of the process is usually the determination of the intensity
or stake that an actor has in a specific issue. The leadership of the interest crafting actor must address
its desire to influence issues and events, both external and internal, its willingness to use any or
all elements of national power to defend or advance certain interests in preference to others, and
potentially its willingness to do so at the expense of other actors.46
Categorization is important not only because it can be used as a framework for systematic
evaluation of national interests, but also because it can also provide “a way to distinguish immediate
from long-range” interest concerns using time as a basis.47 Identified academic sources used between
two and four different categories of interests, and two National Security Strategies published during
the Clinton Administration used three categories.48 The categories are designed to delineate the
different levels of intensity, or order of priority for any respective interest.
The principal difference amongst these approaches is whether they use a separate category for
survival interests, or whether they consider survival interests and vital interests essentially one and
the same. “The major difference between a survival interest and a vital interest” is “in the nature
and imminence of a military threat” to the actor.49 Both terms address the life of the actor, one deals
with the imminent danger of death while the other is only potentially fatal. In this case, the time
difference is the key.50 If one believes there are specific interests where the very survival or existence
of the actor, and little more, is at stake, then four categories are necessary.
For purposes of this assessment, using the work of Neuchterlein, Art, and The Commission on
America’s National Interests, this chapter will use four prioritized categories of intensity, from high
to low (Survival, Vital, Important, Peripheral):
Survival.
These represent the single most important interests for any actor. This is the very essence of the
actor’s existence—the protection of its citizens and their institutions from attack by enemies, both
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foreign and domestic. It addresses an imminent threat of attack and is an interest that cannot be
compromised.51 If not attained, it will “bring costs that are catastrophic, or nearly so.”52 Whatever
can be done would be done to ensure the survival of the actor, to include the use of military force.
Examples: Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
attacks on the interest crafting actor or its military forces abroad; Ensure the survival of allies and
their active cooperation in shaping an international system in which the actor crafting the interest
can thrive; Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on the borders of the actor
crafting the interest.53
Vital.
A vital interest exists when an issue is so important to an actor’s well being that its leadership
can only compromise up to a certain point. Beyond that point, compromise is no longer possible
because the potential harm to the actor would no longer be tolerable.54 If the interest is achieved,
it would bring great benefit to the actor; if denied, it would carry costs to the actor that are severe
but not catastrophic.55 Such costs could severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the
actor’s government to safeguard and enhance the well being of its populace.56
Examples: Prevent the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery
systems; prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions; promote the wellbeing of allies and friends and protect them from external aggression.57
Important.
These interests would be significant but not crucial to the actor’s well being. They could cause
serious concern and harm to the actor’s overseas interests, and even though the result may be
somewhat painful, would be much more likely be resolved with compromise and negotiation,
rather than confrontation.58 It could increase its “economic well being and perhaps its security” and,
thus, contribute to “making the international environment more congenial” to its overall interests.
The potential value, as well as potential loss of these interests, would be moderate and not great.59
Important interests differ from vital and survival interests in the degree of danger perceived to the
actor, and the amount of time available to find a peaceful solution to the issue.60
Examples: Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important state actors
as much as feasible without destabilization; discourage massive human rights violations in foreign
countries; prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic
regions.61
Peripheral.
These interests neither involve a threat to the actor’s security or the well-being of its populace,
nor seriously impact the stability of the international system.62 They are desirable conditions, but
ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the actor to safeguard its populace.63
Examples: Promoting the economic interests of private citizens abroad;64 enlarging democracy
everywhere for its own sake; preserving the territorial integrity or political constitution of other
actors everywhere.65
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THE INFLUENCE OF INTERESTS ON 21ST CENTURY POLICY AND STRATEGY MAKING
Just as the development of national interests is complex, so is the actual application of interests
in the policy and strategy formulation process. The importance of national interests to the process is
significant, as described by Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister in 1856: “When people ask
me . . . for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best,
upon each occasion as it arises, making the interests of our country one’s guiding principle.”66
As we have seen, the crafter participating in the development of interests must take the following
issues into account: How flexible can the interest of the moment be in relation to the actor’s core
interests of the period? Must the interest be based on either realism or morality, or rather; can it be
some combination of the two? Where does the interest fit in terms of how it is to be categorized with
what degree of intensity?
Perhaps the most complicating factor that the crafter must take into account will be the influence
of domestic politics on the interest formulation process. The concept that resource allocation by
type and quantity will be impacted by the identification of the interest designed to guide a policy
creates a critical linkage between the two. The connection is key because, in a democracy, it is
the government of a state actor that will have to sustain the investment of resources required to
attain the interest. Interests with greater fidelity and less ambiguity are easier for governments
and populations to support because they have a clearer idea of why it is they are being asked to do
something, like allocate money or military forces.67 At the same time, such a detailed understanding
could lead to a lack of support on the part of either the government, the people, or parts thereof, if
the interest is assessed to be too low on the scale of intensity.
If they are to develop relevant and executable 21st century interests, a most important
understanding for those participating in the interest development process must be that they are
endowed with a degree of flexibility allowing them to discern the limits of domestic politics in
terms of what types of interests are likely to be supportable. This must entail the provision of the
maximum amount of data available for the development and resulting identification of the interests
at hand. The greater the fidelity and degree of consensus on categorization and level of intensity,
the greater the possibility that the public will support actions to protect or advance the interest.
But even with proper addressal of all the most important issues, resulting in a logical, supportable
interest, at times governments and populations do not support some interests with a high level
of intensity. Conversely, political bodies often support other interests that are identified with a
low level of intensity. The explanation for this behavior is typically found in the internal political
decision making of the actor. For example, sometimes domestic lobbies exercise a significant amount
of influence on parliaments or the American congress, with resulting impact on decisions that
determine whether some interests will be supported at the level necessary to achieve attainment.
One such example comes from the period between 1992 and 2001 when the relatively small
Armenian lobby in Congress, strongly supported by the Armenian American community, prevented
the United States from providing any direct aid to Azerbaijan. This was in response to the Azerbaijani
blockade of Armenia, which was at war with Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
American government policymakers felt it important to provide support for Azerbaijan because
it was just emerging from the former Soviet Union and lay in a very sensitive geographic region
bordering the Caspian Sea and Iran. However, they were prevented from doing so even though
assistance to Azerbaijan could have fallen within the parameters of a vital interest in an effort to
protect the state and its Caspian Sea-based hydrocarbon resources from external aggression.68
To recapitulate, the interest crafting process should include the following to ensure the greatest
opportunity for the development of interests that are both appropriate and supportable for any
10

actor. These issues and questions must be addressed during the course of the process (the conclusion
of which is when the national interest is identified and ready for use to guide the development of
policy and strategy):
• They should be designed to tell the policymaker why and how much he should care about
an issue. Part of this is framed by the determination of where realism and morality fit in the
process.
• Interests help determine what kind and how much attention should be given to challenges
or threats, as well as opportunities.
• They also assist the policymaker in identifying key questions to address during the policy
formulation process. Examples could include:
— How are current developments affecting the actor’s interests?
— Are hostile forces able to negatively impact the actor’s interests?
— Is there sufficient power (both military and non military) available to protect the actor’s
interests?69
— Which issues matter the most? Where do they fit in terms of the interest prioritization
levels of intensity? Survival, Vital, Important, or Peripheral?
— Why should people care?
— How much would the populace be willing to pay to deal with identified threats and
challenges or take advantage of recognized opportunities? Is it enough?
SUMMARY
In the end, while some may believe as Lord Palmerston stated to the House of Commons in 1848
that “we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. (Only) our interests are eternal
and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow,”70 the challenges and opportunities found
in the 21st century will require the flexibility to craft interests that can work in this complex world,
writ large. They may be rationalized in terms of either realism or a morality-based approach, or
by a combination thereof in accordance with the particular circumstances of the issue. In turn, this
rational determination is likely to drive how future policymakers decide to categorize and prioritize
future interests. It will not be easy, but it must be done.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY, REVISITED
Walter H. Leach
At the time of this writing, a search on Google.com for “national security community” registers
about 62,500 hits. The abstract to a 1998 National War College paper entitled “U.S. National Security
Structure: A New Model for the 21st Century” defines the national security community as the
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC).1 In
a chapter titled “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process” by Deutch, Kanter, and
Scowcroft, they add the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).2 Interestingly, a group called the National
Security Network addresses a so-called “progressive national security community,” highlighting a
partisan political divide in making national policy.3 In site after site, authors use the term without
definition, indicating the authors assume the reader knows its definition. Who are the major players
in the national security community today? The Congress, think tanks, interest groups, and the
media all exert significant influence over American security policy and strategy formulation. How
do they formally and informally interact? To whom are they accountable and from whom do they
get their feedback? Answering these questions will illuminate potential opportunities and barriers
to successful policymaking and strategy formulation.
The Congress.
The first and arguably most direct role player to be considered is the Congress. While the
Constitution vests the President with executive powers, it gives the Congress the legislative
responsibility to make the laws of the land and wield the power of the purse. Additionally, the
Constitution allows the President to make treaties with foreign governments “by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate. . . .”4 When the Executive branch implements foreign policy,
expenditure of government funds is usually involved, so the Congress has a formal role to play in
the appropriations process.
One vivid example of struggle between these two branches occurred in May of 2007 as President
Bush vetoed an Iraq War supplemental appropriation. When this legislation was introduced, the
policy of the U.S. was to use military forces in Iraq to train Iraqi security forces, provide security
to the Iraqi people and to support reconstruction efforts. Critics frequently labeled the President’s
policy “stay the course,” and he rejected calls for a scheduled withdrawal of U.S. troops. The
supplemental appropriation language called for establishing a timetable for withdrawal of U.S.
combat troops from Iraq as conditions for providing supplemental funding to continue the war
effort. The President repeatedly stated his intention to veto the bill as it was being drafted.
Leaders of the Democratic majority in Congress also clearly stated their intention to carry out
what they saw as the will of a majority of the American people. Their intent was to begin the process
of disengaging American combat forces from what Congressional Democrats were labeling an Iraqi
civil war. On 2 May 2007, the House of Representatives failed to override the President’s veto and
then set to work trying to develop another legislative vehicle that would accomplish a transition
of responsibility from U.S. to Iraqi forces. They also wanted to encourage the Iraqi government
to take further responsibility for political reconciliation.5 On 11 Jul, the Washington Post reported
on various efforts by Democrats and Republicans to force the administration’s hand, either to
amend the mission and focus of the troops in Iraq or to pull out the combat troops entirely.6 Those
Congressional actions were directed squarely at changing U.S. policy in a national security area.
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While this power struggle illustrates direct conflict, how does the Congress routinely influence
policy and strategy formulation in the national security community? The answer is through
appropriations and oversight. Congress provides appropriations as well as oversight for all the
players in U.S. foreign policy—including the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. While
not enumerated in the Constitution, Congressional oversight logically flows from its appropriations
role.7 The leaders of the foreign policy agencies routinely go to Capitol Hill to testify before various
committees and to answer questions, both in and out of committee sessions. Members of Congress
also have individual, direct access to the Executive agencies by sending letters of inquiry. Operating
beneath the level of public awareness, but arguably no less important, are the relationships between
mid-grade professionals in these agencies and the professional staffs of the House and Senate.
Separate from the personal staffs of Members, these professional staffs exist to provide expertise
to committees in drafting legislation. To that end, committees frequently hire staffers with former
service in and around the Executive agencies. Informal communication between the Executive and
Legislative branches is continuous at the staff level. Agency staffers and Congressional staffers can
frame the debate and set the stage for successful legislation. They also provide early warning to
their superiors when a confrontation appears likely. Much of the effective give-and-take between
the branches is concentrated at this level, while the Members and agency senior executives work
more directly in the media spotlight.
As a body within the Executive Office of the President, the NSC is largely immune from direct
Congressional pressure. At the same time, the primary members of both the principals and deputies
committees—the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury, the Director
and Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are each subject to Congressional oversight in their roles within their respective organizations. The
President ultimately determines the extent to which the NSC formally cooperates with Congress.
The NSC Staff is also mostly immune from direct Congressional pressure. The President can
claim executive privilege to protect NSC staff members from Congressional scrutiny. At the same
time, the NSC Staff must remain cognizant of the role and power of Congress, even as they serve
the President. Similar to the previous discussion of relationships, the working-level relationships
between Congress and the NSC Staff can foster harmonious or acrimonious interactions that help
or hinder the advancement of U.S. policy. When the Executive and Legislative branches come into
direct conflict and neither is prepared to compromise, the opportunity may arise for the Judiciary
to involve itself in settling issues of Constitutional powers.
In asking the question, “Who is the Congress accountable to?” a researcher turns to the
Constitution. All Constitutional legislative powers are vested in the Congress.8 In their role as
legislators, Members advance the interests of the Nation, thereby supporting and defending the
Constitution. At the same time, the Constitution makes Members accountable to their constituents
via regular elections.9 These legislative and representative roles are generally complimentary,
yet there are occasions where Members are forced to choose between these two interests. For the
purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to recognize there can be significant tension between the two
roles.10
The People provide regular feedback to the Congress in a variety of ways. The most obvious
method is through elections. Every 2 years in the House and every 6 years in the Senate, Members
wishing to continue their service must stand for reelection by their constituents. Between elections,
Members receive feedback from their constituents and other interested citizens through written or
electronic contact with Members’ offices, personal visits in Washington or in the home district, and
through financial contributions. Members may occasionally receive contradictory feedback from
their constituents and the rest of the country, reflecting conflict between their twin roles.
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In their Constitutional role as legislators, Members also receive feedback from both the
Executive branch and Judiciary. The Executive branch feedback process includes the staff-level
communication previously described, as well as formal proposals or draft legislation the President
may send to Congress. Additionally, the Executive provides the Congress feedback via the People.
The President can use the bully pulpit to connect with the American electorate via the media. If he
is successful, the electorate can increase or modify the feedback they provide the Congress. The
Judiciary provides feedback to the Congress by ruling on challenged laws, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter. When considering controversial legislation, the Congress always has an eye on
the likely Constitutionality of the legislation, as well as on the various ways opponents may choose
to challenge the Constitutionality of the law through the courts.
With two formal lines of accountability, Members of the House of Representatives are always
in a race for re-election and Senators are finding they have less and less time where re-election
does not impact everything they do. This introduces a tangled web of relationships that usually
operates just below the public consciousness. The most logical result of this perpetual campaign
scenario is strengthening of the representative role (accountable to the People) vis-à-vis the legislator
(accountable to the Nation) role. Also becoming increasingly visible with each new campaign is the
growing impact of money.
While any campaign organization is expensive to operate, for truly competitive races the desired
level of media saturation can cost enormous sums. To comply with ethics restrictions while also
raising the required resources to compete, Members must separate their personal schedules and
their staffs into Congressional and campaign foci. Interest groups can help fill the fundraising need.
These organizations attempt to educate Members and hopefully improve resulting legislation. At
the same time, they bring various financial resources to bear in ways that can benefit a Member
(or the opposing candidate). Members receive direct, although informal, feedback in the levels of
campaign contributions being steered their way by these interest groups, especially as compared
to contributions to their opponents. Interest groups are the focus of a separate section later in this
paper. While many writers have lamented the perceived connections between politicians and
money, the national security professional needs to recognize the numerous influencers operating
behind the scenes attempting to sway the course and content of legislation that may impact national
security policy.
As noted earlier, the high cost of media advertising drives ever more time and effort into campaign
fundraising. While serving various roles, the presence and actions of the media complicate the
numerous relationships involved in U.S. policymaking. The media is the focus of the final section of
this chapter.
Think Tanks.
Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is among the most important
and least appreciated. A distinctively American phenomenon, the independent policy research institution
has shaped U.S. global engagement for nearly 100 years. But because think tanks conduct much of their work
outside the media spotlight, they garner less attention than other sources of U.S. policy – like the jostling of
interest groups, the maneuvering between political parties, and the rivalry among branches of government.11
Richard N. Haass
Director, Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State

A think tank is an organization that conducts policy-oriented research. Think tanks provide ideas
and analysis on myriad foreign and domestic policy issues. They further serve to assist the public
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in making informed decisions about these subjects.12 According to Richard Haass, their primary
contribution is to bridge the gap between academia and government. While government bureaucrats
are too busy in their day-to-day roles to “take a step back and consider the broader trajectory of U.S.
policy,” academicians are generally focused on “arcane theoretical and methodological debates only
distantly related to real policy dilemmas.”13 Much of the academic research in any policy field does
not end up in a form useful to policymakers. Think tanks serve a useful function as they review the
extant literature and distill or synthesize these material into a useful format.14 More broadly, think
tanks serve civil society in five ways: generating ideas, providing talent to government, offering
venues to gather policy professionals, engaging the public, and serving as a middle ground between
opposing parties.15
Think tanks, operating outside the government bureaucracy, have the freedom to challenge the
conventional wisdom. They may be independent or associated with interest groups. Observing
the modus operandi of the administration, think tanks develop new approaches to policy challenges
as well as innovative concepts. At the same time, think tanks may also determine that the current
administration’s approach to an issue is right on target. Recognizing emerging trends and problems,
think tanks can translate the challenges into actionable policy issues.16 During World War II, the
Council on Foreign Relations initiated a project entitled War and Peace Studies that ultimately
generated 682 memoranda for the State Department. It was their flagship publication, Foreign Affairs,
which published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in 1947, providing the intellectual foundation for
the strategy of containment. Think tanks also serve as intellectual support for political campaigns,
generating policy papers and providing advice to candidates on a wide range of issues.17 In their
role as idea generators, they also serve as recyclers. As the number of information sources and
paths of information transfer explode, gatekeepers of that process gain power. As Keohane and Nye
noted in 1998,
To understand the effect of free information on power, one must first understand the paradox of plenty. A
plentitude of information leads to a poverty of attention. Attention becomes a scarce resource, and those
who can distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power . . . . Brand names and the ability to
bestow an international seal of approval will become more important.18

In addition to their work generating ideas, think tanks also make available a wide range of
intellectual talent, with appropriate policy focus, for incoming administrations to draft into
government service. Almost as important, think tanks also provide fertile ground for outgoing
public servants to remain engaged in the policy realm. Stepping back from the day-to-day grind
of government service allows these professionals time to ponder their experience from a wider
perspective. Snaring a retiring high-profile public servant can add luster to a think tank’s reputation
and possibly enhance donations.19 One of the latest examples of the revolving door between
government and think tanks is the move of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from his
post at the helm of the DoD to a visiting fellowship at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University.20
Figure 1 below gives some idea of the prevalence of this trend. An extensive list is available in
Appendix Two of Donald Abelson’s 2006 book, A Capital Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy.
Consider one cautionary note about the revolving door. Individuals who may consider moving
in either direction may constrain their policy research or innovation, or worse yet, moderate their
actions or the report of their findings with a view to remaining in the good graces of their possible
future employers.
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Figure 1. The Revolving Door.21
Think tanks also serve as hosts for gatherings of policy professionals. Whether hosting a singleissue lecture or convening a multiday symposium, these gatherings foster debate and understanding.
While they shape opinions, these meetings can also lay the foundation for new ideas to successfully
enter the policy arena. Just as importantly, these meetings can also serve to demonstrate why some
new ideas need more time for thought before being implemented. Think tanks can also provide
non-partisan venues for government officials to announce new initiatives or for foreign officials to
engage the wider US policy community.22
Using both the public media and their own publishing resources, as well as the Internet, think
tanks attempt to engage and educate the public. While some reflect the philosophical leanings of
associated interest groups, others serve as independent judges of public policy and government
performance. In fulfilling this role, they also build confidence in public policy and public officials.
Even where government fails to deliver sufficient results, think tanks help shine light on policy
failures and suggest corrective actions. The appearance of independence from government is vital
in this role. Additionally, these organizations serve as interpreters of current events for citizens,
providing various viewpoints on the issue of the day.23 Researcher Diana Stone suggests, however,
that think tanks’ engagement with the public is a one-way relationship. That is, there is little formal
structure in most think tanks to receive and process public feedback. She also notes that think tanks
are focused heavily on policy elite and around governmental centers of power, effectively limiting
their engagement mission.24
Similar to their role in providing venues for professionals, think tanks can also provide venues
for mediation between opposing groups. The U.S. Institute of Peace occasionally serves as a
conduit for behind-the-scenes political negotiations, while also providing negotiation training
to U.S. diplomats. The Carnegie Endowment hosted meetings over eight years on South Africa,
establishing an ongoing dialogue focused on South Africa’s future and helping enable its political
transition. Additionally, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has been involved in
mediating divisions between Greeks and Turks and ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.25 In
this role, think tanks can serve an important support function for the U.S. government in lessening
tensions.
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At this point, it is apparent that think tanks must maintain some level of positive reputation
among both the public and the policy community to have any broad impact. Indeed, many think
tanks strategize about garnering media attention though seminars, conferences and public lectures.
They also reach out widely to academics, policymakers and journalists to get the message out. These
events bring credit to the think tank as well as educate others about their work. Some think tanks
pursue academic audiences through university lectures or pursue a more formal influence through
Congressional testimony. Virtually all think tanks now have Internet home pages making their
products widely available for download. While Donald Abelson argues that think tank influence is
quite difficult to assess accurately, he notes that some think tank directors use media coverage as a
gauge of their own organization’s policy influence.26
While the word “independent” is frequently used in describing think tanks or their roles, most
often, the word refers to the relationship between think tanks and the government. It should not be
construed to mean that think tanks are necessarily impartial, nor that they come to their conclusions
or operate in the policy world without outside influence. Looking internationally, Stone claims that
the term think tank brings a certain prestige to an organization, and that the definition has become
very elastic, especially in a non-Anglo-American setting. Think tanks reflect their native political
environment, and the independence from government influence expected of a U.S. or UK think
tank should not be assumed for others.27
To be able to afford all of the activity related above, and the amount of professional expertise at
their fingertips, where do think tanks get their funding? There are four primary avenues of funding
think tanks in the U.S. Many, if not all, think tanks accept donations from private individuals.
Considered separate from these individual donations are endowments or major contributions of
wealthy individuals. Private foundations provide another source of funding, as do government
grants and contracts.28 These funding sources are also a source of feedback. As an organization
produces results that are favorable to a donor, the tendency would naturally be for that donor to
consider maintaining or increasing the funding stream. Similarly, if the think tank fails to deliver
significant enough results, or somehow works against the values and interests of the donor, the
natural tendency would be to eliminate or decrease future funding.
At the same time, donors can choose to overlook short-term results in making funding decisions,
while think tanks can also choose to operate without regard for the opinions of their funding sources.
Human nature suggests that these situations would be exceptions to the rule. This fact should not be
construed to be a guarantee of partisanship on any given issue, but simply a cautionary note not to
assume impartiality. Indeed, James McGann, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute
told a Foreign Press Center audience, “. . . most people don’t talk about it, most institutions will rail
against what I’m about to do, because they don’t want to be pegged in being one quadrant or another
in terms of left, center, right, but the reality is those people who are in the know know what—where
think tanks fall.”29 Knowing this, donors select the think tanks they choose to support, and think
tanks tend to generate ideas and products that reflect their employees and donors. This polarization
of some think tanks toward ideological positions can provide utility where they balance each other,
but this tendency can also leave the ideological center with less of a policy voice.
Think tanks as organizations have no direct line of accountability. As mentioned above, they are
indirectly accountable to their funding sources. Losing a funding source could lead a think tank to
find other sources of revenue which, in turn, may or may not lead to a change in organizational focus.
In a broader sense, think tanks are also accountable to their target audience(s), as losing a significant
portion of their audience will reduce their perceived influence. This loss of influence may, in turn,
also affect their funding. At the individual level, think tank scholars are directly accountable to their
boards of directors.
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Interest Groups.
In 1787, writing in Federalist #10, James Madison defined “faction” as “. . . a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed [sic] to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”30 Today an interest group can be broadly
defined as any group of non-elected individuals that organize themselves in an attempt to influence
public policy. While focused on the national security community, this paper nevertheless recognizes
that interest groups not claiming any interest in security policy can have impacts on policy and
strategy formulation.
An About.com web page entitled “Issues, Organizations, and Interest Groups” gives some feel
for the Wild West nature of the world of interest groups. At the time of this writing, the website
contained 211 links to interest groups from across the political sphere. From well-known groups
like the National Rifle Association and Greenpeace to polar opposites such as National Right to Life
and Planned Parenthood to lesser-knowns such as Stewards of Family Farms, Ranches, and Forests,
this website barely scratches the surface of interest groups vying to impact policy. To illustrate the
scope of such groups, the Encyclopedia of Associations lists 22,200 U.S. national organizations; 22,300
international organizations; and 115,000 regional, state and local organizations.31 (Note that under
an expansive reading of this definition, some Federal agencies such as the Department of Veterans
Affairs and Office of National Drug Control Policy could be considered interest groups—and these
executive branch organizations’ websites are listed on the About.com website. This paper does not
consider government agencies as interest groups.)
Interest groups obviously vary significantly in terms of size, focus, influence, and name
recognition. On one end of the spectrum is Asian Pacific Americans for Progress (APAP), a littleknown, liberal-leaning group based on the U.S. west coast. In May of 2007, this group hosted
a conference call with Elizabeth Edwards, wife of presidential candidate John Edwards. For 30
minutes, she took questions from 65 call-in sites—mostly people’s homes. APAP, begun in 2004 to
support candidate Howard Dean, claims no more than 7,500 members nationwide.32
At the other end of the spectrum reside well-known groups such as the American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP). A visit to the AARP website shows they are open to anyone over 50
years old and claim over 37 million members. The organization is well known for their advocacy
on behalf of seniors for affordable prescription drugs and protection of Social Security or Medicare
from changes that would decrease benefit payments to seniors. Their other interests are wideranging, from homeowner insurance to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights to telecom deregulation and
liability issues for volunteer drivers.33
Neither of these groups is primarily interested in or directly related to foreign policy. However,
virtually all interest groups play at least an indirect role in the foreign policy process. For example,
the national security professional might see the greatest impact of AARP in their tenacious defense of
spending in the Social Security and Medicare accounts. Foreign policy funding of all types competes
with other spending in the budget process. Thus, any argument for resource growth for the DoD or
the State Department will require either a tax increase or a reduction in other government spending
(or both). The case for discretionary spending growth is problematic, as AARP (among others)
stands ready to mobilize 37 million seniors to oppose any resulting spending reductions or tax
increases.
A significant majority of the American public agrees with the statement, “Congress is too
heavily influenced by interest groups.”34 While political scientists across the spectrum cannot
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agree on the extent of interest group influence over the Congress, they uniformly reject “as crude
and exaggerated” the public view of an interest group stranglehold on Congress.35 At the same
time, the American system of government has several facets that tend to increase the influence of
interest groups when compared to other forms of government. Perhaps most importantly, the First
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of American individuals or groups to be heard
through freedoms of the press, speech and assembly. The diffusion of power in the American political
system also serves to increase the power of interest groups. The separation of powers into three
branches enhances the influence of interest groups by preventing excessive accumulation of powers
in any single branch. Further diluting the centralization of power is the concept of Federalism, or
reserving power to the states that is not explicitly granted to the Federal government. Furthermore,
the limited power of any single political party in the American system tends to raise the relative
influence of all actors in the system. Finally, the independent judiciary gives interest groups a route
of appeal when legislative or executive actions stifle minority rights or harm group interests.36
Interest groups play important roles in representative government. They tend to organize either
around broad public policy issues or narrowly focused issues. Organizing is easier for small groups
that share a significant stake in a given issue. Because of its small size, the impact of any policy
change will be more keenly felt, meaning individual motivation and energy are easier to come by
and maintain as the interest group advances its agenda. With small size, however, usually comes
small influence. The amount of time and energy involved in organizing a large public policy interest
group is more extensive. Likewise, the potential impact of any given policy will be more diluted as
it reaches across a larger population, meaning the individual motivation and energy level is more
difficult to sustain.37 At the same time, the influence of a large group is likely to be greater than of
a small group, since larger membership represents a larger constituency, and generally, access to a
greater pool of resources. Interest groups formed to represent other groups (e.g. business groups,
labor organizations, associations of like-minded groups) have similar dynamics.
An example of interest group engagement in governance is the effort to bring greater
transparency to the Congressional practice of earmarking. Earmarks are specific appropriations
inserted into legislation by a single Member of Congress that benefits his or her state or district.
Referring to earmarks, the President of Americans for Tax Reform stated, “Transparency is the
next big thing.”38 A Wall Street Journal article asserts that this trend has accelerated at the state
level—Kansas, Minnesota and Texas are among 19 states that have passed or are considering laws
mandating public transparency of government spending. In the 2006 election cycle, Congressional
democrats campaigned on bringing greater transparency to earmarks. Legislative progress on the
issue has been spotty, however, as some 32,000 earmark requests are working their way through the
2007 legislative session.39
In addition to their efforts to implement change, interest groups’ expertise can be an important
asset to Members of Congress, the Executive branch and the Judiciary. The arcane and technical
aspects of much of American business, agricultural and scientific life, for example, are generally
outside the experience and expertise of Members and their staffs.40 Interest groups step forward to
fill the void, educating Members and theoretically helping to improve the final legislative product.
Members frequently reach out to those interest groups with which they have established trusted
relationships. According to research from as far back as the 1960’s, these relationships may form
the basis for much of the sway interest groups have over policy.41 Clearly, relationships continue to
matter.
At the individual level, interest groups often hire lobbyists to represent their views to the
government. As lobbyists work to educate Members, they, and the interest groups that employ them
can become sources of financial support Members can tap for campaign expenses. The image of a
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congressman receiving money from a lobbyist gets to the heart of the public’s troubled perceptions.
In many cases, however, the public perception is misguided, as the greater power in the relationship
often belongs to the Member. As needy as each Member of Congress is for campaign funds, the
universe of available lobbyists with funds is so large that Members can afford to be somewhat
choosy. This inverts the relationship, forcing lobbyists to compete and to bring value beyond their
money to the table.42 While not dependent on interest group money, members of the President’s
administration are also recipients of interest group lobbying. This lobbying attempts to steer Federal
policymaking as well as the content of legislation the administration may propose to Congress.
Finally, interest groups can also directly lobby the administration to threaten a Presidential veto of
legislation.
In addition to hiring lobbyists, interest groups also can form Political Action Committees (PACs)
to collect and disburse money on behalf of political candidates or specific issues. PACs are limited
to accepting no more than $5,000 from an individual, political party committee or other PAC within
any given calendar year. PACs may give no more than $5,000 to any candidate’s reelection committee
or more than $15,000 to any national party committee annually.43 These PACs serve as conduits for
the ‘soft money’ that has replaced direct contributions to candidates over the years. As Congress
tightened campaign contribution laws in an effort to head off ethics crises and the worsening of
public perception, limits on these direct contributions, known as ‘hard money’ weakened their
overall impact. PACs and soft money emerged out of the resulting political environment, and
efforts to control or limit PACs have suffered from limited Congressional enthusiasm as well as
Constitutional issues regarding limiting free speech.
When working to influence policy, interest groups can adopt an inside strategy, an outside
strategy, or some combination of the two. Inside strategies focus their efforts on influencing change
from inside the organization. This strategy requires connections with centers of power and influence
inside the organization, which will then change the direction of the whole institution. Lobbying is
an example of an inside strategy, wherein an interest group pays an individual or lobbying firm
to communicate directly with select Members of Congress in order to influence their votes on a
piece of legislation or more broadly across a range of bills impacting their interests. An inside
strategy is the most direct approach and when correctly planned and executed, is more effective
than an outside strategy. An inside strategy also has the possibility of being executed with less
public scrutiny than an outside strategy. Ultimately, however, an inside strategy requires access to
resources such as money, a substantial membership list or perhaps established relationships that
facilitate access. Without such resources, interest groups have little hope of effectively working
inside the organization.
An outside strategy attempts to bring external pressure on the organization. The use of public
pressure, shame, protest actions and civil disobedience are samples of tools of an outside strategy.
The appeal of the outside strategy is that is does not necessarily require large sums of money, a
large membership or any direct connection at all to the target organization. Before the advent of
the Internet, the media was a primary tool of the outside strategy, especially for resource-poor
groups. Groups such as Earth First—an environmental action group known to use protest actions
to garner media attention—hope to receive free publicity through news coverage. Just as terrorists
attempt to communicate to their target audience via media coverage of their attacks, some interest
groups create disruptions to garner public attention to their interests. Fortunately, these groups are
a tiny minority, and a more common outside strategy is a simple media campaign that relies on
repetition and a wide reach of press releases and ‘talking head’ opportunities to get the message
out. This is one avenue where PACs excel. Their large monetary resources, limited in terms of direct
contributions to favored candidates, are available for wide ranging media campaigns on behalf of

23

both candidates and issues. Additionally, a University of Michigan study concluded that a mediabased outside strategy is generally only effective for those groups with enough resources to also
attempt an inside strategy.44 It appears that in addition to relationships, size also matters.
While PAC money buys expensive media campaigns, the increasing ubiquity of the Internet
has dramatically reduced the cost of Internet-based campaigns. With the lowered financial bar to
entry comes a vastly more congested public space, in which it becomes ever more difficult to make
a message stand out. It is clear that both large national interest groups and narrowly focused groups
can now mobilize their members with little resource outlay. At the same time, the media still plays
an enormous role both in political campaigns and in governance.
The Media.
In the absence of a functioning media, much of the foregoing discussion about the national security
community would become moot. The Executive branch would make policy, the Legislature would
make laws and the Judiciary would continue to interpret them as before. In that case, however, all
three branches would be more isolated from the People, and think tanks and interest groups would
be hard pressed to generate the influence they enjoy today. The media serves as a conduit energizing
the informal connections highlighted elsewhere in this chapter. Complicating the picture is the fact
that the media cannot cover these issues without also affecting them, both directly and indirectly.
The media impacts the national security environment in many ways. Most importantly, the media
serves as a communications channel between the government and the People. It also serves as
a democratic watchdog over government, guarding against the inappropriate accumulation and
exercise of power. Somewhat less recognized outside of journalistic circles, but arguably no less
important, is the media role of framing.
Framing can represent the context within which the media presents information. Given the
finite news cycle, how much space or time does any single news item deserve? Editors are always
challenged to maximize a story’s accuracy, depth and context while minimizing the time or space
allotted. Limiting context, however, affects the framing and ultimately the consumer’s interpretation
of the story. For example, is a news item presented with enough context to allow the consumer to
distinguish a conspiracy just unmasked from a simple case of human error? Was this news event
even out of the ordinary? Framing can also relate to whether or not an item is covered at all. When
an editor reaches the limit of a given news cycle’s coverage, any remaining lower-priority stories,
according to his sole judgment, are left out—many never to be reconsidered. In choosing not to
cover one story, while covering another, the editor has in a small way personally framed the larger
public debate. A familiar example in military circles is the media’s perceived predilection to report
daily U.S. casualties in Iraq as well as the body count from insurgent attacks. A source of contention
for military professionals is the editorial choice to ignore information contained in Coalition press
releases documenting progress in security, civil society and basic services. The military professional
grouses about the preponderance of negative coverage, while the media editor laments that most
press release information, while perhaps valuable to the overall context, simply is not news. This
media framing presents the war as a recurring drumbeat of costs paid without also providing the
balancing compilation of benefits purchased in part through the efforts and sacrifices of those paying
the costs.
In any close observation of the media and the government it is helpful to remember that they share
the same ultimate customer—the People.45 While on the surface, relations between the government
and the media frequently appear strained, there are institutional continuities working beneath the
surface that make for a symbiotic relationship. These continuities include the media’s ongoing
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need for access to information and the government’s need for the means to communicate with the
People. While both parties want more control over the relationship, they make extensive use of each
other to achieve their objectives. The media exerts pressure on the government to provide greater
access to information—in some cases information that the government does not want to release. The
government, in turn, devotes resources both to crafting strategies to communicate its message to the
People via the media and to responding to media requests for information.46 In that relationship,
both parties hold some power.
The news cycle drives the media’s recurring appetite for information. Theoretically, the
government has the power to grant or withhold access. (Notwithstanding the idealized picture of
the investigative journalist digging through the system looking for a sympathetic source.) If the
government wants to fulfill the media’s request, it generally must do so on the media’s timeline. If
it fails to do so, the story may not get the extent of coverage the government desires. Likewise, if the
government does not want the story to get wide coverage, delaying a response until after deadline
can have that effect. For stories that editors feels have sufficient impact, however, such government
delays do no good. In fact, the media can report on the government’s lack of responsiveness, and
thereby contribute to heightening public attention to a subsequent story.
When compared with the government-media relationship, the relational dynamic between the
media, think tanks and interest groups is somewhat more one-directional. Here, the pull of the
media news cycle is enhanced by the push of these groups’ desire to generate media coverage for
their ideas. Indeed, it may be more accurate to portray a media responsibility of filtering in this
relationship. In today’s fast-paced and crowded news environment, not every think tank or interest
group press release or report is worth a slice of finite media coverage, and the media therefore
decides what receives coverage and what does not.
The proliferation of Internet websites and satellite/cable television channels containing news and
commentary have led to saturation of the media marketplace. Newspaper circulation is declining
around the country, and the ability to turn a profit is more problematic.47 Conventional wisdom
asserts that pursuing high quality journalism costs additional resources, and these added resources
detract from the profit margin of a news organization. With shareholders always looking over the
shoulder, the pressure for profits frequently leads to cost-cutting measures, which in turn degrade
the quality of in-depth reporting. The Chairman of the Tribune Company, Jack Fuller, spoke on the
tension between business and journalistic priorities:
. . . those of us who put out newspapers are important . . . participants in the system of public governance.
If we take that seriously, as we should, our jobs as leaders of newspaper enterprises is to find the sweet spot
where we can fulfill both our fiduciary obligation to the shareholders and our social obligation to provide
communities the kind of information they need in order for people to make their sovereign choices wisely.48

To determine if objective measures of newspaper quality are available, Koang-Hyub Kim and
Philip Meyer began by reviewing a study published in 1989 by Leo Bogart. In his conclusions,
Bogart declared that indicators such as accuracy, civic-mindedness and impartiality in reporting
were too subjective to be measured. What Kim and Meyer went on to find, however, was that for
seven quality indicators they isolated, quality was indeed directly related to profitability. (Higher
quality led to higher profits.) But they noted, “Quality journalism, in the minds of some, is more cost
than gain.” Perhaps more ominously for newspapers in general, the researchers’ final conclusion
was that those focused on cutting costs were achieving short-term gains while masking the longterm costs in terms of reduced readership as quality inevitably suffers.49
How does this phenomenon affect the national security community? As pressures build on
newspapers, and media more generally, to generate additional profits to justify stock price increases,
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the time, effort and resources devoted to news collection and quality reporting will likely decline.
Reporting may depend more and more on inside sources cuing reporters to evolving issues. Perhaps
the various interrelationships in the community will become more complicated as the Internet
opens up ever wider spaces for individuals and groups for report news, leak information or opine
on the issues of the day. The Internet will certainly increase the relative power of any connected,
enterprising individual. It remains to be seen if it will lead to more in-depth, quality reporting.
Conclusion.
While the Executive branch bears the primary burden for national security policy, it functions
in an environment with other actors clamoring for influence. The Congress wields significant
sway in policy debates. In a movement gaining momentum over many years, think tanks have
greatly increased in number. While their direct influence remains difficult to measure, there is little
contention over the idea that their influence continues to grow. Metaphorically elbowing their way
onto the stage are interest groups, large and small, that sometimes bring access to tremendous
resources—resources that are important to the Congress for the almost-perpetual campaigning
required. Providing much of the discussion space for each of these parties to interact is the
media. The national security community is a morass of intersecting relationships of feedback and
accountability. Whether forecasting the second-order effects of a policy proposal or attempting to
shepherd policy changes through the process, the national security professional needs to remain
attuned to the many players involved, and to choose his sources wisely.
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CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
Gabriel Marcella1
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will.
Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve.
Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to
magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and
applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of
these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.2
				

Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

The United States is a fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower. It is the
indispensable anchor of international order and the increasingly globalized economic system.
Nothing quite like it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain,
England, and France achieved extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutional and cultural
influence, and longevity, but they never achieved the full articulation of America‘s global reach.
Today the United States forward deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies,
consulates, and membership in specialized organizations. It possesses a unified military command
system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It is the leader
of an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace, open trade, the principles
of democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment. American capital, technology,
and culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional.
All the instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of
bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national security
staffs strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through use of the “interagency
process.”
The interagency decision making process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity.
Given ever expanding responsibilities and the competition for resources, it is imperative that national
security professionals master it in order to work effectively within it. The complex challenges to
national security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of
effort within the government. It is also imperative that changes be made to make the system and the
process more effective.
The United States first faced the challenge of strategic integration in an embryonic interagency
process during World War II. Mobilizing the nation, the government, and the armed forces for war
and winning the peace highlighted the importance of resources and budgets, of integrating diplomacy
with military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting joint
and combined military operations, and managing coalition strategies and balancing competing
regional priorities, for example, the European versus the Pacific theater in national strategy. From
the war and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of institutional and policy innovations.
Among them: the structure of the modern Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD) (from
the old War and Navy Departments), a centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan for the
reconstruction of Europe, the unified military command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (Point Four), NATO and other alliances, military
assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the U.S. Information Agency.
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There is probably no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that
demonstrates the kind of national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls “purposeful
adaptation.” He defines it as “the need to develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensitive
to national needs and aspirations and to the realities of a changing world environment.”3 The
evolution of the interagency process parallels America’s purposeful adaptation to changing global
realities of the last five decades. But it is not an orderly evolution because of serious structural
and cultural impediments, such as discontinuities from one administration to another and poor
institutional memory.4 Prominent historical markers along the path of learning and adaptation
included such documents as National Security Council (NSC) 68, the intellectual framework for
the containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Though not a policy document, the Weinberger
Doctrine articulated criteria for the use of military power that dramatically influenced the shape of
American strategy in the 1980s and 1990s.
There are countless examples of how American statesmen codify in writing the patterns of
“purposeful adaptation.” The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had such an impact on American
national security that the George W. Bush administration created a Department for Homeland
Security. It also published a series of strategy documents on counterterrorism, homeland security,
military strategy, and infrastructure security. Bush‘s National Security Strategy (NSS) dramatically
redefined the philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. role in the world. Because the attacks of
September 11, 2001, represented an assault on international order and exposed the vulnerabilities of
the United States to asymmetric warfare by non-state actors, the NSS of September 17, 2002, spoke
of the need to redefine the Westphalian concept of sovereignty for the purpose of reestablishing
order and security in the international system.5
When the United States reluctantly inherited global responsibilities in 1945, American statesmen
faced three challenges: forging a system of collective security, promoting decolonization, and
building a stable international financial order. These and 4 decades of intense threat from the other
superpower had a decisive impact on shaping the interagency process. With the end of bipolar
ideological and geopolitical conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda was captured by free
trade, democratization, sub-national ethnic and religious conflict, failing states, humanitarian
contingencies, ecological deterioration, terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking,
and the proliferation of the technology of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dawn of the
21st century calls for a relook at the adequacy of the interagency system, not only because of the
changing agenda but also because of the nature and extent of the global responsibilities the United
States has taken on.
The National Security Council: The Permanent Tension between Coordination vs.
Policymaking.
To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities of the emerging superpower, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security
Council. Its functions:
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national
security.
. . . other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and
functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the nation’s security . . .
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. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . .
. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government
concerned with the national security .

The statutory members are the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and
Defense. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are advisors. Other advisors, including additional cabinet members such as the Secretary of
the Treasury, may be invited. The President chairs the meeting; but the Council need not convene
formally to function. Formal NSC meetings are rare. Indeed, by late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met
only once: March 2, 1993. There are alternatives to formal meetings, such as the ABC luncheons
of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Sandy Berger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or the Deputies breakfasts and lunches. The
President himself may at any time meet informally with members of his cabinet. In recent years,
tele-video conferencing facilitates such senior level consultations.
The “NSC system” of policy coordination and integration across the departments and agencies
operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs directs the staff.
The emergence of the modern “operational presidency,”6 brought to the NSC greater authority over
the development and implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center that competes for
jurisdiction with the Departments of State and Defense.
The NSC staff, known as the Executive Secretariat, has varied in size and function. In 1999 the
staff comprised about 208 (of which 101 were policy personnel and 107 administrative and support
personnel) professionals covering regional and functional responsibilities. Under the George W.
Bush administration, the NSC staff was cut to nearly half. Staffers are detailed from the diplomatic
corps, the intelligence community, the civil service, the military services (12 military officers were
in policy positions in September 1999), academia, and the private sector. The staffing procedures
are personalized to the president’s style and comfort level. The structure of the staff, its internal
and external functioning, and the degree of control of policy by the president varies. Carter and
Clinton were very centralized, Reagan and George Bush, senior, less so. As examples, the first two
Presidential Decision Directives of the Clinton administration, dated January 20, 1993, set forth the
structure and function of the NSC staff and groups that reported to it, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. National Security System Under Clinton.
The day-to-day policy coordination and integration was done by the NSC Staff, divided into the
functional and geographic directorates depicted in Figure 2.
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Defense Policy & Arms Control
Special Assistant to the President
and Counselor

International Health and
Environmental Affairs Directors

Figure 2. Clinton’s National Security Council Staff.
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The Principals Committee members were the cabinet level representatives who comprised the
senior forum for national security issues. The Deputies Committee included deputy secretary level
officials who monitored the work of the interagency process, did crisis management, and when
necessary, pushed unresolved issues to the principals for resolution. Interagency Working Groups
(IWGs) were the heart and soul of the process. They were ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional.
They functioned at a number of levels, met regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, framed
policy responses, and built consensus across the government for unified action. The fluid nature of
the process meant that IWGs did not always have to come to decisions. The system preferred that
issues be decided at the lowest level possible. If issues were not resolved there, they were elevated
to the next level and when appropriate, to the Deputies Committee. Who chaired the different
IWGs and committees varied between the NSC director and senior State Department officials.
Dramatic changes came with the election of George W. Bush. Comfortable with a corporate style
of executive leadership and surrounding himself with very experienced national security statesmen
like Secretary of State Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and White House Fellow), Vice President Richard Cheney
(former Congressman, Secretary of Defense, and White House Chief of Staff), and Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to NATO, and Congressman), President
George W. Bush centralized policy authority by establishing new structures and procedures. 7
The process began with new nomenclature for presidential directives. National Security
Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1), dated February 13, 2001, established six regional Policy
Coordinating Committees (PCCs) and 11 (later 15) PCCs to handle functional responsibilities.8 In
2005 they were:
Regional PCCs:
Europe
Western Hemisphere
East Asia
South Asia
Near East and North Africa
Africa
Functional PCCs (with department responsible in parentheses):
		 Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (NSC)
		 International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (State)
		 Global Environment (NSC and National Economic Council)
		 International Finance (Treasury)
		 Transnational Economic Issues (NEC)
		 Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (NSC)
		 Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (Defense)
		 Arms Control (NSC)
		 Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
		 Records Access and Information Security (NSC)
		 International Organized Crime (NSC)
		 Contingency Planning (NSC)
		 Space (NSC)
HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases (state and Health and Human Services)
(See Figure 3.)

33

Interagency Process
National Security
Council (NSC)

Principals
Committee (PC)

Policy Coordination
Committee (PCC)

POLICIES

Deputy
Committee (DC)

NSC

State

OSD

JCS

DCI USUN Treas

Figure 3. Bush Administration Interagency Process.
The plethora of existing IWGs was abolished by NSPD1. The activities of IWGs were transferred
to the new PCCs. The PCCs were the most important structural changes made by the Bush
Administration. According to NSPD1, they were the “Day-to-day fora for interagency coordination
of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior
committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.”
The centralization of authority over national security matters reached levels not seen for many
years. However, it remained to be seen whether the system would work effectively. In Spring 2003,
a senior national security careerist who was intimately involved with policymaking referred to
interagency relations as “the worst in 20 years.” An experienced foreign policy hand commented:
“The interagency system is broken” and averred that instead of centralization of authority, there is
fragmentation.9 Explanations for this state of affairs varied. They included the intrusion of group
think dynamics among senior neo-conservative decisionmakers, the role of strong personalities, the
bypassing of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Condolezza Rice, as well
as the deliberate isolation of the Department of State.10
Another important interagency reorganization made by the Bush administration was the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a unified military command, the
Northern Command. The creation of DHS involved the transfer of responsibilities, people, and
resources from existing agencies and departments to a new entity. DHS has over 170,000 employees
and an anticipated budget of 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S.
Government since the creation of the Defense Department. DHS combined 22 agencies “specializing
in various disciplines,” such as: law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research,
computer security, transportation security, disaster mitigation, and port security.11 Though it is a
national security department it will not be involved in power projection, a crucial difference with
the Defense Department. Yet, it will use many skills and resources that reside across the agencies:
military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and logistics. Homeland security also involves
the concept of federalism, whereby some 87,000 state and local jurisdictions share power with
federal institutions. The challenge of integrating federalism injects into national security planning
will be immense.
Policy is often made in different and subtle ways. Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza Falling: The
Nicaraguan Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusses how the answer to an important
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letter can help set policy. Hence the importance of interagency coordination and the importance of
being the one (bureau, office, agency) that drafts it. “. . . policy flows as much from work on specific
items—like the letter from Perez [to Carter]—as it does from the large, formal interagency ‘policy
reviews’ that result in presidential pronouncements.”12 Each action is precedent for future actions.
Speeches, press conferences, VIP visits, and presidential travels are important. Lake elaborates
“Policy is made on the fly; it emerges from the pattern of specific decisions. Its wisdom is decided
by whether you have some vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along.”13
The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy and
national security matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:
• Provides information and policy advice to the President.
• Manages the policy coordination process.
• Monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions.
• Manages crises.
• Articulates the President‘s policies.
• Undertakes long term strategic planning.
• Conducts liaison with Congress and foreign governments.
• Coordinates summit meetings and national security related trips.
There is a natural tension between the policy coordination function of the NSC and policymaking.
Jimmy Carter‘s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor, argues that:
. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s
control of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and
the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might not implement the President‘s decisions or might do so
in a way that would make decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.14

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body, but it oscillates between the poles, taking policy
control over some issues while allowing State or Defense to be the lead agency on most national
security and foreign policy issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99, the NSC
staff may take over policy control from State. Similarly, policy towards Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95
was handled directly out of the White House because of the deeply-rooted domestic dimension of
those issues. In virtually all cases, however, major policy must be cleared through the NSC staff and
the National Security Advisor. This process of clearing makes the NSC staff a key element in the
policymaking process. In general, the clearance process involves a review by the appropriate NSC
staff director to assure that the new policy initiative is consistent with the president’s overall policy
in that functional or regional area, that it has been coordinated with all appropriate departments
and agencies, and that all obvious political risks associated with the new initiative have been
identified and assessed. This process makes all the relevant departments stakeholders in the final
policy statement. The Oliver North Iran-Contra caper created an autonomous operational entity in
the NSC staff. But that was an aberration that does not invalidate the general rule. The salient point
is that proximity to the president gives the NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency
process. Such clout must be used sparingly lest it cause resentment and resistance or overlook the
policy wisdom and skills available elsewhere in the executive departments.
Toward a Theory of the Interagency Process: How Does the President Mobilize
the Government?
The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving human beings and complex organizations
with different cultures, and different outlooks on what’s good for the national interest and the
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best policy to pursue—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is
political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is power, personal, institutional, or party. The
“power game” involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives,
the hammering out of compromises, and the normal human and institutional propensity to resist
change.15 Regardless of the style of the president and the structures developed for the management
of national security policy, the interagency process performs the same basic functions: identifies
policy issues and questions, formulates options, raises issues to the appropriate level for decisions,
makes decisions where appropriate, and oversees the implementation of decisions throughout the
executive departments.
It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting,
implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback. Conceptualization involves the
intellectual task of policy development, such as a presidential directive. Articulation is the public
declaration of policy that the president or subordinates make. It is critical in a democracy in order
to engage public support.
Budgeting involves testimony and the give and take before Congress and its various committees
to justify policy goals and to request funding. Implementation is the programmed application
of resources in the field in order to achieve the policy objectives. Post-implementation analysis
and feedback is a continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to make appropriate
adjustments. It is conducted by all the agencies in the field. The General Accounting Office of the
Congress makes extensive evaluations of the effectiveness of policy implementation. Congressional
hearings and visits in the field by congressional delegations and staffers also make evaluations that
help refine policy.
The ideal system (see Figure 4) would have perfect goal setting, complete and accurate
intelligence, comprehensive analysis and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy
and its rationale, effective execution, thorough and continuous assessment of the effects, and
perfect learning from experience and the ability to recall relevant experience and information.
Goal Setting
Intelligence
Options
Plans, Programs, Decisions

Memory
Storage
and
Recall

Declaratory Policy
Execution

Monitorin
Appraisal

Figure 4. Ideal Foreign Policy Process.16
Such perfection is impossible. The reality is shown in Figure 5.
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TASK

CONSTRAINTS

Goal Setting

National interests are subject to competing claims; goals established
through political struggle

Intelligence

Always incomplete, susceptible to overload, delays and distortions
caused by biases and ambiguity in interpretation

Option Formulation

Limited search for options, comparisons made in general terms
according to predispositions rather than cost-benefit analysis

Plans, Programs, and Decisions

Choices made in accordance with prevailing mind sets, influenced
by groupthink and political compromise

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradictions and confusion, self-serving concern
for personal image and feeding the appetite of the media

Execution

Breakdowns in communication, fuzzy lines of authority,
organizational parochialism, bureaucratic politics, delays

Monitoring and Appraisal

Gaps, vague standards, rigidities in adaptation, feedback failures

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, selective learning and application of lessons

Figure 5. Policy in Practice.17
Effective policy requires control, resources, and a system of accountability. The most compelling
challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents do not have the time or
expertise to oversee policymaking in detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they delegate responsibility.
But “nobody is in charge” is an often-heard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating
responsibility, control becomes more diffused and the policy effort diluted. Moreover, the quest for
resources brings in another stakeholder. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to scrutinize
policy initiatives and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora’s
box of players and expectations is opened. The numerous congressional committees and their staffs
have enormous impact on national security and foreign policy.
The president begins to mobilize his government immediately upon election. A transition team
works closely with the outgoing administration for the purpose of continuity. He begins nominating
his cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate. Some 6,000 presidential level appointees
will fill the sub-cabinet positions, staff the White House and the NSC, take up ambassadorships
(serving ambassadors traditionally submit their resignation when the occupant of the White House
changes), as well as second, third, and fourth level positions in the executive departments. The
purpose of these nominations is to gain control and establish accountability to the president and his
agenda. In his first administration, President William Clinton faced serious difficulties because he
never finished staffing his government.
Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and equipped
with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American government
every time the part that controls the White House changes. Continuity of government resides in the
nonpartisan professionals (neutral competence) of the federal civil service, the diplomatic service,
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the military, and the intelligence community. The transition to a new administration is a period
of great anticipation about the direction of policy. Consequently, the entire interagency produces
transition papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and to also protect the institutional interests
of the various departments from unfriendly encroachment.
The first months of a new administration are a period of learning. Newly appointed people must
familiarize themselves with the structure and process of policymaking. This necessity invariably
leads to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle, think tanks and the
foreign policy and defense communities prepare for the transition by writing papers recommending
the rationale for policy. These will inform the new administration about the central commitments of
U.S. policy and provide opportunities for departments and agencies to define institutional turf and
stake a claim to resources. The administration itself will also mandate policy reviews that eventually
produce new guidance for policy.
Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines is another way for the president to mobilize
the government. The State of the Union message is one of the preeminent sources of presidential
activism that engages the interagency. The congressionally mandated National Security Strategy
(NSS) document, which bears the president‘s signature and is supposed to be produced annually,
is eagerly awaited, though not with equal intensity across departments, as an indicator of an
administration‘s direction in national security and foreign policy.
The NSS is eagerly awaited for another reason; it is the best example of “purposeful adaptation”
by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses strategic
vision, what the United States stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the
instruments of national power, the diplomatic, economic, and military will be arrayed. Since it is
truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand
the president’s agenda and priorities and to develop a common language that gives coherence to
policy. It is also more than a strategic document. It is political because it is designed to enhance
presidential authority in order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather
than drive policy initiatives. This is especially true in election years.
The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The Bush administration expanded it by
including more regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, and transnational issues and the
environment. The Clinton document of 1994 proposed “engagement and enlargement,” promoting
democracy, economic prosperity, and security through strength. The 1995 version added criteria
on when and how military forces would be used. By 1997, the integrating concepts of “shape,”
“prepare,” and “respond” for the national military strategy came into prominence. To the core
objectives of enhancing security, and promoting prosperity and democracy, were added fighting
terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, along with managing the international financial
crisis. Homeland defense against the threat of mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed
the agenda.
Another instrument is the presidential national security directives process. Administrations have
titled these documents differently, and they have produced them in greater or lesser quantity. The
two Clinton administrations produced at least 73 Presidential Decision Directives and the George W.
Bush administration issued 44 National Security Presidential Directives by December 2005. Other
administrations’ totals and titles are as follows: George H. W. Bush 79 National Security Decision
Directives, Reagan 325 National Security Decision Memoranda, Carter 63 Presidential Directives,
Nixon-Ford 348 National Security Decision Memoranda and Kennedy-Johnson 372 National
Security Action Memoranda. Each administration will try to put its own stamp on national security
and foreign policy, though there is great continuity with previous administrations. Whereas Reagan
emphasized restoring the preeminence of American military power and rolling back the “evil empire,”
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Clinton focused on strengthening the American economy, open trade, democratization, conflict
resolution, humanitarian assistance, fighting drug trafficking and consumption, counterterrorism
and non-proliferation. September 11, 2001, imposed a national defense priority on the George W.
Bush administration. In response, the Bush administration—in addition to the NSPDs mentioned
above—created a new category of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). Some
policy documents serve jointly as NSPDs and HSPDs. For example, NSPD 43 on Domestic Nuclear
Detection is also HSPD 14.18
Presidential national security directives are macro level documents, often classified, that take
much deliberate planning to develop. They result from intensive interaction among the agencies.
The process begins with a presidential directive to review policy that tasks the relevant agencies to
develop a new policy based on broad guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14 for counternarcotics
emphasized greater balance between supply and demand strategies. Because of the many constraints
placed on the use of economic and military assistance to fight the “war on drugs” and to help
Colombia, PDD 14 evolved into the Colombia-specific PDD 73. This, in turn, was superseded in
the Bush administration by NSPD 18, which, thanks to September 11, 2001, and the terrorism in
Colombia, went further and provided support for both counter-narcotics and counterterrorism
activities in Colombia. The evolution of these policy documents over nearly ten years nurtured
the growth of significant institutional memory in the interagency with respect to the Colombian
conflict.
The learning went both ways because Colombian officials had to adapt to the Washington
policy process. Because of the global reach of American power and influence, such adaptation is
becoming more common. Clinton’s celebrated PDD 25 set down an elaborate set of guidelines for
U.S. involvement in peace operations. It became so effective as a planning device that the United
Nations adopted it in modified form for planning its own peace operations, an excellent example
of the international transfer of American purposeful adaptation. Other nations also used the
terminology and organizing principles for their strategic and operational planning in multilateral
peacekeeping.
Another instructive example is the Latin American policy PDD 21. Effective on December 27,
1993, it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade. It was addressed to more than twenty
departments and agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, U.S. Trade Representative, Representative of the United States to the
United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the
President for National Economic Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the
Agency for International Development, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of the U.S. Information
Agency.
The point of listing departments and agencies is to identify the interagency stakeholders in
regional policy, though the size of the stake will vary greatly among them according to the particular
issue. The stakeholders are related by functional interdependence; they have different resources,
personnel, and expertise that must be integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of the
interagency that no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone.
For example, the DoD needs the diplomatic process that the Department of State masters in order
to deploy forces abroad, build coalitions, negotiate solutions to conflict, conduct non-combatant
evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in difficult circumstances abroad, and administer
security assistance. The Department of State in turn depends on the logistical capabilities of the
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DoD to deploy personnel and materials abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support
military-to-military contacts, and give substance to alliances and defense relationships. The Office
of National Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet level position, must rely on a range of agencies to
reduce the supply abroad and consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require intelligence input
to make sound decisions.
These patterns of functional interdependence, whereby departments stayed within their
jurisdictions, began to fray in the George W. Bush administration. Press reports in the spring of
2003 focused on the Bush “policy team at war with itself.”19 Accordingly, there was a “tectonic
shift” of decision making power from the Department of State to Defense because of the strong
personalities and neo-conservative ideology of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
subordinates, principally Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Such a shift is unnatural and will
likely correct itself in the future. But the prospect of the DoD dominating foreign policy raised
concerns about the effectiveness of policy and the standing of the United States in the world.
The inattention to functional interdependence was a contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of
postwar reconstruction planning for Iraq in 2003.20 In October of 2003 President Bush attempted
to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by placing his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza
Rice, in charge. The correction allegedly upset Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Earlier in the
year the President had (via NSPD 24) given authority over the Iraq reconstruction to the Defense
Department.21
The problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq led to an upsurge of
recommendations on how to improve the system for the future. For example, the House of
Representatives and the Senate proposed the “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” which would
create within the Department of State a permanent office to provide support to the new position of
Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization. A comprehensive study published in November
2003 by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University advocated
major focus on transforming military institutions to perform “stabilization and reconstruction”
operations. It also recommended harnessing interagency capabilities via the creation of a rapidly
deployable National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group to meet the need of a national
level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations.22 At this juncture it is important to note
that in July 2004 the Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization took form in the
Department of State under the leadership of Ambassador Carlos Pascual. Yet, one year later the
office was still understaffed and under budget, an example of an unfunded mandate. The Congress,
which legislated the office and is a stakeholder in national security, by July 2005 had not provided
sufficient funding for the Office to do its job properly.23 By December 2005, as detailed later in this
chapter, a new National Security Presidential Directive (44) would give the Department of State the
responsibility to manage interagency efforts to conduct reconstruction and stabilization.
Ideally in response to the promulgation of a presidential directive all agencies will energize
their staffs and develop the elements that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and
seldom creates optimum results, in part because of competing priorities on policymakers, limited
time, constrained resources, and congressional input. For example, the Haiti crisis of 1992-94 and
congressional passage of the North America Free Trade Act consumed most of the energy of the
Clinton administration’s NSC staff and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of
State during 1993-94 to the detriment of other Latin American policy. The Central American crisis
of the 1980s also crowded out the broader agenda for Latin American policy.
In theory, once the policy elements are put together, they are costed out and submitted to Congress
for approval and funding, without which policy is merely words of hopeful expectation. The reality,
however, is that a presidential directive is not a permanent guide to the actions of agencies. Rarely is
it fully implemented. The culture of the various executive departments will modify how directives
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are interpreted. For example, for the military oriented Defense Department, a directive is an order to
be carried out. For State, a directive may be interpreted as the general direction a policy should take.
Presidential policy can be overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, and by the departure of
senior officials who had the stakes, the personal relationships, know how, and institutional memory
to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy
and Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a directive from a
previous administration was still in force because the government does not maintain a consolidated
list of these documents for security reasons. Moreover, directives and other presidential documents
are removed to presidential libraries and the National Archives when administrations change. A
senior Defense Department official stated that directives are rarely referred to after they are final,
are usually overtaken by events soon after publication, and are rarely updated. In this respect the
interagency evaluation of PDD 56’s effectiveness, published in May 1997, is instructive: “PDD 56 no
longer has senior level ownership. The Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the
NSC officials who initiated the document have moved on to new positions.”24 The loss of institutional
memory is not necessarily fatal. The permanent government retains much of the wisdom for the
continuity of policy. That wisdom is always available to an administration. It must learn how to tap
it.
PDD 56: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?
It is useful to examine PDD 56 as an example of an interagency product and as a tool intended to
influence the very process itself. Directives normally deal with the external world of foreign policy
and national security. PDD 56 was radically different, for it went beyond that and attempted to
generate a cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes to deal with
these issues. PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency
Operations, was perhaps the mother of all modern Directives. It is a superb example of codifying
lessons of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by American civilian and military officials in
the aftermath of problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (199495).25 The intent was to institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and planning tools
to achieve U.S. Government unity of effort in complex contingency operations and in post-conflict
reconstruction. It tried to institutionalize five mechanisms and planning tools:
•
•
•
•
•

An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries)
An integrated, interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan
Interagency Rehearsal
Interagency After-Action Review
Training.

The philosophy behind the document was that interagency planning could make or break an
operation. Moreover, early involvement in planning could accelerate contributions from civilian
agencies that are often excluded from or are culturally averse to strategic and operational planning.
An excellent Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations issued
in August 1998, contains in easily digestible form much wisdom about how to do it right. PDD 56
was applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies, such as Eastern Slavonia (1995-98),
Bosnia from 1995, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict since 1998, and
the Kosovo contingency of 1998-99. The March 1999 review commented: “PDD 56 is intended to be
applied as an integrated package of complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuance in
1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three major issues must be addressed to improve
the utility of PDD 56.” It recommended:
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• Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56
• More flexible and less detailed political-military planning
• Dedicated training resources and greater outreach.
Reflected in the three recommendations were the recurring problems of the interagency: the need
for decisive authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting approaches and institutional cultures
(particularly diplomatic versus military) with respect to planning, and the lack of incentives across
the government to create professionals expert in interagency work. PDD 56 was a noble effort to
promote greater effectiveness. It may bear fruit if its philosophy of integrated planning and outreach
to the interagency takes root. In late 1999 the PDD 56 planning requirement was embedded as
an annex to contingency plans. Bush’s February 2001 NSPD1 tried to provide some life support
to PDD56 by stating: “The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 . . . will be
performed by the appropriate . . . PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide
coordination for ongoing operations.” The failures in post-conflict planning and reconstruction
for Iraq in 2003 underlined the importance of taking PDD-56 seriously. Fortunately, as mentioned
above, there are enough people in government who retain the expertise and who can be tapped as
necessary. Much of the wisdom contained in PDD56 and its Handbook is invaluable in the business
of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.
As the result of the purposeful adaptation engendered by the mistakes made in the reconstruction
and stabilization of Iraq, the Bush Administration promulgated National Security Presidential
Directive 44, on December 7, 2005: “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction
and Stabilization.” It speaks eloquently of the need for a coordinated U.S. government effort
for harmonizing interagency responses across the spectrum of conflict: complex contingencies,
peacekeeping, failed and failing states, political transitions, and other military interventions. NSPD
44 states:
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all
U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to
ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation
being addressed.26

The document closes with the statement: “This directive supersedes Presidential Decision
Directive/NSC 56, May 20, 1997, ‘Managing Complex Contingency Operations.’” It may supersede
but it cannot erase from collective and personal memory banks the excellent and very useful
ideas contained in PDD 56. Such a concept would threaten the notion of purposeful adaptation.
A companion to NSPD 44 is the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” promulgated in late 2005.
The Operational Level of the Interagency Process: Ambassador, Country Team, and Combatant
Commanders.
To this point we have discussed the national strategic level of the interagency process, that
is, what occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans three levels: the national
strategic, the operational, and the tactical. In the field, policy is implemented by ambassadors and
their country teams, often working with the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs) if the issue
is principally security or political-military in nature. Ambassadors and combatant commanders are
not only implementers, they frequently shape policy via their reporting to Washington through
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a continuous flow of cables, after action reports, and proposals for new policy initiatives, as well
as direct consultations in Washington with senior officials and members of Congress. They also
comment on how to shape policy initiatives that originate from Washington.
There is a permanent conversation between the embassy and the respective regional bureau in
Washington, which includes a broad distribution of the cable traffic to such agencies as the White
House, the Defense Department, the regional combatant command, Department of Treasury,
Commerce, the Joint Staff, the intelligence community, as well as other organizations, such as the
Coast Guard, when there is a “need to know.” The “need to know” almost always includes other
embassies in the region, or major embassies in other regions, and even at times, for example, the
American Embassy to the Vatican. The ambassador and combatant commander often conduct
one-on-one meetings over the multiplicity of security issues.
The embassy country team is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency system. In the
country team the rubber proverbially meets the road of interagency implementation. Ambassadors
and COCOMs rely on each other to promote policies that will enhance American interests in a
country and region. COCOMs have large staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs
and resources of ambassadors. Moreover their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates
ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or
she promotes understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes American culture and business,
and is responsible for American citizens in that country. The ambassador is the personal emissary
of the President, who signs the ambassador’s formal letter of instruction. The letter charges the
ambassador “to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
executive branch officers in (name of country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S.
area military commander . . .” There is enough ambiguity in the mandate to require both ambassador
and COCOM to use common sense and, in a non-bureaucratic way, work out issues of command
and control over U.S. military personnel in the country. In effect control is shared, the ambassador
having policy control and the COCOM control over day-to-day military operations. Thus it is
prudent that both work closely together to ensure that military operations meet the objectives of
U.S. policy.
This is particularly the case in military operations other than war. Before and during noncombatant evacuations, peace operations, exercises, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, such
cooperation will be imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy, force, and preparation
required. A successful U.S. policy effort requires a carefully calibrated combination of diplomatic and
military pressure, with economic inducements added. The security assistance officer at the embassy
(Often the commander of the military advisory group) can facilitate communication and bridge the
policy and operational distance between the ambassador and the COCOM. So can State’s Political
Advisor to the COCOM, a senior ranking foreign service officer whose function is to provide the
diplomatic and foreign policy perspective on military operations.27 The personal and professional
relationship between the Foreign Policy Advisor (formerly called the Political Advisor) and the
COCOM is the key to success.
The COCOM represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of command
that goes to the president. He and his sizable staff oversee the operational tempo, deployments,
readiness, exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings–resources, language,
and culture that are the opposite of the art of diplomacy. Since all military activities have diplomatic
impact, it is prudent that both work harmoniously to achieve common purpose. Ambassador and
Commander interests intersect at the Military Assistance Advisory Group (also called Military
Advisory Group, Military Liaison Office, and Office of Defense Coordination ) level. The commander
of the MAAG, which is an important arm of the country team since it provides training and military
equipment to the host country, works for both the ambassador and the COCOM.
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In the spectrum from peace to crisis to war the ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the
lower end of the spectrum. As the environment transitions to war the Commander assumes greater
authority and influence. Haiti 1994 is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador to
COCOM takes place. The American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge
of U.S. policy until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces arrived in September of that
year. Once the military phase was completed, policy control reverted to Swing, thus restoring the
normal pattern of military subordination to civilian authority. In the gray area of military operations
other than war or in what is called an “immature” military theater, such as Latin America, disputes
can arise between ambassadors and COCOMs about jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the
country. The most illustrative was in 1994 between the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern
Command, General Barry McCaffrey, and the U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia, Charles R. Bowers, and
Colombia, Morris D. Busby. The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the Secretaries of
State and Defense.28 Elevating a dispute to such a level is something the system would rather not
do. The fact is that ambassador and COCOM must work closely together to coordinate U.S. military
activities. Another distinction: COCOMs have regional perspectives, strategies, and programs while
ambassadors are focused on advancing the interests of the United States in one country.
An important step forward in synchronizing interagency activities at the theater level has been
the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups. These are literally interagency cells
located at the combatant commands and staffed by personnel from across the government. Though
in their infancy and not endowed with policy making authority, these groups offer the foundation
for greater strategic and operational integration in the future.
The Continuing Challenges in the Interagency Process.
The tensions generated by cultural differences and jealousy over turf will always be part of
the interagency process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national security
system, though there are other cultures and even subcultures, within the dominant cultures. The
former uses words to solve problems while the latter uses precise doses of force. Cultural differences
are large but communicating across them is possible.29 Figure 6 compares the cultures of military
officers and diplomats.
The principal problem of interagency decision making is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in
charge. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support
in the NSC, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable. The world
situation does not wait for the proper alignment of the planets in Washington. There is too much
diffusion of policy control. It is time to implement an NSC-centric national security system, with
appropriate adjustments that align budget authority with policy responsibility. It would consolidate
in the NSC the functions now performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State and the strategic
planning done at Defense. Such reorganization recognizes the reality that the White House is where
an integrated approach to national security planning must take place.
Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The Department of State, which has the
responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its diplomats may have the best
words in town, in terms of speaking and writing skills, and superb knowledge of foreign countries
and foreign affairs, but it is a very small organization that has been getting smaller budge allocations
from Congress. The corps of foreign service officers equates in number to about an Army brigade.
The Department of State’s technology is primitive and officer professional development of the
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Military Officers

Foreign Service Officers

Mission: prepare for and fight war

Mission: conduct diplomacy

Training a major activity, important for units and
individuals

Training not a significant activity. Not important for either units or
individuals

Extensive training for episodic, undesired events, to think
the unthinkable

Little formal training, learning by experience in doing desired
activities (negotiating, reporting)

Uncomfortable with ambiguity

Can deal with ambiguity

Plans and planning—both general and detailed—are
important core activities

Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value flexibility and
innovation

Doctrine: important

Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign policy

Focused on all aspects of foreign policy

Focused on discrete events and activities with plans,
objectives, courses of action, endstates

Focused on ongoing processes without expectation of an “endstate”

Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or partners
in active warfighting

Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and opponents in active
diplomacy

Officer corps commands significant numbers of NCOs
and enlisted personnel

Officers supervise only other officers in core (political and economic)
activities

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core functions
(warfighting)

Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)

Leadership: career professional military officers
(with the military services and in operations)

Leadership: a mix of politicians, academics, policy wonks, and career
Foreign Service professionals at headquarters and in field

All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/
diplomatic, becoming more important

All aspects of peace operations, including military, becoming more
important

Writing and written word less important, physical actions
more important

Writing and written word very important. Used extensively in conduct
of diplomacy

Teamwork and management skills are rewarded,
interpersonal skills important internally

Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded, interpersonal
skills important externally

Understand “humma-humma” and “deconflict”

Understand “demarche” and “nonpaper”

Accustomed to large resources, manpower, equipment,
and money

Focus meager resources on essential needs

Figure 6. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.3
kind that the military does is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a strong
domestic constituency of support. The military has more money to conduct diplomacy than does
State. Secretary of State Colin Powell began to improve the Department’s budget. But the inability
to hire personnel, because of previous budgetary constraints, effected hundreds of positions in the
middle ranks of the diplomatic service. It will take decades of adequate funding to grow the foreign
service officers to fill authorizations at the appropriate grade.
The resource barons, those with people, money, technical expertise, and equipment reside in DoD
and the military services. Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is constantly being asked
to provide resources out of hide for nation-building purposes, for example in Haiti and Panama. It
is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only institution with an expeditionary capability, and
fungible resources and expertise. It can get there quickly, show the flag, bring significant resources
to bear, stabilize a situation, and create an environment secure enough for other agencies to operate.
On a much smaller scale the Agency for International Development is a baron, because it has money
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and technical expertise to promote development and institution building. Other baronies exist, such
as intelligence, Department of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the U.S. Government do not promote
professionalization and rewards in interagency jobs. What is needed is a systematic effort to develop
civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and
operations. Some of this takes place. Military officers are assigned to various departments. For
example, until 2002, 35 officers from all military services worked in the regional and functional
bureaus of the Department of State. Senior diplomats (some of ambassadorial rank) are also
allocated to military and civilian agencies, such as Foreign Policy Advisors at the regional unified
commands, to the Special Operations Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, to
various key positions in the Pentagon, and to the war colleges. These programs must be expanded.
Unfortunately, the opposite was occurring in 2003. In order to convert military personnel slots to
warfighting positions, the DoD recalled most of its officers from the civilian agencies, to include
the State Department, which in turn reduced to 30 the number of diplomats posted to military
organizations. An important element for interagency integration and harmony was weakened.
Moreover, there ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for joint
duty in the military. For civilian agencies, something akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act is needed
to encourage interagency service, to include the Department of State. Promotions should be based
not only on performance at Foggy Bottom and in Embassies abroad, but on mandatory interagency
tours as well. Similarly professional development incentives should apply to civil servants that
work in the national security arena.31
Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel
systems and career tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997, Transforming
Defense: National Security in the Twenty-first Century, recommended creating “an interagency cadre
of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key
positions in the national security structures.”32 This would build on the jointness envisioned by
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Report also recommended a national security curriculum
for a mix of civilian, military, and foreign students. The Defense Leadership and Management
Program of the DoD, a Master’s level initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is
an important step in this direction. The Department of State, under Colin Powell’s guidance, began
to invest in educating its personnel in strategic planning. Accordingly, the Department published
The Department of State and Agency for International Development Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to
2009. The document sets forth directions and priorities and supports policy positions enunciated
in the President’s National Security Strategy. This is potentially an intellectual breakthrough for
strategic integration. Also, more State Department personnel were allowed to participate in War
College courses, thereby adding to the opportunities for mutual learning and strategic integration
in the professional development of civilian and military leaders. In early 2005 there was serious
discussion among senior Pentagon officials about creating a national security career path. At State,
diplomats were now required to have interagency tours for advancement.
Implications for the Military Professional.
There are critical implications for the military warrior. The nature of future warfare is likely
to be more military operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces. Future
war will also require a more intellectual military officer, one who understands the imperative of
working with the panoply of civilian agencies, non-government organizations, the national and
international media, and foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of strategy that American forces
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will rarely fight alone again; they will do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity
of the people, the armed forces, and the government now encompasses the global community. The
implications are clear; the military officer will have to develop greater diplomatic and negotiating
skills, greater understanding of international affairs, capability in foreign languages, and more than
a passing acquaintance with economics.
Moreover, the warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities
short of war. These include: strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace
operations, counter narcotics, counterterrorism, security assistance, environmental security,
human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning
and termination strategy, command and control of forces, continuity of government, post-conflict
reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, non-combatant
evacuations, and homeland defense.
Therefore, the future officer will also need greater appreciation of the institutional diversity
and complexity of government, because of the need to advise a diverse audience of civilians on
the utility of military power in complex contingencies that are neither peace nor war as Americans
are accustomed to think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem with civilian agencies and
non-government organizations unaccustomed to command systems and deliberate planning, and
that often do not understand the limits of military power.33 Lastly, instruction on the interagency
system and process should be mandatory for civilians and military alike. Such education must
have a sound theoretical foundation in national security decision making, strategic planning, and
organizational behavior, expanded by sophisticated case studies of relevant historical experiences.
Because the United States will be heavily engaged in the spectrum of activities entitled humanitarian
intervention, stabilization and reconstruction, and the transformation of societies, the curriculum
of senior service colleges must emphasize the strategic integration of the instruments of national
power to a much greater degree than they have in the past.
What attributes should the military officer bring? Above all, holistic thinking—the ability to
think in terms of all the instruments of national power and respect for the functions and cultures of
diverse departments and agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The effective interagency
player writes and speaks well. He or she will be bilingual, able to function in military as well
as civilian English. Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of interagency communication. The military
briefing, though an excellent vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of information in formatted
style, is not acceptable. One must be less conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the
representative around a table. Someone of lower rank may be in charge of a meeting. A sense of
humor, patience, endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will help. The ability
to “stay in your box” and articulate the perspective of your department will be respected, though
the temptation to poach on other domains will be there. The ability to anticipate issues, to consider
the second and third order effects from the national level down to the country team and theater
levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency requires diplomatic and negotiating skills, the
ability to network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic politics and language.34
The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decision
making process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for democratic accountability.
But some of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with its multiplicity of
players, plentiful but diffused resources and the penchant to throw resources at the problem, and
the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy from war and military power. Frederick the Great
cautioned: “Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments.” So did John F. Kennedy:
“Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail.”35 Major
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structural changes must be made in the interagency system in order to harness human talent and
resources intelligently.
Democracy is defined as a process of mutual learning and adaptation. Accordingly all institutions
of government learn, adapt, and make appropriate changes. This is even more imperative for
the national security agencies and personnel, where the stakes are high. The distempers in the
interagency process evidenced in 2001-04 created new opportunities for learning and for adaptation.
Fortunately, in time American democracy will make those adaptations. The question will be at what
price and how quickly.
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CHAPTER 4
PDD-56: A GLASS HALF-FULL
John F. Troxell1
A lot of Defense Department folks wonder where the rest of the government is in this war. There is clearly a
need for greater interagency collaboration.
			

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates2

In October 1993, the American people awoke to the morning broadcast of horrific scenes of
the bodies of American service members being dragged through the streets of the far off city of
Mogadishu. A failed effort on the part of an elite unit of Army Rangers to capture the Somali warlord
Mohammed Farah Aidid resulted in urban carnage, leaving 18 American dead, 74 wounded, and
perhaps as many as a thousand Somalis killed. The story has since been immortalized in the book
and subsequent movie, Blackhawk Down. David Halberstam referred to this crisis as a “major league
CNN-era disaster.”3 This debacle led President Clinton to announce to the nation that the effort in
Somalia, after an initial reinforcement, would be completely withdrawn in 5 months. Two months
after the disaster, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin left the administration. It has since been learned
that the Somalia debacle also fed the appetite of Osama bin Laden to drive the United States from
the Middle East. One positive outcome of the U.S. experience in Somalia, however, was that it
challenged the interagency to reexamine its policymaking procedures.4 The eventual outcome of
this effort was Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on
Managing Complex Contingency Operations.”
Today, the United States once again finds itself enmeshed in a very difficult and increasingly
unpopular effort to remake a nation that is awash in violence and political incompetence. A collective
national groan seems to ask how did we get into this mess. Why haven’t we been able to apply
our considerable resources in an efficient and effective manner to protect and further our national
interests? The response to this growing frustration is similar as well, fix the interagency. There is
wide recognition that stabilizing or reconstructing a nation (more about these terms later) requires
the application of all of the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic. The key to a successful policy outcome is to orchestrate all of these elements in a coordinated
plan, execute the myriad tasks effectively and efficiently, and then gracefully exit leaving behind
a reasonably secure and functioning country. As a nation, we have been unsuccessful in pulling
this all together, according to the common refrain, because the interagency is poorly organized
and doesn’t know how to plan. The military element of power, on the other hand, has been fairly
successful in deflecting attention from itself when it comes time to fix blame. The military complains
of mission creep—“it’s not my job,” does an admittedly good job of reassessing the operation and
capturing lessons learned, and then writes a new doctrinal manual addressing those lessons and
declares itself ready for the next mission.
For strategic planners and thinkers two things should be clear from even a cursory review of
the past 15 years. First, the strategic environment that the United States faces places a premium on
our ability to succeed in a wide variety of operations that are down the intensity scale from stateon-state conflict. That doesn’t mean that military conflict between nation states is obsolete, just
that the probability is greatly diminished, and that real challengers to U.S. national interests will
seek to avoid tangling with the overwhelming conventional military power of the United States.
The second observation is that fixing the interagency along the lines proposed by PDD-56 only
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addresses one half of the problem. As will be reviewed in detail later, PDD-56 and a host of followon adjustments and initiatives has done a good job of focusing on the challenge of better planning.
But better planning without the capacity or capability to execute the plan is fruitless. In fact, it might
be better to have properly structured and trained capability, even in the absence of a coordinated
plan, than to have a well coordinated plan in the absence of capability.
As a nation we have been reluctant to adequately resource the capabilities needed to further our
interests in the 21st century security environment. This chapter will argue that the predominant
focus on improving the interagency writ large has been somewhat misplaced. The key to success
in the future is resourcing the capabilities needed to address the challenges of nation building, and
the shortest route to creating those capabilities is through the military, not the interagency. In many
cases, the military is also the best alternative to lead these efforts. The United States has never been
good at coordinating and applying all of the elements of national power in a synchronized fashion.
General Albert Wedemeyer, author of the World War II victory plan, argued that, “Our failure to
use political, economic and psychological means in coordination with military operations during
the war also prolonged its duration and caused the loss of many more American lives.”5 Up to now
we have been able to muddle through and avoid unrecoverable disasters. But we owe it to the fallen
heroes of Blackhawk Down and to the service members and civilians on the front lines in Afghanistan
and Iraq to be better prepared for the next stabilization and reconstruction mission.
Clarifying Terms.
Interagency coordination is important even in intense combat operations as General Wedemeyer
noted above, but the primary concern of interagency operations is further down the spectrum of
conflict scale. The terminology used to describe these operations is vast and ever changing. It has
ranged from the broad categories of smaller scale contingencies, to military operations other than
war, to post-conflict operations, to humanitarian interventions. More definitive definitions have
included peace operations, the subject of the Army’s doctrinal response to Somalia, and more recently
stability operations, which subsumed peace operations as one of its ten broad types.6 PDD-56 was
directed at complex contingency operations defined as peace operations. The most recent policy
pronouncements from the Bush administration include DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” and National Security
Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction
and Stabilization.” The DoD Directive defines SSTR as operations that “lead to sustainable peace
while advancing U.S. interests.” But the document then goes on to almost exclusively discuss
stability operations which are designed or established to “maintain order in States and regions.”
NSPD-44 does not include a definition for reconstruction and stabilization.7
Thankfully, others have stepped in to clarify the definitional jumble. Colonel Bryan Watson,
in a recent Carlisle Paper in Security Strategy, has offered the following definitions. Stabilization is
defined as the effort to create a secure and stable environment and to provide basic human needs
of the population. It is most closely linked to the immediate conclusion of major military operations
and is partially aimed at preventing the conditions that could fuel a continuing insurgency.
Reconstruction, on the other hand, represents a shift toward creating self-sustaining political and
economic institutions that will ultimately permit competent self-government. Colonel Watson
concludes that military capabilities under military control are more suited for stabilization, whereas
reconstruction is more suited for civilian agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.8
The key point is that the challenging interagency operations that have received so much study
and attention are those operations and crisis situations that require the blending together of both
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military and traditional civilian capabilities and spheres of operations in the gap between conflict and
peace. The military can win the wars, and humanitarian, relief and diplomatic entities can operate
in the “neutral” or “humanitarian space” to further peaceful development and integration of nation
states into the international community. But how should the government go about winning the
peace? How do we successfully transition from stabilization to reconstruction? As Hans Binnendijk
and Stuart Johnson have concluded in their study on stabilization and reconstruction operations, “no
military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and the persistent conditions
of insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development.”9 To be successful
in the 21st century security environment, the U.S. Government must develop a framework and
resource the needed capabilities to operate in this dangerous middle ground.
Prelude to PDD-56.
According to Michele Flournoy, the principal author of PDD-56, “one of the most powerful
lessons learned during the 1993 operation in Somalia was that the absence of rigorous and sustained
interagency planning and coordination can hamper the effectiveness, jeopardize success, and court
disaster.”10 Somalia was not the first post-Cold War stabilization and reconstruction operation, and
regime change did not begin with the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. In December 1989 the United
States forcefully removed the regime of Manuel Noriega from Panama in the largely successful
Operation JUST CAUSE. The follow-on stabilization phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY,
however, was another matter. Planning was incomplete and haphazard; there were insufficient
civil affairs, engineers and military police for the rebuilding effort; and interagency cooperation
was poor because many of the agencies were excluded from the DoD planning effort.11 Real scrutiny
of the problems associated with operations in Panama may have been diverted by the focus on the
Persian Gulf only 8 months later, or because of the absence of a “Blackhawk Down” type incident.
The Clinton administration was not so fortunate, but his administration’s political misfortune led
to a major institutional improvement in the conduct of interagency operations.12
The after-action review (AAR) process associated with Somalia was intense and represented
real bureaucratic battles in the interagency community and in DoD. The Army was largely
successful in deflecting attention from its performance. The most critical lesson from the UNOSOM
II peace enforcement mission and thus the real value-added from any corrective action, according
to the Army, was the need to improve the interagency planning process. Besides, the Army was
preparing to publish a new Field Manual, Peace Operations, that would obviously address any of its
shortcomings.13 The Army’s view was largely accurate, and Flournoy, as the OSD lead, recognized
it as well. Flournoy was intent on developing an integrated interagency planning process that
would both help define the strategy and highlight policy disconnects for decision makers.14 The
military was also keen on developing improved coordination procedures with the interagency and
proceeded to take the lead in numerous developmental efforts. One of the most important initiatives
at this time was the establishment of the U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute. This small but highly
effective body played a key role in the eventual development of the interagency planning process
that became imbedded in PDD-56.
The first post-Somalia test case was Haiti. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was responsible for
planning Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and along with DoD conducted extensive interagency
coordination. USACOM’s Haiti Planning Group prepared a detailed “Interagency Checklist for
Restoration of Essential Services.”15 The Haiti Executive Committee (ExCom) was established and
developed the first ever interagency political-military plan (POL-MIL plan), which articulated the
mission, and an interagency strategy. The primary players rehearsed the POL-MIL plan prior to
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the launch of the U.S.-led multinational force.16 Additional interagency planning efforts included
Southern Command, under General Clarke, who was very active in attempting to institutionalize
interagency planning conferences; General Zinni, as the Commanding General, 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force from 1994-1996, sponsored interagency planning exercises in the Pacific; and
General Joulwan, SACEUR, sponsored the major IFOR rehearsal at Aachen, Germany, complete
with the full range of interagency partners.
One of the noted success stories of conducting a detailed interagency planning process complete
with a POL-MIL plan was the U.S.-supported United Nations Transitional Administration for
Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). UNTAES was established on January 15, 1996, with a mandate to
demilitarize the Eastern Slavonia region, including the city of Vukovar, which had been overrun
by Serbian forces several years earlier. Under the leadership of Jacques Klein, a senior American
Foreign Service Officer, UNTAES was able to demilitarize the region, monitor the safe return of
refugees, and conduct local elections. The territory was peacefully returned to Croatian control in
January 1998. The planning process outlined in the soon to be published PDD-56 was instrumental
in the success of this operation.17
The final post-Somalia but pre-PDD-56 interagency planning effort that had an impact on
the publication of PDD-56 was only considered but never executed. In the late spring and early
summer of 1996, UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali was pushing for the UN to
conduct contingency planning in preparation for a peacekeeping mission to Burundi. The Tutsi/
Hutu conflict that had produced the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was reappearing in neighboring
Burundi. The Clinton administration, in contrast to its reluctance to get involved in Rwanda, was a
strong supporter of this effort in the Security Council. A team of military and interagency leaders
and planners was sequestered at the U.S. Army War College with the task of developing a POL-MIL
plan for intervention in Burundi. The detailed planning effort revealed the extensive force package
required to achieve a relatively uncertain outcome. The military balked, and the decision was
made not to intervene.18 It was the detailed POL-MIL interagency planning process that generated
consensus behind the no-go decision.
Concurrent with the last of these military/interagency planning efforts, the Joint Staff, not to
be outdone by the Army’s publication of FM 100-23 and sensing a lack of guidance on the subject,
published Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, in 1996. The document
discussed interagency processes and players, outlined the principles for organizing interagency
efforts, and the roles and responsibilities for JTFs. Although the publication was a welcome addition
to the literature, it did not “adequately explain methods for interagency planning, coordination,
and execution. Thus DoD and other agencies reiterated the need for policy guidance such as that
found in PDD-56.”19
PDD-56.
Arguably, the military was after three things in its efforts to transform the interagency process.
Fundamentally, it wanted to infuse better planning in interagency operations, and thus it supported
the adoption of the military planning process. Second, it clearly recognized the need for unity of
effort. And finally, the military remained concerned about mission creep and wanted to delineate
those tasks that should clearly be in the purview of other agencies. With the possible exception of
the desire to avoid mission creep, all of these objectives made perfect sense and dovetailed with the
needs of the interagency planning community.
PDD-56 was signed and published by the Clinton administration in May 1997. The stated intent of
the directive was to define a specific planning process for managing complex contingency operations
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and identify implementation mechanisms to be incorporated into the interagency process with
the ultimate goal of achieving unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international
organizations. The planning process and implementation mechanisms selected closely mirrored
major military procedures and thus supports a claim that PDD-56 attempted to impose a military
version of the planning process on the interagency. This is perfectly understandable given the fact
that planning is a core competency of the military, and that few if any other government agencies
have any specific operational planning experience. Consequently, the structure of the plan and the
supporting activities enumerated in PDD-56 adopted the best practices of the military.
Unity of effort was to be achieved by the appointment of an Executive Committee (ExCom)
appointed by the Deputies Committee. The ExCom was responsible for the day-to-day management
of U.S. participation in a complex contingency. The ExCom was to use an integrated interagency
plan to identify critical issues, establish priorities, evaluate agency concepts of operations, and
conduct after-action reviews.20
The PDD required that a political-military implementation plan be developed. Commonly
referred to as the POL-MIL plan, it was to be developed using the generic political-military scheme
as a template. This template was modeled after the five paragraph military operations order and
covers at a minimum: situation, assessment, national interests, mission statement, objectives,
concept of operations and organization, various tasks, and participating agencies mission area
plans.21 Unity of effort is a desired outcome of the pol-mil planning process. This planning process
clearly supported two of the military’s most important principles of war. The first is objective: direct
every operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The second is unity of
command: for every objective, insure unity of effort under one responsible commander.22
The next two elements of PDD-56 focused on two critical practices from the reinvigorated Army
training regime at the National Training Centers and the Battle Command Training Program:
rehearsals and after-action reviews (AAR). PDD-56 directed the Deputies Committee to rehearse
the pol-mil plan. ExCom members presented the elements for which they are responsible to include
all applicable supporting agency plans. After the conclusion of the operation the ExCom is also
charged with conducting the AAR. This comprehensive assessment of interagency performance
would include a review of interagency planning and coordination and problems in interagency
execution. Appropriate lessons learned would be captured and disseminated throughout the
interagency community to ensure future operations did not repeat the same mistakes.23
The final provision directed the NSC to work with various educational institutions to develop
an annual training program aimed at mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) to train
them in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans. The intent was to create a cadre of
trained professionals familiar with PDD-56’s integrated planning process, and thus able to improve
the government’s ability to manage future operations.24
As noted above, the military played a major role in the development of various aspects of the
planning process outlined in PDD-56. Combining the fact that planning is a core competency of
the military with the military’s focus on operational preparedness, made it only natural that best
practices from the military would migrate into the interagency planning and implementation process.
The military also formalized the inclusion of the POL-MIL plan in its plans and orders process.
According to Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I,” dated 17 March 2006, “the commander
will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POL-MIL plan, when provided, and will
disseminate that guidance to the joint force in Annex V, the Interagency Coordination Annex of
the combatant commander’s OPLAN.”25 Thus the Pentagon formally recognized the importance of
including civilian agency requirements in the deliberate planning process.
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Interagency Planning Post-PDD 56.
Michele Flournoy in a recent evaluation of PDD-56 acknowledged that the directive had
never been fully implemented although in those cases in which it was applied it generated useful
planning processes and tools. She went on to say that, “the process produces more than just a
set of documents: it allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences,
identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their
roles.”26 The innovative aspects of PDD-56 made substantial progress in building institutional
planning capacity, but pockets of resistance to interagency planning remain, reflecting both an antiplanning bias on the part of some agencies and an underestimation of the effort needed to conduct
a full-fledged planning effort.27 The lack of a “planning culture” outside the Department of Defense
represents a significant challenge to institutionalizing a standard planning paradigm. According to
the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report from CSIS, “Whereas military officers are taught to see planning
as critical to success in operations and trained in its finer points, this notion is largely foreign to
other agencies like the departments of State and Treasury.”28 These civilian agencies also tend not to
have dedicated planning staffs or expertise.
The Bush administration had originally decided to develop National Security Policy Directive
(NSPD) XX to replace PDD-56 and initial reports indicated that it would propose some useful
enhancements to the interagency planning process. NSPD XX was never issued, and according to
Flournoy, in the case of Afghanistan there was no person or entity in charge of interagency planning
and coordination.29 Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, expressed the view
that the Afghanistan reconstruction effort had been mishandled by the State Department resulting
in a dysfunctional division of authority between State and the Pentagon.30
The Bush administration’s successor to PDD-56 was finally issued on December 7, 2005, as
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization.” The purpose of this directive is to “promote the security of the
United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and
stabilization” operations.31 It establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for reconstruction
and stabilization to oversee and help integrate all DoD and civilian contingency planning. It specifies
that the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should take the
lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of the interagency for reconstruction and stabilization
purposes. S/CRS is also tasked with developing strategies and identifying states that may become
unstable, a proactive and preventative approach not found in PDD-56. Finally, S/CRS is tasked
with developing a civilian response capacity for these types of operations. Several of the “military”
aspects of PDD-56 are missing: no specifics about a POL-MIL plan or associated template, no
mention of a rehearsal, and no guidance for a training program. The AAR is also absent, but NSPD44 does direct the identification and subsequent incorporation of lessons learned. PDD-56 had a
strong military flavor; NSPD-44, in contrast, has a distinctly foggy-bottom taste.
As lessons from Iraq begin to accumulate, there is a great deal of focus on interagency planning.
Contrary to popular belief, however, there was considerable interagency planning and postconflict planning associated with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Numerous military and other
interagency efforts were very active. The problem wasn’t the lack of planning, but more specifically
problems with integration, generally poor assumptions about conditions in Iraq, and eventually
uncooperative or unfocused leaders.32 As Ambassador Paul Bremer claimed, “we planned for the
wrong contingency.”33 The planning process, although not non-existent, was certainly flawed. One
of the Iraq Study Group recommendations included the need to adopt the Goldwater-Nichols model
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to improve the interagency planning process.34 The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 1 report is a good
place to start to review some of the many planning initiatives being proposed. Chapter 8 of this
report, “Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations,” includes nine recommendations, seven
of which specifically address planning.35 For the most part these proposals are not dramatically
different from the framework established in PDD-56. William Nash and Ciara Knudsen, in their
work for the Princeton Project for National Security, have done an excellent job in summarizing the
challenge and need to harmonize the military and civilian approaches to planning:
…the word “plan” for civilians and military means two different things. The military planning process starts
with an objective, is handed over to the many layers of the military planning machine adding in resources,
strategy, intelligence, training, and gaming. Given the objective, the military will come up with a plan to
achieve it. The civilian planning process up until now has been much more ad hoc and more conceptual in
nature. The planning process tends to concentrate more on developing the objective—what it should be—and
less on the exact details of how to get there. As a result, post-Iraq reform proposals attempt to meld the two
approaches—informing the military planning process with the subtleties of reconstruction challenges, and
operationalizing civilian planning.36

Before leaving the issue of interagency planning, there is one area that seems to warrant further
consideration. PDD-56 and its immediate successor, NSPD-44, have focused on foreign interventions
and reconstruction and stabilization operations abroad. In fact PDD-56 specifically stated that
it did not apply to any domestic situations. The aftermath of 9/11 and the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security have opened up an entirely new arena in which coordinated
interagency operations are critical. Joint Pub 3-08, in fact, splits its coverage between crisis response
to domestic operations versus crisis response to foreign operations. The potential exists to adopt,
or as a minimum consider, a new planning model, the National Response Plan (NRP) and its
associated Emergency Support Function (ESF) annexes. The NRP, last updated May 25, 2006, forms
the basis of how the federal government coordinates with state, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector during domestic incidents. The ESF annexes are the primary means through
which the Federal government provides assistance to State, local, and tribal governments or to
Federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility. They
represent an effective mechanism to group capabilities and resources into the functions that are
most likely needed during actual or potential incidents where coordinated Federal response is
required. The ESF mechanism provides a modular structure to identify the precise components
that can best address the requirements of a particular incident.37 The new strategy development
framework being developed by S/CRS that includes the delineation of Major Mission Elements has
some similar features to the ESF approach.38
Failure to Resource the Plan.
Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.
Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld
There’s nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it is done by the American military.
Condoleezza Rice

If there is one thing that the U.S. Army War College has been able to inculcate in its students for
at least the past generation it is the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means. The interagency
planning effort that began with PDD-56 and continues to evolve and strengthen, is focused on
the development of the ends—the strategic objectives and the ways—how to accomplish those
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ends. But without the means—capabilities and capacities to execute the plan, the planning effort
is superfluous. The major cause of poor performance in complex interagency operations is the lack
of adequate means. Security analyst James Carafano, from the Heritage Foundation, argues that
“the real shortfall in the interagency process is the lack of adequate capacity to conduct operations
outside Washington.”39
There are only two sources for the capabilities and expertise needed to bring to bear all of the
elements of power to help aright a failed state: civilian or military. Actually there is a third; we
can depend on our coalition partners. In fact, this was the anticipated approach in Iraq. Operation
Plan ECLIPSE II, the stability plan developed for Iraq counted on existing Iraqi organizations and
security forces. The Pentagon also believed that other nations would contribute to the stabilization
and reconstruction process, to include the presence of three multinational divisions focused on
bridging the gap between conventional military operations and policing functions.40 The coalition
angle remains very important and the U.S. Government goes to great lengths to enlist broad and
effective support. The QDR explicitly recognizes the need to build partner capacity. However, as Iraq
demonstrates, coalition partners may not always be there nor be present in sufficient strength, so it
behooves the nation to be prepared to shoulder the burden, particularly in cases where important
or vital U.S. interests are at stake.
Most civilian agencies in the U.S. Government have no rapidly deployable experts and capabilities.
Civilian agencies lack an operational culture and consequently, even if tasked to perform a critical
mission, they do not have the personnel who are trained and ready for these missions. They also lack
the authorities and resources to rapidly deploy them and to quickly establish programs in the field.41
Findings from a Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War
College, concluded that the lack of quick response capability in the civilian agencies would ensure
that the military would bear the brunt of all essential tasks in a stabilization and reconstruction
operation.42 The lack of civilian partners creates mission creep, as military personnel conduct tasks
for which they are ill-suited or ill-prepared. It is precisely this concern with mission creep that
made the military such eager partners in the PDD-56 effort. According to Mark Walsh and Michael
Harwood, “Incomplete or failed integration of non-DoD agencies into the development of strategy
and plans for responding to complex contingencies [could] also result in demands for the military
to perform tasks outside its range of skills and competencies. Deficiencies in the interagency process
could extend the military’s involvement in an intervention beyond the need for unique military
personnel and assets to cope with the complex emergency.”43 The military has always been a selfinterested partner in this process.
The Department of Defense has the capability and certainly the capacity to rapidly deploy that
capability virtually anywhere on the globe almost overnight; however, it lacks the will. Colin Powell,
while still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed it up well:
Let me begin by giving a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes
that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed
forces of the United States. We have the mission: to fight and win the nation’s wars. Because we are able to
fight and win the nation’s wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other
new missions that are coming along—peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief—you name it, we
can do it. . . . But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed
forces—to fight and win the nation’s wars.44

Tracking with this cultural bias against lesser contingencies, the Army has planned poorly for
stabilization operations and is not properly resourced or structured to handle these increasingly
relevant missions. Conrad Crane, author of the recently released manual on Counterinsurgency,
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concluded in a study from several years ago, that “neither budgets nor forces have been designed to
take into account the sober fact that during the last decade any major deployment of military force
to resolve a crisis . . . has ended by creating new long-term force requirements to keep the situation
stabilized . . .”45 A more recent study draws the same general conclusion that the Army mortgaged
its ability to conduct stability operations and deliver the required enduring results. Even more
disturbing is the claim that the Army’s Modular Force transformation continues to discount the
importance of stabilization operations, and fails to provide the modular and scalable force pool of
stabilization capabilities that are required.46
DoD seems a little schizophrenic on the issue. On the one hand the Department has recently
issued DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations,” which explicitly defines stability operations as a core U.S. military mission to
be given priority comparable to combat operations.47 At the same time, in the QDR it presents a
strong case that resources should be placed against increasing interagency and coalition partner
capacities. One example is the effort to create NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability and
a European constabulary force.48 There is certainly nothing wrong with encouraging partners to do
more; burden sharing has long been an element of our alliance politics. But this is from a Secretary
who some have claimed supported a strategy of nation-building “lite,” involving a rapid transition
to local control.49 If the U.S. military is not willing to invest in stabilization and reconstruction
capabilities, why should we expect our allies to pick up the slack?
Efforts to create expeditionary civilian capability have proliferated recently. One of the first
was the call for a postwar Reserve Corps in legislation sponsored by Senator Lugar. The intent is
to deploy civilian experts in civil affairs, law enforcement, engineering, economic development,
and government operations as quickly as possible after the fighting ends and allow U.S. military
forces to be withdrawn sooner.50 Another related proposal is the Active Response Corps, which is
a State Department effort to increase the surge capacity in the department to support stabilization
and reconstruction missions. The initial goal is to expand this capability to 30 personnel by the end
of 2007.51 These efforts should not be belittled. Capacity from any source is to be welcomed, but
efforts that provide such small increments of capability may generate more difficulty deploying,
integrating, and sustaining them than they are worth. The Defense Science Board seems to be on
track with its conclusion that “the rest of the Executive Branch has made very little progress toward
the development of operational capabilities applicable to stability operations; and the Congress has
not provided Departments other than Defense with appropriate authorities and resources in order
to develop these capabilities.”52
The capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations predominantly resides in
the military. According to noted military historian Max Boot,
The creation of greater civilian nation-building capacity would not let the armed forces off the hook. No matter
how much civilian management improves, the bulk of the manpower for any nation-building assignment
would still have to come from the pentagon. The armed forces need to do a much better job of preparing for
such work . . .53

The military has civil affairs, engineers, military police, medical, and the full gamut of logistical
expertise. This expertise is organized and prepared to rapidly deploy and is equipped to operate in the
dangerous conditions between peace and war that often characterize stabilization and reconstruction
operations. Eventually the operation can transition to civilian capability, but only after a degree of
security has been established, largely as a result of the early and effective deployment of military
forces organized for the stabilization and reconstruction mission. DoD Directive 3000.05 explicitly
places a priority on stability operations and capabilities so the military’s long-standing cultural
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aversion to the use of U.S. military power for nation building should no longer be a factor. The QDR
recognizes the need to rebalance the mix of joint capabilities and forces. This rebalancing effort
should be in the direction of creating robust stabilization and reconstruction forces along the lines
originally proposed by the NDU study on Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.
The center piece of this study called for the organization of two S&R division equivalents that would
plan, develop doctrine, train, and exercise for S&R missions.54 The details of the organization are
open for debate but the need for a dedicated capability within the military also corresponds with
the strategic argument put forward by Thomas Barnett in the Pentagon’s New Map. Barnett presents
a convincing case that the U.S. needs to transform toward a bifurcated military: one that specializes
in high-tech, big-violence war, and one that specializes in relatively low-tech security generation
and routine crisis response.55
Conclusion.
Trends in the global security environment suggest that stabilization and reconstruction operations are likely to be a major component of U.S. strategy in the coming decades. Success in these operations requires what the QDR refers to as “unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to
bring to bear all of the elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with
allies and partners abroad.”56 Unified statecraft obviously implies interagency collaboration and
thus the planning framework originally presented by PDD-56 and since modified will continue to
be of prime importance. The military aspects of the framework will also likely endure as the military
planning culture will continue to drive the planning process toward acceptable and feasible ways to
accomplish the interagency derived national objectives.
The most robust planning procedure will not succeed however, unless the necessary means
are available to execute the plan. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are so distinct from
warfighting operations that they require special organizations and capabilities. The military will
always be the predominant supplier of these capabilities, and it will require a culture change on the
part of the military to fully accept the dictates of DoDD 3000.05 to view stability operations on the
same level as “fighting and winning our nation’s wars.” DoD and the Army will need to develop
programs, organizations, and plans to be more effective in the stabilization and reconstruction
environment. PDD-56 represents a glass half-full concerning successful interagency operations. Its
realistic planning framework needs to be coupled with adequate and dedicated means to top-off the
glass and allow the United States to be successful in this new and complex security environment.
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CHAPTER 5
NATIONAL SECURITY POWERS:
ARE THE CHECKS IN BALANCE?
Marybeth P. Ulrich
On the distinction between policy success in domestic and foreign policy, President John F.
Kennedy once noted, “The big difference is that between a bill being defeated and the country
[being] wiped out.”1 Much is at stake in the formulation and implementation of national security
policy. Not only is the achievement of national interests on the line, the preservation of the framers’
constitutional allocation of power designed to keep liberty and security in balance is also at stake. As
the United States proceeds further in its “Long War”2 focused on fighting terrorism, its political elite
is struggling to define the degree of collaboration that must remain between the different branches
of government. Does a state of national emergency or war justify the suspension of deliberation and
consultation inherent in the American political system’s design? Does Congress retain meaningful
powers to resist presidential assertions of power? What role should the courts play in limiting
or facilitating presidential overreach and congressional reassertion of its powers? These are key
questions of concern to all who participate in and seek to understand the U.S. national security
policymaking process. This chapter will review the constitutional foundations of the American
political system, explore the adaptation and evolution of this original distribution of power, and
assess the impact of the current state of “checks and balances” on prospects for strategic success and
the preservation of American democracy.
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
A unique aspect of the American political system is its design feature creating two co-equal
principals among the President and Congress. The framers of the Constitution envisioned a national
security process that would be dependent on a system of shared and separate powers across the
democratic institutions that they created. Embedded in these constitutional foundations are the
formal sources of power of the Presidency and Congress, the two key democratic institutions that
work together to formulate and carry out national security policy.
Some scholars argue that the Framers’ intent to give the Congress a leading role in government
is evident in the fact that Article I of the Constitution grants many explicit powers to the Congress in
comparison to the ambiguity and vagueness of the President’s powers outlined in Article II. Indeed,
a survey of the historical record reveals that over time presidents have successfully exploited the
ambiguity of their formal powers to increase the power of the Presidency vis-à-vis the Congress.
A brief review of the constitutional basis of each institution’s powers will be useful to strategists
seeking to understand the evolution of these powers in the life of the American republic.
The Framers envisioned the Congress as the main preserve of governmental powers. The powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8 touch on the entire scope of governmental authority. Chief among
these is the power to tax and spend. This power of the purse, checked by the President’s veto power,
is the defining characteristic of the Framers’ intent to create an energetic central government with
a vigorous legislature.3 The Framers concluded the powers enumerated in Article 8 with the elastic
clause, the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers.”4 The shared vision of their republic was that of a “deliberative legislature,
composed carefully to reflect both popular will and elite limits on that will.”5

67

The first sentence of Article II clearly designates the President as the Chief Administrator of
the government, but the Constitution offers few specifics about how this executive responsibility
should be carried out. The President’s role as Chief Executive stems from language in Section 2
that requires the heads of each executive department to report to the President. In the Washington
administration the federal government consisted of only three cabinet departments (State, Treasury,
and War) and a few hundred people.6 Of course, the vast bureaucracy of the United States has grown
exponentially since then and is now comprised of 15 executive departments and 136 federal agencies
and commissions7 backed up by a work force of 1.7 million federal civil service employees.8 As the
federal government has grown, the power of the President has also expanded as the statutory and
constitutional responsibility for the policies, programs, and expenditure of funds is asserted across
the executive branch.
Authority to administer the federal bureaucracy, however, does not necessarily translate into
its control. All presidents are faced with the challenge of making the bureaucracy responsive
to their leadership. Two key tools to shape the executive branch’s outputs into a more coherent
Administration vision are the use of the appointment authority and the White House Staff. Article
II, Section 2 gives the President the power to appoint the department and agency heads within the
federal government.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the schedule C personnel classification for appointed
policymaking positions throughout the executive branch. This represented a shift from party-based
patronage that rewarded the party faithful with everything from predominantly uncontroversial
government jobs in the field to key policy posts in Washington.10 Schedule C personnel play critical
behind-the-scenes roles, such as setting the schedules and agendas of cabinet members, guiding
political strategy, and giving legal opinions and policy advice. These appointees are lower in rank
than noncareer Senior Executive Service (SES) officials, who fall just below presidential appointees
and who must be confirmed by the Senate. At latest count, SES and Schedule C employees numbered
1,935 in the George W. Bush administration. In all, President George W. Bush has 3000 political
appointees serving in his administration. Although political appointees account for less than twotenths of one percent of the total civil service, their presence results in significant influence throughout
the policymaking process.11 In the modern presidency, presidents have offered these positions to
ideologically compatible people who will work to ensure that their department or agency’s policies
are in sync with the President’s vision.
The Senate’s confirmation role is its check on the President’s appointment power. While the vast
majority of the President’s nominations are confirmed, the potential to subject nominees to intense
congressional scrutiny and to ultimately reject candidates gives the Senate great influence in the
appointment process and, tangentially, in the overall policy process. While the executive sits at the
top of the federal bureaucracy, the design of the various departments and agencies is specified in
congressional statutes that detail their structure and duties. Though not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, Congress’ capacity for oversight can be a tremendous check on the executive when it
is employed. Oversight hearings require officials to appear and testify under oath and report what
the administration is doing. Oversight programs demanding reports on executive department or
agency activity can also have some bite.12 Congress has the responsibility to keep a careful eye on
the administration of its laws to ensure that they are properly interpreted and executed.13
Another management tool of relatively recent creation is the Executive Office of the President
(EOP), better known as the White House Staff. President Franklin Roosevelt established this “minibureaucracy within the bureaucracy” with Congress’ consent in 1939 as an attempt to centralize
control over the executive branch and to provide unity and direction to the federal government.14
The EOP includes both the professional staff working in such places as the National Security Council
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and the Council of Economic Advisers as well as the president’s most trusted advisers in the White
House Office.15 The two tools are closely related as presidential appointments have increasingly
become subject to intense vetting in the EOP.
Formal Powers of the President Relative to
National Security Policymaking As Stated
in the Constitution

Formal Powers of the Congress Relavant to
National Security Policymaking As Stated
in the Constitution

“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”16
Article II. Section 1.

“The Congress shall have Power to . . . make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution . . .” Article I, Section 8.

”. . . he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . ” Article II,
Section 3.

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the debts . . .” Article I, Section 8.

“Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented
to the President . . . If he approve he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it . . . If after such
reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent . . . to the
other House . . . and if approved by two thirds
of that House, it shall become Law.”
Article I, Section 7.

“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.” Article I, Section 9.
“The Congress shall have Power to . . . provide
for the common defense and general Welfare of the
United States, . . . declare War, . . . to raise and
support Armies . . ., To provide and maintain a
Navy; To make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States . . .”
Article 1, Section 8.

“The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the
United States.” Article II, Section 2.
”. . . he may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices . . .” Article II, Section 2.

“He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”
Article II, Section 2.

“He shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established
by Law.” Article II, Section 2.

Figure 1. Key National Security Powers as Enumerated in the Constitution.
In national security affairs and the conduct of foreign policy that might result in the use of armed
force, the President draws on the authority vested in him as Commander-in-Chief. However, the
Framers were in agreement that significant war-related powers must also reside in the Congress.
Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, Article I, Section 8 lays out extensive and explicit war-related powers
69

granted to the Congress. The Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights both reflect the Framers’
distrust of standing armies unaccountable to a legislature. Their design of American democratic
institutions separating the power to declare war from the power to command or direct military forces
in wartime was meant to ensure that the President was unable to make war alone. It is important
to note that rather than giving the President the power to declare war with the “advice and consent
of the Senate” as they had done with the treaty power, the Framers deliberately elected to give
Congress the sole authority to declare war.16 The historical record shows that in practice Congress
has not been the initiator of all significant military actions and that there has been a struggle for
power between the two branches over war powers.
This brief survey of constitutional powers relevant to the conduct of national security
policymaking highlights the Framers’ intent for policymaking and implementation to be a shared
process across the legislative and executive branches. The Framers’ design of shared and separate
powers resulted in a policymaking framework that requires both cooperation and coordination to
achieve anything of real significance in national security affairs.
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES
The Framers’ final product reflected an understanding that the institutions they created had
distinct and complementary institutional competencies. While Congress was granted important
powers ensuring it a significant role in the conduct of national security policy, its institutional
design also meant that it would almost never move quickly on such matters. The requirement for
legislation to clear both the House and the Senate after potentially lengthy deliberations in each
body subject to the influences of public opinion and the media, favored Congress’s role as the
branch of government that considered diverse viewpoints, deliberated among them, and remained
accountable to the public.
The executive branch, on the other hand, was designed to move with speed and dispatch. An
appropriate amount of secrecy was presumed in order to conduct day to day foreign and security
policy, and to act decisively in crisis situations. Congress’ design, meanwhile, has afforded it
significant oversight checks as well as policy influence in the power of the purse. The Framers’
deliberate consideration of institutional competencies when deciding which powers should be
shared, which should be held alone, and in which branch power should be placed is evident in
the Framers’ debate on the distribution of war powers at the constitutional convention. Early
deliberations argued that Congress should be given the power to “make war.” However, it was
eventually agreed that this should be changed to “declare war” to clarify and ensure that the actual
conduct of war remained an executive function, maximizing the institutional competencies of the
Presidency during wartime.
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND PERSUASION
Formal powers contribute to and limit the influence wielded by the President and Congress in
any specific policymaking scenario. Informal powers of each branch, on the other hand, if astutely
employed, can significantly enhance the influence of either institution. The struggle for influence
is characterized neither by all-out competition nor by perfect consensus. Congress can be both a
potential adversary and key partner in the formulation and conduct of national security policy.
Conversely, the President and his team cannot sustain any national security policy course without
the support of Congress and the American people. Dominating the political agenda requires that
the President build popular support, work effectively with Congress, control the vast federal
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bureaucracy, and know when and where to invest political capital. Presidential leadership and the
Administration’s articulation of a vision underpinning its foreign and domestic policies are keys to
success as well.
The President and Congress are at once so independent and so intertwined that neither can be said to govern
save as both do. And even when they come together they face other claimants to a share in governing: the
courts, the states, the press, the private interests, all protected by our Constitution, and the foreign governments
that help to shape our policy.17

Although the President is the single actor in the American political system granted the greatest
range of formal powers, the ability to make his will prevail among the competing wills of actors
also vested with significant powers depends on skillful presidential leadership. President Harry
Truman once remarked that presidential power really just boils down to the power to persuade.18
The renowned presidential scholar, Richard Neustadt, in his classic text, Presidential Power and the
Modern Presidents, equates presidential power with influence and seeks to explain its sources and
the contexts where presidential power is more or less dominant.
Scholars differentiate between situations where the President can essentially command and those
in which he must rely on his powers of persuasion. If the issue involves presidential authority that
is not shared with a competing entity, then the desired result may be achieved without resistance.
Examples include the relief of a military commander, the use of an executive order to advance an
unpopular policy, and the deployment of military forces to protect American interests.
President Truman’s relief of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 is probably the most wellknown dismissal of a military commander in the modern presidency. Truman was careful to
consult the Joint Chiefs in the matter, who unanimously agreed that MacArthur should go. Truman
implemented the order in a successive delegation of authority from him through the appropriate
military authorities. The President and the Chiefs viewed MacArthur’s public statements critical
of Truman’s war policy, in the face of strict orders not to publicly comment on administration
policy, as open defiance of the Commander in Chief. This insubordination consequently justified
his dismissal as essential to maintaining civilian control of the military. There was no question
in the MacArthur affair that the President, in his Commander-in-Chief role, had the authority to
dismiss a commander in the field. However, congressional critics of Truman’s Korean Policy and
MacArthur’s Republican supporters used the opportunity to conduct a full-fledged congressional
investigation of the government’s foreign and military policies against a domestic backdrop that
featured a grand tickertape parade honoring the relieved general, MacArthur’s address to a Joint
Session of Congress, and an adoring public passionately opposed to the ouster of an American
icon.19 Truman’s actions consequently were offset by the exertion of informal powers inherent in the
Congress, the press, and the people, which shaped the ultimate political impact of the President’s
actions.
The issuance of an executive order is another strategic tool presidents can use to assert presidential
authority. Eisenhower’s use of federal troops to enforce the orders of a Federal Court to desegregate
Little Rock schools in 1957 illustrates a President’s prerogative to assert his constitutional power
over the state militias, a power that is not shared with another constitutional entity. The President’s
decision to federalize the Arkansas National Guard troops originally called into action by Governor
Orval Faubus to halt the integration of Central High School was clear, unambiguous, and highly
public. The President’s assertion of power featured a “sense of legitimate obligation, legitimately
imposed.”20 As in the MacArthur case, to have not exerted the authority would have resulted in its
erosion and the prevalence of less legitimate sources of power in the American political system.
Executive orders have mainly been used in three areas: to combat various forms of discrimination
against citizens, to increase White House control over the executive branch, and to maintain secrets.21
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When Congress perceives that executive orders are taken to bypass Congress on controversial
issues, they may elicit great political controversy and be a source of conflict between the two
branches. This is why the congressional reaction to President George W. Bush’s series of executive
orders authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to eavesdrop on the conversations of
Americans without warrants as required in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has
been uncharacteristically strong. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle saw the action as a
challenge to the Congress’ power vis-à-vis the executive.
Even the prospect of an executive order being issued can erupt in major political controversy as
was the case with President Bill Clinton’s proposal to lift the ban on gays serving in the military.
There was no question that the President had the legitimate authority to issue such an order as
President Truman had done to integrate the armed forces in 1948, but the political backlash was so
strong in 1993 that President Clinton abandoned the idea in order to salvage his domestic agenda
before Congress.22
While the President’s formal powers are significant, presidential leadership is more often
dependent on the President’s power to persuade others that what he wants of them is also compatible
with the pursuit of their own interests. The successful launching of the Marshall Plan is an example
of a President with minimal political capital achieving a critical foreign policy goal through the
effective use of the informal powers of his office. Truman faced the uphill battle of convincing a
Republican and traditionally isolationist Congress and a Treasury department focused on controlling
spending, that massive European aid deserved their support. The domestic political context in 1947
was further characterized by animosity over Truman’s veto of the Republican leadership’s key
legislative initiatives and the assumption that Truman would be easily defeated in the upcoming
1948 presidential election.
He had a key advocate in the figure of General George C. Marshall pushing for the plan that bore
his name from State and the support of the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Arthur Vandenberg. All the resources of the administration were unleashed to back the
plan and special care was taken to meet the terms Vandenberg insisted on to maintain his support,
which included frequent personal meetings with the President and Marshall and extensive liaisons
between Congress and the agencies involved with implementing the plan. Truman even deferred
to Vandenberg’s choice of a Republican to head the new agency created to administer the program.
These “bargains” subsequently resulted in key players lending their prestige and influence to make
the proposed European Recovery Program a reality.23
The few cases discussed here highlight the linkages between presidential power and effective
presidential leadership. The American political system’s institutional design, with its unique blend
of shared and separate powers, means that key actors often have divided loyalties, a result of serving
multiple masters in government. Even players within the executive branch are also responsible to
Congress and have allegiance as well to their staffs and departments to represent their bureaucratic
interests. Fulfilling the President’s policies, in addition, necessarily involves interagency cooperation
and overcoming the disparate bureaucratic interests of each. Presidential power is as much a function
of personal politics as it is of formal authority or position.24
CONGRESS: DOES AN EFFECTIVE CHECK REMAIN ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
Most texts examining the extent of the presidential-congressional partnership in national
security policymaking cite the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin’s musing that the Constitution
“is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”25 What does the
historical record suggest about the President’s capacity to dominate national security policy? Is the
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American political tradition that Congress defers to the Executive in foreign and security policy,
weighing in with countervailing powers only by exception? Can Congress regain its lost clout and
limit presidential overreaching?
An objective assessment of the congressional-executive struggle over the control of national
security policies will reveal several findings. First, American history is replete with examples of
serious Congressional quarrels with the President over the conduct of foreign policy. Second, periods
of deference to the executive have been limited, and even then, included at least tacit approval of
the basic parameters of U.S. foreign policy. Third, as a result of congressional reforms in the 1970s
Congress gained an increased capacity to challenge presidential policies with the creation of the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the expansion of personal
and committee staffs. These tools boosted the Congress’ analytical ability and contributed to
more enhanced oversight of foreign policy and a greater trend toward legislating specific aspects
of foreign policy.26 Finally, the congressional-executive relationship on use of force issues seeks a
comfortable equilibrium. Periods of congressional acquiescence are often interrupted by perceived
executive overreach that leads to the reassertion of congressional authority. Such was the context
for the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973.
However, the net result of this struggle over time has been what one report called “the
executive’s slow-motion coup” made possible by Congress, itself, which has been complicit in its
own diminution of power instead of guarding its institutional prerogatives.27 Even though Congress
periodically fought back with such measures as the War Powers Act and the enactment of FISA in
1978, enforcing the oversight provisions mandated in these initiatives has been uneven amounting
in the overall concession of power to the executive. Some question whether it is even possible in
the current political environment of polarized politics favoring partisan loyalties over institutional
obligations to correct the imbalance between congressional and executive power.
ENTER THE JUDICIARY: WILL IT ACT TO RESTORE THE BALANCE?
Beginning with George Washington, presidents have drawn on the institutional competencies of
the executive and formal powers to play an active and assertive role in foreign affairs and national
security issues. President Thomas Jefferson essentially conducted the Louisiana Purchase on his
own. Abraham Lincoln, citing war powers, governed without Congress and suspended the courts.
Franklin Roosevelt oversaw the establishment of a plethora of federal agencies empowered to make
policy in their realms in order to lift the country out of the Depression. Justice Robert H. Jackson’s
1952 decision has been cited in the debate over President George W. Bush’s use of presidential
power. Justice Jackson rejected President Harry Truman’s claim that as Commander-in-Chief he
had the inherent power to seize the nation’s steel mills. This decision has been cited as precedent
for future Supreme Court deliberations of the issue. Justice Jackson’s framework for judging the
constitutionality of assertions of executive power is outlined below and was at the center of the
confirmation hearings of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito.28 Many believe that many aspects
of the question of presidential overreach will come before the Supreme Court, giving the Court a
unique opportunity to reshape the balance between the executive and Congress.
Three Political Contexts.
Justice Jackson laid out three possible political contexts characterizing congressional-presidential
relations in the national security arena. First, presidential power is maximized when the President
acts pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress in a given area. In such periods of

73

concordance, presidential leadership is virtually unchallenged. Such cooperation may be attributed
to agreement over the major policy decisions in play. Presidential power has also been at its height
during times of national crisis and war. Lincoln largely got his way in the conduct of the Civil War.
In the 20th century, Woodrow Wilson until 1919, and Franklin Roosevelt after 1941, enjoyed an
advantage over the control of foreign policy. The postwar era through the mid-1960s was another
period of presidential dominance rooted in broad agreement over policy. Harry Truman, Dwight
Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson all governed during major wars or at the height
of the Cold War, and each had relative control over national security and foreign policy.29 President
George W. Bush contended that the 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the president “to use
all necessary and appropriate force” to respond to the September 11, 2001, attacks and to prevent
such attacks in the future served as implied authorization for detention and surveillance programs
incident to the use of force in wartime. However, it is clear that the Administration and Congress
shared sharp differences of opinion over the matter.
Each period of perceived presidential overreach was followed by a backlash or resurgence of
congressional power. Following the Civil War, powerful Congresses dominated the Presidency in
the late 19th century, and Congress handed Wilson the devastating political and personal defeat
of rejecting the Treaty of Versailles with a reassertion of congressional power that resulted in the
domination of foreign policy until World War II.30 The War Powers Act of 1973 was the culmination
of Congress’ break with the President over the conduct of the Vietnam War and its reemergence in
national security affairs.
Second, presidential independence is possible if Congress is indifferent or acquiesces in a particular
policy area. In this political context Congress falls short of playing the role of constructive partner
to critique, build support for, and improve on the President’s foreign and security policy. Many
factors may contribute to such a scenario. There is a tendency in Congress to view foreign and
security policy through domestic political lenses or from the perspective of special interests, which
may both be barriers to judging foreign policy initiatives on the basis of the national interest.
Presidential independence may also be possible simply because Congress is not paying attention to
the administration’s policies. Domestic issues often dominate the congressional agenda in peacetime.
Furthermore, Congress may neglect its responsibilities in foreign affairs and devote too little time
to rigorous programmatic oversight.31 In both the concordant and acquiescent political contexts, the
President’s leadership is not essential. However, in the third context to be considered, presidential
leadership is critical.
Presidential power in security and foreign policy is at its lowest ebb when the administration’s desired
action is incompatible with the expressed or implied will of the Congress. An analysis of congressionalpresidential relations in the Vietnam War illustrates a dramatic conversion of Congress’ perception
of its role in checking presidential war making powers. Its 1964 passage of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution essentially ceded to President Johnson the “blank check” he sought to deal with the
crisis in Southeast Asia. The near unanimous backing in Congress (there were only two dissenting
votes in the Senate) gave the President authority to take all “necessary measures” to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United States and “to prevent further aggression.” Johnson’s
interpretation of his Commander-in-Chief powers, which President Richard Nixon took to even
greater heights as his successor, was an open-ended doctrine permitting the President to order
armed forces into combat whenever the President determined that the security of the United States
was threatened.32
As the administrations’ prosecution of the war continued, Congress retreated from its role of
presidential cheerleader and gradually began to reassert its authority. Congressmen increasingly
traveled to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s to take stock of the war, the Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee held televised hearings in 1966 and by the early 1970s Congress changed its rules
for considering defense appropriations bills so that individual amendments attempting to limit
or influence the policy could be considered without rejecting the entire defense appropriations
package.33 Continuation of presidential dominance was challenged in the face of a growing majority’s
disagreement with the Vietnam policy. Even broader consensus that the Nixon Administration
had overreached with the assertion that the executive had unlimited discretionary authority as
Commander-in-Chief to send American troops into action around the world, led to the passage of
the War Powers Act.
The act established procedures in three main areas: presidential consultation with Congress,
presidential reports to Congress, and congressional termination of military action. Congress’ intent
was to assert its authority via procedural constraints limiting the ability of the President to commit
U.S. forces abroad. The act called for the President to consult with Congress “in every possible
instance” before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, declared that the
President must report to Congress within 48 hours when such forces are introduced, and mandated
that forces be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes that they remain.34
The continuous shifting between the political contexts discussed above is indicative in the
ambiguous role the War Powers Act has had since its passage. President Nixon rejected it out of
hand with his veto of the measure in 1973. Congress shot back with its overwhelming override35
asserting its intent to expand its influence in national security policy making with measures beyond
the blunt instrument of withholding funds.
In practice, Congress has not consistently asserted the authority granted in the act. Presidents,
meanwhile, have been careful not to acknowledge the law’s constitutionality, while avoiding direct
confrontations with Congress over its provisions. In fact, Congress has managed to get the President
to honor the War Powers Act only once, in an obscure 1975 Marine action to recapture a tanker
off the coast of Cambodia.36 Depending on lawmakers’ overall view of the President’s proposed
intervention, they may sit on the sidelines or strive to be consulted. Presidents continue to insist
on flexibility and may seek Congress’s explicit authorization for an impending action, but without
admitting that such action is being taking in order to comply with the Act. There is, however, an
acceptance, if grudgingly, that the War Powers Act stands as a reminder of the ultimate need to
get at least congressional acquiescence, and, ideally, congressional approval for the commitment of
troops.37 Since the introduction of the War Powers Act into congressional-presidential relations all
three political contexts, enthusiastic concord, indifferent acquiescence, and expressed disagreement
with the President’s foreign and security policy continue to occur.
The controversy surrounding President Bush’s domestic surveillance program illustrated
the political context of expressed disagreement between the Administration and Congress. This
raised the ire of the usually acquiescent Republican Congress because it sidestepped the oversight
provisions outlined in FISA. The Republican Chair of the Senate Judiciary committee, Senator Arlen
Specter, conducted hearings to dispute the Administration’s claim that its broad powers to fight
terrorism overrode specific legislation prohibiting warrantless eavesdropping. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales testified before the Judiciary Committee in February 2006 that the Administration
reasonably interpreted the 2001 authorization of force resolution as the legal justification for its
actions. However, when two laws seem to come in conflict, the law which is more specific tends to
prevail unless a law meant to supersede an earlier one specifically includes language to the contrary.38
The FISA debate was unique because it brought together elements of wartime presidential powers
within the context of actions contrary to “the express will of Congress.” Indeed Senator Lindsey
Graham warned Attorney General Gonzales that the Administration’s expansive interpretation of
the 2001 resolution may make it “harder for the next president to get a force resolution if we take
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this too far.”39 Two years later when Gonzales’ replacement, Michael Mukasey, appeared before
the Judiciary Committee its chairman expressed his frustration that lawmakers have been almost
completely unsuccessful trying to hold the executive branch accountable for its actions on the issues
of torture, the CIA’s destruction of interrogation videos, and White House claims of executive
privilege, and the “terrorist surveillance program.”40 Senator Specter vented to Attorney General
Mukasey, “Congressional oversight has been so ineffective, notwithstanding Herculean efforts for
the last three years. The courts provide a balance, a separation of powers. . .the only effective way
of dealing with what is argued to be executive excesses is through the courts.”41 Congressional
angst notwithstanding, the current balance of power between the executive and Congress is likely
to stand unless the courts address the alleged executive excesses.
Keys to Effective Presidential Leadership.
The executive branch’s institutional competencies make the President the most important actor
in foreign and security policy. The President, alone, has command of the bully pulpit to give him an
unrivaled voice in policy debates. The President is also the actor in the American political system
best positioned to consider the national interest. Since World War II, control over foreign and
security policy has increasingly been centralized in the executive. The government’s expertise for
formulating and implementing foreign and security policy is largely resident in the Department
of State and the Department of Defense, with the National Security Council also assuming an
increasing amount of authority and influence—all three components of the executive branch. Yet
effective leadership is not a given. Perhaps the broadest and most common sense recommendation
comes from presidential scholar Paul Quirk, who contributes the concept of “strategic competence.”
Quirk argues that presidents must have a well-designed strategy for achieving the competencies
they need to effectively lead. In this view, the key competencies to be mastered are policy substance,
policy process, and policy promotion. Policy expertise results from years of attentive engagement
in the major national issues. The development of direct in-depth personal competence in policy
areas is necessarily selective, but a base knowledge of the key issues is essential to the president’s
recognition of the elements of responsible debate and to responsible decision-making.42 Anything
less than this, Quirk argues is minimalist and may impede intelligent decision making.
A minimalist president. . .will not fully appreciate his own limitations. By consistently neglecting the
complexities of careful policy arguments, one never comes to understand the importance of thorough analysis.
In politics and government, at least, people generally do not place a high value on discourse that is much more
sophisticated than their own habitual mode of thought.43

To lead effectively, presidents must also be competent in the processes of policy making. The
President sits atop a system of complex organizational and group decision making processes and
must ensure that the Administration has put in place reliable decision making processes. The major
threats to effective national security policy making processes are intelligence failures, groupthink
and other malfunctions of the advisory process,44 and failing to effectively coordinate within the
interagency process and beyond the executive branch as appropriate.45 Finally, building coalitions
with congressional leaders and key interest groups, and using the bully pulpit to take the case to
the public are essential ingredients for effective policy promotion once policy decisions have been
made.
Lee Hamilton offers his advice for effective presidential leadership in foreign and national
security policy from his perspective as the former chairman and long time ranking Democrat on
the House Committee on International Relations. Presidents must make foreign policy a priority

76

and set forth a day-to-day course that is driven by an overall strategic vision. Hamilton argues
that the foreign and security policy arena is uniquely dependent on the President’s attention and
leadership. Too often an issue receives intense attention and scrutiny for a short time, but then the
Administration fails to remain sufficiently focused or to expend the requisite resources to achieve
success. The President is also uniquely positioned to forge the personal relations with foreign heads
of state that are critical to alliance building and to articulate U.S. policies and the associated national
interests with clarity to the American people.46
In a system of shared and separate powers in national security policymaking, successful policy will
rarely be the result of strong-arming the Congress or the American people through the overplaying
of formal powers. The Supreme Court is extremely reluctant to check the President’s power while
a war is in progress. Presidential leadership in national security policy making effectively blends
presidential authority with a consideration of the institutional competencies that the rival branch
brings to the development and execution of strategy.
As the most accessible and representative branch of government Congress can help mediate
between the American people and the foreign policy elite. Through the hearings process, Congress
can also help to educate the public on complex foreign and security policies. Testifying before
the appropriate committees also forces the Administration’s top officials to articulate and defend
their policies However, some observers are concerned that this check on executive power is being
weakened by an Administration reluctant to make senior officials available for sworn congressional
testimony or to provide documents to relevant committees, citing the confidentiality of executive
branch communications.47
Debates over contentious and weighty matters of national security, such as whether or not to
authorize the use of force, engage the public and strengthen the policy process. Passing legislation
in support of the Administration’s policies can also help to strengthen the President’s hand before
international bodies, adversaries, and allies. In the case of the Gulf War, Congressional leaders
insisted on being consulted and on debating the issue before authorizing the use of military force.
President George H.W. Bush, however, feared that weak support or a split vote would be worse
than no vote at all and might actually weaken his hand in the face of Iraqi aggression. President Bush
maintained throughout the period of congressional consultation that regardless of the outcome in
Congress he still had the constitutional right to commit U.S. forces to battle. In the end, the Congress
passed the resolution with a clear victory in the House, 250-183, and a squeaker in the Senate, 52-47.48
Effective presidential leadership in foreign and security policy recognizes Congress’ constitutional
role in the process and seeks ways to ensure that sustained consultation is a characteristic of the
executive strategy for interacting with Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL-PRESIDENTIAL COLLABORATION IN THE WAR IN IRAQ
The open-ended resolution Congress passed in October 2002 granted the President broad
authority to use any means he determined necessary and appropriate—including military force—
to respond to any security threat posed by Iraq.49 Critics contended that in contrast to the 1991
appeal of President Bush’s father to authorize force on the eve of conflict when key conditions
related to its prosecution were well known, “The president is asking Congress to delegate its
constitutional power to declare war before he has decided we need to go to war, but he has not
adequately explained what this war will look like.”50 Others argued President Bush’s request was
constitutionally inappropriate because it was seeking a conditional grant of power, leaving in the
President’s hands the decision to change the nation into a state of war. These critics contend that a
nonbinding resolution declaring support for the President’s efforts to make Iraq comply with UN
resolutions followed by the authorization to use force if peaceful means fail may have been more
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appropriate. Such a two-step approach would have left Congress in the loop up until the point
when the President was ready to begin military action.51
Although some Republicans had concerns about endorsing the new doctrine of preemption,
they deferred to the President. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, many Democrats
felt pressure to “get this question of Iraq behind us” so they could return to other issues that they
thought would be successful for them in the elections. At the height of the House debate, less that
40 members could be found on the floor. On the Senate side no more than 10 senators were in
attendance. The resolution passed 296 to 133 in the House and in the Senate 77 to 23.52
Observers noted that the debate over the Iraq war was a pale shadow of the Senate’s more
vigorous role in the past. Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein commented on the Senate’s role
on the eve of the Iraq war, “The Senate is struggling to find an appropriate role to play. I think you’d
be hard-pressed to suggest the Senate is a great debating body—on anything.”53 The concordantacquiescent political context that has characterized congressional-presidential relations since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may have contributed to executive overreach in ways that
ultimately weakened President George W. Bush’s ability to sustain support for his Iraq strategy.
The political environment in the run-up to the War in Iraq was conducive to the executive “going
it alone” vis-à-vis Congress. Although the Congress put up little resistance over the open-ended
resolution to use force in Iraq, this support occurred within a climate of some angst on the Hill
over the Administration’s attitude toward the role of Congress in defense policy. Congressmen of
both parties complained that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld “tells lawmakers little and demands
immense discretion.”54 Complaints continued throughout the Bush Administration accusing it of
thwarting Congress’s investigative authority. Some lawmakers were frustrated that their attempts
to get more information about the Administration’s impending war plans and strategy came up
empty. Administration officials were unable to answer with any specificity questions related to the
cost of the war or of the reconstruction effort to follow before lawmakers cast their votes.
Some members of Congress demanded to hear the Administration’s plans for the postwar
occupation, but were denied such consultations based on the argument that it would not be proper
to plan for the aftermath of a conflict that the President had not yet decided to fight. The “ends”
that the President advanced shifted among competing candidates, eventually settling on the need
to disarm Saddam Hussein and dismantle the imminent threat that his weapons posed.
Scholars pointed out that the doctrine of pre-emptive military strikes added a “new wrinkle to
the Imperial Presidency,” because the trigger for the use of force is classified intelligence.55 Richard
Durbin, a member of the Senate intelligence committee, complained that an insufficient body of
intelligence was declassified in the run-up to the vote on Iraq hindering the ability of his colleagues
to make an informed vote.
The choice to maximize the powers of the presidency, while marginalizing the participation of
the Congress may have put the strategy at risk. Congress shares responsibility for the policy due
to its decision to support the open-ended resolution. However, the emphasis on regime change
through invasion without laying out all aspects of a comprehensive strategy complete with clear
strategic ends, a thorough explanation of the ways or courses of action the Administration would
pursue to achieve the ends, and a good faith estimate of the means or cost to the American people
in terms of lives and treasure made it more likely that the Administration would be on the defensive
when the strategy ran into difficulty.
Indeed, in September 2003, when the Bush Administration finally delivered the first major bill for
the war to Congress in the form of a request for $87 billion dollars to fund Iraqi reconstruction and
the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of the fiscal year, Congress pushed
back mightily. Pent up frustration over the lack of collaboration with the legislative branch was
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evident. Senator Diane Feinstein remarked, “We want to be good Americans. We want a bipartisan
foreign policy. We know the time is tough. We want to be with you. But there’s a feeling that you
know it all. The administration knows it all. And nobody else knows anything. And, therefore,
we’re here just to say, ‘Yes, sir. How high do we jump?’ And at some point we refuse to jump.”56
More direct was Senator Robert Byrd’s comment to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
“Congress is not an ATM. We have to be able to explain this huge, enormous bill to the American
people.”57
The Administration sustained another wave of attacks in January 2004 when its Chief Weapons
Inspector in Iraq, David Kay, concluded that there were no large stocks of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in Iraq before the war. “Based on what I’ve seen is that we are very unlike to find stockpiles,
large stockpiles of weapons. I don’t think they exist.” “It turns out we were all wrong.”58 Democrats
charged this was further proof the war was based on false premises. Lawmakers on both sides of
the aisle took issue with the certainty of the language that Administration officials used with regard
to the pre-war intelligence and some questioned whether Administration officials misled them.
Members of Congress complained that the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, gave
his personal assurance in closed-door hearings that WMD stocks would be found in Iraq. “He was
telling the senior people in the Administration . . . that the weapons were absolutely there, that they
were certain the stuff was there.”59 Ohio Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican on the Intelligence
Committee, told the Columbus Dispatch, that he was not sure he would vote to authorize war with
Iraq if he had to do it all over again.60 Meanwhile, on the 2004 campaign trail, Democratic presidential
candidates took aim at the Administration. “We were misled not only in the intelligence but misled
in the way that the President took us to war,” the Democratic front-runner, Sen. John F. Kerry (MA),
said when asked about Kay’s conclusions.61
The Administration’s critics faulted the lack of consensus building and derided its unwillingness
to collaborate with either international allies or its domestic partners in the national security
policymaking process. As the popularity of the Iraq War wanes in the face of its $500 billion price tag
by early 2008 and deaths of American servicemen creep upward of 4000,62 the Bush Administration
stands undeterred in its approach to executive power. The sweeping assertion of the powers of the
presidency is grounded in a belief that the full power of the executive must be restored in order to
prevail in the War on Terrorism.63 Leaving the Congress and the Courts in its wake, however, is at
least politically flawed and may provoke a reaction from these bodies that ultimately cuts back on
presidential powers.
Supporters of the Administration, on the other hand, laud the resurgence of presidential power
and maintain that the Administration’s approach is merely a corrective action necessary to reverse the
erosion of presidential prerogatives in recent decades. According to this view, the Administration’s
approach is to be admired as a model in presidential leadership,
To achieve all this, Bush staged one of the most impressive exercises of presidential power in modern times.
He used all the tools at hand: the bully pulpit, TV, personal persuasion in the Oval Office, and the skillful
deployment of top officials in his administration. And, not to be underestimated, there was sheer presidential
bullheadedness. When a president takes a firm and defensible position and doesn’t flinch, he normally prevails.
. . .One telling result of Bush’s full-throttle use of his presidency was a far greater percentage of Democratic
support for his congressional war resolution than the elder President Bush won in 1991 after Iraq had invaded
Kuwait.64

Is President Bush’ leadership vis-à-vis Iraq firm, resolute leadership appropriate to the national
security challenges inherent in fighting the security threats facing the United States in the twenty-first
century or imperial presidential overreach, that if continued, will ultimately lead to a failed strategy
for fighting the War on Terrorism? The historical record indicates that policy is strengthened when
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each branch understands its proper role, powers, and limitations in foreign policy. An analysis of
the case of the war in Iraq suggests that both branches have fallen short of this ideal.
CONCLUSION
The American republic’s very essence lies in its allocation of power across the political system.
The Founders envisioned a struggle for power between actors enabled with competing powers
to keep each other in check. That such struggles continue is a testament to the continued viability
of the founding blueprint. In the current political environment, the backdrop of national security
seems to present an obstacle to the balanced interplay of the President, Congress, and the Courts.
But the Founders’ institutional design was undertaken with a realistic expectation that national
security matters could be at the heart of power plays among the government elite placed in each of
three empowered branches. Liberty could not be forfeited, the Founders assumed, unless key actors
chose not to employ their countervailing power to preserve it. Security, meanwhile, would depend
on the adoption of an effective strategy for victory. At the early stages of the “Long War,” balancing
the quest for security with the preservation of liberty requires a collaborative employment of the
national security powers that the President, Congress, and the Courts share.
Effective conduct of national security policy depends on understanding one’s power, its limits,
and the recognition that other actors’ actions also shape the policy battlefield. Successful national
security policy exploits the institutional competencies that the Framers designed into the American
political system. Coordinated efforts that link the President’s national security policy initiatives with
Congress’ unique capacity to vet the policy, educate the public, and ultimately lend its support are
more likely to lead to successful strategy. Such policy must also withstand the scrutiny of the Courts
empowered to rein in the President or Congress when either entity oversteps its allocation of power.
Successful policy implementation, furthermore, is reliant on competent executive decisionmaking,
efficient bureaucratic processes and the keen oversight of lawmakers, the media, and the American
people.
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CHAPTER 6
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES: 1990 TO 2007
Richard M. Meinhart
The five Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1990—Generals Powell (1989-1993),
Shalikashvili (1993-1997), Shelton (1997-2001), Myers (2001-2005), and Pace (2005-2007)—used an
unclassified national military strategy to provide advice on the military’s strategic direction to the
President and Secretary of Defense and communicated that direction to Congress and the American
people. The Chairman’s responsibilities as the nation’s senior military advisor to provide this
strategic advice, along with many other tasks, are specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. These increased
responsibilities were a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), considered to be the most
significant piece of defense legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 that established
the Defense Department.1 The GNA was the result of almost 4 years of somewhat contentious
dialogue and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and
the Reagan administration on how best to organize the Defense Department to strengthen civilian
authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources,
and better execute in the field to respond to the nation’s security challenges.2
While this chapter will discuss the strategic environment each Chairman faced in more detail
as it analyzes these four strategies, the first three Chairmen were challenged by an environment
that began with the Gulf War and continued with an increasing number of other regional military
operations across the spectrum of conflict as the decade progressed. They had to meet these
challenges while accommodating slowing declining financial resources and a Cold War equipped
force reduced by about one-third. Since 2000, and particularly after September 2001, the last
two Chairmen faced different security challenges dominated by the focus on terrorism, as most
evidenced by the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, while needing to simultaneously transform by
developing future capabilities to achieve the vision of full spectrum dominance. They had to meet
these challenges with greater financial resources, better technology, and with a greater reliance
on activating Reserve forces to meet operational force requirements.3 The four national military
strategies were the key formal way each Chairman advised the nation’s leaders on how best to meet
these challenges, which are summarized in Figure 1.
1990s

2000s

Regional competition and threats
Gulf War
Greater number of military operations
Declining financial and personnel resources
Need to integrate technology
Robust overseas bases and deployed force
Well maintained Cold War equipment

Global War on Terror
Iraq and Afghanistan
Continued global engagements
Increasing financial resources
Need to transform to capabilities
Less global infrastructure and forces
Updated but worn equipment

Figure 1. Chairmen’s Strategic Environment.
This chapter will focus on the Chairmen’s leadership challenges since 1990, and how they
developed and used four different national military strategies in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2004 to
respond to those challenges. This chapter describes in broad terms the strategic environment
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facing each Chairman, as it formed the basis for his subsequent military strategy. Then each of the
strategies’ key components, which were organized around an ends, ways and means construct, will
be examined. The assertion is that formal direction provided by these strategies was an important
aspect of each Chairman’s leadership legacy. Since each military strategy was part of and perhaps
the key integrating component of an overall strategic planning system, the chapter begins by briefly
examining this planning system’s integrating nature and other key characteristics.
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM
The Chairman’s strategic planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people
and organizations above him (President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council) and
the people and organizations with which he directly coordinates (Services, Agencies, and Combatant
Commanders). The Chairman has no control over any significant defense resources (Secretary of
Defense, Services, and Agencies control resources) or direct control of operational military forces
(Combatant Commanders control operational forces); however, orders to those forces flow through
the Chairman. The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders and those with whom he
coordinates through the processes and documents developed from this strategic planning system.
In addition to influencing leaders, this planning system provides insights and specific direction
for the many staffs that support these leaders. As such, the Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning
System formally evolved four times during this 16-year period in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999. It is
the Chairman’s key system that integrates the Nation’s strategy, plans, and resources that consist
by FY 2007 of approximately 2.2 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays
of $572B.4
1989 Status.
Prior to 1990 there were 10 rather large and primarily classified strategic planning products
that were described as voluminous, somewhat stove-piped, and highly bureaucratic, but this was
indicative of strategic planning products produced in the late 1980s.5 The Senate Armed Services
Committee called this style of strategic planning ineffective, and the former Chief of Naval Operations, in remarking on a strategic planning document, stated it was “. . . almost as valueless to read
as it was fatiguing to write. . . . a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance
they gave was minimal.”6 Chairman Powell recognized these deficiencies and streamlined the
system when he published Memorandum of Policy No. 7 on 30 January 1990.7
1990 Change.
The 1990 change added a front-end leader’s guidance while eliminating or combining many other
documents as ten planning products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was designed
to be documented through a formal joint strategy review for “. . . gathering information, raising
issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning and program assessments,”
that culminated with publishing Chairman’s Guidance.8 This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was
structured to provide the principal, initial direction to develop the planning system’s next three
documents: the National Military Strategy Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the
Chairman’s Program Assessment. The classified National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) was to be
developed under a rigid 2-year cycle with several parts, one of which was a National Military Strategy.
In addition, there were seven functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and
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research and development that in total comprised hundreds of more pages. The part of the NMSD
called the National Military Strategy (also classified) would be sent to the Secretary of Defense for
review and forwarded to the President for approval before returning to influence defense resource
guidance.
1993 Change.
Chairman Powell again revised this planning system in March 1993 by publishing the first change
to his earlier Memorandum of Policy No. 7.9 This change essentially codified what was executed in
previous years rather that designing a new system as had been done in 1990. This revised system
included the following guidance: Place more focus on long-range planning by requiring formal
environmental scanning to determine what challenges the strategy needed to consider; issue the
National Military Strategy as an unclassified document designed to communicate with the American
people rather than providing internal military direction; establish a Joint Planning Document to
sharpen the Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense on how to resource the strategy; and
keep the JSCP, which directs plans to implement that strategy in the field, the same.
1997 Change.
Chairman Shalikashvili made the next revision to the strategic planning system in September
1997 when he published a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01.10 This instruction
again reflected changes he instituted in prior years rather that formally changing the system before
execution. He kept the national military strategy as an unclassified document produced in a flexible
manner that looked out about five years, but he added the 1996 Joint Vision 2010 to provide longer
range direction not covered by his strategy. He also added the Chairman’s Program Recommendation
to provide leader-focused resource advice to implement both the strategy and vision. Again, the
JSCP was left unchanged.
1999 Change.
Chairman Shelton made the final formal change to the strategic planning system in September
1999.11 He did not change any major processes or products. Instead, he placed more focus on Theater
Engagement Plans to integrate the strategy’s shape component and on implementing the 1996 Joint
Vision to better support the strategy’s prepare component. This vision process involved identifying
specific 21st Century security challenges and the desired operational capabilities to meet those
challenges, all of which provided joint direction to conduct operational experiments and influence
resource decisions. Overall, this process change resulted in improvements to better execute the
national military strategy. These four changes from 1989 to 1999 are portrayed in Figure 2.12
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Figure 2. Evolution of Strategic Planning System, 1989 -99.
1999-2005.
While Chairman Myers made no official changes to the 1999 operating instruction that describes
the strategic planning system, the formal system has not been completely followed since the early
2000s. In execution, General Myers published three new strategy-related documents, kept four
existing planning products to include the unclassified national military strategy, and cancelled the
separate vision and staff-resource advice products. The three new strategy-related products he added
were: a classified 2002 and later 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism to provide
more guidance to the military’s effort to execute the nation’s strategies associated with terrorism;
a classified Chairman’s Risk Assessment that identified to Congress the strategic and military risk to
execute the national military strategy; and Joint Operating Concepts in 2003, which were revised to
the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in 2005. These last two documents identified future concepts
and capabilities associated with implementing the vision of full spectrum dominance that was now
embedded in the 2004 National Military Strategy.
2005-2007 Status.
During General Pace’s tenure as Chairman from 2005 to 2007, no formal changes were made
to the joint strategic planning system although coordination of a draft instruction was initiated to
formally and holistically integrate the many changes made in execution.13 From a strategy perspective
General Pace did not change the 2004 National Military Strategy inherited from his predecessor
although a biannual review and risk assessment were conducted for 2006 as specified in U.S. Code.
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However, in 2006 he published three military strategies on specific subjects that were subordinate
to the 2004 National Military Strategy. These strategies, the subject readily determined by their titles,
were as follows: National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, National Military Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations.
On 31 July 2007, the new Chairman, Admiral Mullen, in formally responding to a Senate Armed
Services’ question on the appropriateness of the 2004 National Military Strategy for his confirmation
indicated that its three military objectives: “. . . were broadly developed to remain relevant to the
complexities of the emerging security environment . . . and [he] would submit an updated assessment
in February 2008 as required by Title 10 Section 153(d).”14 Furthermore, in his guidance to the Joint
Staff in October 2007, Admiral Mullen identified the need for a strategy to manage the U.S. military
presence in the Middle East.15 These two responses by the new Chairman provide insight to his
focus on military strategy.
All of these Chairmen’s changes incrementally resulted in the strategic planning system evolving
from being rigid and Cold War focused at the decade’s start to being more flexible, vision oriented,
and resource focused at the decade’s end. After 2000, the strategic planning system was more
focused on the many diverse facets associated with the War on Terrorism and identifying joint
force capabilities. Throughout this 17-year period with its changing national security challenges,
the unclassified National Military Strategy remained the Chairman’s planning system keystone
document. Figure 3 is a way to envision this strategy’s importance for the entire strategic planning
system, along with what it directs or informs related to resources, concepts, and plans in 2005.16

Figure 3. Strategy—Foundation for all Major Processes.
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NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES (1989, 1992, 1995, 1999, AND 2004)
1989 National Military Strategy Document.
At the beginning of 1990, the formal manner by which the Chairman advised the President and
the Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces was via a classified and
rather voluminous National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and a shorter classified National
Military Strategy that was part of this document. Admiral Crowe published these in 1989 to provide
guidance for the resource time frame of FY 92 to 97. The process to produce this strategy was also
formally linked to the Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Hence, this was the
strategy and planning processes that General Powell inherited.
The classified 1989 National Military Strategy Document included chapters dedicated to subjects
such as: national military objectives, national military strategy, appraisal of U.S. defense policy,
intelligence appraisal, fiscally constrained force levels, net assessment options and risk evaluation.17
In addition to this basic document, there were seven separate classified annexes on functional
subjects that supported the strategy in subjects such as intelligence; research and development;
and command, control and communications. The size of some of these annexes exceeded the basic
document itself as one annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The 1989 strategy focused
on the Cold War and the Soviet Union and articulated the military element in many of the worldwide
alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This strategy, which was underpinned
with a robust nuclear deterrent, included a forward defense with many forces deployed forward,
particularly in Europe and Korea, which were then backed up by rapid reinforcement to dispersed
operating bases in many nations.
1992 National Military Strategy.
The demise of the Soviet Union, a broad retreat from ideological support of communism, and
an inclusive international coalition that reversed Iraqi aggression in Kuwait characterized the
strategic environment that influenced the 1992 strategy.18 On the positive side, democracy was
growing in many parts of the world. On the negative side, regional conflicts, animosities, and
weapons proliferation that the bi-polar world and Cold War had previously constrained now had
the potential to intensify. In essence this was the new world order, which was a concept articulated
by the President Bush in his 11 September 1990 speech to a joint session of Congress and repeated
many times later.19
The 1992 strategy, which was unclassified and only 27 pages long, was a complete change from
the previous one in clarity, conciseness, and strategic direction. While this strategy was published
in January 1992, its roots can be traced to the President’s National Security Strategy, the Secretary of
Defense’s policies in his Defense Planning Guidance and Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
and General Powell’s development of the Base Force. This strategy represented a “. . . shift from
containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible
strategy that is regionally oriented and capable of responding to the challenges of this decade.”20
In essence, this was the most fundamental change in the U.S. military strategy since the global
containment strategy and Cold War that began in the 1950s. The military’s primary objective was
now focused on deterring and fighting regional wars rather than containing a superpower rival.
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This strategy was based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and
security. It was built on the following four foundations: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, which
consisted of a credible nuclear deterrent composed of offensive and defensive capabilities; Forward
Presence, which consisted of forces continually stationed or deployed worldwide; Crisis Response,
which was the ability to respond quickly to more than one regional crisis; and Reconstitution, which
involved the ability to mobilize personnel, equipment, and the industrial base to rebuild military
strength. The strategy also specified eight strategic principles that reinforced those four foundations.
They were: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic
agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force. In concluding, the strategy
described how to employ forces and listed the broad military force structure, called the “Base Force,”
to implement the strategy.
This Base Force, which was determined earlier, was broadly composed of strategic nuclear forces,
Army divisions, Navy ships, Marine expeditionary forces, and Air Force fighter wing equivalents.
When compared to the 1991 force structure, the Base Force was significantly smaller by the following
representative systems or organizations: 460 missiles and 16 nuclear submarines from the strategic
forces; 4 active and 2 Army Guard Divisions; 80 naval ships and 3 Carrier Battle Groups; and 7
Active and 1 Reserve Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents.21 The strategy clearly conveyed to the
American people, one of the main target audiences if not the most important, why they needed a
military and in what size. The American people and Congress were clamoring for a peace dividend
as the end of the Cold War sank in and the euphoria of the 1991 DESERT STORM victory ended.
This strategy’s coordination was different than the bureaucratic coordination of other strategic
planning documents on the Joint Staff, which illustrated the flexibility in strategic planning General
Powell achieved. The strategy, which had undergone a few variations and was interrupted by
operational necessity (Gulf War and Soviet internal turmoil) from its conceptual beginnings in 1990
to the end of 1991, was finally published in January 1992. It did not go through a disciplined twoyear cycle with its associated annexes and formal assessments as specified by the planning system’s
instructions, but more quickly reacted to the strategic environment and Chairman’s leadership
needs. A Joint Staff Officer, Harry Rothman, who was part of the process, gave credit to General
Powell’s personal relationships and strategic vision of the world that broke down the impediments
resident in formal planning processes. He stated that “. . . people and not the process were more
important in the forging of the new strategy.”22 General Powell spent considerable energy convincing
other senior leaders and converting them to his broad views rather than conducting the detailed
coordination at junior or mid levels that usually influenced the document’s content.
One other significant aspect about this strategy was the foreword to the document, which
illustrated General Powell’s leadership style that combined boldness and humility. The foreword
boldly stated that the strategy was his advice, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and commanders of unified and specified commands, and that he presented it to fulfill his
responsibility under the GNA to provide such advice. Humbly and emphasizing civilian control
of the military, the foreword also stated that in determining this strategy he listened to his civilian
leadership, as the strategy clearly implemented the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s policies.
Clearly, as the first Chairman totally under the GNA, General Powell created a leadership legacy
in this strategy’s style and substance, as it was the first unclassified strategy signed by a Chairman.
Lorna Jaffe in her detailed examination of the Base Force’s development (a key part of the strategy),
concluded that Powell fully used the enhanced authority of the GNA and stated:
While he hoped to win the Services to his point of view, he did not aim for either bureaucratic consensus
through staff work or corporate consensus through JCS meetings. He never asked the Service Chiefs to vote on
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either the Base Force or recommending to the Secretary and the President adoption of a new strategy [NMS].
Rather, he thought it was more important to win the Secretary’s approval.23

1995 National Military Strategy.
The strategic environment at this time was centered on an unsettled world that exhibited
both opportunities and threats.24 The following characterized this world: regional instability as
evidenced by conflict in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda; concern about the possible proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction to hostile regional groups or terrorists from the Soviet Union’s
breakup; transnational dangers associated with fleeing refugees, diseases, and crime syndicates;
and dangers to nations undergoing transition to democratic reform, particularly those in the former
Soviet Union. The strategy developed to respond to these challenges was one of two produced
by General Shalikashvili. These strategies looked very similar to General Powell’s in style, but in
direction were very different in a few key areas.
The 1995 strategy took guidance from the President’s National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement and defined the military’s two simple main objectives -- promote stability and
thwart aggression. While the thwart aggression was embedded in the 1992 strategy, the promote
stability objective was fundamentally different than the 1992 strategy. The 1995 strategy described
a more active use of the military globally to promote stability rather than to react to instances of
instability. To achieve these two objectives the 1995 strategy defined three components: (1) peacetime
engagement, which was the broad range of non-combat activities to promote democracy, relieve
suffering and enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, which
ranged from conflict’s high end represented by nuclear deterrence to conflict’s low end represented
by peace enforcement to restore stability, security, and international law; and (3) fight and win,
which the strategy described as the military’s foremost responsibility and defined as the ability to
fight and win two major regional contingencies. In essence, the military was expected to become
more engaged in conflict prevention to include missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and nation assistance; missions not mentioned in the 1992 strategy.
The National Military Strategy also identified the military forces necessary to execute the strategy,
but earlier work by the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review had actually determined the
force structure outside the formal strategy development process. While the military missions were
growing in non-combat areas, the force structure was decreasing from the 1992 Base Force. For
example, active Army divisions declined by two, the Air Force lost six fighter wings, and Navy
combatant ships went from 450 to 346.25 In addition, reconstitution, defined in the 1992 strategy as
forming, training, and fielding new fighting units along with activating the industrial base, dropped
out of the 1995 strategy altogether. Hence, maintaining readiness became ever more important as the
force became smaller and was used more frequently. This readiness focus was greatly emphasized
by Chairman Shalikashvili, as he used words related to readiness in his annual Posture Statements
to Congress with significantly greater frequency than Chairman Powell.26
This strategy’s development was significantly different than the 1992 strategy, as it followed
the more flexible processes and overall structure outlined in the 1993 instructions that changed
the planning systems. The strategy included information summarized from another strategic
planning product, the joint strategy review, and reflected the conceptual outline as defined
in the 1993 memorandum.27 This illustrated that formal processes, as well as people, drove this
strategy’s development. This also reflected General Shalikashvili’s leadership style, which could
be characterized as using interpersonal skills to develop and value consensus and using strategic
planning processes to help achieve and implement that consensus.28 In addition, since this strategy
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was similar in style to the previous one, an existing strategic planning process could more easily
produce an evolutionary vice revolutionary product.
1997 National Military Strategy.
Opportunities and threats again characterized the strategic environment in 1997.29 The
opportunities were the lower threshold of global war and the potential for a more peaceful world.
The four principal threats this strategy identified were: (1) regional dangers as primarily represented
by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; (2) asymmetric challenges as represented by state or non-state actors
to include terrorists that might possess weapons of mass destruction; (3) transnational dangers such
as extremism, ethnic or religious disputes, crime, and refugee flows; and (4) wild cards that could
arise from unexpected world or technology events as yet undefined or by a synergistic combination
of the other three threats.
To respond to these challenges, the strategy centered on concepts described by the three simple
words of shape, respond, and prepare. These words and concepts were more broadly articulated for
all elements of a nation’s power in the President’s May 1997 National Security Strategy and also
used in the Secretary of Defense’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. In integrating advice from
the President and Secretary of Defense these words took the following meaning in the military
strategy: “U.S. Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power to Shape the
international environment and Respond to the full spectrum of crisis, while we Prepare Now for an
uncertain future.”30
The 1997 NMS built on the work of the previous strategy, but was different in four main areas.
First, it more specifically identified the asymmetric and wild card threats, which in hindsight could
conceptually reflect the characteristics of the al Qaeda organization and the subsequent 9/11 attacks
four years later. Second, it strongly made the case for why the military needed to be involved
with shaping the international environment. While doing so, it clearly emphasized the warfighting
aspect when it stated: “Our Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”31
Third, it identified the force structure to execute the strategy in greater detail than previously, which
may have been a way for the Chairman to more definitively specify needed force structure. For
example, the strategy now identified the required numbers of: Army Corps, cavalry regiments and
National Guard enhanced brigades; naval attack submarines and amphibious groups; and defense
department civilians, Coast Guard personnel and special operations forces. Fourth, in preparing
for the future, the strategy established an early foundation for the current joint force and defense
transformation when it identified the characteristics for a multi-mission, joint, and interoperable
force. This was clearly the greatest joint focus of any military strategy to date.
This strategy was also developed within the strategic planning process. It relied on two other
1996 strategic planning documents. The Joint Strategy Review influenced the strategy’s strategic
environment assessment, and the section that covered preparing for the future leveraged the concepts
identified in the 1996 Joint Vision 2010. Since the strategy came out in September, a short time after
the President’s May National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s first Quadrennial Defense
Review, it illustrated the interconnectivity and strong collaboration that existed among the military
and civilian leadership in the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff. While General Shalikashvili signed this strategy in his last month as Chairman, it was fully
coordinated with General Shelton, the announced incoming Chairman.
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2004 National Military Strategy.
Prior to the publication of the National Military Strategy in 2004, the nation experienced a
dramatic change in the strategic environment that started with the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and included the strategic response of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan)
in October 2001 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq) in March 2003. In essence the military
was fully engaged in the War on Terrorism in these two countries as well as in others. A defense
strategy being written in concert with this military strategy placed the persistent and emerging
security challenges the United States faced into four categories of traditional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive.32 A traditional challenge was more associated with states employing well formed
militaries and systems that typified the massive state-on-state warfare characteristic of World War
I and World War II. Irregular challenges reflected unconventional methods used by both state
and non-state entities against a stronger state, or somewhat akin to what occurred during parts of
the Vietnam War. Catastrophic challenges focused on terrorist or rogue use of weapons of mass
destruction or methods producing WMD-like effects, which reflected concerns identified in the 1997
strategy. The last category was disruptive, which described competitors making a breakthrough by
technological means to overcome the United State’s advantage in a particular operational domain.
This last category reflected aspects of the 21st century environment that previous strategies had not
considered.
This military strategy amplified these four broad defense challenges when it specified three
key aspects of the environment that had unique military implications. These three aspects were
under the headings: a wider range of adversaries; a more complex and distributed battlespace;
and technology diffusion and access. The wider range of adversaries aspect ran the gamut from
established or rogue states to non-state organizations, such as crime syndicates or terrorists
networks and finally to individuals. The complex battlespace aspect included: the entire globe,
whether in urban or desolated areas; defined physical space or cyber space; or in foreign states or
the U.S. homeland. Emphasis on the U.S. homeland was unique to this strategy. The technology
diffusion aspect reflected the global availability and easy access to civilian dual-use technologies
that determined adversaries could adapt for military use. The last aspect was again very different
than seen in previous military strategies.
To meet these challenges, the military strategy again built directly on defense objectives, as it
defined three key supporting military objectives. These three military objectives were organized
around three simple words of: protect, prevent and prevail. They were simply defined as: “protect
the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and
prevail against adversaries.”33
To achieve these objectives, this strategy made no reference to specific force structure as had
previous military strategies. Instead, it emphasized the desired attributes, functions, and capabilities
for a joint force. However, it also supported what came to be called a 1-4-2-1 force sizing construct
that appeared in the defense strategy. The 1-4-2-1 construct postulated that the U.S. military needed
to accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions (4);
conduct two overlapping defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1).34 Overall,
this force structure approach provided great flexibility for future force structure changes in concert
with a capability- vice threat-based approach, and it clearly had the greatest joint focus to date of
any military strategy.
The process to produce this strategy was very different from the other three strategies in many
ways. A draft of the strategy was produced in 2002 to integrate the advice of the post 9/11 2001
Defense Quadrennial Review and the 2002 National Security Strategy. However there was some question
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whether an unclassified National Military Strategy was needed. For example, a defense strategy was
published as part of the QDR, the Chairman provided military specific advice by the 2002 classified
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, and he provided unclassified operational
military advice in 2003 through the Joint Operations Concepts. However, Congress cleared up any
ambiguity that existed when it passed the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act. This Act
required the Chairman to produce a detailed report that is a biennial review of the National Military
Strategy in eight specific areas to include the strategic and military risks inherent in the strategy.35
This amendment to existing U.S. Code involving the Chairman’s responsibilities is an example of
Congress performing its oversight role. If Congress is not satisfied with the information it receives,
it will pass legislation that is then more specific on “what” the Chairman needs to provide.
The actual writing of the 2004 military strategy followed a very integrated and parallel path as
the Vice Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff stated: “So we’ve worked hand in
glove with the Secretary of Defense’s staff in developing both of these documents.”36 The Defense
Staff focused on writing a national defense strategy, the first time this was done as a separate
unclassified document, and the Joint Staff focused on writing a national military strategy. As such,
one sees the military strategy directly referencing a national defense strategy in many of its sections,
which reflects this close collaboration to ensure synchronization and alignment. While the military
strategy was completed in 2004 and copies could be located on the internet, it was officially released
at a March 18, 2005, press conference when the Under Secretary Defense for Policy and Joint Staff
Vice Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy discussed the National Defense Strategy and National
Military Strategy together.37
CONCLUSION
The National Military Strategy is the keystone document of an overarching strategic planning
system that enabled the Chairman as the nation’s senior military advisor to execute his formal
leadership responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Since 1990, each of these four
strategies identified the broad military ends, ways, and means that were needed to meet the nation’s
security challenges identified by the President in his National Security Strategy and integrated advice
by the Secretary of Defense from other documents, which now include a National Defense Strategy.
The unclassified nature of the military strategy and its completion by the Chairman to integrate
this civilian advice was a leadership legacy started by Chairman Powell that continues today. Most
importantly, this strategy directly communicates to Congress and the American people the need for
a military, what that military will do, and how it will do it to provide for our nation’s security. It
essentially creates a compact between the military and the American people that is so important in
today’s volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global security environment.
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CHAPTER 7
SECURING AMERICA FROM ATTACK:
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S EVOLVING ROLE AFTER 9/11
Frank L. Jones
At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, a clear, sunny day on the East Coast, an American Airlines
plane loaded with passengers, crew and thousands of gallons of fuel slammed into the 110-story
north tower of World Trade Center in downtown Manhattan, exploding in a massive inferno.
Seventeen minutes later, a second airplane, this time a United Airlines flight, crashed into the Center’s
twin south tower, igniting another firestorm. President George W. Bush, traveling in Florida, was
informed of the incidents and immediately departed for the capital. Before leaving, he made a brief
statement at 9:30 a.m. confirming that the planes were part of “an apparent terrorist attack” on the
United States. Less than 10 minutes after he spoke, a third airliner crashed into the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) headquarters, more commonly known as the Pentagon, setting off an enormous
fire causing hundreds of casualties; jet fuel literally ran down the corridors. The events did not
end there. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., a fourth airliner plummeted to earth in a field just outside rural
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, before it could reach its intended target, the result of a heroic effort by
the passengers to prevent another horrific act from occurring.1
In a matter of less than 2 hours, both the World Trade Center’s towers had collapsed, an
unimaginable event, and nearly 3,000 people were killed. Manhattan was a storm of dust, ash, and
debris. After the Pentagon attack, the Federal Aviation Administration, for the first time in U.S.
history, shut down the nation’s airspace, ordering all airborne planes to land immediately at the
nearest airport. In their place, U.S. fighter jets streaked into the sky above the nation, their pilots
ordered to shoot down any aircraft that did not comply. The horrific events of the morning now
surpassed the nation’s most famous day of infamy: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years
earlier.2
The terrorist attacks were stunning not only in the tragedy they produced, but also as
demonstrations of the creative lengths to which enemies of the United States could go to use
everyday technology as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against us. The capacity to wreck
havoc of this magnitude was not unexpected for the signs of such an attempt had been foretold
through a series of earlier events, both at home and overseas, including the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and an attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in Yemen in which dozens of crew
members were killed or injured. What was startling to many Americans was the inability of the
U.S. Government agencies to discern and prevent such a clever use of civilian aircraft. It was, as
one of the commissions established to investigate the incident ominously warned, “a failure of
imagination” on the part of the government.3 These words also signaled that protecting the United
States from further attack would be neither simple nor immediate despite the best intentions of U.S.
Government leaders.
Years before the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, various commissions established by
the U.S. Congress urged the President and other officials to place substantial emphasis on improving
the security of the United States against terrorist attack through increased resources, organizational
redesign, and enhanced coordination among federal, state, and local governments.4 Unfortunately,
September 11, 2001 would not only represent a distressing event in American history, it would take
this tragedy to catalyze the governments and the private sector in the United States to undertake
such a massive concerted effort to prevent such an attack from recurring. However, there was always
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the nagging realization that such an event could happen again, and if so, then the public and private
sector needed to be prepared to respond to the consequences. Such an expectation had been noted
decades before when President Calvin Coolidge gave voice to those fears in an address delivered
before the American Legion convention in Omaha, Nebraska, on October 6, 1925. “In spite of all the
arguments in favor of great military forces, no nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee
it against attack in time of peace or to ensure victory in time of war.”5 Nonetheless, as the preamble
to the U.S. Constitution underscores, it is the duty of the U.S. Government to “insure the domestic
tranquility” and “provide for the common defense.” Mindful of this obligation, U.S. Government
leaders initiated a number of actions to respond to this exceedingly complex mission.
The attacks on the United States forced President George W. Bush and other administration
officials to concentrate intently on the possibility of threats to the U.S. homeland. For DoD officials,
there was recognition that the country had become, to use military parlance, a “battlespace.” There
was an immediate refocusing from programs spending millions of dollars to develop a high-tech
missile shield to prevent a ballistic missile attack by another state to fundamental concerns about
a growing non-state threat. Thus, DoD would be given domestic duties to fight terrorism at home
because as then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained, “The government is just not
organized to deal with catastrophes on that scale, and when we do have catastrophes on that scale
we inevitably end up turning to the military.” There were skeptics nonetheless who contended that
the military would embrace this mission as it would justify force structure and increase the defense
budget, while Republican politicians would view it as an ironclad rationale for promoting national
missile defense as a component of overall homeland defense.6 More reflective thinkers recognized
that defending the U.S. homeland against terrorism required a new paradigm—a new structure
for meeting a more ambiguous challenge. The Pentagon no longer had to sell the idea of homeland
defense politically. The issue now was how to make it work.”7
The first response to this challenge was conventional with the president ordering a retaliatory
strike on Afghanistan, which was harboring the Al-Qaeda terrorist leaders who had planned the
suicide attack on Manhattan and Washington, and where this terrorist group had training camps.
Nonetheless, there was no major overhaul of U.S. military forces nor was there a significant
reallocation of funds to homeland defense missions, which had not even been defined. The 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), presented to Congress in early October, largely upheld
traditional thinking although it claimed that homeland defense was the Pentagon’s highest priority.
This document continued to stress U.S. advantages in space, information and power projection as
well as the future of its nuclear arsenal. The underlying warfighting concept remained focused
on combat with nation-states, emphasizing regime change in one war and repelling an aggressor
in another.8 One critic said the thinking remains “full speed ahead with the status quo,” while
Andrew Krepinevich, the executive director of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
a Washington, DC think tank, complained that the QDR was a “thematic” document that called for
transformation but provided no specifics on how this is to be accomplished. He was perplexed as to the
Secretary of Defense’s public statements that while the priority is on homeland defense, intelligence
and other features for the changed strategic environment, new fighter jet programs remained the
major acquisition programs.9 Krepinevich’s observation was astute. Although Rumsfeld heralded
an ambitious program for transforming the military, the changes were marginal. The Department
had already begun to deflect any serious responsibility for this new mission by declaring in the
QDR that the September 11 attacks made clear that “the Department of Defense does not and cannot
have the sole responsibility for homeland security.” The only concession mentioned expressly was
to consider establishing a new combatant commander for homeland defense.10 In the White House,
other actions were occurring at a more rapid pace. The President signed Executive Order 13228 on

100

October 8, 2001, that established the post of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security in the
Executive Office of the President as well as a Homeland Security Council, modeled on the National
Security Council, which had existed since 1947.
The creation of this post and the council required Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to name Secretary
of the Army, Thomas E. White as DoD’s first homeland security coordinator with responsibility for
representing the department in council deliberations as well as interacting with the new homeland
security advisor, a former Pennsylvania governor and member of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Thomas J. Ridge. Pundits suggested that by naming White to the coordinator mission, the Army
would have a pivotal role in whatever responsibility is given to the military for homeland defense.
White added to that perception by stating: “Since the early days of our nation, the Army, both active
and reserve, has engaged in homeland security. The Army brings enormous experience, talent and
capabilities to this effort.”11 The rhetoric was comforting to a nation still reeling from the attacks,
but the exact role that White would have remained unclear. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld soon delivered
on his promise to examine whether a separate combatant command should be established for the
purpose of securing the U.S. homeland.
By mid-October 2001, a review of the Unified Command Plan was in progress. Rumsfeld was
convinced that the current manner in which the armed forces were organized along regional lines
was inappropriate to execute a global campaign against terrorism. There was considerable concern
that transnational threats such as weapons proliferation and terrorism had not received sufficient
attention from senior commanders and that the capability to coordinate with law enforcement
concerning these threats from region to region was nonexistent. To fasten the military’s attention on
homeland defense there was also extensive discussion about the creation of an Americas Command
that would be responsible for the Western Hemisphere. In addition to this effort, the Pentagon
leadership released the defense planning guidance for the war on terrorism that consisted of three
goals: assail state support for terrorism, weaken its non-state support, and defend the U.S. homeland
from additional terrorist attacks. Pentagon officials recognized that the current Unified Command
Plan addressed the first two aims but not the third.12
By the end of 2001, Ridge and his staff were largely in place, but there were continued concerns
by lawmakers and anti-terrorism experts that Congress needed to create a permanent homeland
security post with a large staff and consolidate government agencies as part of it. The White House
disagreed, arguing that Ridge could accomplish more as an adviser with the president’s mandate
and a staff detailed from other U.S. agencies than as head of a separate bureaucracy. DoD cautiously
adopted its new homeland defense mission. By late January 2002, Defense officials sought to pull
National Guard troops from security duties at the nation’s airports, turning that responsibility over
to the new Transportation Security Administration, which Congress established by law a month
earlier. Approximately 6,000 troops were on duty at 400 airports across the United States to deter
terrorists and reassure the public about the safety of air travel. The disengagement of the National
Guard as a security force bespoke DoD’s view that other federal agencies as well as state and local
governments should handle the majority of the nation’s homeland security duties. Ridge shared this
view and declared that federal funding would be made available for this purpose. Secretary White
endorsed Ridge’s priorities, stating publicly that the military should have a limited role in guarding
the borders and policing airports and other potential terrorist targets in the United States. Instead,
it should concentrate on Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Additionally, National Guard
troops assisting in border security in some states should be relieved of this duty also. Meanwhile,
the Department of Defense was considering scaling back the air patrols the Air Force had been
conducting over major U.S. cities and critical infrastructure locations since September 11.13
White’s remarks and the slow pace at which bureaucratic reorganization was occurring suggested
to one observer, former U.S. ambassador and retired U.S. Army lieutenant general Edward Rowny,
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that there was a lack of urgency on the part of the Bush White House. Rumsfeld, however, in early
February announced a proposal to establish a new regional command, Northern Command, to
deal with the military component of homeland security. Rowny applauded Rumsfeld’s initiative
but contended that more needed to be done. He recommended that the Bush administration push
for a similar consolidation and reorganization of the intelligence, border security, and emergency
response agencies of the federal government. He also criticized Ridge’s organization as ineffective
because it lacked the needed tools and resources to handle a large-scale terrorist attack. Ridge,
in Rowny’s opinion, also had insufficient authority: he could not order federal agencies to act.
Rowny’s viewpoint was not a solitary one. Even the Bush administration recognized this deficiency,
and in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Ridge remarked that the President
was considering reorganizing some federal departments and agencies, which would require
congressional authorization.14
Meanwhile, Rumsfeld, sensing the mood of the country and particularly the Congress,
announced in April 2002, a military reorganization designed to give higher priority to homeland
defense against terrorist attacks by the establishment of Northern Command. The new command,
with headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and commanded by an Air Force general, was
tasked to oversee the defense of U.S. territory except for Hawaii and the U.S. possessions in the
Pacific Ocean. Responsibility for these areas would belong to the existing U.S. Pacific Command.
Northern Command would not only be responsible for the homeland defense mission, but would
also coordinate with other federal agencies in preparing and responding to the consequences of a
terrorist attack as well as natural and manmade disasters. Canada and Mexico would be included
as part of the command’s regional responsibilities.
Rumsfeld’s decision had its critics, particularly civil libertarians who were concerned about the
use of the U.S. military for domestic security, particularly the erosion of constraints placed on the
military by the Posse Comitatus Act, a federal law enacted after the Reconstruction in 1878, that
prohibits the regular military from performing domestic law enforcement functions. Other critics
expressed concern that the use of the military for domestic security and response diverted limited
resources and weakened the military’s effectiveness to fight wars overseas.15 Almost simultaneously
with the creation of the command, the Bush administration proposed the creation of a new executive
branch department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Rumsfeld remained determined, however, to limit the scope of DoD’s homeland defense mission.
On May 7, 2002, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he continued to stress the
importance of forward deterrence, that is, the prosecution of the war on terrorism abroad. Eventually,
he turned to the subject of homeland defense and in doing so, articulated clearly and for the first
time, the circumstances under which DoD would be involved in operations in the United States.
First, there were extraordinary circumstances that required DoD to execute its traditional military
missions and therefore, DoD would take the lead with support from other federal agencies. Examples
of these missions were combat air patrols and maritime defense operations. Also included in this
category are cases in which the president, exercising his constitutional authority as commander-inchief and chief executive, authorizes military action. This inherent authority, Rumsfeld pointed out,
may only be used in instances such as terrorist attacks, where normal measures were insufficient to
execute federal functions. The second category was more traditional: in emergency circumstances
of a catastrophic nature. Rumsfeld offered the example of responding to an attack or assisting
other federal agencies with natural disasters. In these cases, the department would be providing
capabilities that other agencies did not possess. The third category he described as missions limited
in scope, where other agencies have the lead from the outset, giving the example of security at a
special event such as the Olympics.16
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Rumsfeld stressed that of the three categories, the first one was homeland defense since the
department was carrying out its primary mission of defending the people and territory of the United
States. The other two categories were homeland security whereby other federal agencies have the
lead and DoD lent support. He continued by justifying the need for a $14 billion supplemental
funding request for fiscal year 2002, and an increase in fiscal year 2003 funding of $48 billion. He
added that both were essential for the war on terrorism but made no claim that any of the funding
would be used for homeland defense. This was understandable given his limited definition of the
department’s role.17
He also announced that the president had approved a major revision of the Unified Command
Plan and that one feature was the establishment of a combatant command for homeland defense,
U.S. Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The primary missions of the new
command were defending the United States against external threats, coordinating military support
to civil authorities as well as responsibility for security cooperation with Canada and Mexico.18
He followed this announcement with another, stating that he had established his own interim
Office of Homeland Defense, and his intention to establish, by summer, a permanent office in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. The office would ensure internal coordination of DoD policy, provide
guidance to Northern Command regarding homeland defense and support of civil authorities, and
coordinate with the White House’s Office of Homeland Security and other government agencies.19
Lastly, he assured the committee members that the department was conducting the study
on the DoD role in homeland defense directed by the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act.
Specifically, the comprehensive plan on how best to structure the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to combat terrorism, defend the homeland, and enhance intelligence capabilities was expected to be
completed during the summer.20 The plan was completed as promised.
Acting on the recommendations in that plan, in July 2002, Rumsfeld decided to reorganize
the Office of the Secretary of Defense by adding the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense based on the plan required by Congress. He selected Paul McHale, a former
Democratic member of Congress from Pennsylvania, as the first to hold this position, pending Senate
confirmation. One of the new assistant secretary’s responsibilities would be to serve as a liaison
between the Department of Defense and the proposed new homeland security department.21
Weeks later, Rumsfeld found himself, along with the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and
the Attorney General, in the midst of the Bush Administration’s controversial plan to establish a
new homeland security department using all or parts of twenty-two existing agencies, a proposal
that the President laid out in June. Rumsfeld and the other cabinet officials testified in support of
the President’s plan before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. The plan faced
substantial opposition because the 12 committees in the House of Representatives that oversaw
these agencies wanted to preserve their oversight responsibilities. Some standing committees of the
House had already voted against provisions of the proposed legislation to create the department.
The presence of the four cabinet heads before the select committee underscored not only the
seriousness of the issue, but also the interdepartmental nature of the homeland security function
and the domestic and international dimensions of the mission, ranging from border patrol and law
enforcement to immigration and the issuance of visas.22 As Attorney General John Ashcroft noted,
“America’s security requires a new approach, one nurtured by cooperation, collaboration, and
coordination, not compartmentalization, one focused on a single, overarching goal—the prevention
of terrorist attacks.”23
The emphasis on homeland defense remained more rhetoric than reality in DoD at least in terms
of funds, procurement programs, and force structure changes. The Defense Planning Guidance,
a document providing budgeting and planning guidance to DoD components, that Secretary
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Rumsfeld issued in May 2002, placed greater emphasis on the new strategic concept, “forward
deterrence,” that is, a commitment to attacking potential threats overseas. While the projection of
U.S. forces over long distances to fight new adversaries made sense, the Defense Planning Guidance
paid no attention to the support missions that the Department of Defense might have to provide
federal, state, and local responders should a WMD, such as a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or
biological device, be detonated in the United States. Instead, the emphasis was primarily on a global
strike capability with added emphasis on overseas intelligence collection, covert special operations,
unmanned air vehicles, cyber-warfare, hypersonic missiles, and the capacity to prevent an adversary
from disrupting U.S. communications and intelligence assets in space and to strike underground
targets.24 This was a position Rumsfeld articulated publicly in a Foreign Affairs article that appeared
that spring.25
This narrow perspective was expected to change because of two events. The first was that
Northern Command became initially operational as an organization on October 1, 2002. The second
event promised equally dramatic change, based on a provision in the 2003 Defense Authorization
Act, which Congress passed in October 2002. The act authorized the establishment of the position
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Four months later, in February 2003,
Paul McHale was confirmed as the first person to hold this position. Additionally, Congress
established the new Department of Homeland Security by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
enacted in November. Its first secretary would be Tom Ridge. The only major provision of the law
that affected DoD was that the Homeland Security Council was established statutorily, consisting
of the President, Vice President, Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense and the newly created
Secretary of Homeland Security.
In February 2003, the new department and the two new DoD organizations would faced the first
test of their abilities to respond to a domestic event and coordinate with other U.S. Government
organizations when the space shuttle Columbia broke up over Texas during reentry to earth. Within
an hour after the disaster, Ridge conferred with intelligence and White House officials as well as
Northern Command, and determined that the incident had not resulted from terrorism. Ridge put
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), now part of DHS, in charge of recovering
debris from the shuttle, while Secretary Rumsfeld assigned Northern Command to assist with this
effort; a variety of aircraft and ships responded.26
This experience also helped prompt a new presidential directive, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, in which DoD would ultimately have a substantial
role in implementation. In this document, the President designated the Secretary of Homeland
Security as the principal federal officer for domestic incident management. The Secretary of
Defense was tasked to provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents under
the president’s direction or when consistent with military readiness, the appropriate circumstances,
and law. The directive indicated that even during these events, military forces would remain under
the command and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Homeland Security were to develop mechanisms to promote cooperation and coordination between
the two departments. Lastly, the directive called for the formulation of a National Response Plan
(NRP) that would integrate the federal government’s domestic prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans into a single all-hazards plan. An initial version of the NRP was due to the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security by April 1, 2003, along with a recommendation
for the time needed to develop and implement a final version of this plan.27
By the beginning of April 2003, with U.S. military forces having invaded Iraq a month earlier, and
now within 50 miles of Baghdad, Rumsfeld’s view about homeland defense was apparent: the best
way to secure the United States was to pursue terrorists in their havens.28 Meanwhile, Paul McHale
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was busily putting his office in place with all the attendant bureaucratic headaches associated
with such a venture. He also had his first appearance before Congress in April, when he testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding defense of the U.S. homeland. McHale
reiterated Rumsfeld’s three conditions under which the Department of Defense would be involved
in activities within the United States. However, these conditions were already being eroded. As
McHale indicated, since September 11, 2001, DoD had flown more than 28,000 sorties over U.S. cities
and responded to more than 1,000 requests from the Federal Aviation Administration to intercept
potential air threats. Air patrols over the U.S. domestic airspace were no longer extraordinary but
routine.29
During the summer of 2003, McHale’s office would devote substantial time to a major
department-wide, Secretary of Defense-directed classified study of the homeland defense mission
and the force structure required to execute that mission. Later that year, the office would shape the
next Strategic Planning Guidance, which required his office to formulate with assistance from other
DoD components a homeland defense strategy within a year.
On December 17, 2003, President Bush approved two new homeland security directives that
affected DoD. The first document, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization and Protection, established national policy for federal departments
and agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect
them from attack. The directive recognized that there were several critical infrastructure sectors,
each with its own characteristics and operating processes. Although the DHS would have principal
responsibility for implementing this directive, specific departments were designated responsible
for collaborating with business and industry, conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments,
and encouraging risk management activities to protect against terrorist attacks or mitigate their
effects. The Department of Defense assumed responsibility for the defense industrial base, thereby
gaining another homeland security mission.30
The President also issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, National Preparedness
that established policies to bolster the preparedness of the United States to prevent or respond to
threatened or actual terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. This measure called
for the establishment of a national all-hazards preparedness goal, mechanisms for improving the
delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and defining actions
to improve preparedness at all levels of government. The Department of Defense’s role, though
not as major as other federal departments and agencies, was to provide the DHS with information
concerning organizations and functions that could be utilized to support civil authorities during a
domestic crisis.31
Despite the attention to these strategic issues, the tyranny of daily operational demands was
also present. During the Christmas holiday season, intelligence indicators stressed that al Qaeda’s
intent to carry out multiple catastrophic attacks in the United States was greater than at any point
since September 11. The indicators suggested that the terrorist group was testing the vulnerabilities
of the air transportation system, both passenger and cargo. In response, Secretary Ridge announced
an upgrade in the threat level from elevated risk to high risk or orange alert, the second highest
level in the color-coded system, after President Bush approved the recommendation by Ridge along
with senior officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, DoD,
the Justice Department, and White House staff. Raising the threat level increased security measures
across the country to protect government buildings, critical infrastructure, shopping malls and
other places where large numbers of people congregate. This decision was not made lightly. A few
months earlier, in response to al Qaeda suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and after
several orange alerts within a few months, Ridge and Rumsfeld opposed raising alert levels. Ridge
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argued that frequent changes only caused considerable psychological unease in Americans as well
as making the public cynical. Rumsfeld stated that raising the alert diverted military resources from
Iraq and Afghanistan.32 The holiday season ended uneventfully, but operational concerns continued
to intrude because of the need to refine security procedures.
Slowly and subtly, the three conditions for DoD involved in domestic activities that Rumsfeld
articulated 2 years earlier were jettisoned. In March 2004, McHale appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee to update the members on DoD’s ongoing homeland defense initiatives. At that
time he did not mention the three conditions. Instead, McHale laid out a concept of layered defense,
which he called the lines of defense. The first line of defense was combating terrorism far from U.S.
territory. The second line of defense was the air and maritime approaches to the United States and
interdicting terrorists before they reached U.S. borders, which was largely the responsibility of two
combatant commands—Northern Command and Pacific Command. Within the United States, the
domestic law enforcement community was responsible for countering terrorist attacks, in a sense
a third line of defense, with DoD ready to provide its capabilities to civil authorities, consistent
with U.S. law. However, McHale also stated that DoD had established and maintained a small
number of reaction forces in the United States. These forces consisted of U.S. Army and Marine
Corps personnel who were postured to respond to a full range of threats if ordered by the president,
and when deployed, under NORTHCOM’s command and control.33
Additionally, throughout 2004, as had been the case in 2003, DoD actively continued to enhance
its homeland defense and civil support missions. It maintained the readiness of its own forces by
hosting exercises and participating in those sponsored by other government entities. Further, it was
implementing its responsibilities under HSPD-7 regarding critical infrastructure by consolidating
funding for this effort under a single program and managing it by a program office. It also undertook
a number of supporting missions including establishing a DoD presence in the DHS’s Operations
Center, detailing personnel to DHS to fill critical specialties primarily in intelligence analysis and
communication, creating various liaison mechanisms, and identifying and transferring technology
items and equipment that DoD had or was developing that might be of assistance to federal, state and
local governments in their homeland security roles. Simultaneously, the department was responding
to requests for assistance from several civilian agencies—for example, providing emergency
support in natural disasters such as Hurricane Isabel and California wildfires. It also responded
to the ricin incident on Capitol Hill in January 2005. That incident saw the first operational use of
NORTHCOM’s Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region, which provided the command
and control of the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Response Force’s assistance to the U.S.
Capitol Police. 34
DoD support to the interagency was broadened in August 2004, when President Bush established
by executive order, the National Counterterrorism Center under the direction and control of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The primary function of the center was to serve as the hub for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism, except purely domestic intelligence
information. Additionally, it was to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism
activities by integrating all the national instruments of power.35 To that end, DoD, as well as other
partner organizations, provided personnel to assist the center with its mission.
DoD also assumed a major role in the development of the National Response Plan (NRP) required
by HSPD-5. The development of the initial NRP met with resistance from state, local and tribal
governments as well as non-governmental organizations, since they were not consulted by DHS
during its formulation. Consequently, DHS and a small group of its federal partners, including
DoD personnel, began anew—mindful of outreach to other stakeholders—in an intense writing
process of monumental proportions that addressed planning assumptions and considerations, roles
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and responsibilities of the variety of organizations involved in responding to an emergency, and
a concept of operations. The NRP identified fourteen emergency support functions, of which DoD
(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) would have the lead for public works and engineering, but would
be a supporting agency in the remaining 13. The document also included special support annexes
dealing with myriad topics such as tribal relations and private sector coordination and incident
annexes for specifically troublesome situations such as a terrorism event involving a biological
agent or hazardous materials pollution.36
The document, consisting of more than 300 pages, was approved in December 2004 by Secretary
Ridge along with 27 federal departments and agencies, the U.S. Postal Service, the American
Red Cross, the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the National Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster.
Within days of the NRP’s approval, President Bush issued a combined National and Homeland
security directive on maritime security, an initiative of his new homeland security adviser, Frances
Fragos Townsend. This directive not only established U.S. policy regarding protection of the
nation’s maritime interests, but directed the development of a national strategy for maritime security
and eight national plans addressing such critical subjects as the U.S. Government’s capability to
respond to a maritime threat, the nation’s capacity to recover from an attack or disaster affecting the
maritime infrastructure, and security of both the maritime transportation system and the related
supply chain. The President tasked DoD and DHS to lead an interagency task force to formulate
the national strategy for maritime security for his approval within six months. The eight plans were
to be delivered nearly simultaneously.37 This approach was fraught with problems since the plans
relied on the guidance framed in the strategy as well as coordination with various state and local
governments, transportation and port authorities, and maritime industry trade associations.
It turned out that maritime security was not the only domain that required additional attention.
In May 2005, a privately owned Cessna 150 airplane inadvertently penetrated the 16-mile-radius
no fly zone around Washington, DC, established after the events of September 11, and designed to
prevent air attacks on the White House and the Capitol. Federal Aviation Administration and DHS
officials could not communicate with the pilot, so Secretary Rumsfeld gave military officials the
authority to shoot the plane down, if necessary. Aircraft from DHS Customs and Border Protection
and military fighters moved to intercept the plane, and after eleven tense minutes, the pilot heeded
instructions to turn away from the city. The incident required Defense Department and civilian
officials to review the effectiveness of the air defense system for the nation’s capital. Once again,
DoD and its civilian counterparts were confronting sensitive issues involving internal governmental
decision-making, communications, and federal interagency relations as well as authorities.38 With
respect to the latter, the DHS, under the new leadership of Secretary Michael Chertoff, a former
federal judge, argued that his agency should have the shoot down authority. President Bush rejected
this request. Nonetheless, the incident led to increased congressional scrutiny of the procedures
and agency responsiveness. The event was also a warning signal that although air transportation
security had been upgraded, the focus had been limited to scrutiny of passengers and cargo security.
However, the Homeland Security Council staff contended that this issue would have to be deferred
since other areas such as domestic nuclear attention had priority.
A month earlier, President Bush issued another combined NSPD/HSPD, designed to enhance
protection against an attack in the United States using a nuclear or radiological device, and to
advance the technology and integration of detection capabilities among across federal, state, local
and tribal governments. To achieve these policy goals, the chief executive directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to create a national level Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within DHS. The
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy as well as the Attorney General were ordered to assign
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personnel to staff this new organization and to lend expertise to strengthen the development and
deployment of a detection system, coordinate the detection effort with the other government entities
in the United States, and develop a global nuclear detection architecture consisting of domestic and
international portions. The Departments of Defense, State, and Energy would design and implement
the international segment.39
June 2005 marked a critical milestone in reshaping DoD’s approach to its homeland defense and
support to civil authorities’ missions through the development and approval of DoD’s Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Although Secretary Rumsfeld directed the formulation of the
strategy in the Strategic Planning Guidance of March 2004, internal delays and bureaucratic resistance
associated with organizational change hampered progress. Nonetheless, these impediments were
ultimately overcome, and the strategy represented the Department’s vision for transforming
homeland defense and civil support capabilities.
The strategy specifically concentrated on DoD’s paramount goal: securing the United States from
direct attack. Recognizing the sensitivity associated with the role of the military in domestic affairs,
the strategy made clear that it was rooted in a respect for America’s constitutional principles. The
strategy also sought to capitalize on Secretary Rumsfeld’s commitment to transformation of U.S.
military capabilities. Thus, it examined a ten-year period and gave equal recognition of terrorist and
state-based threats to the United States.40
The strategy’s foundation was the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National
Defense Strategy. Specifically, this active, layered defense is understood to be global, seamlessly
integrating U.S. capabilities in the foreign regions of the world, the global commons of space and
cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the United States. In short,
it is defense in depth predicated on viewing the strategic environment as an open system in which
people, trade, and information move continuously and for which the entire U.S. Government
contributes to its defense through a variety of capabilities in a synchronized manner. For an active,
layered defense to be effective, it “requires superior intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis,
calculated deterrence of enemies, a layered system of mutually supporting defensive measures that
are neither ad hoc nor passive, and the capability to mass and focus sufficient warfighting assets to
defeat any attack.”41
Although the concept of an active, layered defense had a global context, the strategy focused
primarily on the U.S. homeland and the approaches to U.S. territory. The Defense Department
recognized its responsibility for a number of activities in these geographic layers, but as an organizing
construct, there were three principal categories: “Lead, Support and Enable.” “Lead” meant that
DoD, at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, executed military missions to
dissuade, deter, or defeat attacks on the United States. “Support” considered DoD’s traditional role
of providing support to civil authorities at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense.
This support was to be part of a comprehensive national response to prevent or protect against
terrorist incidents or to recover from an attack or disaster. Finally, “Enable” sought to enhance the
homeland security and homeland defense capabilities of domestic and international partners and,
in turn, improve DoD capabilities by sharing technology and expertise across military and civilian
boundaries. The strategy also addressed key objectives of this three pronged framework as well as
specific operational capabilities that were needed to achieve these objectives and the strategic risks
of not doing so.42 In addressing capabilities the authors of the strategy sought to influence other
departmental processes, namely, funding, force structure, and technology development, in order
to implement the strategic tenets of the document. The next opportunity to have an influence on
these processes would be the QDR. However, before that review occurred, an incident of national
significance43 would also have an effect.
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On August 29, 2005, the most destructive hurricane in U.S. history, Katrina, hammered the
Gulf of Mexico, killing more than a thousand people and causing substantial devastation to the
states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. New Orleans bore the brunt of the damaging effects
when the powerful storm breached the levee system and flooded eighty percent of the city.44 Public
order disintegrated because of inadequate planning by municipal and state officials and a lack
of foresight regarding potential scenarios when a category 5 hurricane hits. The federal response
proved unequal to the task as well, and poor communication and coordination between federal
and state authorities only exacerbated the deficient response effort. FEMA was overwhelmed by
the magnitude of the destruction and the requests for assistance. It soon became apparent that even
with the support of other civilian agencies, DoD and National Guard units from across the country
would need to be deployed.45
Ultimately, more than 72,000 active duty military and National Guard personnel deployed to
provide assistance to ravaged areas between August 29 and September 10. The figure was twice
the record deployment of military assets in response to a natural disaster since Hurricane Andrew
in 1992. The department acted on more than 90 requests for assistance from civil authorities, many
of which were approved orally by the Secretary of Defense, including one that had an estimated
value of one billion dollars. There were deficiencies in the Department’s response such as lack of
pre-planned response capabilities for possible disaster scenarios, the need for closer coordination
between DHS and Northern Command, and the requirement for more accurate and rapid initial
damage reconnaissance and assessment. Nonetheless, the DoD evaluation was that U.S. military
forces were ready and capable to execute the largest, most comprehensive, and most responsive
civil support mission ever.46
Overall, the media, the American public and federal authorities rated DoD’s response a success.
When departmental advocates pointed out, however, that an even more robust DoD response
might be required in the event of a catastrophic terrorist event where the loss of life and destruction
of property would exceed Katrina’s devastation, the argument was dismissed because of the
department’s successful response.47 The DoD leadership overseeing the ongoing QDR, which
examined U.S. defense strategy in late 2005 and resulted in a report to Congress in February 2006,
paid scant attention to homeland defense and civil support issues. In short, the touting of DoD’s
rapid and dependable response before congressional committees and in the media made these
issues victims of their own success.
Publication of the QDR report is certainly not the end of DoD’s involvement in homeland defense
or support to civil authorities. While publication of the DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support represents the zenith of attention to these missions, the QDR review represented a plateau.
The QDR report itself signaled that the Department’s leadership felt confident that in the more
than four years since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, DoD had made substantial progress
in improving its capability to protect the U.S. homeland from attack and to respond effectively to
a catastrophic event. The latter was a capability that required further attention, as the QDR report
noted, but it was not the priority. Iraq and Afghanistan were consuming the leaders’ attention and
the Department’s resources. As the QDR report noted, DoD believed that the civilian agencies that
had these missions as their primary responsibility needed to attend to them. It was a position with
which the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Congress agreed. The former stated that an
enhanced FEMA was needed, and the Congress obliged him by passing the FEMA Reorganization
Act in 2006. For many, DoD had amply proved its ability to fulfill its three roles specified in its own
strategy: lead, support and enable. For its part, the Department was confident in its strategy and its
ability to accomplish the homeland defense mission.
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CHAPTER 8
THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY1
Anthony R. Williams
The purpose of intelligence analysis is to elevate the quality of discussion in this town.
Sherman Kent

What is the appropriate role of intelligence in the making of national security policy? Most
members of the national security community bring to their roles a preconceived and mostly
subconscious view on this issue, which view seems so obvious to its holders, that they rarely see
reason to raise the question. Even within the U.S. Intelligence Community, where the subject is more
frequently discussed, it is usually approached as part of an academic discussion, and only rarely
as part of the planning and execution of normal support to the national security policy process.2
In effect, all the players in the process hold opinions on this issue, but those opinions function in
the background, much as the operating software for a personal computer runs invisible to the user
unless it malfunctions.
Generally speaking, members of the national security community will fall loosely into one
of two groups as regards their attitude toward the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy
process. These can best be described as the “unconstrained support to policy” view and the “policy
neutral” view. While few will hold either attitude without qualification, it is instructive to imagine
these attitudes as opposite poles on a spectrum, along which national security players will tend to
coalesce. This difference is more than of academic interest, because it dictates how the players use
intelligence and the intelligence apparatus in the development, communication and execution of
national security policy. And that in turn has significant implications for the nature of American
democracy.
The 1947 National Security Act can be cited in support of the “unconstrained view,” in that
it specifically charges the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (and by extension the CIA as his
executive agent) to act as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence matters relating
to the national security.3 And most would agree that the State of the Union Address is very much a
matter of national security. Furthermore, the 1947 Act also charges the DCI with the responsibility
“for providing national intelligence:
• to the President;
• to the heads of the departments and agencies of the executive branch;
• to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders;
• and where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees
thereof.”4
But because the 1947 National Security Act leaves so many things undefined, it allows for the
widest interpretation and in that context can be cited to buttress any position on this spectrum of
attitudes. For example:
• What form or forms exactly is the DCI’s advice and “national intelligence” to take? Does it
include only formal reports, either verbally or in writing? Or does it include the review of
Presidential and Secretarial speeches, statements, etc.? Does it include only passive review
of those instruments or active involvement in their creation?
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•
•

Who is to initiate advice? Is it at the initiative of the DCI, or only at the invitation of the
President, the National Security Advisor or other members of the NSC, executive departments,
agencies and military commands?
Is there a difference between advice given by the principle advisor and “national
intelligence?”

How one answers these questions determines where one falls with regard to the appropriate role of
intelligence in the policy process.
Although most of these questions have never been formerly answered through Executive Order,
legislation or judicial interpretation, the government has managed to function more or less well
over the past 60 years as if it had answers to them in hand. These questions are customarily resolved
on a dynamic basis through a variety of procedures established and modified by each presidential
administration, by each Congress, and through the political process. Generally speaking, as each
administration establishes its procedures for dealing with the overall issue of intelligence advice
to the policymaking process, the players accept those procedures without challenge. Even in cases
where both sides hold differing views as to the answer to one or more of the above questions, the
players will frequently find a way to “peacefully coexist” on a given issue.5 Where they do clash,
they customarily do so through the political process, which, regardless of specific outcome, always
allows successors the opportunity to challenge again with potentially different outcomes.
The recent furor surrounding the casus belli for the Iraqi War provides us a case in point. Both
the President’s critics and supporters have addressed the veracity of the evidence presented by the
President and Cabinet Secretaries justifying the initiation of hostilities against Saddam’s government
in Iraq, and the appropriateness of the President’s reference in the State of the Union Address to the
British report on Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa.
In virtually every case, however, both supporters and critics have operated from a preconceived
and unstated view of the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process. For example, the
Statement by the DCI accepting responsibility for the questionable “intelligence” included in
President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union speech, and a critical article by a former senior CIA officer
titled “Intelligence Shouldn’t Exist Just To Serve Policy,”6 present starkly contrasting views on the
role of intelligence in policymaking. Yet neither actually addresses that issue directly.
The DCI’s Statement makes clear that he believes the responsibility of the DCI (and his executive
arm, the CIA) goes beyond providing intelligence in a policy neutral format, and includes making
sure to the extent possible that the President does not make a mistake in developing or communicating
policy, whether the President is relying directly or indirectly on intelligence. It should be noted that
the current DCI also apparently accepts that “intelligence” plays an appropriate informational role
in all aspects of policymaking, both public and private.
The McGovern article, by its very title, makes the case that intelligence analysis should be policy
neutral. While the author does not explicitly make that statement, and his polemical tone helps
to obscure the bottom line in the piece, the clear implications of the article are that intelligence
analysis should be neutral as regards policy. Note for example the parenthetical reference to the
way the author believes intelligence assessments were done in his day, “without fear or favor.”7
It would also appear that the author shares with DCI Tenet the view that “intelligence” should
play an informational role in policymaking without regard to the public or private nature of that
policymaking.
By the terms of the “unconstrained” view, because the CIA and much of the Intelligence
Community had serious reservations regarding the substance of the British reports on Iraq’s nuclear
program, the DCI had a responsibility to make certain that the President was advised by the CIA to
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remove reference to those British reports from the State of the Union Address. And from the nature
of the response to the DCI’s Statement, it is obvious that a wide range of policymakers, legislators,
academics and journalists agree that the DCI has this responsibility.8
By extension, the holders of this position also generally hold a wider definition of what constitutes
the national security policy process, than is commonly appreciated. Note, for example, that the
“policy” document under discussion was a speech by the President, albeit a very important speech.
And in October 2002 the DCI intervened in another presidential speech of much less moment than
the State of the Union Address, for which intervention he has been praised but not criticized by those
policymakers who have chosen to address this issue in public.9 Apparently those who share DCI
Tenet’s view of his responsibility clearly see any presidential statement (and by extension that of his
closest advisors and cabinet members) as part of the policy process that the Intelligence Community
is obligated to support. This view at its broadest holds that it is incumbent on the DCI to take
strenuous measures to assure the veracity of all policy statements, both public and private, as they
may deal with matters on which the Intelligence Community has some information.
One can conclude from the DCI’s Statement, and the statements from the White House noting
that the CIA reviewed the President’s address, that the current administration accepts the “unconstrained” view of intelligence support to policy. Furthermore, based on statements by National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and efforts by members of the National Security Council (NSC)
and White House staffs to coordinate various parts of the President’s State of the Union Address,
it is clear that this administration views the DCI’s intelligence advisory role to include active
involvement in both the development and communication of national security policy. Ms. Rice
stated on 11 July 2003 that the wording used in President Bush’s speech had been reviewed and
changed by the CIA, and that some “specifics about amount and place” had been changed, and that
after the changes “the CIA cleared the speech in its entirety.” According to press reporting, detailed
discussions were held between a nuclear proliferation expert at the NSC and a proliferation expert
at the CIA over the content of the speech relating to the putative Iraqi nuclear program.10
If we conclude that the DCI and “intelligence” are to play an active role in developing and
communicating national security policy, at whose initiative are they to play this role? To wit, Ms. Rice
said that “if the CIA, the director of central intelligence (sic), had said, ‘Take this out of the speech,’
it would have been gone, without question.” And Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence stated “it was incumbent on the director of intelligence to correct
the record and bring it to the immediate attention of the president.” And an unnamed Democratic
member of the SSCI was quoted by the Washington Post as saying that DCI Tenet was repeatedly
asked in closed hearings on 16 July why the CIA had “permitted” the unfounded Iraqi uranium
allegation in the address.11 Clearly, there would seem to be wide agreement that the initiative lies,
at least in part, with the DCI, and is not solely dependent on the initiative of the president or his
cabinet members and advisors.
As noted above, the countervailing view of the role of intelligence in the policy process,
holds that to the extent possible, the DCI should insure that the Intelligence Community strives
to provide intelligence advice to the president and his advisors in a policy neutral format. While
very few would argue that this goal can be attained 100% of the time, many see it as a necessary
constraining force. The primary argument for this is that anything less undermines the credibility
of the Intelligence Community, and particularly the Office of the DCI and the CIA. In general,
there appears to be an acceptance of the fact that departmental intelligence agencies12 are intended
to support policymakers within their respective departments or military services, and thus their
product will be in many cases “policy supportive.” There is, however, a strong expectation on the
part of many in the national security community that the national agencies should avoid even the
appearance of policy bias in their products.
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A good example of a policy neutral approach to intelligence can be found in the famous “missile
gap” case in the run-up to the 1960 Presidential Election. Despite the fact that the Kennedy Campaign
had used much of the material provided to the press by the Gaither Committee to substantiate its
charge that the USSR held a commanding lead over the U.S. in the deployment of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, President Eisenhower refused to allow CIA intelligence on the subject to be
released. It has been argued that this decision was a factor in the loss of the election by Richard
Nixon, since the available national intelligence made clear that there was no missile gap, and there
was not likely to be one for the foreseeable future. In this case, President Eisenhower chose not to
allow intelligence to become embroiled publicly in the political process. One can argue the merits
of Eisenhower’s decision, but it is taken by many analysts in CIA and the other national agencies as
the proper way to handle national intelligence.
This view has a long tradition within the CIA, and it has often been criticized by members of
the national security community as a bar to effective CIA intelligence support to policymakers. For
example, as part of the continuing educational effort for analysts at CIA, the Sherman Kent School for
Intelligence Analysis at the CIA University has published a series of occasional papers addressing
among other subjects the proper relationship between the analyst and the policymaker. The author
of these papers is at some pains to assure analysts that lowering the wall between intelligence
analysis and the policymaking process will not damage intelligence credibility (if proper tradecraft
is used) and will make intelligence more relevant to the policymaker.13
Criticisms of the “policy neutral” view have a long tradition among policymakers. The current
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was selected as a member of the so-called Team B,
“which challenged the expertise, methods, and judgments of Intelligence Community analysts
working on Soviet strategic military objectives (specifically, National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-8
for 1977)”. The underlying issue in this case was the perceived failure of the NIE to directly address
the implications for Soviet intentions of the USSR’s ongoing strategic buildup. While serving as the
Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Wolfowitz was
appointed to the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Throughout this period he continued to argue for a more “policy actionable” approach to national
intelligence. According to press reports, Ambassador Wolfowitz, as Deputy Secretary of Defense
in the current administration, has been associated with a large group of policymakers who have
argued strenuously that the Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, has not produced
intelligence on current policy issues that has been helpful in the development, articulation and
execution of policy.14
From the policy neutral perspective, the primary concern, as noted above, is that the close
involvement of intelligence in the making, communication and execution of specific national security
policies will undermine the credibility of the intelligence itself, and the intelligence organizations
involved. Often, critics attack the intelligence organization, such as the CIA, as “shilling” for a
policymaker if the intelligence product is seen as too supportive, or is used openly in the political
process. In this case the intelligence agency itself, or the DCI, becomes sucked up in the maelstrom
of political conflict over the policy under debate. The net effect of this, to quote Senator John Kerry,
D-Mass., does “. . . nothing to make this country safer and will simply further erode the confidence
of the American public and our allies around the world.”15
The caution to the intelligence provider, and to the policymaker who uses that intelligence, may
well be Aristotle’s axiom, “moderation in all things.” If the intelligence player or product is too
supportive of policy, or appears to be too supportive, then both will be subject to criticism and a loss
of credibility. If, on the other hand, intelligence is too “neutral” and too high a wall is kept between
intelligence and policy, then the intelligence will be subject to criticism and a loss of relevance.
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Complicating this picture for the intelligence player is the fact that critics will also often make
the case that they want “objective” analysis, that can be used by all the participants in the policy
debate.16 When that is translated into reality, however, it most often means that the critic’s side in
the debate is not faring as well as the critic believes it should because the intelligence input favors
the other side. Finally, as noted above, even the legislation creating the current intelligence structure
does more to complicate than to answer the question as to the appropriate role of intelligence in the
policy process.
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questions such as “Why did CIA permit the allegation in the address?” cited in Walter Pincus, “Tenet Says He Didn’t
Know About Claim,” Washington Post, July 17, 2003.
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PART II
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 9
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Alan G. Stolberg
For strategic leaders of the 21st century primarily concerned with the issues of foreign policy
and national security, the international system with which they will be dealing is likely to only
partially reflect the traditional international system. While the nation-state, first codified by the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, remains the dominant political body in international politics, its ability
to influence events and people is being challenged by an assortment of nonstate actors, failed or
failing states, and ungoverned regions. This is occurring in combination with the transnational
threats posed by terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, drugs,
pandemics, and environmental degradation, as well as by elements of the system that also have
potentially positive impacts such as globalization and the information revolution.
The international system refers to the structure of relationships that exist at the international level.
These include the roles and interactions of both state and nonstate actors, along with international
organizations (IO), multinational corporations (MNC), and non-governmental organizations (NGO).1
States make foreign and national security policy against this external environment. Opportunities
for both conflict and cooperation arise within this framework. The international community has
tried for years to maintain order and prevent conflict using international institutions like the United
Nations and international legal regimes like the Geneva Conventions.2
The international system frames the forces and trends in the global environment; it also
frames the workspace of national security policy and strategy makers. As they work through the
formulation process, with an understanding for the interests and objectives of any actors in a given
situation, those involved in the business of policy and strategy making must be able to account
for the associated state and nonstate actors present in the international system. In addition, it has
become particularly important that they be able to assess the competing values associated with
the global actors, both state and nonstate, especially in relation to the Global War on Terror. Also,
given the criticality of being able to call upon other nation-states and international or multinational
organizations for support, the strategist or policymaker must know which alliances and coalitions
are stakeholders in the issue in question. Another related element of the international system is the
economic condition, as influenced by both the positive and negative components of globalization,
that helps determine the amount of power actors can wield in the system. It is also important to be
able to identify the international legal tenets and regimes that bear on the situation. Finally, the 21st
century policy and strategy maker must be able to understand the threats to order in the international
system represented by both conventional and transnational entities. If the policymaker or strategist
can accurately assess all these factors, he might be able to determine friends and enemies, threats
and opportunities, and capabilities and constraints inherent in the contemporary world.
Threats, challenges, and opportunities can come in many shapes and sizes. A traditional threat
might take the shape of a nation-state in possession of WMD and a hostile attitude. This is also true
for a nonstate actor, potentially going down to the individual level if he is willing to fly an airplane
into a building. Less direct but also significant in the 21st century world are the threats that can be
made to the successful execution of a nation-state’s policies, if other nation-states are unwilling to
provide support in a given situation. This lack of support can manifest itself in an opposing vote in
an international organization like the United Nations (UN), a multinational organization like the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or an international regime such as the International
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It can equally be demonstrated by the refusal of a state to grant
transit or over flight rights to the forces of another state.
The international system also affords the strategy or policy maker numerous opportunities for
advantage. If a nation-state can come to the assistance of another nation-state or region in time
of need like a natural disaster or failing economy, the opportunity exists to demonstrate concern
and ultimately gain some level of influence with the entity in need. The same may be true when
cooperating with other states as they transition toward democratic forms of government or market
economies, or when accepting an international regime like an arms control treaty. In all cases, these
are opportunities to gain acceptance and influence through and with other actors in the international
system.
Who are the Actors?
Nations and states are not the same. Nations represent groupings of a people that claim certain
common bonds, such as descent, language, history or culture. Collectively such an aggregation would
constitute a national entity.3 States, also known as nation-states, have a legal character and possess
certain rights and duties under the tenets of international law. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, that considered the classic legal definition for states, indicates that states
possess the following characteristics: permanent population, defined territory, and a government
capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and conducting international relations
with other states.4 In addition, the government must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force in the state, and other states in the international system must recognize the sovereignty of that
government.5
The concept of sovereignty came into existence with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the
Thirty Years War in Europe, when, for the first time, the authority of state governments became
officially recognized as greater than the authority of organized religion in formal state affairs. In
contemporary international law, sovereign states are treated as equals, every recognized state can
participate in the international system on the same plane. This sovereign equality possesses the
following elements:
1. States are legally equal.
2. Every state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
3. Every state is obligated to respect the fact of the legal entity of other states.
4. The territorial integrity and political independence of a state are inviolable.
5. Each state has the right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic,
and cultural systems.
6. Each state is obligated to carry out its international obligations fully and conscientiously
and to live in peace with other states.6
Since the 17th century, the nation-state has been the dominant entity in the international system,
in part because of the power the concept of sovereignty gave the recognized states—both in terms
of absolute domestic control and independence on the international level.
But nation-states have never been alone in the international system. A variety of nonstate actors
has always challenged their influence. The term nonstate actor typically refers to any participant in
the international system that is not a government. It is an entity or group that may have an impact
on the internationally related decisions or policies of one or more states. Examples of nonstate actors
would be international organizations (IO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), multinational
corporations (MNC), the international media, armed elements attempting to free their territory
from external rule, or terrorist groups. An individual may also be a nonstate actor.7
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An IO is a formal institutional structure that transcends national boundaries. States create
them by multilateral agreement or treaty. IOs normally function as an association of states that
wields state-like power through governmental-like organs. The founding treaty defines the limits
of the IO’s legal competence. This is the primary difference between a state and an IO. The IO
only possesses the powers granted to it in its originating document by the states that created it,
and cannot legally act beyond those powers. A state possesses the rights and duties recognized by
international law, subject to the provisions of that law, and can involve itself in almost any activity
of its choosing. IOs are completely dependent on member states for support and resources, both
political and practical (like money and personnel). The result is that every IO is dependent on a
sufficient number of member states believing that it is in their national interest to support the IO
and its activities. Without member state support, the IO will not be able to function. Examples of IOs
include the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European
Union (EU). 8
Different from IO’s that are state based, NGOs are voluntary organizations of private individuals,
both paid and unpaid, who are committed to a wide range of issues not on the behalf of any specific
state government. Owing to increased interconnectedness, partly associated with improvements
in communications technology and transportation, specialized NGO organizations, agencies, and
groups have risen around the globe, and have an unprecedented level of influence in the modern
international system. NGOs typically fall in one of two categories: those that have a universal noncommercial (non-profit), and non-partisan focus, and those that are primarily motivated by selfinterest. The former are likely to involve humanitarian aid organizations, human rights groups,
environmentalists, or new social movements. Representative organizations of this first type are
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and Save the Children.9
The second NGO grouping, those that are directed by self-interest, is usually best represented
by multinational corporations (MNC). MNCs, sometimes called transnational corporations, are
global actors that execute commercial activities for profit in more than one country. Estimates are
that the largest 500 MNCs control more than two thirds of world trade. While not a new concept
given that predecessors like the Hudson Bay Company and the British East India Company were
operational over 300 years ago, contemporary MNCs such as General Motors or IBM have been able
to take advantage of advances in technology and communication to become truly global in nature,
with only a corporate headquarters in a single given country. Production no longer has to be located
at the headquarters. With their enormous wealth, the impact of MNCs on the global economy is
immense. Much of this influence comes in the arena of international commerce. In addition to
being credited as a modernizing force in the international system through the establishment of
hospitals, schools, and other valuable infrastructure in the Third World, MNCs are also charged
with exploiting underdeveloped states in their conduct of free trade.10
To combat violations of the world order, the international community has created a number
of regimes to ensure that widely accepted principles, procedures, norms, and rules are in place to
govern particular issues in the international system. The intent is to create opportunity for states to
use these regimes as fora to cooperate to achieve beneficial outcomes. Membership in these special
purpose organizations is generally open to all relevant state actors. The success or failure of regimes
is based on the level of coordination and cooperation of policies among the member states.11
International regimes can take the form of legal conventions, international agreements, treaties, or
international institutions. Special issue areas that they occupy include economics, the environment,
human rights, policing, and arms control. Contemporary regimes like the World Trade Organization
(WTO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Kyoto Protocol on the Environment, Geneva Conventions, International Criminal
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Court (ICC), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties (START) I and II are all intended to specify general standards of behavior and identify the
rights and obligations of signatory states.12
The checks and balances created for the international system by the primary state actors and
regimes have still been unable to assure global stability and good governance. This has been
particularly manifest in the increase in the number of failed states and ungoverned spaces as well
as the appearance of rogue states in the later part of the 20th century.
The problem of failed states has emerged since the end of the Cold War. It indicates that a
breakdown of law, order, and basic services, such as education and health for the population, has
occurred. This situation arises when a state is no longer able to maintain itself as a workable political
and economic entity. A failed state is ungovernable and has lost its legitimacy from the perspective
of the international community. In some cases, power lies in the hands of criminals, warlords, armed
gangs, or religious fanatics. Other failed states have been enmeshed in civil war for many years. In
essence, the government of the state has ceased to function (if it exists) inside the territorial borders
of the original sovereign state. The end of the Cold War catalyzed the state failure process because
the rival powers no longer provided economic and military assistance to former client regimes in
the underdeveloped world. The governments of the failed states in countries like Haiti, Somalia,
Liberia, Cambodia, and Rwanda were unable to survive without that assistance.13
While not necessarily a component of a failed state, ungoverned spaces feature rugged, remote,
maritime, or littoral areas not effectively governed by a sovereign state. The state that theoretically
should control the territory either lacks the willingness or ability to exercise authority over part
or all of a country. Ungoverned spaces are areas where nonstate actors that threaten domestic or
international order can exploit the lack of legal norms and processes. Examples include northern
parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the Northwest Territories in Pakistan.14
An additional failure to maintain complete order in the international system is associated with
the development of the rogue state. A rogue state is a state that frequently violates international
standards of acceptable behavior. This is a sovereign entity that is openly aggressive, highly
repressive, and intolerant with little or no regard for the norms of the international system. As such
it is a threat to international peace. The rogue state may attempt to exert influence over other states
by several means. It might threaten to or actually develop, test, and field WMD or ballistic missile
systems. It might traffic in drugs, break international treaties, or sponsor terrorism. It is likely to be
aggressive toward other states. Current example rogue states are North Korea and Iran.15
Transnational threats are threats to the international system that cross state borders. Such threats
emerged or increased dramatically in the latter part of the last century. While the term transnational
relates to any activity that cross state boundaries, transnational threats is a technical term that
usually refers to activities with minimal or no governmental control. Three types of movement can
be associated with transnational behavior: movement of physical objects, to include human beings,
movement of information and ideas, and movement of money and credit.16
The combination of the cross border movement with illicit or dangerous activities has resulted
in the identification of an emerging set of threats to human security, the ability of states to govern
themselves, and ultimately the stability of the international system at large. These transnational
threats fall into two broad categories:
1. Direct threats from human beings (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal alien
smuggling, small arms transfers, and smuggling of WMD).
2. Threats from impersonal forces (disease and international pandemics, population growth
and migration, resource shortages, global environmental degradation, climate change, and natural
disasters like earthquakes, volcano eruptions, hurricanes, or tidal waves).17
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Transnational threats have been expanding since the end of the Cold War for a number of reasons.
These include the premise that many emerging democracies are the vestiges of former authoritarian
states where there has been a long tradition of coercion, violence, and corruption. Such states relied
more on roles and relations than on rules and regulations. Thus, many governments have been
constrained by political norms that place factional loyalties above commitment to public policies.
Also, as was the case with failing states and ungoverned spaces, diminished assistance from the
developed world helped reduce the ability of governments to police their borders.18
Clearly, transnational threats, along with other traditional state-to-state threats, have created a
number of significant challenges for the maintenance of stability in the international system. These
threats and the problems associated with failed and rogue states, ungoverned spaces, and potential
competition and conflict among the state and nonstate actors, also present some opportunities.
Some states and nonstate actors can advance their individual causes in support of their national,
organizational, or group interests by exploiting instability in the system. This interaction among the
actors represents the international system at work.
How Does the International System Function?
As players on the international stage, both state and nonstate actors either work alone or
attempt to work with other elements of the system. Such relationships might be with other states or
nonstate actors on a bilateral basis; formal groupings of states, IOs, NGOs, or other nonstate actors;
or informal, even unacknowledged cooperation with other system members. States can opt to form
or join existing alliances or coalitions. An alliance is a formal security agreement between two or
more states. Typically states enter into alliances to protect themselves against a common threat. By
consolidating resources and acting in unison, members of an alliance believe they can improve their
overall position in the international system and their security relative to states that are not members
of their alliance. Additional benefits to alliance membership might include the ability to offset the
cost of defense. Unless an alliance partner is an actual liability, membership in an alliance allows
states to supplement their military capability with those of their alliance partners. The alliance is
thus, at least theoretically, less expensive than a unilateral approach to security. Also, economically
related alliances can provide expanded economic benefits through increased trade, assistance, and
loans between allies.19 Alliance examples include NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Coalitions are normally less formal than alliances. Normally they represent a broad grouping of
often very diverse states temporarily united for a specific purpose, typically military action.20 States
often agree to participate in a coalition strictly as a matter of convenience. Coalitions are likely to
be temporary, while alliances can frequently endure for lengthy periods. Examples would be the
American-led coalitions during the first Persian Gulf War (Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM)
and the second conflict (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM).
Two ways states might use alliances or coalitions are to balance or to bandwagon. Both refer to
decisions, conscious or subconscious, about relations with other system members. A state is balancing
when it joins a weaker alliance or coalition to counter the influence or power of a stronger state or
group of states. “Balancing happens when weaker states decide that the dominance and influence
of a stronger state is unacceptable and that the cost of allowing the stronger state to continue their
policies unchecked is greater than the cost of action against the stronger state.”21 Balancing can be
either external or internal in origin. In the external case, weaker states form a coalition against a
stronger state, shifting the balance of power in their favor. A weaker state can also balance internally
by deciding to undertake a military build up to increase its power with respect to the stronger state.
Balancing in the international system can also be either a hard or soft action. It would be hard when
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it is intended to increase or threaten the use of military power of one state relative to another. A soft
usage would be when a weaker state or states want to balance a stronger opponent but believe use
of military power is infeasible. In that situation, states employ non-military elements of power to
help neutralize the stronger states.22
Bandwagoning is different from balancing because it will always refer to the act of a weaker
state or states joining a stronger state, alliance, or coalition. Bandwagoning occurs when weaker
states determine that the cost of opposing a stronger state exceeds the benefits to be gained from
supporting it. The stronger power may offer incentives like territorial gain or trade agreements to
entice the weaker actor to join with it.23
Actors on the global stage, both state and nonstate, decide to participate in alliances and coalitions
and to conduct policies in support of balancing and bandwagoning based on their assessment of
their relative power in the international system. This reflects one of the pervasive concepts about
the system—that it represents or responds to a balance of power. It is important to distinguish
between balance of power as a policy (a deliberate attempt to prevent predominance on the part
of another actor in the international system) and balance of power as a description of how the
international system works (where the interaction between actors tends to limit or restrict any
attempt at hegemony and results in a general status of stability). The most widely accepted usage
of the balance of power term is related to the later concept: the process that prevents or opposes
the emergence of a single dominant actor. Theoretically, the international system works to prevent
any actor from dictating to any other actor—that is, it actually works to maintain the anarchy of
equal, independent, and sovereign states. Balance of power does that for the system.24 In effect,
balance of power describes the distribution of power in the international system in both equal and
unequal portions. Given an assumption that unbalanced power is dangerous for the maintenance
of stability, actors attempt to conduct policy that produces equilibrium of power in the system. This
helps form the rationale for actors to bandwagon or balance as they form alliances or coalitions
against potentially dominant competitors.25
Belief that equilibrium protects the sovereignty of the states, perceived inequality of power,
and the threat of violence combines to give both dominant and subordinate actors a shared (if
unequal) interest in maintaining order in the international system. Balance of power becomes a
type of compromise among actors that find stability preferable to anarchy, although it results in a
system that favors the strong and wealthy over the weak and poor. More powerful actors, like the
great power states, play leading roles in a balance of power international system because they have
superior military force and the ability to wield key technology.26
Ultimately, the balance of power concept fulfills three functions in the international system:
1. It prevents the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire.
2. Localized balances of power serve to protect actors from absorption by a dominant regional
actor.
3. Most important, the balance of power has helped create the conditions in which other elements
or characteristics of the international system can develop (i.e., diplomacy, stability, anarchy,
war).27
Above all, this third function ensures the importance of the balance of power concept to the
international system for the foreseeable future.
For those actors in the international system less comfortable with operating in alliances
and coalitions, collective security provides an alternative. In formal terms, collective security is
a framework or institution designed to prevent or neutralize aggression by a state against any
member state. All state members are jointly responsible for the physical security of every other

126

member. Membership in such an institution permits states to renounce the unilateral use of force
because the institution guarantees to come to the assistance of the aggrieved state and sanction the
aggressor. The overall intent of collective security is the maintenance of peace among members of
the framework or institution (i.e., the UN, League of Nations), not between the system and external
elements, as in the case of an alliance.28
The search for security is the most significant concern in some manner, shape, or form for the
vast majority of actors in the international system. Security implies the absence of threats to one’s
interests. In absolute terms, complete security would mean freedom from all threats. Historically,
the term security equated to the military dimension of security. Thus, security meant security from
war or violent conflict. But the 20th century witnessed an expansion of the concept to include other
security issues such as those relating to the economy or environment. Economic security is the
need to ensure that a hostile actor cannot control the supply of goods and services, or the prices
for those goods and services.29 Examples are access to water, oil, or natural gas. Environmental
security implies protection from environmental dangers caused by natural or human processes
due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement, or design and originating within or across national
borders.30 Example issues are air and water quality, global warming, famine, or health pandemics.
How an actor in the international system chooses to interpret the concept of security helps
determine participation in alliances or coalitions, involvement in collective security frameworks
or institutions, and balancing or bandwagoning behaviors. In all cases, these actors consider their
ability to wield all the elements of power they have available, whether or not to use force, and—
most significantly—what interests their ultimate policies will support.
Power in the international system is the ability of an actor or actors to influence the behavior of
other actors—usually to influence them to take act in accordance with the interests of the powerwielding state. Power does not have to be used to be effective. It is enough that the other actors
acknowledge it either implicitly or explicitly. The reason for this is that the potential exercise of
acknowledged power can be as intimidating as its actual use. Historically, some international actors
have sought power for power’s sake; however, states normally use power to achieve or defend
goals that could include prestige, territory, or security.31
There are two general components of power: hard and soft. Hard power refers to the influence
that comes from direct military and economic means. This is in contrast to soft power, which refers
to power that originates with the more indirect means of diplomacy, culture and history. Hard
power describes an actor’s ability to induce another actor to perform or stop performing an action.
This can be done using military power through threats or force. It can also be achieved using
economic power—relying on assistance, bribes, or economic sanctions. Soft power is a term used to
describe the ability of an actor to indirectly influence the behavior of other actors through cultural
or ideological means.32
In contrast with the primary tools of hard power—the ability to threaten with sticks or pay
with carrots—soft power attracts others or co-opts them so that they want what you want. If a state
can attract another state to want what it wants, it can conserve its carrots and sticks. The sources
of soft power are culture (when it is attractive to others), values (when there is no hypocrisy in
their application), and foreign polices (when they are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others). Soft
power uses an attraction to shared values and the perceived justness and duty of contributing to the
achievement of those values.33 It is much more difficult to systematically or consciously develop,
manage, control, or apply than hard power.
Whether it is hard or soft, an actor’s power is measured in terms of the elements of power that
it actually possesses. Such measurement is always done in relation to another actor or actors and
in the context of the specific situation in which the power might be wielded. Are the available
elements of power appropriate given the potential foe or the nature of the conflict?34 American
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security professionals have traditionally categorized the elements of power in terms of the acronym
DIME for the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements. This concept has been
expanded in some of the most recent national level strategies to DIMEFIL: diplomacy, information,
military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement.35
Regardless of which specific elements of power are available for potential use, the most
important consideration for an actor’s ability to transform potential power into operational power is
political will. Effectiveness of the actor’s government and depth of domestic support (or leadership
effectiveness and stakeholder support for nonstate actors) are crucial for developing and sustaining
political will.36 Without either of those components, the likelihood for successful use of power is
significantly reduced.
One of the most visible uses of power is in the use of force. There are a number of reasons
given for its employment. In 1966, the classic analyst of the use of force and influence, Thomas
Schelling, described the use or threat of force as a kind of “vicious diplomacy.” He described
four different ways in which force might be used: deterrence, compellence, coercion, and brute
force. Deterrence seeks to prevent another actor from doing something that it might otherwise
have done. This is implemented over an indefinite period of time by convincing the deteree that
he cannot successfully achieve the aim he seeks, sometimes by demonstrating sufficient force to
prevent achievement and sometimes by promising a punishing response should the target engage
in the action. An actor chooses to use compellence when it desires to make an enemy do something
by a specific time deadline. It might have the positive effect of persuading an adversary to cease
unacceptable behavior, or it might cause him to retreat from seized positions or surrender assets
illicitly taken. Compellence is usually used after deterrence has failed, although that condition is
not a prerequisite. It can carry the promise of inflicting an escalating level of damage to a foe until
it meets demands. It might also provide some type of reward for meeting the demands. For both
deterrence and compellence to be successful, both the threatened penalty and promised reward (if
applicable) must be credible. 37
Coercion is the intent to inflict pain if an opponent does not do what you want. It is normally
most successful when held in reserve as a credible threat. Signaling the credibility and intensity
of the threat are keys to success. Different from compellence, coercion only offers a threat for
noncompliance without a reward for compliance. Brute force is directly taking what the actor wants.
It is not dependent on signaling intent to the opponent and succeeds when used based simply on the
success of the application of force. Brute force is ultimately not about asking, but taking whatever
the actor wants through the direct use of force.38
Virtually any action taken by an actor in the international system, whether it be peaceful or
forceful, will likely be done for the purpose of supporting the interests of the executing actor. The
national interest is intended to identify what is most important to the actor. Until the 17th century, the
national interest was usually viewed as secondary to that of religion or morality. To engage in war,
rulers typically needed to justify their action in these contexts. This changed with the coming of the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For a state, the national interest is likely to be multi-faceted and can be
oriented on political, economic, military, or cultural objectives. The most significant interest is state
survival and security. The term “vital” is frequently applied to this interest, with the “implication
being that the stake is so fundamental to the well being of the state that it cannot be compromised”
and may require the use of military force to sustain it. Other types of interests considered to be
important are the pursuit of wealth and economic growth, the promotion of ideological principles,
and the establishment of a favorable world order. In addition, many states believe the preservation
of the national culture in the state to be of great significance.39 Ultimately, it is the state’s assessment
of the importance of its national interests that will determine much or all of what it will do or not
do within the international system.
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Why Does the International System Behave the Way it Does?
Given a belief that the international system is composed of a structure and associated interacting
units, political scientists in the late 1950s developed the concept known as levels of analysis to
help analyze all the dynamics of interaction in the system.They believed examining problems in
international relations from different perspectives on the actors would help determine why different
units and structures in the international system behave as they do. They called the perspective
points levels. Levels represent locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be
identified. The five most frequently used levels of analysis are:
1. International systems—largest grouping of interacting or interdependent units with no system
above them. Encompasses entire planet.
2. International subsystems—groups or units within the international system that can
be distinguished from the entire system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or
interdependence on each other. [Examples: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)].
3. Units—actors consisting of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many
individuals, all with standing at higher levels. [Examples: states, nations, multinational corporations
(MNC)]
4. Subunits—organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect the
behavior of the unit as a whole. [Examples: bureaucracies, lobbies]
5. Individuals. 40
Making use of the levels of analysis, international relations theory attempts to provide a
conceptual model with which to analyze the international system. Each theory relies on different
sets of assumptions and often a different level of analysis. The respective theories act as lenses,
allowing the wearer to only view the key events relevant to a particular theory. An adherent of one
theory may completely disregard an event that another could view as crucial, and vice versa.41
International relations (IR) theories can be divided into theories that focus primarily on a statelevel analysis and those that orient on an overall systemic approach. Many, often conflicting, ways
of thinking exist in international relations theory. The two most prevalent schools of thought are:
Realism and Liberalism; though increasingly, Idealism, also known as Constructivism is becoming
a competing concept.42
Realism has been a major, if the not the dominant, theory of international relations since the end
of World War II. From the realist perspective, struggle, conflict, and competition are inevitable in
the international system. Mankind is not benevolent and kind but self-centered and competitive.
Realism assumes that the international system is anarchic because there is no authority above
states capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on
their own, rather than by obeying the dictates of some higher entity. States and not international
institutions, non-governmental organizations, or multinational corporations are the primary actors
in the international system. For states to thrive and survive, they must orient on security as their
most fundamental national interest. Without security, no other goals are possible. States must
struggle for power in that system; this produces the constant competition and conflict.43 Military
force is the ultimate arbiter in the struggle for power. Each state is a rational actor that always acts in
accordance with its own self-interest. The primary goal is always ensuring its own security. Strong
leaders are key to success in this environment and will be required to exhibit realistic vice morally
idealistic based positions.
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Realism asserts that states are inherently aggressive, and territorial expansion is only constrained
by opposing state(s). This aggressive orientation, however, leads to a security dilemma because
increasing one’s own security produces greater instability as opponents build up their forces to
balance. Thus, with realism, security is a zero-sum game where states make only relative gains.44
A variation of realism is called neorealism. Rather than the realist view of the influence of human
nature, neorealists believe that the structure of the international system controls and impacts all
actors. In effect, it is the system itself that is in charge. States, with their orientation on survival,
have a primary if not sole focus on war and peace. For a neorealist, state interests shape behavior.
In neorealism the success of regimes is totally dependent on the support of strong powers.45
The international system constrains states. The system comprises both the states and the structure
within which they exist and interact. From a neorealist point of view, cooperation is more likely
than a pure realist claims because states are more interested in relative than absolute gains. States
are often willing to bargain to give something up.46
Several principal notions, especially since Immanuel Kant drafted “Perpetual Peace” in 1795,
have characterized liberalism as another fundamental theoretical basis for international relations:
Peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a worldwide basis. Governments,
not people cause wars. . . . Free Markets and human nature’s perfectibility would encourage interdependence
and demonstrate conclusively that war does not pay. . . . Disputes would be settled by established judicial
procedures. …Security would be a collective, communal responsibility rather than an individual one.47

Liberalism, which in this context differs from liberalism as used in the liberal-conservative
political paradigm, maintains that interaction between states goes beyond the political to the
economic components of the international system—to include commercial firms, organizations
and individuals. Thus, instead of the realist anarchic international system, liberals see plenty of
opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power like cultural capital. Liberals also
assume that states can make absolute gains through cooperation and interdependence—thus peace
and stability are possible in the system.48
One primary hope of liberals for stability is the democratic peace concept. The main propositions
of this concept are: peace through the expansion of democratic institutions; populations of states
focus naturally on their economic and social welfare as opposed to imperialistic militarism; the
subordination of states to an international legal system; and commitment to collective security
enhances stability. Perhaps the most important element of the democratic peace concept is the
belief that liberal democratic states are likely to remain at peace with one another. The international
judicial system, combined with the perceived economic and social success of liberal states, normally
dictates avoidance of external conflict, especially with another liberal democratic state.49
As with classic realism, liberalism has a related alternative called neoliberalism. This
postulates that the system is not in charge of everything; states make their own decisions. States
are not only interested in survival, but also in cooperation. International institutions can promote
cooperation; there are options beyond war and peace. Rules, principles, ideas, social norms, and
conventions must be considered. With neoliberalism there is a much greater degree of cooperation
in the international system than neorealism is willing to acknowledge. To a great degree this is as a
result of the success of international regimes.50
Regimes as a framework of rules, expectations, and prescriptions between actors can change
state behavior, particularly in the arena of cooperation.51 Regimes often develop their own interests
and become actors in the system.52 Regimes come about for many reasons. They can benefit all
actors in the system and do not require a hegemonic state for support. The more times states
cooperate in a regime, the more opportunity exists to change the behavior of a particular state. In
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effect, regimes can change state behavior. There is a shared interest that can ultimately benefit both
parties. Institutional incentives can motivate states to cooperate peacefully even in situations when
force might be considered. A regime’s intervention in state behavior can lead to cooperation. The
result is that the existence of regimes makes cooperation more likely—which, in turn, could help
drive change.53
Idealism, also known as constructivism, rejects standard realist and liberal views of the
international system, arguing that states derive interests from ideas and norms. Idealists believe
that the effects of anarchy in the system are not all defining, but “anarchy is what states make of
it.”54 For an idealist, the state’s identity shapes its interests. To understand change, an idealist must
assess a states’ identity. States are social beings and much of their identity is a social construct.
If a state identifies itself as a hegemonic global policeman, it will shape its interests accordingly.
States that self-identify as peace-loving economic powers emphasize different interests. Who a
state is—primarily in the form of culture—will shape that state’s identity. States understand other
states through their actions. Key for an idealist, one state’s reaction will affect the way another state
behaves.55
Summary.
In the end, there is no single answer for why any actor in the 21st century international system
behaves the way that it does. There is also no single description for all the actors in the system,
as well as no predictable method that any of them will use to interact. In effect, even considering
the complexities of the 20th century, the 21st century international system is highly likely to be
more complex than ever. Clearly the nation-state will continue to be the primary actor, but it will
have increasing competition from the nonstate actors that have emerged in the later part of the last
century. Advances in communication and transportation, along with the information revolution’s
contribution to globalization, have provided both emerging states and nonstate actors a degree of
international influence never previously imagined. From the perspective of a 21st century strategic
leader, these emerging state and nonstate actors and emerging transnational threats will create
numerous challenges and opportunities. These challenges and opportunities will force leaders to
address issues like determining the exact threat, assessing the intensity of national interests at stake,
deciding whether to employ hard or soft power, and opting to work with alliances or coalitions or
to go it alone. Ultimately, understanding these issues and many others dependent on the situation
will be critical for the success of any actor in the 21st century international system.
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CHAPTER 10
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY
Janeen M. Klinger
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which
the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind
insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher
realms of action.
				

Carl von Clausewitz, On War1

This chapter takes as its starting point Clausewitz’ view concerning the pedagogic role of theory
for practitioners illustrated by the opening quote. Like Clausewitz’ theory of war, scholarship from
the field of international relations theory offers insights that would benefit policy-makers working
in the realm of American grand strategy. Bridging the gap between theory and practice in this
case can be difficult because much of the specialized academic literature can seem so arcane and
“impractical” since it offers no clear-cut blueprint or “hedge of principles” for conducting the optimal
grand strategy. Moreover, since there are several schools of thought whose conclusions often seem
to be contradictory, strategic thinkers can become bogged down trying to ascertain which theory
is the “correct” one. In fact, international relations theory should not be conceived as either true or
false, but as providing a way for organizing ideas about the underlying dynamics in international
politics. And in this task, each school of international relations theory is equally useful.
The aim of this chapter is to outline the basic tenets of three different schools in international
relations that go by the labels realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist2 to show the practical
significance of the field’s theoretical ideas. The discussion that follows will attempt to show the
linkages and commonalities among the schools and avoid a characterization that paints them as
rival interpretations. The discussion also aims to avoid simplistic caricatures of the three approaches
under consideration. In this way, we hope to discourage the reader from becoming a committed
partisan to any single approach. As a starting point each theory shares the common task of trying
to answer the key questions that bedevil policy-makers formulating grand strategy: How can we
best shape events to serve our national interests? How will other states respond to our actions? For
the United States that began the 21st century commanding a position of hegemony that some critics
labeled “hyper-power,” international relations theory has the potential to suggest which courses of
action are most likely to yield stability and which are most likely to corrode it.
Realism and the Construction of a Theory of International Relations.
We begin our discussion with the realist school because realist scholars assert their approach
has an ancient lineage that can be traced back to ancient Greece. In addition, the realists were the
first scholars of international politics to explicitly attempt to move beyond mere description of
international politics by creating a theory for their discipline.
The basic precepts of realism are easy to summarize. The emergence of many independent,
sovereign states in Europe in the seventeenth century, none of which acknowledged any superior
authority, created an anarchical international system. Within such a system there could not be a
genuine international society but only a conflict of interest and struggle for survival so that interstate
relations were ultimately regulated by warfare. For realists, conditions in the international state
system are captured in the metaphor developed by 17th century political philosophers of a “state
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of nature.” Further, drawing on models of game theory, realists demonstrate that although states
might recognize that cooperation would yield benefits, the very structure of their situation precludes
them from cooperation because other states might cheat on agreements and thus jeopardize their
security. Expressed in the jargon of game theory, the underlying dynamic of international politics is
one where independent decision-making leads to sub-optimal outcomes.3 Realists claim the validity
of their analysis is demonstrated by the fact that its precepts have been identified by classic thinkers
even before the emergence of the state system.
An accurate portrayal of the origins of realism must first demolish the cliché myth that realism’s
explanatory power is strengthened by the fact that classic thinkers from Thucydides to Machiavelli
identified its underlying principles. Proponents of the realist perspective point to the famous passage
in the Peloponnesian War where the Athenians tell the Melians:
. . . since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard
of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power
to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.4

After the speech, the Athenians go on to kill all Melian men of military age and sell the women
and children into slavery. Realists cite this passage and the events that followed to support their
claim to represent an understanding of the underlying dynamics of international politics that is
universal across time and space and that can hardly be altered by human choice or action. Yet,
scholars citing the passage omit the fact that the events Thucydides described took place in the
16th year of the war. Consequently, one cannot assert that Thucydides was stating a basic law of
international politics, when he might well be drawing a lesson about the impact of prolonged war
on a society. This decidedly “unrealist” reading of Thucydides can also be supported by the fact
that the Athenians took quite different actions when they voted to spare the Mytilenians earlier in
the same war. Further, one can even interpret Thucydides choice to recount the Athenian decision,
taken immediately after the Melian affair, to sail to Sicily where they met with military catastrophe
as suggesting a lesson about the consequences of imperial ambition.5
The second classic thinker often called a founding member of realism is, of course, Niccolo
Machiavelli. In one sense, Machiavelli’s reputation as a realist is deserved and stems from his
rejection of the medieval approach to political philosophy that focused on how men should live,
rather than describe how they do live. Further, his book, The Prince, provides the classic expression
of realpolitik that has led to the negative connotation of the term “Machiavellian.” However,
Machiavelli’s biography suggests that the book was less an effort to ascertain universal principles of
political behavior than an effort to salvage his own position. As a Florentine diplomat who served
in the republic, Machiavelli lost his position when the Medicis returned to power in 1512. Moreover,
Machiavelli was implicated in an anti-Medici plot, imprisoned, and tortured. He wrote The Prince in
1513 in an effort to ingratiate himself to the Medici family—most likely in the hopes of recovering
his position. The circumstances under which Machiavelli wrote The Prince shaped its content in a
way that detracts from it as an authentic expression of realism.
One can gain a better appreciation of Machiavelli’s genuine political orientation by reading his
longer work, Discourses: On the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. This book was written over a 5-year
period (1512-1517) and provides a celebration of the virtues of a republican form of government that
is absent in The Prince. His political preferences are most apparent when comparing a republican
form of government with a monarchy. In one chapter he says:
But as regards prudence and stability, I say that the people are more prudent and stable, and have better
judgment than a prince; and it is not without good reason that it is said, “The voice of the people is the voice
of God.”
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He goes on to add:
For a licentious and mutinous people may easily be brought back to good conduct by the influence and
persuasion of a good man, but an evil minded prince is not amenable to such influences, and therefore there
is no remedy against him but cold steel.6

Although Machiavelli is not the founder of realism often claimed, the ambiguity in his work is
sufficient that one can trace some contributions to both a realist and institutionalist tradition of
international relations theory to him.7
To show as we have that realists cannot claim to be the heirs of a long-standing tradition with
ancient roots is not intended to discredit that school of thought. Yet realists claim that one great
virtue of their approach to understanding international politics lies in its ability to explain continuity
in state behavior that is evident from the long history of realist views found in the classic works
discussed above. In fact, the realism located in both Thucydides and Machiavelli is at best overexaggerated and at worst a complete distortion of their ideas. The one classic thinker that realists
can claim as a progenitor for their ideas is Thomas Hobbes, who was one of the seventeenth century
writers to develop the concept of “state of nature.” In this case, however, we must note that his
tract on behalf of absolute monarchy, The Leviathan, containing as it did his pessimistic assessment
of human nature, was written against the experience of the English Civil War in which all the
characteristics we associate with failed states were in evidence. Therefore, the validity of drawing
universal inferences about behavior from such circumstances must certainly be questioned.
Given the tenuous links with classic writers, the best place to begin an elaboration of realism
lies in the work of Hans Morgenthau. Aspects of Morgenthau’s biography help explain the content
of his ideas, while circumstances of his era help explain why his ideas would resonate with his
contemporaries. Hans Morgenthau was born in Germany in 1904. He witnessed the major 20th
century traumas of his country: defeat in the first world war, the collapse of the Weimar Republic,
and the rise of Adolf Hitler. Morgenthau left Germany for the United States in 1937. Given what
he saw as the irrationality of German fascism with its rabid anti-Semitism that shaped its foreign
policy, it is not surprising that Morgenthau would contrive to place foreign policy on a more rational
foundation. He described that foundation in his classic book, Politics Among Nations, first published
in 1948. Needless to say, a book whose purpose was to provide a “rational theory” of international
politics found fertile soil in the environment after World War II. That era was marked by a profound
disillusionment with inter-war diplomacy whose crusading idealism, symbolized by the League of
Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war, failed to stop the conflagration that began in
1939. Morgenthau’s ideas proved sufficiently compelling that his book continued to be published
long after his death with the latest edition appearing in 2005.
Morgenthau began his analysis with a claim to found a science of international politics based
on objective laws of human nature. From this origin he developed his core concept and one of his
six principles of realism as “interest defined in terms of power.”8 This core concept served both
practical and scholarly functions. For the statesman, the concept provided a yard stick for measuring
policy by enabling him to ask: How does this policy affect the power of the nation? For academics,
Morgenthau’s stress on the rational element had the virtue of aiding theoretical understanding
and could therefore account for “. . .that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes
American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and
large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences and intellectual and
moral qualities of successive statesmen.”9
By reducing the basic motive for states to “interest defined in terms of power,” Morgenthau
simplified the task of understanding the actions of states for both practitioners and scholars alike.
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For Morgenthau, his realist view guarded against the fallacy that understanding or anticipating
a state’s behavior required knowledge of either its motives or its ideological preferences. The
realism of Morgenthau can be summarized as favoring an understanding of state behavior based
on calculations of interest and power without reference to morality. As such, Morgenthau’s work
became vulnerable to a charge that it was amoral, although that charge cannot really be substantiated.
For Morgenthau, prudence is the supreme virtue of politics, and prudence is the necessary precondition for any kind of morality. Almost by definition only a rational, realist foreign policy could
be moral to the extent it ensures a moderation that saves states from “moral excess and political
folly.”10 One can appreciate why a refugee from Hitler’s Germany would come to define and value
prudence and moderation as the only sound basis for a moral foreign policy.
Morgenthau’s realism is, to be sure, highly pragmatic, and he is critical of statesmen like John
Foster Dulles who introduced a crusading moralism as a guiding principle of American foreign policy.
Morgenthau was an early critic of the American war in Vietnam and not on legal or moral grounds,
but because he believed the war did not serve American interests.11 Morgenthau’s principles of
realism also have the virtue of guarding against the hubris of imperial power—particularly relevant
to post-Cold War America—and he noted that the moral aspirations of any particular nation are
not synonymous with the moral laws that govern the universe. On this score, the profound moral
vision that informs his realism was apparent when he said:
The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally
indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have
warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion
in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations—in the name of
moral principle, ideal or God himself.12

Before leaving our discussion of Morgenthau, it is appropriate to point out that for all of his
emphasis on the struggle for power as the underlying dynamic force in international politics, and
the fact that subsequent realists view him as their intellectual godfather, Morgenthau foreshadowed
approaches used by the two other schools of international relations theory. In his discussion of
British predominance in the nineteenth century he noted that Britain was able to overcome all
serious challenges to its superiority because its self-restraint enabled it to gain allies and minimize
the incentive of other powers to challenge it. Such a view suggests that the domestic character and
nature of a regime shapes its behavior as much as external circumstances.13 The view that domestic
politics deserves equal causal weight as external conditions—a view rejected by other realists—
would be expanded upon subsequently by liberal institutionalists, as we will see below.
Morgenthau also foreshadowed constructivist analysis in both his discussion of the balance
of power and of the impact of nationalism. Morgenthau did not conceive of the balance of power
as some automatic process or universal behavior, but rather as a process that rested on the moral
and political unity of Europe. Translating Morgenthau’s insight into constructivist terminology,
we would say that the balance of power is socially constructed by states and therefore has no
independent permanent existence external to them. Similarly, Morgenthau noted that states viewed
themselves and their very identity quite differently as a result of nationalism, and he denounced the
pernicious impact of nationalism on state behavior because it undermines the restraint necessary
for moral conduct. He said:
Compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, becomes the treason of the new; for the mutual accommodation
of conflicting claims, possible or legitimate with a common framework of moral standards, amounts to
surrender when the moral standards themselves are the stakes of the conflict.14
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Morgenthau’s view here is consistent with constructivist claims that socially constructed identities
shape behavior of states. We will return to constructivist analysis later in this chapter.
Other realist scholars followed in Morgenthau’s footsteps. Perhaps most notable among them is
Kenneth Waltz, whose influential Theory of International Politics was published in 1979, the year that
Hans Morgenthau died. Waltz came to the study of international politics from economics and drew
on the logic of that discipline for his analysis of international politics.15 Given the logic of microeconomic theory, it is not surprising that Waltz viewed all states as similarly motivated and rational,
value-maximizing actors. In fact, the assumption that states apply an economic mode of reasoning
pervades the work of other realists as well as the work of liberal institutionalist scholars.
Waltz moved away from Morgenthau’s version of realism in some important ways that earned
his work the label of neo-realism. First, Waltz’ theory is more abstract than Morgenthau’s, and he
strives to create a theory that is both parsimonious and elegant. The greater level of abstraction
is justified by his definition of the function of theory and its distinction from the related concept,
“laws.” For Waltz, laws identify invariant or probable associations that can be ascertained as true.
Theories on the other hand explain why laws are true. He concludes from this distinction that “A
theory though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct
from the world.”16
Second, unlike Morgenthau, Waltz sees power as a means and not as an end that states pursue.
Power provides the means by which states achieve their core interest or objective, which is survival.
Third, Waltz emphasizes more strongly than Morgenthau the extent to which state behavior is
shaped by external conditions. Waltz asserts that his theory is a “systems” theory because it shows
how the organization of units (states) affects their interaction and behavior. Waltz’ focus on systemslevel causes means that, for him, impersonal forces shape behavior rather than objective laws of
human nature. Thus, Waltz rejects Morgenthau’s pessimistic view of human nature that traced
state behavior back to man’s inherent lust for power.17 The crucial component of the system lies
in its structure, anarchy, and the distribution of power in the system. For all practical purposes
determining the distribution of power means counting the number of great powers to determine if
the system has a multi-polar or a bipolar structure. Waltz’ emphasis on system structure is why the
approach is sometimes labeled “structural realism.”
For Waltz, the structure of the international system and power as the means by which states
seek to ensure their survival are linked to shaping behavior and outcomes. Unlike Morgenthau who
saw the operation of the European balance of power as dependent on a common moral framework,
Waltz conceives of the balance of power as an automatic process akin to the law of gravity in the
physical sciences. Because all states have the same core interest to survive, they will balance against
a greater power because any concentration of power has the potential to threaten their survival.
Waltz logically expects then, that balancing behavior means states will tend to join the weaker of two
coalitions to check the power of the stronger one. Because the structure of the international system
influences the means available to balance power, different structures have different implications
for peace and war. Thus, a multi-polar system with many comparable power centers necessarily
relies on alliances as the balancing mechanism. Reliance on alliances creates great uncertainty
among states as to who actually threatens whom. Uncertainty is also compounded by the fact that a
defection from one alliance will completely alter the capability of that alliance and hence jeopardize
the survival of its members. Diplomacy within a multi-polar system is fraught with such uncertainty
that states easily miscalculate. Pervasive miscalculation, in turn, will make multi-polar systems
warlike. Indeed, some historians suggest that during the multipolar system from 1688 to 1939, there
were not just two but nine world wars.18
In contrast to his expectations concerning a multi-polar system, Waltz expects a bipolar system to
be less warlike because the two great powers that dominated the system after 1945 relied on internal
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mechanisms to balance each other rather than alliances. For Waltz, such internal balancing is more
reliable and precise and does not generate the uncertainty that makes states prone to miscalculation.
To be sure, Waltz recognizes that each of the superpowers in the bipolar system created alliances,
but these did not serve to balance power between the two alliance leaders. Rather, the alliances
provided the weaker members a guarantee of protection. Furthermore, because the discrepancy in
power between the superpowers and the states within their respective alliances was so great, any
realignment through defection of one state to the other side would not be destabilizing. Thus, Waltz
notes that both the United States and the Soviet Union experienced the loss of China to the other
side, yet the loss was easily tolerated and did not prompt war because it did not fundamentally alter
the balance between the two superpowers.19
Several observations about Waltz’ analysis should be noted at this point. First, in Theory of
International Politics, Waltz categorically puts the causal force shaping state behavior and therefore
foreign policy on external factors. One does not need to know about the domestic political system
or culture of a state or the character of its national leaders to infer general expectations about its
behavior. Quite different states can be expected to respond in the same way to the same external
structural conditions. Couched in social science terminology, the structure of the international
system acts as an intervening variable between an actor’s purpose and the outcome he achieves.
The way the international system shapes or disciplines the behavior of states is illustrated by the
famous example of Leon Trotsky. Appointed as the first Soviet Commissar for foreign relations,
Trotsky believed the new Bolshevik government would be able to pursue a new revolutionary
foreign policy without reference to the international system. He expected that as foreign minister
he would “issue some revolutionary proclamations to the peoples and then close up the joint.”20 Of
course, Trotsky was mistaken about his ability to ignore the realities of the international system. As
further supporting evidence for the influence of structure on behavior, Waltz notes that for the two
world wars of the 20th century, the same principal countries lined up against each other despite
the domestic political upheavals and the changes in leadership that occurred during the interwar
period.21
Yet if Waltz’ claim that the underlying dynamic of international politics is unchanging, and statelevel factors cannot transform the system, then one must conclude logically that if the Axis powers
had won World War II and a bipolar structure organized around the leadership of Germany and
Japan had emerged, conditions in international politics would not have evolved much differently.
Similarly, a Soviet victory in the Cold War would not be expected to have transformed the system in
any meaningful way. These counterfactual examples are suggestive of the limits to an understanding
of international politics that places the greatest causal weight on the external environment. Waltz
himself moved away from that extreme view and admitted in a later article that “The causes of war
lie not simply in states or in the state system; they are found in both.”22
A second observation needs to be made concerning Waltz’ claim about the greater peacefulness
of the bipolar system that emerged in 1945. He asserts that the peacefulness was the result of the
internal balancing mechanism that made the superpowers less prone to miscalculate. Yet nuclear
weapons came into existence at the same time as the bipolar structure. Consequently, one cannot
ascertain for sure whether the absence of war between the superpowers was the result of the
change in military technology or the bipolar structure. Finally, from the standpoint of practical
policy-making, Waltz’ theory has the drawback of working at such a level of generality—and one
he readily admits—that statesmen are unlikely to be able to use it to evaluate courses of action.23
However, Waltz does provide a very practical warning about the hazard of overextension that is
inherent in the excessive concentration of power found in a unipolar structure. Waltz believes such
a structure is not likely to be durable because a country leading a unipolar structure will be tempted
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to misuse the concentration of power it enjoys, so that “. . . even if a dominant power behaves with
moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior.”24
The Liberal Institutionalist Response.
Although realist scholars assert the persistence and dominance of their approach to understanding
international politics, an alternative view that questions the basic tenets of realism has wide appeal.
The alternative view starts with a different sense of the “state of nature” metaphor—one that is
derived from John Locke rather than Thomas Hobbes. Locke, who was a contemporary of Hobbes,
believed that the absence of government authority created a state of nature that was a state of liberty,
but was not a state of license leading to conflict and war. Consequently, cooperation and order are
feasible even in the absence of preponderant power, and the liberal institutionalist school focuses
on the many factors that contribute to expanding opportunities for collaboration among states. For
liberal scholars the era of total war begun by Napoleon and continuing with the two world wars
of the 20th century demonstrated the growing dysfunction of the costs of great power rivalry that
undermine the very ability of great powers to secure their interests. Thus, liberal scholars assert
that a transformation in international politics occurred that created regions where war is virtually
obsolete. These zones of peace, exemplified by the creation of the European Union, is testament to
the fact that the anarchy induced competition can be overcome.
The coexistence of realist and liberal theory is illustrated by the ebb and flow of diplomatic practice
that draws on the assumptions of one or the other school of thought. The notion that acceptable
diplomatic practice must be based on self-interest embodied in raison d’etat was unquestioned by
leaders until the end of World War I. That war had a sobering effect on statesmen who realized that
total war among the advanced industrial states was catastrophic. This led to a wholesale rejection
of realist statecraft and acceptance of a new liberal practice. The liberal practice sought to replace
balance of power considerations with collective security and to regulate interstate relations on the
basis of open diplomacy and law. The failure of such liberal statecraft to avert the Second World
War seemed at the time to invalidate liberal principles and practice and reestablish the eternal
verities of realism. E. H. Carr was a predominant spokesman who sought to critique the legalistmoralistic diplomacy of the interwar period in his book, The Twenty-Year’s Crisis. In the end, Carr
recognized that the pursuit of power by itself could not provide a firm foundation for international
order and that any political order must rest on the twin pillars of power and legitimacy. He wrote:
If, however, it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the
element of morality in any world order. Just as within the state every government though it needs power as
a basis of its authority, also needs the moral basis of the consent of the governed, so an international order
cannot be based on power alone, for the simple reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against
naked power.25

Beginning in the 1970s a new generation of scholars sought to pick up where E. H. Carr’s conclusion ended to suggest that the liberal statecraft of the interwar period had not been wrong but
merely premature. This new response to realism was launched by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph
S. Nye’s edited volume, Transnational Relations and World Politics in 1970. Other works followed
including Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations which
appeared in 1976. What these and other works shared in common was a recognition that profound
changes had occurred during the past two hundred years so that state behavior could not be
expected to resemble that of the European states in the 18th century. In some sense these early
works reflecting liberal institutionalist views foreshadow analysis of the impact of globalization.
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Although states still pursue survival as an objective, that survival is more broadly defined to
include satisfying the demands of the people and ensuring prosperity. Given the fact that states
have broadened their goals, they need to move away from reliance on military force and power
with its drive for competitive unilateral advantage toward greater cooperation. Furthermore, the
search for security increasingly takes place in an environment where borders have been made more
porous by changes in technology and growing interdependence. Interdependence in turn makes a
strategy that relies on unilateral drives for advantage self-defeating. It is important to underscore
the point that liberal theorists do not believe that states have somehow acquired new ethics that
value cooperation, but that the changes wrought by technology make it impossible for them to
achieve their selfish objectives without cooperation.
Liberal institutionalists share the realist assumption that states are rational actors engaged in a
continuing cost-benefit analysis, so they carry over the realist notion that states apply an economic
mode of reasoning. Hence, liberal institutionalists reconfirm the realist assumption that state
behavior is not significantly affected by cultural variation. However, as part of that actor rationality,
liberal scholars believe states to be willing to forgo competition on behalf of greater gain, as long
as they can eliminate the fear that other states might cheat on their agreements. International
institutions are the means for minimizing fear and hence the reason that the school carries the label
“institutionalist.” In addition, this liberal strand of theory shifts the causal weight for behavior away
from the external conditions or structure toward the importance of domestic political institutions.
Thus, liberalist scholars assert that the gradual spread of democratic governance provides states
with added incentive to pursue objectives beyond a narrowly defined physical security. An
additional theoretical corollary that grows from the observation of the impact that democracy has
for international relations is the so-called democratic peace theory that asserts that democracies are
less inclined to go to war against other democracies than they are against authoritarian states.26
Realists often accuse scholars writing in the liberal institutionalist tradition of paying insufficient
attention to the role of power in international politics. This charge cannot really be substantiated,
and we can illustrate this by looking at how liberalist scholars address the quintessentially realist
phenomenon of war. In the discussion that follows we will look at liberal analysis of both the
initiation of war and the nature of peace settlements that follow major wars. In each instance, liberal
institutionalists draw implicitly on Morgenthau’s insight concerning the British restraint in the
exercise of power in the nineteenth century that we noted earlier.
Power transition theory provides a conceptual framework for understanding the factors that
contribute to the start of war. The book, The War Ledger by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler,
outlines a model of power transition and explains its implications.27 As its name suggests, changes
in the distribution of power play an important causal role in the initiation of war. Changes in power
are driven by internal growth, and here power transition theory relies heavily on changes in gross
domestic product (GDP) as a measurement. Changes in growth lead to a dynamic process of rise
and decline in the power of states. From a strictly realist perspective, one would expect a dominant
country to try to inhibit the growth of another state’s power. Similarly, one would expect the
rising country to challenge the interests of the dominant country until the tension between the two
countries becomes so great that war ensues. But changes in power are only one factor that accounts
for the outbreak of war, and power transition theory is not purely realist.
The second factor that power transition theory identifies as contributing to the onset of war relates
to the evaluation of the status quo. That status quo is composed of institutions, laws, and practices
that govern state interactions and allocate rewards and punishments. As such, the specifics of the
status quo arrangements reflect the preferences and interests of the dominant country. But it is how
others, especially rising challengers, view the status quo that determines whether or not war breaks
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out between a challenger and the dominant country. In other words, as E. H. Carr recognized, both
power and legitimacy matter in terms of maintaining or breaking the peace.
Applying both variables to the Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War illustrates the
impact that power transition theory attributes to the interaction of power parity with satisfaction/
dissatisfaction of the status quo. The Soviet Union was very dissatisfied with the status quo established
by the United States at the end of World War II, which included among other things the Bretton
Woods system designed to foster economic openness. Yet, the Soviet Union came no where near
matching the U.S. from the standpoint of power—particularly as measured by GDP. Consequently,
no war occurred between the rising Soviet challenger and the dominant United States. One might
speculate concerning the likelihood of war between the United States and China as being similarly
dependent on whether or not China will reach power parity with the U.S. and become dissatisfied
with the status quo.
The book that is most useful for understanding the nature of an acceptable status quo is G. John
Ikenberry’s After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars.
This work focuses on the origin of the status quo found in the peace settlements that conclude major
wars. Like power transition theory, Ikenberry recognizes the indispensable role that power plays
in establishing a status quo, for it is the victor in a major war that shapes the postwar world. From
this position of power a state can choose to exercise its raw power and dominate others, or use its
position to create a durable order. Realists and institutionalists differ in what they see as the likely
choice of a dominant power. Ikenberry captures the two views when he notes:
The debate about the sources of international order is typically waged between those who stress the importance
of power and those who stress the importance of institutions and ideas. This is a false dichotomy. State power
and its disparities determine the basic dilemmas that states face in the creation and maintenance of order,
but variations in the “solutions” that states have found to these dilemmas require additional theorizing. The
character and stability of postwar order hinge on the capacities of states to develop institutional mechanisms
to restrain power and establish binding commitments—capacities that stem from the political character of
states and prevailing strategic thinking about the sources of international order.28

The cases Ikenberry examines show how, beginning in 1815, the leading state resorted to an
institutional strategy and how subsequent peace settlements varied from the first one. In part, the
variation in the institutional arrangements created by the peace settlement shows that the greater the
power disparity after the war, the greater the capacity of the leading state to adopt an institutional
strategy.
Unlike other liberal institutionalist theorists who see the value of institutions in the extent to which
they provide a mechanism that guards against cheating, Ikenberry sees institutions as transforming
the very condition of anarchy to the point where it bears some resemblance to a “constitutional
order.” He defines a constitutional order as one organized around agreed upon legal and political
institutions that because they allocate rights and limit the exercise of power, make that concentrated
power less consequential.29 Ikenberry’s view of anarchy then, is quite the opposite of the realists who
see anarchy as an absolute. For Ikenberry, institutions can lead international politics to resemble
domestic politics more closely. Institutions can do this because both the dominant state and weaker
ones have a stake in the arrangement. Institutions give weaker states a voice and ensure against their
exploitation by the strong. The dominant state has an incentive to conserve its power by committing
to an arrangement that explicitly limits its own exercise of power. By so doing, the dominant state
acquires acceptance by the weaker states, which lowers the enforcement costs to the dominant state
for maintaining the order. By limiting the expense of maintaining international order, the dominant
state minimizes the corrosive effect that imperial costs might otherwise impose. Ikenberry describes
the dynamic behind the bargain this way:
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. . . the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It
obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power. In return,
the leading state agrees to limits on its own actions and to open itself up to a political process in which the
weaker states can actively press their interests upon the more powerful state. . . . Institutions play a two-sided
role: they must bind the leading state when it is initially stronger and the subordinate states later when they
are stronger.30

Ikenberry recognizes that nations will not under all circumstances select the solution to
order that relies on institutions, and that democracies are better suited to use this strategy than
nondemocracies. Several reasons account for the relative ease that democracies have in establishing
an institutional order. First, democracies have a higher level of political transparency and openness.
Such transparency means that other states will be fully aware of their actions and the motives behind
them. Part of the transparency involves political competition inherent in democratic processes that
makes leaders accountable to an electorate. Related to transparency and political competition is the
fact that decision-making is decentralized, which offers the opportunity for many actors (including
other states) to influence policy. Finally, Ikenberry notes that democracies can be characterized by
“policy viscosity,” which means there are institutional checks on abrupt policy shifts that reduce
destabilizing surprises.31 In essence, Ikenberry moves beyond the thesis of a democratic peace to
suggest that democracies—especially great powers in a position to establish world order—have
foreign policy options that are not as available to nondemocracies. Thus, using our counter factual
scenario about what would have happened if the Axis powers had won World War II, Ikenberry’s
answer is quite a departure from what the realists like Waltz might say. The logic of Ikenberry’s
analysis suggests that the Axis powers would have been less able to select an institutional strategy
to lock in their power position and would have faced persistent, simmering resistance from other
states.
Constructivists and the Social-Psychology of International Politics.
Of all the approaches to international relations theory, perhaps the most difficult to summarize
briefly is constructivism. Constructivism is the most recent school and its relative newness means
that its precepts have not yet seeped into diplomatic practice, nor has its terminology entered
public debate. Further, constructivism departs significantly from the other two schools, particularly
in its rejection of the assumption that states use an economic mode of reasoning. In addition, of
the three approaches, constructivism is most easily misrepresented because it rejects the crudely
materialist view that the physical reality of the environment governs state behavior. Consequently,
constructivists are often labeled idealists. In one sense, this is an unfortunate label because idealism
conjures up notions of impractical, naïve and unrealistic views of the world. However, in another
more philosophic sense, the label idealist is appropriate because constructivists focus on more
intangible factors like the impact of ideas on state behavior. Thus the starting point for constructivist
analysis is to consider facets of culture like norms and ideas as well as processes of social interaction
as the best avenue for understanding state behavior. One way constructivists illustrate the weakness
of a purely material explanation for state behavior is to consider U.S. relations with two neighbors,
Cuba and Canada. From the standpoint of power, the two stand in comparable positions in relation
to the U.S. Yet power is an insufficient explanation of U.S. behavior toward each.32
Alexander Wendt is one leading scholar who draws on a constructivist approach, which he
outlines in his book, Social Theory of International Politics. Indeed, his work is sufficiently notable that
a journal devoted to international security found it worthy as a subject of a major review essay. As
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a starting point, Wendt notes that:
A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors,
on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do
toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.33

Given such a principle, constructivists would never accept the fact that any given condition in
international politics like anarchy (or balance of power) has an effect on state behavior that
is universal across time and space. There is in other words, no inherent logic to anarchy, it is,
as one author phrased it, an “empty vessel.”34 That empty vessel may be filled in various ways
depending on social interaction of the states and the knowledge they gain concerning anarchy from
this interaction. For example, Wendt describes three possible meanings for anarchy that he labels:
competitive, individualistic and cooperative. The first two forms of anarchy fit the classic realist
conception of international politics in that they are self-help systems where states do not positively
identify their security with that of others. For Wendt, there is a possible third meaning for anarchy
that is cooperative because states see their security as linked to the security of others.35 Realists
would claim that the competitive meaning for anarchy is the only possible one, while Wendt would
suggest that although it happens that our system of international politics accepts the competitive
meaning for anarchy, there is nothing inevitable about this acceptance. Rather, as Wendt would have
it, the meaning of anarchy was socially constructed and emerged as a result of past practice—so
changes in practice can be expected to yield changes in the understanding of anarchy that will lead
to changes in behavior. Indeed some scholars suggest that changes may already be taking place,
and here changes in inter-subjective knowledge is viewed as prompting adoption of institutional
strategies:
To a large extent, the sovereigns have tamed themselves through the construction of international institutions.
They have done so only imperfectly but the trajectories are in the direction of increased peaceful coexistence
between political communities. For most states most of the time, sovereignty and peace are compatible. Hobbes
and Rousseau predicted permanent insecurity and war as the predominant consequence of sovereignty.
Institutional development since they wrote has proved them wrong.36

The impact that social construction has on state behavior suggested above can be likened to the
formulation of customary international law. Customary international law establishes legal norms
and obligations through state practices. States are expected to carry out their obligations consistent
with past accepted conduct so that customary international law is as binding on states as treaty law.
The notion that world politics is socially constructed in a manner similar to customary international
law is not intended to suggest that world politics is so malleable that human choice and free will
have unlimited options because any social construction and the inter-subjective meanings that
emerge from them will take on a self-perpetuating quality creating path dependencies difficult for
new ideas or social interactions to transcend.37 The fact that social construction of new meanings
may take time and be difficult does not mean the process does not occur. For example, the meaning
that people of the West give to war today is quite different from the view in 1914 when, under the
impact of Social Darwinist ideas, people viewed war as a means to re-invigorate society.38
Two more aspects of the constructivist approach are important for understanding the underlying
dynamics of international politics: identity and interests. The constructivist view of these two
elements is a stark contrast to that held by the other two schools. Neither realists or liberals
examine the origins of state identities or interests. Realists in particular see interests and identities
as “unvarying and a-contextual.”39 Liberal institutionalist scholars are closer to constructivists on
the issue of the impact of ideas and norms on international politics; however, they focus on the
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consequences of ideas and are less concerned about their origin. For constructivists, state identities
are inherently relational and thus dependent on social construction, for how can one state view
another as a friend or foe a priori, without some previous interaction? Constructivists adopt the term
identity from social psychology where it refers to “images of individuality and distinctiveness”
held and projected by an actor and formed through relations with others. As conventionally used,
therefore, the term refers to mutually constructed and evolving images of self and others.40
For constructivists, identities serve as a crucial link between the external world and interests.
Therefore, interests are not predetermined, nor are they permanent, Lord Palmerston’s assertion
about British interests notwithstanding. Rather, interests emerge from social practice and depend
on the state’s sense of identity. One scholar stated the point this way: “Actors often cannot decide
what their interests are until they know what they are representing—‘who they are’—which in turn
depends on their social relationships.”41 Constructivists do not take national interests for granted,
but seek instead to locate their source.
Germany and Japan provide excellent cases for illustrating the way constructivists see identity
as affecting national interest.42 Both countries exhibited a xenophobic nationalism that culminated
in their policies of conquest during World War II. The devastation they suffered during the war and
their unconditional surrender goes a long way toward explaining their anti-militarist policies after
1945. Certainly the adoption of anti-militarist policies is consistent with a realist understanding of
state behavior. However well realist understanding may account for the origin of anti-militarism
in Japan and Germany, they are not able to account for the persistence of the trend at the end of
the Cold War, which enlarged German and Japanese power and opened up greater latitude for
maneuver. Moreover, although a liberalist view might attribute the continued anti-militarism to the
spread of democracy or growing interdependence, liberalists are less able to explain why feelings of
anti-militarism run deeper in Japan and Germany—as was evident by their policies during the first
Gulf War—than in Britain or France.
Thomas Berger believes that a constructivist understanding about the way identity shapes
interests is useful for understanding the persistence of anti-militarism in Japan and Germany. One
indicator of that anti-militarism is the extent to which each country has sought to assert civilian
control of the military, albeit using different methods. Berger draws on survey data to show the
increasing consensus for anti-militarist policies after the 1950s. Commitment to such policies as
the means for pursing national interests can only be understood by the changing sense of national
identity in each country. For Japan, that identity was defined in terms of economic expansion
as a trading state. For Germany that sense of identity was defined as part of a larger European
community bound together by common values and interests. So deep was the German redefinition
of its identity—what one journalist described as a “deeply internalized ethics of repentance for
World War II”43—that once re-unification was achieved, Germany further reduced its sovereignty by
accelerating European integration through the Maastrict Treaty. Acceptance of Maastrict required
Germany to make economic concessions that amounted to an abandonment of major sources of
power and influence in a way that neither realism nor liberalism explain. To be sure, changes in
German and Japanese identity is part of a broader trend concerning notions about governance that
are part of a post-modern politics focusing greater emphasis on welfare than traditional conceptions
of national security. Berger goes on to conclude:
. . . Germany’s decision to integrate itself into the West, and Japan’s determination to stay aloof from regional
security affairs were logical responses to the particular external pressures that the two countries experienced.
Once made, however, these decisions were tied to the new national identities by the German and Japanese
governments, which had to justify their policies to their highly critical public. In this way policies were invested
with a symbolic value that linked them to the core values. . . 44
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Conclusion: Toward a Grand Strategy of Hegemony.
If international relations theory really does offer a framework for organizing ideas about world
politics as asserted at the start of this chapter, where does our review of the three approaches
leave us as we contemplate American grand strategy? Interestingly, despite the differences among
the schools, they tend to point in similar directions for a grand strategy for “the sole remaining
superpower.” All three schools see the excessive concentration of power achieved by the United
States after the Cold War as problematic or at least potentially so. What follows is an attempt to
apply the logic of each strand of theory to the reality of American hegemony in order to avoid the
pitfall of wishful thinking that has been so damaging to policy in the past.
Realists, with their assertion of the centrality of power—whether as a means or an end—for
understanding the dynamics of international politics view American hegemony with apprehension.
Although on this point there is some divergence between the views of Morgenthau and Waltz,
Morgenthau’s belief that all states seek power as their primary goal would seemingly be more
pleased with the power accumulated by the U.S. Nevertheless, Morgenthau would likely question
the equation of American values with universal ones articulated in the latest National Security
Strategy published in March 2006. That document, which declares the American objective to be
“ending tyranny in our world,” would likely be viewed by Morgenthau as the kind of excessive
crusading that comes when a nation abandons the pursuit of “interest defined in terms of power”
for absolutist goals.45 Such messianic zeal necessarily abandons the prudence that Morgenthau
believed crucial for a realist foreign policy. Morgenthau would see in the latest national security
document the same kind of moralism he found such an anathema in John Foster Dulles’ Cold War
diplomacy.
Waltz, writing after the Cold War and in response to conditions created in its aftermath sees the
United States as responding to structural imperatives and behaving “as unchecked powers have
usually done.”46 Moreover, Waltz predicted that the extension of NATO was likely to make Russia
feel surrounded and isolated, which would propel them into closer alignment with China. Indeed,
there is some evidence that this alignment is occurring. Russia and China held their most ambitious
joint military exercise in 2005, which is quite the departure from the shooting across their common
border that occurred in 1967. In addition, Vladimir Putin has made several recent remarks about the
danger to world order emanating from concentrated U.S. power that offer further evidence of the
automatic balancing process identified by Waltz.47
While realist views tend to suggest a certain inevitability to the emergence of an anti-American
coalition, liberal institutionalists and constructivists are not so fatalistic in their assessment. Whether
from the perspective of power transition theory or Ikenberry’s view of peace settlements, liberal
scholars see the United States as able to shape the response of other states to the status quo. One key
for shaping that response that might preclude the formation of a Sino-Russian condominium would
be for the U.S. to exercise some self-imposed restraints on its power. There are several specific
institutional mechanisms that would enable the U.S. to demonstrate self-restraint. The United
States could bind itself by joining the International Criminal Court or taking the lead on the Kyoto
Protocol. The U.S. might also renounce the unilateralism implied by the doctrine of preemptive
war promulgated in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and re-commit to reliance on the United
Nations to sanction the use of force. All of these actions would lend legitimacy to the status quo by
showing other states that the strongest among them agreed to be bound by the same rule of law. In
the absence of pursuing an institutional strategy as Ikenberry notes, “. . . the more that power peeks
out from behind these institutions, the more that power will provoke reaction.”48 Once that reaction
is provoked, the U.S. stands to lose more than it does by exercising self-restraint.
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Finally, because the constructivists locate the source of national interests in a nation’s identity, the
way the United States views itself may well determine its ability to pursue the kind of institutional
strategy recommended by Ikenberry. There is some evidence that the United States is moving
increasingly in the direction of an imperial definition of its identity. That emerging identity can be
gleaned in the statement of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when she declared: “If
we have to use force, it is because we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further
into the future.” The elaboration of that imperial destiny is fully articulated in the latest national
security strategy. American identity framed in imperial terms will lead to its definition of interests
that shape how other states will respond to it, for as Wendt observes, how power affects state
calculations “depends on the inter-subjective understandings and expectations, on the ‘distribution
of knowledge,’ that constitutes their conception of self and others.”49
In the end, all three schools of theory converge on conclusions concerning hegemony.
American leaders would do well to heed the observation of Edmund Burke in 1793 when Great
Britain stood at the brink of its power:
Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss to take one precaution against our own. I must fairly
say, I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. . .we may say that
we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other nation will think we shall
abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us
which may end in our ruin.50
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CHAPTER 11
MULTILATERALISM AND UNILATERALISM
James A. Helis
Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will—the strength
and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to
enforce them. 1
Charles Krauthammer
The paradox of American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by any
other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America
needs the help and respect of other nations. 2
Sebastian Mallaby

At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States enjoys a historically unprecedented
accumulation of national power. The American economy is the largest in the world and even in
a slowdown far outstrips that of any other nation.3 The prowess of America’s armed forces has
been demonstrated again and again, from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. In 2002, the United States
accounted for 43 percent of the world’s military spending, more than the total of the next 14 countries
put together.4 Projected increases in American military spending will likely lead to the United States
spending more on defense than the rest of the world combined, and the training and technological
superiority of America’s armed forces provide a quantum advantage that no nation is likely to even
approach in the near to medium term. The combination of overwhelming economic and military
power gives the United States enormous political influence throughout the world. There are few, if
any, global issues that can be addressed or resolved without U.S. support and cooperation.
One central debate in U.S. foreign policy has been the degree to which the United States should
be involved in the affairs of the world. World War II and the Cold War seemed to settle the question
of isolationism or engagement in favor of the latter. After the Cold War, the issue of isolationism rose
again, but only briefly. The real post-Cold War debate was and remains over the degree to which
the United States should pursue its foreign policy alone or in partnership with other states. The
debate has been framed in terms of multilateralism versus unilateralism and is heavily influenced by
competing views on what the United States should do with its position of preeminent international
power and influence. In one sense, “the differences [between the two views] are a matter of degree,
and there are few pure unilateralists or multilateralists.”5 However, there are clear differences
between the two schools of thought on when and to what extent the United States should work with
others. We should keep in mind that unilateralism and multilateralism are not strategies. Strategy
is about matching ends, means and ways. Unilateralism and multilateralism are competing ways
to approach problems. This chapter will examine the advantages and disadvantages offered by
each approach. The goal is to identify those conditions under which it is better to work with others
through coalitions and alliances and when it is might be best go it alone.
Unilateralism.
People who advocate unilateralism tend to believe that the post-Cold War world is unpredictable
and dangerous. They believe America must use its power to protect, and in many cases propagate,
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its interests and values. America no longer need constrain itself in the assertion and expansion of
its influence out of fear of provoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold
War stand-off with its threat of nuclear war created an opportunity for the United States to apply
its overwhelming military, economic and political power to build an international order that will
perpetuate America’s preeminent position in the world.
Unilateralists contend that an assertive approach to foreign policy is justified on both pragmatic
and ideological grounds. Charles Krauthammer concisely summarizes the unilateralist philosophy:
“The essence of unilateralism is that we do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter
us from pursuing the fundamental security interests of the United States and the free world.”6
In other words, as a practical matter, the United States should not compromise when pursuing
national security interests. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and America’s subsequent
pursuit of a global war on terrorism strengthened the belief that the U.S. was vulnerable to threats
and needed to act aggressively to defeat those threats, irrespective of how the strategy played on
the global stage. Ideologically, unilateralists argue that American values and ideals are essentially
universal. Policies and actions intended to advance them are in the interest of not only the United
States but people throughout the world. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that “the United
States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people
everywhere. . . . America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity.”7 The
non-negotiability of interests and values calls for their uncompromising pursuit, preferably with
the support of others, but alone if necessary. The United States, with its overwhelming aggregation
of national power, can be a decisive player anywhere in the world on virtually any issue it desires.
“It is hard for the world to ignore or work around the United States regardless of the issue—trade,
finance, security, proliferation or the environment.”8 The United States should not squander its
position and capabilities by compromising and diluting its objectives in order to attract allies and
partners. If the cause is right and just, the United States should pursue it without compromise.
Others states can either accept America’s arguments and follow her lead or be left behind as the
United States does what it should and must to advance its interests and values.
One of the main advantages of unilateral approaches to problems is that they provide maximum
freedom of action. While allies and partners can bring extra capabilities to the table, they often bring
constraints on how their tools can be used. Those who contribute to an enterprise normally expect
to have a say in how it will operate. A common problem in United Nations military operations in
the 1990s was the “phone home syndrome,” under which commanders of forces assigned to United
Nations operations had to seek approval from authorities in their home capital before accepting
orders from the coalition commander. Unilateralists also point to the limitations that the NATO
allies placed on air operations during the Kosovo campaign as an example of how multilateral
approaches can be inefficient and reduce the effectiveness of American capabilities by restricting
how they will be used. Because foreign militaries cannot approximate American capabilities, their
military contributions are seldom worth the inevitable constraints they add.
Multilateralism.
Multilateralists acknowledge that there are circumstances in which the United States should not
rule out acting unilaterally, particularly when “vital survival interests” are at stake.9 On the other
hand, multilateralists argue that most important issues facing the United States in the 21st century
are not amenable to unilateral solutions. Transnational issues requiring multilateral approaches
include terrorism; the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; illegal drugs; and
organized crime. Globalization has made management of international trade and finance even more

154

important, as economic crises are susceptible to contagion that can have global impact, as was seen
in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. And environmental and health problems, to include the spread
of infectious diseases, can only be dealt with on a global basis.10
The reality is that American power, while overwhelmingly superior to that of any other state
or present coalition of states, is not unlimited. Allies and coalition partners allow the consolidation
and pooling of capabilities. A group of nations can almost always bring more tools of power to
bear against a problem than one state can alone. While the NATO allies did place constraints on
air operations over Yugoslavia, they provided the majority of the peacekeeping forces deployed
to Kosovo following the air campaign. The price of their participation in post-conflict operations
was a say over how the war was fought. While air planners may have chafed under the politically
imposed limitations on their freedom of action, those limits were seen as an acceptable price to pay
for cooperation in the peacekeeping effort. The United States certainly had the capacity to conduct
the air campaign itself (in fact, the overwhelming majority of missions were flown by American
aircraft). However, it was not in the interests of the United States to be the sole or main provider
of ground troops for what was bound to be a protracted peacekeeping mission that would follow
the air campaign. Going it alone may offer short-term efficiency, but sometimes long-term interests
call for multilateral approaches and making concessions in order to have committed partners. And
measuring allies’ worth only in terms of their military capabilities ignores the importance of their
political and diplomatic contributions.
Multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to protect and extend its status as
the soul superpower. However, they believe that exercising power unilaterally could actually
be counterproductive. Historically, dominant powers have faced efforts by other states to
counterbalance their accumulation of power. “Balance of power theory makes a clear prediction:
weaker states will resist and balance against the predominant state.”11 For the United States to
maintain its position in the international system, it should endeavor to secure the cooperation of
other states in addressing global problems. Such a cooperative approach might negate or lessen any
perceived need to counterbalance U.S. power. Multilateralists reflect a liberal institutionalist point
of view in arguing that it is easier to gain the support and cooperation of others by working within
a system of norms, rules, and institutions that assure others of America’s intention to act in good
faith as a partner, not a hegemon. While unilateralists contend that the United States should use its
power to impose an international order favorable to maintaining America’s long-term supremacy,
multilateralists counter that eventually that approach will generate resistance and backlash. A
system developed through cooperation is more likely to stand the test of time. Given America’s
predominance of power, it would take a remarkable effort and investment of resources for any state
or group of states to challenge America’s position. If America behaves as a cooperative member
of the international community and does not create the impression that it threatens international
stability, there is no reason for other states to seek to balance against American power. No one
doubts American capabilities. What America does with its capabilities will determine how others
will react and if America’s position will be accepted or challenged.
Alone or with Others?
The rhetoric in the dispute between multilateralist and unilateralist approaches obscures that
there are few foreign policy decisions that are purely one or the other. Advocates for both positions
agree that it is better to have allies in support of a cause than to go it alone. They disagree over what
the U.S. should be willing to give up to recruit partners. Unilateralists favor staking out one’s position
and moving forward with whomever is willing to go along. Multilateralists favor rallying other
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nations to our cause and are more willing to accept trade-offs in building coalitions. Unilateralists
and multilateralists agree that there is little room for compromise on such fundamental issues as
survival interests. Time constraints may also limit the ability of the United States to drum up allies.
Threats that are immediate and pose a serious threat to survival or vital interests may force the
hand of the United States.
Finally, both unilateralists and multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to
build an international order that will favor the expansion of American values and help preserve
America’s dominant position in the world. The United States has a unique opportunity to establish
international rules and standards that protect American interests. They differ on how the United
States should attempt to build that order. Unilateralists tend to favor more assertive, even coercive
approaches. They fall more into the realist school of international relations theory and argue that
ultimately power is what matters and reliance on agreements or treaties in lieu of real power is
dangerous. On the other hand, multilateralists favor moving ahead in a framework of international
institutions and treaties that will bind all states, America included, to rules and commitments. They
feel that restrictions on the United States will assuage concerns “about a global order dominated by
American power—power unprecedented, unrestrained, and unpredictable.”12 And even within the
constraints of a rules-based system, America will continue to enjoy a preponderance of power.
The Case of Iraq.
The U.S.-Iraq War of 2003 was a showcase for the different approaches to foreign policy. The
American position was clear: Iraq would comply with UN Security Council resolutions requiring
it to divest itself of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and medium-range missiles or
the United States, with whomever was willing to assist, would enforce the resolutions by force.
Advocates for unilateral American action argued that the United Nations had been ineffective in
enforcing its own resolutions. Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, and the United
States could no longer tolerate the international community’s unwillingness to force Iraq to comply
and disarm. While the United States welcomed other states that were willing to support the forcible
disarmament of Iraq, the positions of other states, including key allies and the Security Council,
would not influence the course of American foreign policy. The United States saw a need to act
and was going to do so. And by acting alone, the United States could actually enhance stability
in the Middle East and the globe. An America willing to use its power without the support of the
international community would have greater credibility in dealing with other threats. No longer
could potential adversaries hope the United Nations or America’s allies could dissuade it from
major military action. When the United States said it would act, that would be a credible threat.
Knowing the consequences of defying America would deter states from doing so in the future,
which could only contribute to stability and to American security.
Multilateralists approached the issue differently. While acknowledging Iraq’s failure to comply
with United Nations resolutions and the likelihood that Iraq was in possession of significant
quantities of banned weapons, they questioned whether it was in America’s best interest to take
military action without broad support within the international community. While it would be faster
and militarily more expedient for the United States to forge ahead with a unilateralist Iraq policy,
the costs of such a policy were likely to be prohibitive in the long run. By acting largely alone and
without broad international support, the United States risked weakening the international norm
against unilateral use of military power to resolve political disputes. A war with Iraq had potentially
global consequences, both political and economic. By undertaking such a war and assuming these
risks for the international community without its approval, the United States would reinforce
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fears of unconstrained American power and increase the potential for a future backlash. Finally,
the United States risked finding itself burdened with a lengthy and expensive occupation of postwar Iraq. There would be no guarantee of significant international support for post-conflict efforts
following a war the United States started and waged largely on its own. Leaving the United States
saddled with post-war Iraq would serve as something of a balancing tool. An America committed
to a major military presence in Iraq would not find it as easy to exercise military operations in other
parts of the world without support from allies. Also, a lengthy and costly overseas commitment
could undermine domestic support for future actions.
In the summer of 2003 it is still too early to assess how the Iraq war will affect America’s
position in the world or how the world will react to American power. However, the unilateralist
and multilateralist camps used the lead up to the war to make their cases for acting more or less
unilaterally or within broader international coalitions. While the war and early phases of the
occupation of Iraq have not settled the debate, both have established some measures by which to
determine if in this case a generally unilateral approach to foreign policy and war helped or hurt
America’s long-term standing in the world. The end of the war may have opened the door for
progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but there has been relatively little international support for
post-war occupation, which may leave a substantial portion of America’s ground forces committed
to Iraq for some time to come.
Conclusion: Recent Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy.
There is a growing view that American foreign policy has tended to be more assertively unilateral
in recent years. America’s refusal to join the international ban on antipersonnel land mines, its
rejections of the Kyoto treaty on global warming and an inspection and verification protocol for the
Biological Weapons Convention, its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty are offered as evidence of a policy of avoiding international commitments
that might constrain America’s freedom of action. Critics argue that the United States pursues its
own international agenda without regard for the interests, views, or concerns of the rest of the
world. The response is that the United States is acting, as all states should and must, in its own selfinterests.
In spite of its overwhelming power, in the spring of 2003 the United States found itself embarking
on a war with Iraq. While Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly one of the world’s great villains,
the United States found itself diplomatically at odds with important traditional allies, politically
outmaneuvered and stymied at the United Nations, and opposed by public majorities in virtually
every nation in the world. How did the United States, with all its advantages, become so politically
isolated? One answer lies in the perception that the United States is using its national power more
unilaterally than in the past. International opposition did not prevent the United States from going
to war. However, the absence of allies has caused the United States to bear the overwhelming
burden of post-conflict operations in Iraq. In contrast, in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO allies and other
partners provided the bulk of peacekeeping troops following U.S.-led campaigns.
The perceptions and reality of the extent to which the United States pursues unilateralist policies
will undoubtedly affect America’s strategic choices in the future. There are clear trade-offs between
sacrificing freedom of action and lowering costs and adding the capabilities of other nations.
Considering these trade-offs should be part of the strategic decision-making process for the United
States as it wages a global war on terrorism and confronts a range of critical global interests and
issues. The United States cannot limit its options by clinging to notions about whether it should act
unilaterally or multilaterally. There are times and circumstances for both approaches. The art is to
recognize them and select the proper tool.
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CHAPTER 12
REGIONAL STUDIES IN A GLOBAL AGE
R. Craig Nation
The New Regionalism.
Twentieth century strategy was dominated by global conflict. The First and Second World Wars
were implacable struggles waged on the world stage, and they were followed by the Cold War, a
militarized contest between superpower rivals described by Colin Gray as “a virtual World War
III.”1 Not surprisingly, interstate rivalry propelled by Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht (Strike
for World Power) gave rise to theoretical perspectives concerning the dynamic of international
relations dominated by globalist perspectives.2 From the founding of the first university department
devoted to the formal study of International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth (Wales) in
1919 to the present, globalist and universalizing theoretical models have been at the core of the
profession.
Such models have also defined the practice of American foreign and security policy. The venerable
traditions of American isolationism and exceptionalism, integral to the founding of the republic,
and through most of the 19th century the inspiration for a cautious and discrete U.S. world role,
were gradually pushed aside against the background of the Great War by the liberal tradition of
benign engagement under the aegis of international law, international organization, and collective
security. Though Woodrow Wilson’s project for a U.S.-led League of Nations was frustrated by
congressional opposition, in the larger picture there would be no return from “over there.” America
was a dominant world power from at least 1916 (when the U.S. became a creditor for the major
European powers), and the range of its interests no longer permitted the luxury of an exclusively
national or even hemispheric policy focus
Already on the eve of the Second World War, in his seminal work The Twenty Years’ Crisis, E.
H. Carr argued that a relative neglect of the role of power and coercion in international affairs had
paved the way for the rise of fascism.3 Carr’s “realist” perspective, lent theoretical substance in the
U.S. by transplanted Europeans such as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Stanley Hoffman,
who viewed themselves as tutors for powerful but naive American elites, became the dominant
conceptual framework for postwar U.S. policy.4 The classical realism of postwar theorists was never
a vulgar philosophy of might makes right, though it is sometimes interpreted in that way. Its most
prominent promulgators, often European Jews like Morgenthau who had fled the holocaust and
were lucidly aware of what unchecked power set to evil ends could affect, were preoccupied with
ethical concerns and the need to constrain the inherent violence of anarchic interstate competition.5
But the realist tradition made no bones about the need to place power, the global balance of power,
and strategic rivalry between competing sovereignties at the center of a globalist worldview. During
the Second World War, State Department planners carefully prepared for a policy of engagement
based upon the purposeful use of U.S. power to shape a congenial international environment.6
George Kennan’s containment doctrine, the backbone of U.S. security policy through most of the
Cold War decades, was little more than an astute application of realist premises to the management
of U.S.-Soviet relations.7
Regional conflict was a significant part of Cold War competition, but it too was usually interpreted
in a global perspective, as a projection of superpower rivalry into peripheral regions. Architects of
U.S. Cold War strategy like Henry Kissinger could publicly opine about the marginality of Third
World regions, and assert a great power orientation that perceived the essence of foreign policy as an
elegant game of balance between power centers in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and
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Beijing.8 Nuclear competition between the superpowers, and the theory of strategic deterrence that
was crafted to direct it, encouraged ever more abstract modeling of interstate rivalry. These trends
culminated in the 1980s with the emergence of “neo” versions of traditional theoretical paradigms
that consciously sought to void international theory of its historicist and humanistic foundations.
Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist argument used austere logic in interpreting interstate competition as
an abstract calculus of power.9 The related schools of game and rational choice theory sought to
use mathematical modeling to reproduce the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making. Neoliberal institutionalist models built alternatives to realism upon the universalizing trends of
interdependence and globalization, sometimes built upon a simplistic Benthamite utilitarianism.10
By the end of the Cold War, much of the rationale for U.S. foreign and security policy rested upon
assumptions integral to these approaches—the centrality of great power rivalry, the balance of
power as the axis of interstate competition, the changing nature of power in an age of globalization
where economic strength and various soft power options have accrued in importance, and the need
for a competitive strategy to maintain and extend U.S. advantage.
Part of the reigning confusion surrounding the nature of post-Cold War world order derives
from the fact that it is no longer defined by an all-consuming rivalry between peer competitors.
With a Gross Domestic Product far outdistancing the nearest competitor, levels of defense spending
superior to any imaginable combination of rivals, a clear-cut technological advantage, and a strong
and stable domestic order, the U.S. stands head and shoulders above any real or potential rival. The
current distribution of world power is objectively hegemonic, and American leadership is less a goal
than a fact. In the absence, now and for the foreseeable future, of an authentic peer competitor capable
of posing a serious challenge to U.S. dominance, balancing strategies such as that promulgated by
Russia’s former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, seeking to regenerate a “multipolar” world order
in which America would be limited to the status of first among equals, must remain essentially
rhetorical.11 Maintaining U.S. status and using the advantages of preeminence to good ends have
become primary responsibilities for U.S. security planners.12 These are tasks that demand different
kinds of perceptions and priorities than those motivating policy during the Cold War.
Analyses of new directions in global security policy tend to similar conclusions concerning the
kinds of threats that the U.S. will be required to respond to. In contrast with the focused strategic
environment of the Cold War years, these threats will be dispersed rather than concentrated,
unpredictable and often unexpected, and significantly derived from regional and state-centered
contingencies. The threat of global terrorism, in particular, driven forward by widely dispersed
terror networks, is rooted in failed states and marginalized regions denied the benefits of balanced
modernization and development. These conclusions rest upon shared assumptions about the
emerging 21st century world order, the changing contours of global security, and the evolving
U.S. world role. The new configuration of global power, which combines U.S. preeminence with
considerable regional fragmentation and turbulence, ensures that major world regions will be
an ever more important target for U.S. engagement—as sources of critical strategic resources,
as platforms for geostrategic leverage, as breeding grounds for terrorism, as integral parts of an
increasingly interdependent global economy, and as testing grounds for great power will and
determination to impose rules of the game. Preeminence does not imply total control. Influence in
key world regions will be a significant apple of discord between the hegemonic leader, great power
rivals, and influential local powers. Regions and sub-regions will remain the primary forums for
armed conflict and instability, with a variety of small wars and protracted stabilization operations
posing the greatest demands upon a U.S. military committed to engagement and shaping strategies.
Aspiring regional hegemons, sometimes tempted by hopes of gaining access to weapons of mass
destruction, will continue to promote disorder and pose direct threats to important U.S. interests.
To navigate effectively under these circumstances, U.S. strategists will have to base international
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engagement upon a sophisticated understanding of major world regions, viewed not only in regard
to their place within an overarching structure of world power, but as entities in their own right,
including the underlying social, political, and cultural processes that make the national and regional
context unique.
For all of these reasons, regional studies will remain a necessary foundation for an integrated
curriculum in national security policy and planning. If the 20th century has been the century of
global conflagration, the 21st century seems poised to become the century of regional disaggregation.
New directions in international relations theory, cast around concepts such as turbulence and chaos
theory, have been honed to highlight these trends.13 For U.S. policy makers, the challenge will be to
integrate regional perspectives and sensitivities to national and regional dynamics into a realistic
and balanced approach to the pursuit of global security; not to question the relevance of regional
perspectives (which should be self-evident), but to better understand the ways in which they need
to be joined to a comprehensive strategy for the pursuit of national interest.
What Is a Region?
Regions may be defined and distinguished according to an approximate combination of geographic, social, cultural, and political variables. Unambiguous distinctions, however, will always
be elusive. As an analytical category in international relations, the “region” is fated to remain contingent and contentious. Geographical contiguity is clearly a prerequisite for regional identity, but
drawing uncontested boundaries is usually an impossible task.14 The concept of “eastern Europe”
once had a fairly high degree of integrity, but since 1989 it has virtually disappeared from the
political lexicon. The phrase “Middle East,” which was originally the product of colonialist and
Eurocentric world views, continues to be used (often rendered as a “Greater Middle East”) to describe
an extremely diverse area stretching from the Maghreb into distant Central Asia. Meanwhile, the
designation of an eastern Mediterranean Levant has fallen out of fashion. The Balkans has been
regarded as a distinctive European sub-region for well over a century, but almost any Balkan state
with elsewhere to turn rejects the designation unambiguously.15 “All regions,” writes Andrew
Hurrell with some justification, “are socially constructed and hence politically contested.”16
One of the more influential recent attempts to delineate regions according to cultural criteria
has been Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington identifies nine world
civilizational zones based significantly, though not entirely, upon confessional affiliation.17 The
argument that geostrategy will be increasingly dominated by civilizational conflict waged along
the “faultlines” dividing these zones has been widely used to explain the apparent upsurge in
ethnic conflict of the recent past. Huntington’s argument, however, is neither entirely novel nor
altogether convincing. Geopolitical analysis has long used the idea of the “shatterbelt,” defined as
a politically fragmented and ethnically divided zone that serves as a field of competition between
continental and maritime powers.18 Great civilizations cannot be precisely bounded spatially, and
they are rarely either entirely homogenous or mutually exclusive. Huntington’s attempt to designate
geographically bounded civilizational zones, and to use these zones as the foundation for a theory
of geostrategy, rests on suspect premises.
Barry Buzan has developed the concept of the “regional security complex” in an effort “to offset
the tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international
security affairs.”19 He makes the assertion that in security terms, “ ‘region’ means that a distinct
and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they
have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”20 The existence of a “subsystem”
of security relations presumes high levels of interdependence, multiple interactions, and shared
sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Any attempt to identify such complexes empirically, however,
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poses obvious problems.21 Regional security complexes are rarely if ever defined exclusively by
geographical proximity, they are often dominated by external powers, and they are sometimes
held hostage by national-cultural variables or systemic dynamics. The United States is the focus
of functioning security complexes in both Europe and Asia. Turkey and Israel lie within different
security complexes according to most of Buzan’s criteria, but they have developed a close bilateral
relationship that impacts significantly upon their relations with contiguous states. Transnational
threats such as terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, or environmental
disintegration also overlap regions and create dynamics of association that prevent security
complexes from becoming significantly self-contained.
The U.S. makes an approximate distinction between geographic regions in the Unified Command
Plan that lies at the basis of its war-fighting strategy, by fixing the contours of unified command
areas assigned to combatant commanders. This approach originally evolved from the division of
responsibilities adapted by the U.S. to fight the Second World War, and was formalized by the
National Security Act of 1947. Over the years the geographic division of responsibility has been
adapted repeatedly, on the basis of changes in the international security structure, technological
advances, and strategic calculation, but also bureaucratic infighting over areas of responsibility and
access to resources. Combatant commanders have recently been required to draw up an annual
Theater Engagement Plan defining regional shaping priorities, but they are primarily war-fighters,
and the division of responsibility which the current unified command plan structure embodies is
geared to position the U.S. to prevail in armed confrontations. Contemporary U.S. national security
strategy, mandating readiness to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, has concentrated
the attention of the combatant commanders on the areas where such conflicts are presumed to be
most likely—in the Middle East/Southwest Asian and Western Pacific/Northeast Asian theaters.
The regional distinctions built into the Unified Command Plan are arbitrary, but they are geared to
the performance of the functional tasks of warriors and do not always rest upon careful conceptual
distinctions.
David Lake and Patrick Morgan define region minimally, as “a set of countries linked by
geography and one or more common trends, such as level of development, culture or political
institutions.”22 Their definition has the advantage of simplicity, but it is potentially too broad to be
really useful, and is also possibly misleading. The nation-state is sometimes an inadequate building
bloc for regional complexes. Any viable definition of the post-Soviet Central Asian region would
have to include China’s Xinjiang province, whose population is composed of 60 percent Turkic
Muslims. Russia’s far eastern provinces are an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, while the
core of historic Russia is an extension, both geographically and culturally, of a greater Europe.
Ukraine’s population is divided politically along the line of the Dnipro River, with the western
provinces affiliating with an enlarged central Europe and the eastern provinces oriented toward the
Russian Federation and Eurasia. Northern Mexico and southern California have become intimately
associated as a result of high levels of economic interaction and cross-border movement of peoples.23
The European Union has even sought to institutionalize transnational communities, by creating
multi-state districts designated as “Euro-regions.”24 The commonalities used to distinguish regions
cannot be terminated artificially at national boundaries, and “one or more common trends” is too
weak a foundation for association to give regional designations analytical substance.
In its regional studies curriculum, the U.S. Army War College designates six major world regions
on the basis of broad geographical criteria—Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Russia and Eurasia, the
Asia-Pacific region, and the Americas. These are designations of convenience intended primarily
for pedagogical purposes. Our working definition of what constitutes a region is of necessity broad
and multidimensional. Geographical propinquity; a sense of identity and self-awareness based
upon shared experience, ascribed traits, or language; a degree of autonomy within the international
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state system; relatively high levels of transactions; economic interdependencies; and political and
cultural affinity may all be cited as relevant criteria. It is presumed that there will be gray areas and
significant overlap between regions however they are defined. The Turkish Republic, for example,
is simultaneously part of a wider Europe, a greater Middle East, and post-Soviet Eurasia. No single
set of associations is essential, and in the best of cases fixing the contours of major world regions
and sub-regions will remain a problematic exercise.
World Regions and World Order.
However regions are defined and differentiated, the impact of local, national, and regional
dynamics upon world politics is substantial and destined to grow larger. For the foreseeable future,
effective strategy will require sensitivity to the various ways in which regional affairs condition the
global security agenda, channel and constrain U.S. priorities, and affect a changing world order.
Regional instability poses diverse kinds of challenges to U.S. interests. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait
in 1990 placed a critical mass of Middle Eastern oil reserves in the hands of an ambitious and
hostile regional power, thus posing a clear threat to vital interests. Such dramatic scenarios will
not occur very often, but the potential consequences are so great as to demand high degrees of
readiness. “Rogue states,” which aspire to regional hegemony and whose leaders are often defiant
of international norms, are now acknowledged as a distinct threat in their own right. The most
persistent challenges of recent years have been the chronic instability born of flawed regional orders
marked by severe impoverishment, unequal development, frustrated nationalism, ethnic rivalry,
and the “failed state” phenomenon, where weak polities lose the capacity to carry out the basic
tasks of governance. Embedded terrorism, exploiting failed regional systems as sanctuaries for the
pursuit of global agendas, has been a dramatic consequence.
In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to participate in an
unprecedented number of complex contingency operations ranging from simple non-combatant
evacuations to extensive, protracted, and dangerous peace enforcement and peacekeeping duties.
The logic of U.S. engagement is usually impeccable. Unchecked regional or civil conflicts risk
escalation with broadening consequences; threaten the credibility of the U.S., its allies, and major
international instances as guarantors of world order; and confront decision makers with horrendous
and morally intolerable humanitarian abuses. But the U.S. should not feel obligated, nor can it afford,
to take on the role of global policeman. Protracted and open-ended peacekeeping deployments risk
to undermine combat readiness by disrupting training routines, erode the morale of the volunteer
force, and pose the constant possibility of deeper and higher-risk engagement. Shaping regional
complexes to head off resorts to coercive conflict behavior, and responding to regional challenges, if
possible preemptively and under the aegis of international organizations or multinational coalitions,
have, as a result, become pillars of U.S. security policy.
The challenges of civil war and low-intensity regional conflict will not go away or diminish.
In a larger historical perspective it seems clear that the total wars of the twentieth century have
been exceptional events rather than typical ones. Prior to our century, technological limitations
made the concept of “world” war unthinkable—warfare, of necessity, was waged within physically
constrained theaters on the regional level. Ironically, the technological possibilities unveiled with
the creation of massive nuclear arsenals during the Cold War have once again made the outbreak of
hegemonic warfare between great power rivals highly unlikely, as well an eminently undesirable.
The increasing lethality (and expense) of modern conventional armaments only further raises the
threshold of total war. While the Kantian thesis that great power warfare has become obsolete may
or may not be credible, it rests upon substantial foundations.25 If for no other reasons than those
imposed by the evolving technology of violence, wars and armed confrontations are today once
163

again being contested almost exclusively as low and medium intensity conflicts on the local and
regional level. “In the foreseeable future,” write Lake and Morgan, “violent conflict will mostly
arise out of regional concerns and will be viewed by political actors through a regional, rather than
global, lens.”26
In some ways, Cold War bipolarity worked to constrain regional conflict. Neither superpower
could afford to tolerate an uncontrolled escalation of regional rivalry that risked drawing it into
a direct confrontation, and regional allies were consistently pressured to limit their aspirations
and bend to the will of their great power sponsors.27 It is difficult to imagine that the anarchic
disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation would have been allowed to proceed unchecked in 1991
had the fragile European balance of terror of the Cold War system still been at risk. The extent of
such constraint may nonetheless be exaggerated. Many of the regional conflicts of the Cold War
era—in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, the Middle East, or southern Asia—have
perpetuated themselves into the post-Cold War period. Cumulatively, post-World War II regional
conflicts have occasioned the deaths of over 25 million individuals, and the incidence and intensity
of such conflicts continues to increase.
A composite portrait of post-Cold War regional conflict calls attention to the difficulties involved
in programming effective responses. The large majority of contemporary “limited” wars are civil
wars or wars of secession, waged with the ferocity that is typical of such contests. Combat operations
often include the significant engagement of poorly controlled and disciplined irregular forces. The
bulk of casualties are imposed upon innocent civilians, sometimes including genocidal massacre and
forced population transfers (ethnic cleansing). While often obscure in terms of their origins, such
conflicts are usually highly visible. The modern mass media, commercially driven and chronically
in search of sensation, brings regional chaos “into the living room” and generates popular pressure
to respond that political leaders often find difficult to ignore. Limited and often frustrated or only
partly successful intervention by the international community in the role of would-be peacemaker
is another shared trait that gives many contemporary regional conflicts a fairly uniform contour.
Wayne Burt notes correctly that, in comparison with the structured context of Cold War bipolarity,
the “post-Cold War world is a much ‘messier’ world where limited conflict will be fought for
limited and often shifting objectives, and with strategies that are difficult to formulate, costs that
are uncertain, and entrance and exit points that are not obvious.”28
As undisputed world leader, and the only major power with significant global power projection
capacity, the U.S. is often compelled to react to such conflicts whether or not it has truly vital interests
at stake. America’s ability to manage and shape the conflict process is nonetheless severely limited.
A decade of struggling with regional conflict in post-communist Yugoslavia, including intensive
diplomatic efforts, punitive air strikes, large and open-ended peacekeeping deployments, and a
full-scale war over Kosovo, has led to what may at best be described as a mixed result.29 Peace
enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities have been carried out with impressive efficiency,
but the much more problematic, and politically charged task of post-conflict peace building has
proven to be something close to a mission impossible.30
Since the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the
phenomenon of embedded terrorism has become another manifestation of how regional instability
may provoke intense political violence. U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been
designed to strike at terror nests, but it has quickly become apparent that defeating designated
enemies is only part of the challenge. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts have demanded an
increasingly sophisticated awareness of local norms and values, and heightened sensitivities to the
cultural context within which stability operations are being pursued. Army Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in Afghanistan have striven to develop closer working relations with local populations and
build a foundation of trust based upon mutual understanding that will make it more difficult for
terrorist cells to relocate in the areas in the future.
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The U.S. has made the maintenance of regional stability a pillar of its security strategy, but the
forces of disintegration at work within many world regions are daunting. Effective responses will
first of all require some selectivity in choosing targets for intervention. When we do elect to become
involved, our efforts should be based upon a much greater awareness of regional realities than
has been manifested in the recent past. We will also need to make better use of friends and allies.
Regional instability is often best addressed by local actors, who usually have the largest vested
interest in blocking escalation, and in some cases regionally based conflict management initiatives
can become a significant stimulus to broader patterns of regional cooperation. Engaging allies and
relevant multilateral forums in managing regional conflict, as the U.S. has sought to do with the
African Crisis Response Initiative, should be a high national priority.
Geopolitics.
Many currently fashionable approaches to international relations assume the decline of
territoriality as a motive for state behavior. The dominant trend in world politics is persistently,
albeit vaguely, described as globalization, implying a rapid increase in interactions fueled by
revolutions in communications and information management, the emergence of a truly global
market and world economy, the primacy of economic competition as a mode of interstate rivalry,
and an unprecedented space-time compression that places unique demands upon decisionmakers.31 The globalization scenario is built on overarching generalizations about world order and
it rests upon universalizing premises that leave little space for sticky concern with the intricacies
of regional affairs. There are alternatives to theoretical perspectives cast on so high a level of
abstraction however, and they bring regional issues into the forefront of international discourse.
Most important among them is the tradition of geopolitics.
The core challenge of geopolitical analysis is to link the systematic study of spatial and
geographical relations with the dynamic of interstate politics. As a formal discipline, geopolitics
dates from the late nineteenth century work of the Leipzig professor Friedrich Ratzel. His 1897
study Politische Geographie (Political Geography) presents states as organisms with a quasi-biological
character, rooted in their native soil, embedded in a distinctive spatial context or Lebensraum
(living space), and condemned to either grow and expand or wither away.32 In the works of
various contemporaries and successors, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford
Mackinder, Alfred de Severing, Klaus Haushofer, and Nicholas John Spykman, these insights have
been pushed in a number of directions. The strong influence of geopolitical categories, especially
as transmitted through the work of Haushofer, upon Adolf Hitler’s strategic program during the
1930s has brought enduring discredit upon the discipline, widely but unfairly regarded as a vulgar
amalgam of social Darwinism and military expansionism. In fact, in its manifold and not always
consistent manifestations, geopolitical analysis presents a range of alternative strategic perceptions
whose common ground is a sense of the permanent and enduring relevance of spatial, cultural, and
environmental factors in world politics.33 These are also the factors that stand at the foundation of
regional studies.
Geopolitics is rooted in the study of geography, broadly but relevantly defined by Saul Cohen as
“spatial patterns and relations that reflect dynamic physical and human processes.”34 Geography is a
rich and complex construct that provides a context for weighing the impact of a number of significant
but often neglected variables. These include ethnicity, nationalism, and the politics of identity;
access to natural and strategic resources; geostrategy and the role of lines of communication and
strategic choke points; relations between human communities and their natural environment; and
the strategic implications of increasing environmental stress. It encompasses demographic issues
such as population growth, cycles of migration and changing patterns of population distribution,
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and “decision-making milieus” including Huntingtonian civilizational zones, political systems and
political cultures, as well as the spatial distribution of power within the world system.
Geopolitical analysis is best known in the West as refracted by Halford Mackinder’s heartland
concept, which defines control of the Eurasian landmass as the key to world power. Mackinder
distinguished between a World-Island encompassing the joined continents of Europe, Asia, and
Africa, the Eurasian Heartland approximately equivalent to Russia and Central Asia, and the Rimlands
(including east-central Europe) along the Eurasian periphery. “Who rules East Europe,” he wrote in
a famous passage, “controls the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.”35 Mackinder was not a fascist militarist, but
a moderate professor and civil servant, whose thinking lay at the foundation of British strategy
through much of the twentieth century. By calling attention to the spatial dimensions of grand
strategy, his work points out the extent to which geostrategic concepts have been and continue to
be at the heart of modern statecraft.
A striking contemporary illustration of the continuing impact of geopolitical perspectives is
provided by the heartland power par excellence, the Russian Federation, where disillusionment with
the gilded promises of globalization and integration with the U.S.-led world economy have led to
a rapid and broadly influential revival of geopolitical theory.36 The new Russian geopolitics has
been dismissed in the West as a manifestation of radical extremism, a sort of Russian fascism born
of the post-communist malaise.37 In fact, core geopolitical perceptions (the need to maintain the
integrity of the Russian Federation, the call to reassert a strong sphere of influence in the territories
of the former Soviet Union, the cultural distinctiveness of the Russian Idea and its historical role
as a force for integration in the expanses of Eurasia, the need for alliances to balance and contest
American hegemony) have moved into the mainstream of Russian strategic thought and enjoy
strong support.
		Haushofer has written that “geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political processes
by the earth,” and that “the essence of regions as comprehended from the geopolitical point of view
provides the framework for geopolitics.”38 This is a plaidoyer for the concrete and substantial, for a
theory of world politics built from the ground up. Effective geopolitical reasoning leads us back to
the earth, to the distinctive political communities nested upon it, to the patterns of association that
develop between them, and to the conflicts that emerge from their interactions. It is not the only
school of thought that prioritizes the relevance of geography and regional studies, but it provides
a particularly good example of the relevance of the textured study of peoples and places as a
foundation for effective strategy.
The Cultural Dimension of Warfare.
The maxim “know thy enemy” is often counted as the acme of strategic wisdom. It is unfortunately
a maxim that has not always been highly respected in the U.S. military and security communities.
War has organizational and technological dimensions which make it a rigorous, practical, and
precise enterprise, but wars are also waged between calculating rivals in a domain of uncertainty,
and by distinctive political communities in ways that reflect deeply rooted, culturally conditioned
preferences.
During the Cold War, the U.S. made an intense effort to understand the societal and cultural
dynamics shaping the perceptions of its Soviet rival, arguably to good effect. In general, however,
in-depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not been a strong point for U.S.
strategy, which has tended to rest upon the sturdy pillars of relative invulnerability and the capacity
to mobilize overwhelming force.39 In the volatile and uncertain security environment of the years
to come, however, the assumption of technological and material advantage may not be a safe one,
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nor will these advantages always suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The
People’s Republic of China represents a potential long-term rival with considerable assets and great
self-confidence, derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture.40 Russia’s current
Time of Troubles has temporarily brought her low, but eventually the inherent strengths that made
the USSR so formidable a rival during the Cold War decades will reassert themselves. We confront
a long-term struggle to manage the dilemmas of modernization in the Arab and Muslim worlds,
and the associated dynamic of terrorism, that will demand sophisticated cultural awareness. The
U.S. will need to know “what makes them tick” if it wants to manage its relations with potential
peer competitors and troubled world regions successfully. Effective intervention in complex
contingencies will likewise demand in-depth knowledge of real or potential rivals. Strategy is not
uniquely the product of culture, and culture itself is not a lucid or unambiguous construct. But all
strategy unfolds in a cultural context, and cannot be fully or properly understood outside it.
Colin Gray defines strategic culture as “the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions,
habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation ... that are more or less specific to
a particular geographically based security community.”41 The foundations of strategic culture are
the fundamentals of culture itself; shared experience, language, common governance, and values.
The cultural orientation that derives from these commonalities, it can be argued, affects the ways in
which polities conduct diplomacy, define and pursue interests, and wage war. In his controversial
History of Warfare, John Keegan suggests that throughout history war has always been an essentially
cultural phenomenon, an atavism derived from patterns of group identification and interaction
rather than the purposeful activity implied in Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the
continuation of politics by other means.”42 Victor Hanson argues that the ancient Greek preference
for physical confrontation and quick decision has created a “Western way of war,” dominated by a
search for decisive battle and strategies of annihilation, a tradition that remains alive to this day.43
Such conclusions are extreme, but they are useful in underlining the fact that wars are conceived,
plotted, and waged by socially conditioned human agents.
As a dominant global power the U.S. will be called upon to wage war in a variety of contexts in
the years to come. A better understanding of the strategic cultures of real or potential adversaries
will place another weapon in its arsenal and strengthen prospects for success. In Bernard Brodie’s
classic formulation, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the
greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.”44
Knowing the enemy goes well beyond order of battle, to the sources of strategic preference and
military operational codes that are grounded in the social and cultural context of distinctive nations
and regions.45
Espaces de Sens: Regional Alliance and Association.
The Cold War was a phase of intense global competition manifested in ideological polarization,
arms racing, and militarized regional rivalry. It nonetheless offered a structure of purposeful
endeavor for its leading protagonists, as well as for critics who sought alternatives to what they
perceived as the dead-end of belligerent bipolarity. The USSR justified its international policy on
the basis of a distinctively Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism. The U.S. consciously developed
its Cold War strategy as a defense of the values of freedom and democracy. Various non-aligned
alternatives called for a plague upon both houses, and sought to develop a third way independent
of either power bloc. Regardless of where one stood, world politics took on the contours of a moral
tale infused with meaning.
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a certain euphoria, captured by Francis Fukuyama’s
“End of History” thesis, according to which the demise of the communist challenge meant “the end
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of history as such: that is, the end point in mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”46 Fukuyama’s sweepingly
optimistic argument promised an era of global harmony in which interstate strategic rivalry would
give way to cooperation under the impetus of democratization, development, and consumerism,
promoted by a benign American hegemony. In place of a contest of values, Fukuyama’s Hegelian
vision looked forward to the unchallenged primacy of the culture of the West.
Needless to say, nothing of the kind has transpired. The post-Cold War period has been marked
by regional turbulence, torturous and sometimes unsuccessful post-communist transitions, violent
ethnic conflict, the rise of global terrorism as a major challenge to the premises of world order,
and continued, if sometimes muted, great power rivalry. Western values are contested rather
than embraced, and the absence of a compelling sense of overall direction, of a larger domestic or
international project, of a source of signification and meaning, has arguably become a problem in
its own right. Uncertainly about direction has also contributed to strategic confusion. The suspicion
or rejection of large civilizational projects that has become so prominent a part of contemporary
post-structuralist and social constructivist approaches to international theory, often accompanied
by quasi-indifference to any kind of strategic analysis whatsoever, reflects the state of affairs with
great clarity.47
The United Nations, symbol of an earlier generation’s aspirations for a more peaceful world
order, has languished during the post-Cold War decade. In contrast, projects for regional
association have flourished. Realist theory portrays the formation of alliances and regional blocs
as an “outside-in” phenomenon, occurring as a response to real or perceived external challenges,
whether via “balancing” efforts to correct a maldistribution of power, or “bandwagoning” whereby
weak polities seek to dilute threats through association with a hegemonic leader.48 Neo-mercantilist
approaches follow an identical pattern in explaining regional association as a logical response to
enhanced international economic competition. But regional association may also be understood as a
function of “inside-out” dynamics driven by social and cultural trends. Zaki Laïdi has argued that,
in the face of the universalizing tendencies of globalization, meaningful civilizational projects can
only be constructed on a regional basis, as espaces de sens (spaces of meaning) bound together by a
complex of historical, social, cultural, political, and economic associations.49 These are contrasting
arguments, but they are not mutually exclusive. Both “outside-in” and “inside-out” approaches to
regional association need to be combined in an effort to come to terms with a phenomenon that has
the potential to transform world politics root and branch.50
The “new regionalism” is manifested both by the revitalization of traditional regional
organizations and the creation of new forms of regional association. Large regional or sub-regional
blocs with a history of institutionalization, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union,
the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), often have a strong security orientation, though today
their focus is more often placed upon internal conflict management than external threats.51 The
proliferation of regional projects for economic integration, including some of the organizations listed
above as well as others such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
the Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Southern Cone
Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Central America Common Market (CACM),
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), has an obvious economic logic, but also a strong cultural foundation; within
these broadly drawn and sometimes overlapping zones of association one may observe a powerful
revival of regional and sub-regional awareness and identity. In other cases, functionalist logic
prevails. Regional associations are sometimes appropriate forums for approaching large global
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problems such as environmental disintegration, occasioned on the systemic level but not always
effectively addressed on that level.
Regional alliances and associations play a critical role in U.S. strategy. The most important by
far is the Atlantic Alliance, uniquely successful as a formal security association over many decades,
but an organization whose raison d’être has been called into question in the new circumstances
of the post-Cold War. NATO was originally built up and maintained as an organization for
collective defense against a clear and present external threat. The collapse of the USSR and the
disappearance of the Warsaw Pact have made this aspect of its identity considerably less important,
if not altogether irrelevant, but the Alliance has adapted by restructuring itself as a “new NATO”
including commitments to enlargement, out of area peace operations, and gradual movement
toward a broader collective security orientation. Former Secretary General Javier Solana describes
the process extravagantly, as a “root and branch transformation” aimed to create “a new Alliance,
far removed in purpose and structure from its Cold War ancestor,” inspired by the premise of
“cooperative security.”52 This “new” NATO is arguably more important than ever in the broader
context of U.S. security policy, as a platform for power projection, as a forum for managing relations
with key allies, as an instrument for reaching out to the emerging democracies of eastern Europe,
as the foundation for a new European security order, and as a context for engaging the Russian
Federation in a cooperative security effort.
The Atlantic Alliance is also a regional pact, whose stability has always been presumed to rest
in part upon close historical and cultural associations between the U.S. and its European partners.
Unfortunately, the new NATO will not have the luxury of assuming that a close cultural affinity will
continue to link both sides of the Atlantic indefinitely. Changing demographic balances in the U.S.
are reducing the proportion of citizens with European roots and heritage. Enlargement has made
NATO itself a politically and culturally more diverse organization, where decision by consensus
will be harder to achieve. Most of all, the project for European unification is moving slowly but
steadily toward the goal of a more autonomous European subject possessed of the capacity to
pursue an independent foreign and security policy. Managing regional conflict in the Balkans placed
strains upon Alliance mechanisms. The Kosovo conflict generated considerable tension between the
U.S. and its European allies, key allies were disappointed by the U.S. decision not to leverage the
Alliance in a more significant way during its initial campaign in Afghanistan, and differences over
the choice of a military option against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003 brought alliance partners to
the brink of an overt break. NATO continues to rest upon secure foundations, but friction in transAtlantic relations persists and it likely to grow stronger as the European project continues to unfold
and efforts to bolster a European defense identity progress. Alliance management, based upon a
careful appreciation of changing European realities and awareness of the cultural specificities of
key European partners, will be an ever more important strategic task.
Other forms of regional association represent potential dangers. At least since the Iranian
revolution of 1979, concern for an emerging “Islamic threat” has been prominent in U.S. policy
circles. These concerns, to some extent understandably, have become considerably more prominent
since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Somewhat less prominent, unfortunately, has been an
informed understanding of what Islam is and is not, as a religion, as a philosophy of governance,
and a way of life.53 The possible solidification of a Russian-Chinese strategic axis, which would rest
in large measure upon mutual alienation from the West, has the potential significantly to effect
global power balances, and the European Union clearly aspires to challenge the U.S. economically.
Contesting, co-opting and counter-acting these kinds of patterns will remain an important priority
for U.S. planners.
There is an unmistakable momentum pushing in the direction of stronger local and regional
identities, and more robust regional association. For some analysts, the trend is part and parcel
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of a “retreat from the state” occasioned by changes in the locus of power in the global political
economy, whose logical endpoint will be a “new medievalism” in which alternative forms of political
association, with a more pronounced regional character, will eventually come to prevail.54 Whether
or not such forecasts are correct, shifting patterns of association and the heightened visibility of a
variety of regional forums are clear manifestations of the increased relevance of regional perspectives
in global security affairs.
Conclusions.
The foundations of regional studies have changed remarkably little over time. Substantive
understanding of major world regions demands a thorough mastery of the relevant specialized
literature, careful and persistent monitoring of events and trends, appropriate language skills, and a
period of sustained residence allowing for immersion in regional realities, accompanied by periodic
visits to keep perceptions up-to-date. Regionalists need refined skills that demand a considerable
investment of time and resources to create and maintain. If the argument presented in this essay is
correct, however, and regional dynamics will in fact become an increasingly important part of the
international security agenda in the years to come, the investment will be well worth making.
Although the confines of major world regions and sub-regions are difficult to fix with a great deal
of consistency and rigor, the relevance of local, national, and regional perspectives in international
political analysis is more or less uncontested. For U.S. strategists in the post-Cold War period the
importance of such perspectives is particularly great. In the absence of a peer competitor, significant
challenges to U.S. interests are most likely to emerge from various kinds of regional instability,
including threatened access to critical strategic resources, the emergence of “rogue” states with
revisionist agendas, embedded terrorism, and persistent low and medium intensity conflict. In
an increasingly integrated world system, geographic, cultural, and environmental factors that are
importantly or uniquely manifested in the regional context will play an increasingly important
role in shaping national priorities and international realities. Strategic culture is a vital context for
war-fighting, as relevant to contests with peer competitors as it is to clashes with less imposing
adversaries in regional contingencies. Shifting patterns of regional association, often motivated by
a heightened sense of regional identity and a search for meaning and relative security in the face of
the impersonal and sometimes dehumanizing forces of globalization, is an important worldwide
trend. None of these dynamics can be properly incorporated into U.S. security strategy without a
solid understanding of regional decision-making milieus and cultural proclivities.
To assert the importance of regional approaches in a balanced strategic studies curriculum is not
to deny the relevance of alternative perspectives. Universalizing theory is essential and unavoidable.
The formal and technical specializations necessary to make sense of political and military affairs are
ineluctable. And there is the ever-present danger of regionalists falling into a narrow preoccupation
with local problems and personalities, while missing the larger, structural forces at work in the
background. In context, however, and approached with appropriate modesty, regional perspectives
have an essential place in strategy formulation.
The U.S. Army War College builds a regional studies component into its core curriculum,
structured around the six major world regions mentioned above and focused on the effort to define
and understand U.S. interests at stake on the regional level. Students are exposed to an in-depth
study of a particular region, and to an overview of all six world regions, as a foundation for the
school’s capstone exercise, which tests their ability to manage a series of overlapping regional crises
in an integrated political-military framework. Students are expected to become familiar with the
general historical, cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of the six major world
regions; to evaluate U.S. national and security interests in these regions and to identify the kinds
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of challenges that are most likely to emerge; and to develop a regional strategic assessment that
identifies alternative courses of action that can lead toward the achievement of U.S. national security
objectives. The skills and expertise garnered during this bloc of instruction should make a vital
contribution to the cultivation of future strategic leaders.
Regional strategic analysis is also of particular relevance to Army leaders. Though we live in the
age of jointness, the Army remains the service branch primarily charged with placing boots on the
ground in regional contingencies. Its operational environment is the land, where people live and
societies are rooted, and it must at a minimum come to terms with the geographical realities of the
places where it is constrained to operate, and the cultural characteristics of the peoples it is charged
to fight or to protect. The emphasis on regional studies in the U.S. Army War College strategy
curriculum stands out among our senior service schools. Experience, as well as common sense,
shows that it is an emphasis well-placed.
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CHAPTER 13
“LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY”:
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Paul Rexton Kan
Although the singer Warren Zevon may not have been aware, the title of his song “Lawyers,
Guns, and Money” represents several facets of transnational threats, like cross-border crime,
that comprise the international security environment in which the United States must operate.
Transnational threats do not recognize the significance of borders, their effects are wide ranging
with consequences in multiple nation-states, they transcend the capacity of a single nation-state
to confront them adequately, and they are loosely structured, if structured at all. Transnational
threats represent a type of non-conventional threat that are not directed by the actions or policies
of the government of a nation-state. Such threats include actors like terrorists, drug traffickers and
organized criminal syndicates who are involved in activities like mass murder, extortion, bribery,
kidnapping, money laundering, drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal arms trading, sea
piracy, theft of art and cultural objects, cybercrime and the illicit trade of gemstones, timber and
oil. Such activities are estimated to generate a volume of financial flow on the order of $600 billion
annually.1
Moreover, these actors and actions are increasingly multifaceted. Several terror groups like Al
Qaeda and Hezbollah are involved in drug trafficking and money laundering, while traditional
drug smuggling groups in Mexico have evolved into “trafficking network organizations” since they
are also involved in a range of smuggling activities like human smuggling and arms trafficking.2
Such actors combine corporate and criminal cultures, “conducting criminal business not only with
ruthlessness but also with a degree of business skill worthy of many CEOs.”3
An equally important, but routinely overlooked quality of transnational threats is that they are
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to peel away from the process of globalization. In fact, the
potency of transnational threats has grown as border enforcement and capital controls have loosened
and as free trade agreements have expanded. As a result, responding to them with governmental
action is exceptionally thorny. Attempting to tackle transnational threats in a comprehensive manner
would mean greatly reducing the efficiencies of globalization like the speed of transportation and
commercial transactions—to have all ports worldwide routinely check every shipping container
for illicit commodities is not feasible, while any attempts to do so would reduce a government’s
capacity to provide for the economic well-being of its citizenry.
There are also other transnational threats like the N5N1 bird flu virus and climate change that
are “threats without threateners” since they do not have an agent at all.4 Pathogens are not “actors”
on the international stage—a virus does not seek a seat in the UN General Assembly. Even without
an actor who is responsible for these phenomena, pathogens and natural catastrophes share the
qualities of transnational threats by ignoring borders, affecting multiple nation-states, transcending
the capacity of a single nation-state to confront them adequately while not emanating from a
structured organization. Likewise, tackling them in a comprehensive manner would significantly
affect the process of globalization—screening all airline passengers for infectious disease would
dramatically interfere with global transportation. And, as of this writing, no one has been able to
control tsunamis, earthquakes and rising sea levels.
Facetiously labeled as “thugs, bugs, and drugs,” transnational threats are, as James Rosenau
describes, “sovereignty-free” and serve to remind national security professionals that there are
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other issues beyond the conventional state-centered ones that can rise to high levels of national
importance. The challenge is that “traditional or Westphalian states are not prepared to deal with
non-governmental dynamics operating outside the domains of state and alliance systems. Doctrine
and force structures are designed around traditional concepts of overwhelming conventional force
to achieve decisive victory against established state militaries.”5 While these threats are unfamiliar
and responses cannot solely rely on traditional approaches, transnational threats are not immune
from treatment; they must be addressed in priority of their importance to U.S. national interests just
like any conventional security challenge. This chapter examines the ways that transnational threats
can affect the U.S. national security agenda and demonstrates how decisionmakers will need to
become more comfortable in developing complex responses to them.
Transnational Threats as Direct Threats.
Transnational threats are direct threats to U.S. national security. One can argue that threats like
drug dealing, terrorism, organized crime and pandemics directly challenge the authority of the U.S.
Government to provide for the general welfare while protecting the U.S. homeland from events that
can lead to the undermining of its territorial integrity, economic prosperity or vital institutions of
government. Such a case is not difficult to make—leaders have argued that the use and abuse of
hard core narcotics by U.S. citizens undermines law and order. Indeed, in 1989, President George
H. W. Bush addressed the nation on prime time television, held up a bag of crack cocaine seized
across from the White House days prior to the speech and proclaimed that “the gravest domestic
threat facing our nation today is drugs.”6 Just a few weeks after that speech, President Bush sent the
U.S. military in a major joint operation to capture Panamanian President Manuel Noriega for drug
trafficking crimes. In both word and deed, President Bush elevated the battle against the drug trade
to the same level as combating Soviet-inspired communism.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the dramatic increase in the lethality of
violent non-state actors. By utilizing the benefits of globalization—the internet, electronic banking,
air travel, student visas—less than two dozen individuals were able to kill thousands of U.S. citizens
and cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars. These series of attacks on a single morning revealed
the catastrophic potential of terrorist groups’ acquisition and use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Transnational organized crime syndicates are also a direct threat to U.S. national security since
they challenge state power from beneath—they assume the role of the state at local levels by enforcing
their own code of conduct, entering into illegal contracts and using violence to guarantee their
private interests.7 The result is the diminishing of legitimacy and authority of core governmental
institutions. Mafia violence of the Al Capone era should not be confused with the “rapid growth and
global reach that appear to have given transnational organized crime an unprecedented capacity to
challenge states.”8
Beyond the drug trade, terrorism and organized crime, the outbreak of a pandemic in the United
States would arguably pose a direct threat to the welfare of the American population. Although
sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission of avian influenza has not yet taken place,
its occurrence could result in over 140 million deaths worldwide and staggering economic losses.9
The most recent near human pandemic was the SARS outbreak in Asia between 2002 and 2003.
While not directly threatening the U.S. population, it did demonstrate the potential for a pandemic
to undermine the authority of a government. This outbreak had a seven to fifteen percent mortality
rate and created fears in the Chinese government of a “Chinese Chernobyl” that would create the
conditions for a popular outcry against the government to force greater openness.
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Transnational Threats as Indirect Threats.
There is not universal agreement that transnational threats should be labeled a direct threat
and placed high on the national security agenda. Although they can certainly challenge core U.S.
interests, transnational threats create indirect effects that complicate, but do not have the potency
to destroy the American homeland, wipe out the economy, or exterminate the writ of the U.S.
Government. As such, they can only create second order effects that, while significant, do not
jeopardize America’s ability to continue to exist as a nation-state.
Arguably, the drug trade and transnational criminal groups are indirect threats to U.S. national
security. Criminals and drug smugglers generally seek to evade government authority rather than
to directly confront it. While certain criminal groups, like the Russian mafiya, are exceptionally
violent, they do not seek to replace the authority of the U.S. Government with their own. Corruption
of public officials and law enforcement do undermine the authority of the government while drug
use and associated criminality can be deleterious to public health and civil order. The extent of
organized crime and illegal activities that penetrates legitimate institutions of government, society
and the economy can be quite damaging. Drug trafficking alone requires the participation of
members of legitimate professions—chemists, lawyers, accountants, realtors, and bankers. Such
widespread involvement can jeopardize fundamental elements of the American way of life based
on transparency and accountability of vital institutions.
Geo-strategically, transnational threats do have the ability to destabilize other nation-states that
are key to U.S. interests. Drug violence in neighboring Mexico has risen sharply since the 1990s,
includes former members of the Mexican military, and has spilled over into U.S. cities and towns
along the border. Drug violence continues to plague Colombia, a country pivotal to the stability of
Latin America. Russian organized crime has penetrated multiple levels of Russian society and has
spread to a variety of nations. Such criminality threatens a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy—the
expansion of democracy. One observer of the rise of transnational crime was forced to ask: “Can
democracy be promoted in countries in which criminal networks are the most powerful political
players?”10
While the U.S. may be able to fend off the more serious consequences of transnational threats,
more fragile countries are much more susceptible to greater damage. Research on civil wars and
armed conflict in the 1990s revealed that “the pursuit of criminal agendas by warring parties is
often difficult to distinguish from other objectives, supposedly of a more ‘political’ nature, that
are commonly assumed to be driving conflict.”11 Such protraction of conflicts creates regional
instability, exacerbates human rights abuses, and allows for the development of “brown areas” that
are isolated from the power of legitimate governmental authority. The result may be a failed state
that serves as a sanctuary for additional criminal activity and political violence. Such a state has
been raised to the level of a direct threat due to its ability to harbor international terrorist groups.
As President George W. Bush’s first National Security Strategy put it, “America is now threatened
less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”12
Transnational Threats as Enablers of Direct Threats.
Another way to conceptualize transnational threats is to view them as enablers to more direct
threats to the U.S. national security interests. In other words, adversaries can take advantage of
the illicit global economy to earn money for their activities that challenge U.S. actions or work
in collusion with criminal groups to procure expertise and material to attack the U.S. and its
citizens. Participation in the international drug trade is especially empowering for many warring
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groups that the U.S. confronts.13 The drug trade is seductive for many groups since it can be used
as a weapon against the U.S. as well as a generator of profit. Reportedly, Hezbollah imports raw
materials for heroin and cocaine production into Lebanon and sells the finished products to the U.S.
and Western Europe as a way to continue its campaign against Israel and the West.14 The Taliban
has engaged in heroin trafficking as a way to promote its insurgency against NATO forces. The
result was that, in September 2006, it became statistically as dangerous for an American service
member to serve in Afghanistan as it was in Iraq.15 Al Qaeda ran a number of criminal schemes to
keep their operations financially viable. One member of Al Qaeda is wanted on federal charges for
trafficking methamphetamine. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attempted to buy
illegal diamonds from Liberian President Charles Taylor to shield its hard currency assets from
seizure.
Rogue states can also be empowered by linking themselves to the illicit global economy. The
North Korean regime is actively engaged in the production, distribution and sale of drugs as part
of government policy coordinated by Central Committee Bureau 39. In fact, North Korean military
personnel have been used to smuggle drugs for nearly 30 years.16 North Korean infiltration craft
(manned by North Korean Special Operations Forces) have often been found in Japanese waters
since the late 1990s engaged in “drug drops.”17 North Korean uniformed personnel have reportedly
been involved in the transfer of illegal drugs both off the coasts of Japan and Taiwan.18
Transnational Threats as Strategic Distractions.
Transnational threats and their effects may also be viewed as strategic distractions; they appear as
exaggerations that pose nowhere near the same level of danger as conventional threats. By focusing
so much attention to them, some argue policy makers overstate the threat at the expense of focusing
limited time, attention, and resources on more pressing issues like rising powers, rogue states, and
the competition for oil. There is also the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy—raising transnational
threats like terror groups or criminals to high levels of importance legitimizes these actors on the
global stage in ways that they may not have been able to do themselves with their own resources or
actions. Even “threats without threatners” becomes problematic for national security professionals.
Placing pandemics on the security agenda has meant a more active role for the U.S. Department of
Defense, a role that is added to an already crowded agenda for the U.S. military.
To hold the view that transnational threats are distractions is not to argue that they are
unimportant, but that they should not be seen as residing in the province of national security. They
are not in the realm of “high politics.” They belong where they always have, be they in the arena
of law enforcement (for terrorism, drug trafficking), private business (for money laundering), or
the scientific community (in the cases of pandemic and climate change). Corruption and crime are
not so ingrained or widespread as to cripple the vital functions of the U.S. Government; the U.S.
routinely scores low as a country in corruption indexes and the level of drug use and rate of drug
related crimes has not significantly risen in the years the Office of National Drug Control Policy
has been keeping records. Money laundering has not significantly eroded public confidence in U.S.
financial institutions or the economy itself. Pandemics and the effects of climate change have been
effectively managed by the current configuration of the institutions of government.
Responses to Transnational Threats.
However one chooses to prioritize transnational threats, responding to them requires a high
level of interaction among a variety of actors in the U.S. and the international arena. Be they
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viewed as direct threats, indirect threats, enablers or distractions, transnational threats require that
responses be as complex as the threats to produce meaningful results. Ironically, since transnational
threats seemingly undermine the sovereignty of states, confronting them will mean that the U.S.
national security community must more fully integrate and harness the elements of its own
national sovereignty—diplomacy, information, military, economics, financial, intelligence and law
enforcement (DIMEFIL).
Since these threats are enmeshed in the process of globalization, the speed at which they
move means that governments are always playing catch-up. For example, the multifaceted nature
of criminal networks permits them to rapidly adapt to many of the countermeasures used by
governments. Human trafficking is on the rise and uses many of the same routes and techniques
as drug trafficking—one reason is that jail time for smuggling a person into the U.S. is less than for
smuggling a load of marijuana. The legal system has not caught up to the practice, meaning that
the risk is lower, but the profit is roughly the same and, therefore, the incentive is greater. Even
seemingly innocuous laws that were designed to mitigate some of the damages the global economy
can inflict also serve to empower transnational activities. After the signing of an agreement among
several Pacific nations to place limits on tuna fishermen to avoid capturing dolphins in their nets,
Chinese organized crime was able to take advantage of excess room in the holds of Taiwanese
fishing vessels to smuggle people from Fujian (the Chinese province closest to Taiwan) to other
vessels bound for the United States and other countries.19 Migrants became the new commodity.
For leaders of America’s armed services, transnational threats appear especially frustrating; for
a number of reasons cited above they are resistant to one of America’s strongest instruments of
power—military might. For example, it is difficult to wage war on a product (for example, drugs)
or phenomenon (for example, terrorism). After all, an adversary should be able to fight back. While
the U.S. Government is waging a War on Drugs, drugs are not fighting a war against the U.S.
Government; and this is not because drugs declined to participate, but because drugs are not the
sort of thing that could.20 Transnational threats are also frustrating for policymakers and strategists
because there does not seem to be a point at which they can be said to be vanquished. Policy makers
and strategists are more comfortable defining a particular goal or end-state for U.S. action. “It would
not make sense to say, ‘at the moment we are fighting fascism (or poverty or drugs), but we hope
at a future time we’ll be on better terms with fascism (or poverty or drugs) and the reason for
fighting it will have gone away’.”21 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, tackling any particular
transnational threat in a comprehensive way would be debilitating to the global order; “to declare
war on [all] organized crime would in these conditions be more tantamount to writing a suicide
note than embarking on a crusade.”22
Although transnational threats are frustrating, elusive, and resilient, national security
professionals are not powerless in the face of them. Such threats must be met with innovative, flexible
and sustainable strategies. Depending on the specific transnational threat, the coordinated use of the
elements of national power should be targeted to go after an organization, a product, a process, or a
combination. Traditional approaches that focus purely at the level of the nation-state and holding a
government responsible for transnational threats is of limited utility. While sovereignty implies the
ability of a government to control affairs within its boundaries, some nation-states are more capable
than others. As one scholar put it, “Afghanistan is not Sweden with bad roads.”23 While options
like Foreign Internal Defense and nation-building should not be dismissed, adopting a broader
perspective has greater strategic advantages. Adversaries must be viewed as “adaptive competitors”
in ways that conventional adversaries are not. Adaptive competitors “address problems, change
practices, and create identities in response to knowledge and experience, sometimes improving
their performance and aiding their bureaucratic survival.”24 As such, they are able to exploit seams
and respond more flexibly than traditional nation-states.
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To tackle adaptive competitors, strategists must make them face disincentives like lessening
demand, lowering profit margins, and raising risks.25 As such, a central feature any policy or
strategy to deal with transnational threats will be cooperation in building new networks to track,
monitor, and trace specific organizations, illicit markets, and global trends. Organized crime is not
invincible. In fact, each time a criminal cartel has been attacked with the right resources, legal tools,
and political determination, it has been defeated; the most important accomplishment has been to
challenge and destroy the myth of invincibility among criminal cartels.26
When it comes to threats without threateners, cooperation is still required. Networks of
multinational, multilayered and established actors need to be put in place to prepare to mitigate
the effects of pandemics and climate change. National public health systems are relatively new
to human social organizations—it was only during the early 20th century that cities became selfsustaining and did not have to rely on healthy bodies coming from the countryside to replenish
their populations. The global public health system is even younger and inherently more fragile, yet
the tools of globalization can aid in strengthening this system. In many ways, efforts to combat the
H5N1 bird flu pandemics were successful in tracking and tracing suspect poultry and taking action
to cull flocks. These efforts have not led to any “cure,” but containment proved to be possible given
the cooperative efforts of several actors in the international arena.
Maneuvering through an international security environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex
and ambiguous means working through such diverse entities as the World Bank, World Health
Organization, Interpol and multinational corporations in a coordinated way will become the norm
for policy-makers and strategists when confronting transnational threats. The national elements
of power must be used in multinational, multilayered, and sustained ways, and those charged
with creating policy and strategy must develop the “kind of competitive intelligence that is now
pervasive in the business world.”27 Transnational threats will continue to bedevil U.S. national
security, as will designing successful policies and strategies to mitigate their effects. Such are the
challenges for decisionmakers, military officers, and national security professionals in the era of
globalization.
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PART III
STRATEGIC ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 14
ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW

Martin L. Cook
Violent conflict among human beings is, unfortunately, one of the great constants in our history
as a species. As far back as we can see, the human species has engaged in war and other forms of
organized violence. But it is equally true that, as far back as human culture and thought have left
written records, humans have thought about morality and ethics. Although cultures vary widely in
how they interpret death and killing from a moral and religious perspective, every human culture
has recognized that taking human life is a morally grave matter; every human culture has felt the
need to justify taking of life in moral and religious terms.
In the modern world, a large body of ethical and legal thought attempts to limit, constrain and
to establish criteria that sanction the use of violence in the name of the state and society. Through
the mechanisms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Charter of the United Nations,
military manuals such as the U.S. Army’s “Law of Land Warfare,” and similar documents, modern
governments and militaries attempt to distinguish “just war” and just conduct in war from other
types of killing of human beings. Morally conscientious military personnel need to understand and
frame their actions in moral terms so as to maintain moral integrity in the midst of the actions and
stress of combat. They do so in order to explain to themselves and others how the killing of human
beings they do is distinguishable from the criminal act of murder.
Attempts to conduct warfare within moral limits have met with uneven success. Many cultures
and militaries fail to recognize these restraints, or do so in name only. The realities of combat, even
for the best trained and disciplined military forces, place severe strains on respect for those limits
and sometimes cause military leaders to grow impatient with them in the midst of their need to “get
the job done.” In the history of the U.S. Army, events like My Lai in Vietnam show that even forces
officially committed to just conduct in war are still capable of atrocities in combat—and are slow to
discipline such violations.
Despite these limitations, the idea of just war is one to which the well-led and disciplined
military forces of the world remain committed. The fact that the constraints of just war are routinely
overridden is no more a proof of their falsity and irrelevance than are similar points about morality:
we know the standard, and we also know human beings fall short of that standard with depressing
regularity. The fact of moral failure, rather than proving the falsity of morality, points instead to the
source of our disappointment in such failures: our abiding knowledge of the morally right.
Because of the importance of just war thinking, the general history, key provisions, and moral
underpinnings of just war are things which every military person, and especially every senior
leader, must understand and be able to communicate to subordinates and the public. It is important
that senior leaders understand just war more deeply and see that the positive laws of war emerge
from a long moral tradition which rests on fundamental moral principles. This essay will provide
that history, background and moral context of ethics and war.
Background of Just War Theory.
Most cultures of antiquity attempted to place some restraints on war. All recognized that there
are some causes of war which are justifiable and others that are not. All recognized that some persons
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are legitimate objects of attack in war and others are not. All recognized that there were times,
seasons, and religious festivals, etc. during which warfare would be morally wrong or religiously
inappropriate.
The roots of modern international law come from one specific strand of thought emerging out
of Antiquity: the Christian Roman Empire that took shape after the conversion to Christianity of
the Emperor Constantine in the year 312 AD. Although there were important ideas of restraint in
war in pre-Christian Greek and Roman thought and, indeed, in cultures all over the world, it is the
blend of Christian and Greco-Roman thought that set the context of the development of full-blown
just war thinking over a period of centuries.
Christianity before this time had been suspicious of entanglement in the affairs of the Empire.
For the first several centuries of the movement, Christians interpreted the teaching of Jesus in the
Sermon on the Mount and other places quite literally, and saw themselves as committed to pacifism
(the refusal to use force or violence in all circumstances). Although many appreciated the relative
peace, prosperity and ease of travel the Empire’s military force made possible, Christians felt prayer
on behalf of the Emperor was the limit of their direct support for it.
Much changed with Constantine. For many, war fought on behalf of a “Christian Empire” was
a very different thing than war on behalf of a pagan one. Further, during the century following
Constantine’s conversion, the Empire began to experience wave after wave of invasion from the north,
culminating in the fall of the city of Rome itself in 410 AD—a mere 100 years after Constantine.
It was in that context that Christian thinkers, most notably St. Augustine, a doctor of the church
and bishop of Hippo in North Africa, first worked out the foundations of Christian just war thought.
History, Augustine argued, is morally ambiguous. Human beings hope for pure justice and absolute
righteousness. Augustine firmly believed that the faithful will experience such purity only at the
end of time when God’s kingdom comes. But until that happens, we will experience only justice of
a sort, righteousness of a sort.
What passes for justice will require force and coercion, since there will always be people who
strive to take more than their share, to harm and steal from others. In that world, the peacemakers
who are blessed are those who use force appropriately and mournfully to keep as much order and
peace as possible under these conditions. The military officer is that peacemaker when he or she
accepts this sad necessity. Out of genuine care and concern with the weak and helpless, the soldier
shoulders the burden of fighting to maintain an order and system of justice which, while far short of
the deepest hopes of human beings, keeps the world from sliding into complete anarchy and chaos.
It is a sad necessity imposed on the soldier by an aggressor. It inevitably is tinged with guilt and
mournfulness. The conscientious soldier longs for a world where conflict is unnecessary, but sees
that the order of well-ordered states must be defended lest chaos rule.
For Augustine and the tradition that develops after him, Just War is an attempt to balance two
competing moral principles. It attempts to maintain the Christian concern with non-violence and
to honor the principle that taking human life is a grave moral evil. But it attempts to balance that
concern with the recognition that, the world being what it is, important moral principles, and that
protection of innocent human life requires the willingness to use force and violence.
As it wends its way through history, the tradition of Just War thought grows and becomes
more precise and more elaborate. In that development, it faces new challenges and makes new
accommodations.
The Spanish in the New World, for example, were challenged to rethink the tradition as they
encountered and warred against indigenous populations. Are such wars, too, governed by moral
principles? Are all things permitted against such people? Or, it was seriously debated, are they even
people, as opposed to some new kind of animal? Through that discussion came an expansion of the
scope of Just War principles to populations that did not share common cultures.
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After the Protestant Reformation, as wars raged throughout Europe in the attempt to restore
religious unity to “Christendom,” some thinkers (most notably Hugo Grotius) argued that Just
War must be severed from a distinctively Christian religious foundation. Human reason instead
must provide a system for the restraint of war that will be valid despite religious difference, valid
etsi deus non daretur, even if God did not exist! In other words, for Grotius and others, human
reason is a commonality all people share, regardless of religious, ethnic, and cultural differences.
That rationality, rather than revealed religion or religious authority, could suffice to ground moral
thinking about war.
As a result of that “secularization” of Just War thinking in Europe, the foundation was laid
for the universal international law of the present international system. As a result, the foundation
was laid for that system in Natural Law (moral rules believed to be known by reason alone, apart
from particular religious ideas and institutions) and in the jus Gentium, the “law of Peoples,” those
customary practices which are widely shared across cultures. In current international law these
accepted practices are called “customary international law” and set the standard of practices of
“civilized nations.”
Since virtually all modern states have committed themselves by treaty and by membership in
the United Nations to the principles of international law, in one sense there is no question of their
universal applicability around the globe. But the fact that the tradition has roots in the West and in
the Christian tradition does raise important multicultural questions about it.
How does one deal with the important fact that Muslims have their own ways of framing moral
issues of war and conflict and even of the national state itself which track imperfectly at best with
the Just War framework? How does one factor into one’s thinking the idea of “Asian Values” which
differ in their interpretation of the rights of individuals and the meaning of the society and state from
this supposedly universal framework? What weight should the fact that much of the world, while
nominally nation-states on the model established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe, are
in reality better described as “tribes with flags”? How does one deal with the fact that, in much of
the world, membership in a particular ethnic group within an internationally recognized border is
more an indicator of one’s identity than the name of the country on one’s passport?
All of these questions are subject of intense scholarly debate and practical importance. All have
very real-world applications when we think about the roots of conflict around the modern world and
attempt to think about those conflicts in the ways many of the participants do. But for our purposes,
we will need to set them aside in favor of making sure we understand the Just War criteria as they
frame United States military policy and the existing framework of international law.
This limitation of focus is justified not only by the limitations of time, but also by legal reality.
Whatever one might want to say about the important cross-cultural issues posed above, it remains
true that the United States and its allies around the world are committed by treaty, policy, and
moral commitment to conduct military operations within the framework of the existing Just War
criteria. That fact alone makes it important that strategic leaders possess a good working knowledge
of those criteria and some facility in using them to reason about war.
Ideally, however, strategic leaders will also have some grasp of the ongoing debate about cultural
diversity and the understanding of war in fundamentally differing cultural contexts as well.
The Purposes of the Just War Framework.
The framework of principles, commonly called “Just War Criteria,” provides an organized
schema for determining whether a particular conflict is morally justified. As one might imagine,
any such framework will inevitably fall short of providing moral certainty. When applied to the
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real world in all its complexity, inevitably persons of intelligence and good will can and do disagree
whether those criteria are met in a given case.
Furthermore, some governments and leaders lie. No matter how heinous their deeds, they will
strive to cast their actions in just war terms to provide at least the appearance of justification for
what they do. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is testimony to the moral weight
of the just war principles that even the most extreme lies follow the shape of just war principles. Just
war language provides the shape of the lie even the greatest war criminals must tell. Rare indeed is
the aggressor or tyrant willing to declare forthrightly the real causes and motives of their actions.
The twin realities of real-world complexity and the prevalence of lying about these matters
suggest the importance not only of knowing the just war criteria as a kind of list, but also of skillful
and careful reasoning using the just war framework as a strategic leader competency. Only if a
leader is capable of careful and judicious application of just war thinking can he or she distinguish
valid application of just war thinking from specious and self-serving attempts to cloak unjust action
in its terms.
The Just War Framework.
Moral judgments about war fall into two discrete areas: the reasons for going to war in first
place, and the way the war is conducted. The first is traditionally called jus ad bellum, or justice of
going to war, and the second jus in bello, or law during war. Two interesting features of this twopart division are that different agents are primarily responsible for each, and that they are to a large
degree logically independent of each other.
Judgments about going to war are, in the American context, made by the National Command
Authority and the Congress. Except at the highest levels where military officers advise those decisionmakers, military leaders are not involved in those discussions and bear no moral responsibility for
the decisions that result. Still, military personnel and ordinary citizens can and do judge the reasons
given for entering into military conflict by those decision makers and make their own determinations
whether the reasons given make sense or not. A morally interesting but difficult question arises
concerning one’s obligations and responsibilities when one is convinced that recourse to war is not
justified in a particular case.
Just conduct in war concerns the rules of engagement, choice of weapons and targets, treatment
of civilian populations and prisoners of war and so forth. These concern the “nuts and bolts” of how
the war is actually conducted. Here the primary responsibility shifts from the civilian policymakers
to the military leadership at all levels. Of course political leaders and ordinary citizens have an
interest in and make judgments about how their troops conduct themselves in war. Militaries
conduct themselves in light of national values, and must be seen as behaving in war in ways citizens
at home can accept morally.
Modern war, usually fought in plain sight of CNN and other media, is for good and for ill
especially subject to immediate scrutiny. Political leaders and ordinary citizens react to virtually
every event and require of their leaders’ explanations for why they do what they do and conduct
war as they do. This fact, too, indicates why strategic leaders must be adept in explaining clearly
and honestly the conduct of their forces within the framework of the Just War criteria.
I turn now to a discussion of the criteria of Just War in some detail. These are the “tests” one uses
to determine the justification of recourse to war in particular circumstances.
We begin with the criteria for judging a war just ad bellum (in terms of going to war in the
first place). In detail lists of these criteria vary somewhat, but the following captures the essential
elements:
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Just Cause
Legitimate Authority
Public Declaration
Just Intent
Proportionality
Last Resort
Reasonable Hope of Success.

Recall that the moral impulse behind just war thinking is a strong sense of the moral evils
involved in taking human life. Consequently, the ad bellum tests of just war are meant to set a high
bar to a too-easy recourse to force and violence to resolve conflict. Each of the “tests” is meant to
impose a restraint on the decision to go to war.
Just Cause asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war. Once, causes
like “offended honor” or religious difference were considered good reasons for war. As it has
developed, just war tradition and international law have restricted greatly the kinds of reasons
deemed acceptable for entering into military confrontation. The baseline standard in modern just
war thinking is aggression. States are justified in going to war to respond to aggression received.
Classically, this means borders have been crossed in force. Such direct attacks on the territorial
integrity and political sovereignty of an internationally recognized state provide the clear case of
just cause, recognized in just war and in international law (for example, in the Charter of the United
Nations).
Of course there are a number of justifications for war which do not fit this classic model.
Humanitarian interventions, preemptive strikes, assistance to a wronged party in an internal
military conflict in a state, just to name some examples, can in some circumstances also justify
use of military force, even though they do not fit the classic model of response to aggression. But
the farther one departs from the baseline model of response to aggression, the more difficult and
confusing the arguments become.
As one moves into these justifications, the scope for states to lie and try to justify meddling in
each others affair’s grows. For that reason, international law and ethics gives an especially hard look
at claims of just cause other than response to aggression already received. To do otherwise risks
opening too permissive a door for states to interfere with each other’s territory and sovereignty.
Legitimate authority restricts the number of agents who may authorize use of force. In the
Middle Ages, for example, there was the very real problem that local lords and their private armies
would engage in warfare without consulting with, let alone receiving authorization from, the
national sovereign.
In the modern context, different countries will vary in their internal political structure and
assign legitimate authority for issues of war and peace of different functionaries and groups. In
the American context, there is the unresolved tension between the President as Commander in
Chief and the authority of Congress to declare war. The present War Powers Act (viewed by all
Presidents since it was enacted as unconstitutional, but not yet subjected to judicial review) has still
not clarified that issue. But while one can invent a scenario where this lack of clarity would raise
very real problems, in practice so far the National Command Authority and the Congress have
found pragmatic solutions in every deployment of American forces.
The public declaration requirement has both a moral purpose and (in the American context) a
legal one. The legal one refers to the issue we were just discussing: the role of Congress in declaring
war. As we all know, few twentieth-century military conflicts in American history have been
authorized by a formal Congressional declaration of war. While this is an important and unresolved
Constitutional issue for the United States, it is not the moral point of the requirement.
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The moral point is perhaps better captured as a requirement for delivery of an ultimatum before
initiation of hostilities. Recall that the moral concern of just war is to make recourse to armed
conflict as infrequent as possible. The requirement of a declaration or ultimatum gives a potential
adversary formal notice that the issue at hand is judged serious enough to warrant the use of military
force and that the nation is prepared to do so unless that issue is successfully resolved peacefully
immediately.
The just intent requirement serves to keep the war aims limited and within the context of the
just cause used to authorize the war. Every conflict is subject to “mission creep.” Once hostilities
commence, there is always the temptation to forget what cause warranted the use of force and
to press on to achieve other purposes—purposes that, had they been offered as justifications for
the use of force prior to the conflict, would have clearly been seen as unjustifiable. The just intent
requirement limits war aims by keeping the mind focused on the purpose of the war. Although
there are justified exceptions, the general rule is that the purpose of war is to restore the status quo
ante bellum, the state of affairs that existed before the violation that provided the war’s just cause.
Proportionality is a common sense requirement that the damage done in the war should be
worth it. That is to say, even if one has a just cause, it might be so costly in lives and property
damage that it is better to accept the loss rather than to pay highly disproportionately to redress
the issue. In practice, of course, this is a hard criterion to apply. It is commonplace that leaders
and nations are notoriously inaccurate at predicting the costs of conflict as things snowball out of
control.
But here too, the moral point of just war criteria is to restrain war. And one important implication
of that requirement is the demand for a good faith and well-informed estimate of the costs and
feasibility of redressing grievances through the use of military force.
The requirement that war be the ultima ratio, the last resort, stems too from a commitment to
restrict the use of force to cases of sad necessity. No matter how just the cause, and no matter
how well the other criteria may be met, the last resort requirement acknowledges that the actual
commencement of armed conflict crosses a decisive line. Diplomatic solutions to end conflicts, even
if they are less than perfect, are to be preferred to military ones in most, if not all cases. This is
because the costs of armed conflict in terms of money and lives are so high and because armed
conflict, once begun, is inherently unpredictable.
In practical reality, judging that this criterion has been met is particularly difficult. Obviously, it
cannot require that one has done every conceivable thing short of use of force: there is always more
one could think to do. It has to mean doing everything that seems to a reasonable person promising.
But reasonable people disagree about this. In the First Gulf War, for example, many (including
Colin Powell) argued that more time for sanctions and diplomacy would be preferable to initiation
of armed conflict.
The last requirement ad bellum is reasonable hope of success. Because use of force inevitably
entails loss of human life, civilian and military, it is a morally grave decision to use it. The reasonable
hope criterion simply focuses thinking on the practical question: if you’re going to do all that damage
and cause death, are you likely to get what you want as a result? If you’re not, if despite your best
efforts it is unlikely that you’ll succeed in reversing the cause that brings you to war, then you are
causing death and destruction to no purpose.
An interesting question does arise whether heroic but futile resistance is ever justified. Some
have argued that the long-term welfare of a state or group may well require a memory of resistance
and noble struggle, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Since the alternative is acquiescence to
conquest and injustice, might it justifiable for a group’s long term self-understanding to be able look
back and say, “at least we didn’t die like sheep”?
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This completes the overview of the jus ad bellum requirements of just war. Recall that the categories
and distinctions of the theory are not simple and clear. Neither individually nor together do they
provide an algorithm that can generate a clear-cut and obvious judgment about a particular war in
the minds of all fair-minded people.
On the other hand, it is important not to overemphasize the difficulty here. Although the language
of just war is used by virtually all states and leaders in the attempt to justify their actions, not all uses
are equally valid. Often it is not that difficult to identify uses that are inaccurate, dishonest, or selfserving. While there certainly are a range of cases where individuals of good will and intelligence
will disagree in their judgments, there is also a good range where the misuse is transparent.
Recall, for example, Iraq’s initial (and brief) attempt to justify its invasion of Kuwait on grounds
that there had been a revolution in the Kuwaiti government and the new legitimate government of
Kuwait had requested Iraq’s fraternal assistance in stabilizing the new government. Had this story
been true, of course, Iraq would have been acting in conformity with international law and just war
tradition by being in Kuwaiti. It is important to note that Iraq did apparently feel obliged to tell a
tale like this, since that itself is a perverse testimony to the need of states to attempt to justify their
actions in the court of world opinion in just war terms. Of course the story was so obviously false
that even Iraq stopped telling it in a matter of hours. (How many of you even recall that they told
it?)
My point in citing this example is to forestall an easy relativism. It is simple intellectual laziness
to conclude, because these judgments are hard and people disagree about them in particular cases,
that the principles have no moral force or, worse, that all uses of them are mere window-dressing.
In all moral matters, as Aristotle pointed out, it is a mark of an educated person not to expect
more precision than the matter at hand permits. And in complex moral judgments of matters of
international relations, one cannot expect more than thoughtful, well-informed and good-faith
judgments.
Jus in bello.
I turn now to the jus in bello side of just war thinking. As I noted above, except at the highest
levels of the military command structure, officers do not make the decision to commit forces to
conflict. The moral weight of those judgments lies with the political leadership and its military
advisors. On the other hand, strategic military leaders, whether they are technically responsible for
decisions to go to war or not, will often be placed in the position of justifying military action to the
press and the people. Further, thoughtful officers will often feel a need to justify a particular use of
force in which they participate to themselves. For all these reasons, therefore, facility with just war
reasoning in both its dimensions (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) is a strategic leader competency.
The practical conduct of war is, however, the primary responsibility of military officers. They
bear the responsibility for the training and discipline of military personnel. They issue the orders that
determine what is attacked, with what weapons and tactics. They set the tone for how civilians are
treated, how POW’s are captured, confined and cared for. They determine how soldiers who violate
order and the laws of war are disciplined and what examples they allow to be set for acceptable
conduct in their commands.
Because of this weight of responsibility, the officer at all levels must thoroughly incorporate
thought about the jus in bello side of just war into standard operating procedure. It is an integral
part of military planning at all levels, from the tactical issues of employing small units to the
highest levels of grand strategy. United States policy, national and universal values, and political
prudence combine to require officers at all levels to plan and execute military operations with a
clear understanding of just war requirements.
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The major moral requirements of just war in bello boil down to two: discrimination and
proportionality. Together, they set limits in the conduct of war—limits on who can be deliberately
attacked and on how war can legitimately be conducted.
Although we use the term “discrimination” almost wholly negatively (as in racial discrimination),
the core meaning of the word is morally neutral. It refers to distinguishing between groups or
people or things on the basis of some characteristic that distinguishes one group from another.
In the context of thought about war, the relevant characteristic upon which just war requires
us to discriminate is combatant status. In any conflict, there are individuals who are combatants—
actively engaged in prosecuting the war efforts—and there are noncombatants. The central moral
idea of just war is that only the first, the combatants, are legitimate objects of deliberate attack. By
virtue of their “choosing” to be combatants they have made themselves objects of attack and have
lost that immunity from deliberate attack all human beings have in normal life, and which civilians
retain even in wartime. I put “choosing” in quotes, of course, because we all know soldiers become
soldiers in lots of ways, many of which are highly coerced. But they are at least voluntary in this
sense: they didn’t run away. They allow themselves to be in harm’s way as combatants.
Of course, in modern war, there are lots of borderline cases between combatant and noncombatant. The definition of the war conventions is straightforward: combatants wear a fixed distinct
sign, visible at a distance and carry arms openly. But in guerrilla war, to take the extreme case,
combatants go to great lengths to blend in to the civilian population. In such a war, discrimination
poses very real practical and moral problems.
But the presence of contractors on a battlefield, or combat in urban environments where fighters
(whether uniformed or not) are mixed in with civilian populations and property (to point to only
two examples) also make discrimination between combatants and noncombatants challenging both
morally and practically.
It is less critical to focus on the hard case than on the central moral point. War can only be
conducted justly insofar as a sustained and good faith commitment is made to discriminate between
combatants and noncombatants and to deliberately target only the combatants.
Of course civilians die in war. And sometimes those deaths are the unavoidable by-product of
even the most careful and conscientious planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence
may be mistaken and identify as a military target something that turns out to be occupied by
civilians or dedicated only to civilian use. Weapons and guidance systems may malfunction; placing
weapons in places they were not intended to go.
Just war recognizes these realities. It has long used the “principle of double effect” to sort through
the morality of such events and justifies those which, no matter how terrible, do not result from
deliberate attacks on civilians. Such accidents in the context of an overall discriminate campaign
conducted with weapons that are not inherently indiscriminate are acceptable as “collateral
damage.”
What is not acceptable in just war thinking is the deliberate targeting of civilians, their use as
“human shields,” or use of indiscriminate warfare on populations. In practice this means choosing
weapons, tactics and plans which strive to the limit of the possible to protect innocent civilian
populations, even if they place soldiers at (acceptably) greater risk.
The other major requirement of jus in bello is proportionality. It, too, attempts to place limits
on war by the apparently common-sense requirement that attacks be proportionate to the military
value of the target. Judgments about these matters are highly contextual and depend on many
dimensions of practical military reality. But a massive bombardment of a town, for example, would
be disproportionate if the military object of the attack is a single sniper.
It is true, of course, that all sides violated these rules in World War II, especially in the uses of
airpower. But the development of precision munitions and platforms for their delivery have, since
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that conflict, allowed the U.S. military to return to more careful respect for the laws of war, even
in air war. Furthermore, it is a testimony to the moral need to do so that, at least in part, drove that
development—along with the obvious point that munitions that hit what they’re aimed at with
consistency and regularity are more militarily effective as well.
Contemporary Challenges to the Westphalian Model of Just War.
Recent history has put considerable pressure on the understanding of Just War described above.
From World War II forward, a growing body of human rights and humanitarian law has evolved
which, at least on paper, restrains the sovereignty of states in the name of protecting the rights of
individual citizens. The Genocide Convention, for example, sets limits to what states may do to their
own citizens and creates the right (and perhaps the obligation) of states to intervene to protect the
rights of individuals when their violation rises to an unacceptable (and unfortunately, somewhat
vaguely specified) degree.
The conflict in Kosovo was clearly an example of intervention by NATO into the “internal affairs”
of Serbia (recall: Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia in the policy of all the states involved). Very
little of the national interest of the NATO powers, narrowly conceived, was involved in Kosovo. It
was a case where humanitarian causes and human rights were cited to “trump” Serbian sovereignty.
Further, it was not authorized by resolution of the UN Security Council, to a large degree because
the Chinese and the Russians feared the “porous sovereignty” precedent it would set.
Conversely, the failure to intervene in Rwanda was widely cited as a case where humanitarian
concerns ought to have overridden sovereignty and national interest questions.
These examples point to one large and unresolved issue in contemporary international ethics
and law: the harmonization of state sovereignty with issues of human rights and humanitarian
intervention.
Another even deeper challenge is posed by the Global “War” against Terrorism. The term
“war” is in quotations, of course, because in many respects the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda
and similar terrorist groups of global reach departs markedly from the model of war between
Westphalian sovereign states. Most obviously, terrorist groups are not state actors, so many of the
conventions governing conflict between states imply imperfectly at best.
Of course unless terrorist groups are in international waters or in space, they necessarily exist in
some relationship to states. Some states deliberately and consciously sponsor and encourage them;
others harbor them unknowingly and perhaps even unwillingly; still others would like nothing
better than to be rid of them, but have weak or nonexistent governments with the capability to
dislodge them.
For states that deliberately harbor them, no great stretch is required to extend the Westphalian
paradigm to cover such cases. At some point the existence of a threat within the border of such
states that the government is disinclined to rein in constitutes a just cause of war between the United
States and its allies and the harboring state. One way of construing the conflict in Afghanistan is
precisely this: that the Taliban government wished to shelter and protect al Qaeda on its territory
and, after sufficient warning, placed its own continued existence in jeopardy.
For states that lack the power to dislodge terrorist groups, if they can be persuaded to request
assistance from the U.S. or other powers to dislodge them, even if that “persuasion” results from
considerable pressure, the formalities of the current international system are maintained.
But other possibilities present themselves. On one interpretation of the Bush Administration’s
National Security Strategy, the nature of the terrorist threat, combined with the possible destructive
power of WMD, warrants abandoning the “just cause” restriction to aggression received in favor
of a more aggressive “preemptive” (or, perhaps better, “preventative”) use of military force. If
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this indeed becomes policy and customary international law, it might take one of two forms. It
might be a simple assertion of U.S. military supremacy and lead to a fundamental recasting of the
Westphalian assumption of the equality of sovereign states.
On the other hand, the nature of the threat might also lead to a reformulation of a common
understanding of “terrorism” among the major powers that generates a multilateral agreement,
implicit or explicit, that some threats warrant interventions that might not pass the inherited “just
war” tests of recent centuries. In that respect, just war would be returning to it origins: rather
than seeing war as a conflict among sovereign states in response to aggression, the international
community might see itself once again (as Augustine did in the 5th Century) as defending a
“tranquility of order” in the international system against incursions of alien systems and ideologies
whose sole purpose is a disruption and displacement of that order. In other words, the globalized
civilization grounded in democracy, human rights, free trade and communication, technology and
science may be defending its civilization itself against forces that seek its complete destruction.
These aspects of the contemporary scene more than any others point to the need to think
about just war in deeper historical terms than simply international law, precisely because existing
international law has been formed almost entirely in the European, post-Reformation and
Enlightment, Westphalian system. If the second interpretation of the GWOT has some validity, the
central point is precisely that those shared assumptions of the past several centuries may have less
and less relevance, and the original concerns of defending the stability of a system of civilization
against fundamental attack may be the better analog to present circumstances.
Conclusion.
The moral tradition of just war, and its partial embodiment in the laws of war at any moment
is part of on-going evolution. They represent a drive to make practical restraints on war that honor
the moral claim of individuals not to be unjustly attacked while at the same time recognizing that
use of military force in defense of individuals and values is sometimes a necessity.
All military officers charged with the grave moral responsibility of commanding and controlling
military units and weapons must, if they are to conduct war morally, have a good working knowledge
of the just war tradition and of the moral principles it strives to enshrine.
Above all, strategic leaders who set large-scale military policy, control training and organizational
culture, and supervise the preparation of operational plans for national militaries need to understand
and think in ways deeply conditioned by just war principles. Because their responsibility is so great
and because the weapons and personnel under their control are capable of causing such destruction,
they above all bear the responsibility to insure that those forces observe the greatest possible moral
responsibility in their actions.
No amount of knowledge of the terms and concepts of just war will make morally complex
decisions miraculously clear. But clear understanding of the concepts of just war theory and of
the moral principles that underlie them can provide clarity of thought and a way to sharpen one’s
thinking about those choices. And in the rapidly changing international scene characterized by
American military supremacy and non-state actor attack, it may be that we are entering into a rare
fundamental shift in the understanding of the international system such as we have not seen in four
centuries.
If our military is to conduct itself in war in ways compatible with American national values,
and if individual soldiers and officers are to be able to see themselves and their activities as morally
acceptable, they must be able to understand the moral structure of just conduct in war. Further, it
is imperative that they integrate that understanding into the routines of decisionmaking in military
operations.
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In the Gulf War, and in major operations since then, the language and concerns of just war are
integrated increasingly into planning and execution of military operations. Military lawyers are
fully integrated into modern targeting and operations planning cells of the U.S. military. In light of
those realities, facility in just war thinking is, indeed, a strategic leader competency. This chapter
is only an introduction to the terms and grammar of that thought. True facility in just war thinking
will come from careful and critical application of its categories to the complexities of real life and
real military operations.
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CHAPTER 15
ETHICS AND WAR IN COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
David L. Perry
This chapter highlights a wide range of ethical views on killing and war in the world’s major
religious traditions.1 One can learn a lot about a religion or culture simply by paying attention to
how it answers the question, “Is it ever right to kill?”2 People raised within particular religious
faiths are sometimes led to believe that their tradition has always held a consistent set of ethical
principles. But what we find when we look closely at virtually any religious tradition are teachings
that are at least paradoxical, and in some cases downright contradictory. Every major religious faith
regards life (especially human life) as sacred in some sense, and affirms mercy and compassion as
basic human obligations. But sacred scriptures and influential religious authorities have also taught
that it is sometimes right to kill other human beings. Some have gone so far as to rationalize wars of
annihilation against heretics and infidels.
Religion is clearly not the only catalyst of total war and other forms of indiscriminate violence.
People seem to be able to invent all sorts of rationales for mass killing without feeling the need to
cite the will of God. Some of the most appalling atrocities in history have been rooted not in religion
per se but rather in racial or class hatred. (Think of the 20th-century victims of Hitler, Stalin, Mao,
and Pol Pot.) There may even be a genetic tendency in our species, like that of our chimpanzee
relatives, to attack and kill others for no reason except that they aren’t “one of us.”3
But religious violence can take on a particularly intense and ruthless character, if the objects of
that violence are seen as blaspheming or insulting God, and thus as enemies of God who must be
humbled or destroyed.4 I am confident, though, that some ethical principles can be affirmed by all
of the world’s major religions to limit violence, even when it can not—or should not—be prohibited
completely.
Senior military, diplomatic and intelligence officials may profit from this essay in at least the
following ways:
1. In recognizing the diversity of teachings within their own religion, especially its moments of
violent intolerance of other faiths, they ought to be less likely to proclaim their country’s wars as
divinely ordained crusades or jihads against enemies who might thus be denied basic rights.
2. In learning to appreciate certain ethical values and precepts in other traditions as similar to
those of their own, they will be better able to support diplomatic initiatives between countries and
cultures to reduce the likelihood of war and lessen its severity.
3. Specifically in “the battle for hearts and minds” in places like Afghanistan and Iraq today, they
may learn ways to ally with moderate Muslims against murderous ideologies such as Al Qaeda.
Eastern Traditions.
One of the oldest living religions is Hinduism. The Hindu tradition reveres all of life, and affirms
an ethical principle of ahimsa or avoiding injury to any sentient creature.5 This ethic has often led
Hindus to adopt vegetarianism and strict pacifism, and has been especially strong in Buddhism
and Jainism, both offshoots of Hinduism. The pacifist ethic nurtured by these faiths lives today
among the followers of Mahatma Gandhi and renowned Buddhist teachers like the Dalai Lama of
Tibet, Thich Nhat Hanh of Vietnam, and Maha Ghosananda of Cambodia.6
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Buddhism stresses the need for people to constantly be aware of how hateful and greedy
emotions can arise in order to avoid being controlled by them and lashing out violently against
others. Buddhism seeks to undermine social divisions like the Hindu caste system, while at the
same time reinforcing its virtue of compassion and the obligation of non-injury. As a result, the
duty not to kill people or other sentient animals applies to all Buddhists, though as an absolute duty
it has often been restricted in practice to Buddhist monks and nuns.7 Similarly, a sacred Jain text
says, “One may not kill, ill-use, insult, torment, or persecute any kind of living being. . . .”8 Former
Burmese prime minister U Nu even renounced the use of force by the state, claiming that Buddhism
“cannot sanction even such acts of violence as are necessary for the preservation of public order and
society.”9
How would pacifists within these faiths respond to a concern that nonviolence might have little
or no persuasive effect on a violent enemy, and could result in the destruction of one’s community?
Some would contend that violence only seems to be effective, but usually ends up merely producing
more violence. Others would admit that nonviolence sometimes does not succeed in deterring or
ending violence, but claim that success is not as important as doing the right thing. (The Christian
pacifist John Howard Yoder made the same point in many of his books.)
Hindus and Buddhists believe in the Law of Karma, which rigorously enforces justice through
an indefinite series of rebirths. So even if evil people succeed in their present lives, Karma will
ensure that they’ll pay for it in their next life. Trusting in the Law of Karma can help to motivate
adherents of these faiths to overcome selfishness and hostility and resist succumbing to violence.
(This functions similarly to the Western belief in a heavenly reward for living a devout and moral
life, even if one suffers great injustice during one’s earthly life at the hands of evil people.)
In practice, though, Eastern traditions often permit some exceptions to the general rule against
killing. In mainstream Hinduism there is an entire caste of warriors, the Ksatrias, whose role in
defending the community with force is considered to be just as important as that of the Brahmin or
priestly caste. If a Hindu man is born into the warrior caste, he is obligated to kill enemy soldiers in
defense of the community; his social role does not permit him to be a pacifist. He must kill with the
proper disposition, though, without greed or anger. (Read the “pep talk” given by the god Krishna to
the reluctant warrior Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita.) Some Hindu gods like Indra are believed to have
warlike characteristics themselves, and are praised for destroying the enemies of orthodox Hindu
teachings and practices.10 So holy war is not entirely foreign to Hinduism. And some contemporary
Hindus cite traditional warrior values in support of India’s possession of nuclear weapons.11
On the other hand, total war in the sense of indiscriminate killing has typically been forbidden.
Hindu soldiers are not to kill unarmed prisoners or civilians, apparently due in part to a sense of
chivalry: it would be considered unprofessional for a Hindu soldier to harm defenseless people.12
(Similar values of chivalry in the West helped to ground the modern principle of noncombatant
immunity. Chinese strategist Sun Tzu also stipulated, “The king’s army does not kill the enemy’s
old men and boys; it does not destroy crops. . . . In carrying out punitive expeditions, it does not
punish the common people.”13)
Some Buddhists have argued that killing can be justified in rare cases as the lesser of evils, if the
Buddhist community or other innocent people are threatened by violent attackers, and if nonviolent
means of persuasion and protest have not succeeded. Interestingly, even when war might be waged
with just cause and as a last resort, Buddhists still regard it as inherently sinful; so just warriors
might nonetheless expect to undergo karmic punishment.14 (Medieval Christians held a similar
view, requiring all soldiers to perform penitential acts upon their return from war; see below.)
We should not infer, though, that Hindus and Buddhists have never engaged in total war or
other indiscriminate killing. Many of their leaders have openly advocated aggressive violence
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against people of competing religions. Zen Buddhism was distorted in Japan to support a ruthless
warrior ethic before and during WWII. Some Buddhists in Sri Lanka have promoted the “ethnic
cleansing” of Hindu Tamils from the island. An influential Thai monk claimed in the 1970s that
killing communists would actually produce karmic merit.15 And the man who assassinated Gandhi
in 1948 was a member of a radical Hindu sect that opposed any political compromise with Islam or
other faiths. But of course it is very difficult to see how such things can be justified in light of their
religion’s core values.
In the Western monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, we also encounter a
mixture of moral values—some restraining war, others promoting it. I think it is fair to say, though,
that the problem of total war has been more frequent in these faiths than in Eastern traditions, due
to a more intense fear of unorthodox beliefs and idolatry (i.e., the worship of false gods).
Judaism.
Frequently in the Hebrew Bible16 (or what Christians call the Old Testament), love of one’s
neighbor is said to be a fundamental duty; in fact, love is to extend beyond one’s religious or ethnic
kin to include resident aliens as well (Leviticus 19:17-18, 33-34). Murder and other forms of unjust
violence are forbidden (Exodus 20:13).
The primary moral arguments underlying or reflected in those commandments appear to be: (1)
God is loving; so imitate God’s love; (2) God has shown mercy to you; so show gratitude to God by
being merciful to others; and (3) human beings are created in God’s image; so treat them as such.
(See Psalm 145:8-9, Micah 6:8, and Genesis 1:26-27, 9:6). If we considered those ideas in isolation
from some other biblical values and commandments, we might derive an ethic of strict pacifism
toward human beings, an absolute duty not to kill people, since killing even a murderous attacker
might be regarded as a kind of sacrilege as well as contradicting love.
But that’s apparently not what the ancient Hebrews believed, since murder and other serious
offenses (Exodus 21-22) were subject to capital punishment, i.e., a form of intentional killing. Genesis
9:6 says, “Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person’s blood be shed; for
in his own image God made humankind.” I would interpret that to mean, “All persons have a basic
right not to be killed, rooted in their having been created in God’s image; but they can forfeit that
right if they commit a serious enough offense.”
So far, this would only permit those who are guilty of certain crimes to be executed, i.e., strict
retributive justice. Deuteronomy 24:16 states, “Parents are not to be put to death for their children,
nor children for their parents; each one may be put to death only for his own sin.” In addition, if
this ethic permitted war at all, it would seem to limit it to the defense of the innocent against unjust
invaders, or in punishment of their atrocities.
But collective punishment and indiscriminate war were also commanded or approved in the
Hebrew Bible, especially in cases of idolatry. The first of the Mosaic commandments prohibited
the Israelites from worshipping anyone but Yahweh. God demanded purity and strict obedience;
idolatry and blasphemy were punishable by death (Exodus 20:3, 5). Non-Israelites who lived within
the area believed by the Hebrews to have been promised to them by God were seen to pose a
great temptation to them to abandon their faith. This led them to rationalize the slaughter of entire
communities, in some of the most chilling passages in the Bible. Deuteronomy 20:16-18 says, “[In]
the towns of the nations whose land the LORD your God is giving you as your holding, you must
not leave a soul alive. . . . [Y]ou must destroy them . . . so that they may not teach you to imitate
the abominable practices they have carried on for their gods. . . .” Joshua 6:21 and 10:40 claim that
“[Joshua’s army killed everyone in Jericho], both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and
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donkeys. . . . Joshua defeated the whole land. . . he left no one remaining, but utterly destroyed all
that breathed, as the LORD God of Israel commanded.”17
Israel’s external enemies were to be treated somewhat more leniently: they were first to be
presented with peace terms, and if those were accepted then the people would be subjugated, not
killed. But if they rejected the terms, the men would be slaughtered and the women and children
enslaved (Deuteronomy 20:10-15). In those respects the Hebrews were little different from other
ancient cultures.
The later rabbinic commentators who compiled the Talmud relegated wars of annihilation and
other indiscriminate killing solely to the specific divine commands connected with the ancient
conquest of the Promised Land.18 But the Talmud also gave explicit permission for individuals to
kill murderous pursuers, either in self-defense or in defense of others, based primarily on Genesis
9:6 (though that verse seems to apply only to a murder that’s already occurred). Maimonides even
thought that killing could be required, in light of his reading of Leviticus 19:16, “Don’t stand idly by
the blood of your neighbor.” Defensive war was permitted on those grounds as well, and required
if the survival of a Jewish state were threatened. Pacifism was only recommended as a prudential
option, when using force against oppression or invasion would likely result in significantly more
harm to the community.19
Even when just cause for war exists, though, Maimonides and most other rabbis urged that
nonviolent efforts to achieve justice and maintain peace be pursued first. If war begins, destruction
should not exceed what is minimally necessary to achieve important military objectives. And
innocent lives should be spared whenever possible.20
Drawing in part on those elements in the Jewish tradition, the contemporary Code of Ethics of
the Israeli Defense Forces21 requires soldiers to use minimal force and to spare civilian lives, and
also affirms the importance of respecting their dignity, property, values, and sacred sites. Clearly a
war of annihilation like Joshua’s would not be permitted under the IDF Code.
But in practice the Code has not always been upheld in Palestinian areas occupied by Israel,
nor during Israel’s wars with Lebanon in the 1980s and 2006. Israeli military force is not always
discriminate or proportionate: whole families of individual terrorists have been punished collectively
(e.g., their houses are bulldozed), and Palestinian civilians intimidated and humiliated on a daily
basis. Of course, many Jewish people in Israel and elsewhere have criticized these tactics on moral
grounds, drawing upon centuries of Talmudic affirmations of compassion and respect for human
dignity.22
Christianity.
One question that has been the subject of considerable debate in this religious tradition is whether
Jesus was a pacifist, in other words, whether he prohibited violence absolutely. Some passages in
the Gospels seem to clearly imply that, but others are more ambiguous.
Matthew chapter 5 reports Jesus as saying: “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. [I]f anyone strikes [or slaps] you
on the right cheek, turn [and offer him] the other also. . . . You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall
love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those
who persecute you.” These sayings seem to imply a strict rule of nonviolence.
By contrast, when Jesus spoke with Roman soldiers, he did not recommend that they abandon
their profession in order to serve God (Luke 7). Now an argument from silence is logically weak,
but it is puzzling how Jesus would have reconciled the military profession with nonresistance to
evil and love of enemies. The Gospels further portray Jesus as using some degree of intimidation or
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force to eject the merchants from the Temple in Jerusalem (John 2:13-16). There’s also a story where
Jesus seems explicitly to permit his disciples to carry swords, and by implication to use them in selfdefense, though that passage appears only in Luke 22 and is very mysterious. The apocalyptic book
of Revelation even imagines the returning Christ as a mighty warrior, “just in war” and wielding
“a sharp sword to smite the nations.” But how can such passages be squared with Jesus’ pacifist
precept, “Do not resist an evildoer”?
Similar puzzles emerge from the stories of Jesus’ arrest. The four Gospels agree that when Jesus
was arrested by an armed group, one of his disciples drew a sword and wounded a servant of the
high priest. But the Gospels differ about what was said during that incident:
In Mark’s version of the story (14:43-52), Jesus says nothing to the disciple who inflicts the
wound. Mark’s gospel is thought by scholars to be the earliest of the four, and probably familiar at
least to the writers of Matthew and Luke. But only Mark’s gospel suggests that Jesus was silent at
this point. Perhaps Mark meant to imply that Jesus was rendered speechless at the sight of one of
his disciples lashing out violently, but we can’t know for sure.
In Luke’s account (22:47-51), alone among the gospels, Jesus’ disciples first ask him, “Lord,
should we strike with the sword?” But Jesus doesn’t respond before one of them cuts the servant’s
ear off. (Perhaps he wasn’t given enough time to reply.) Then Jesus says simply, “Stop! No more of
that!” In Luke’s version there’s only that brief command, with no supporting reasons given. It might
reflect an abhorrence of violence in general. But we might wonder why Luke’s Jesus would permit
his disciples to carry swords just a few verses earlier, yet forbid their use here in his defense.
In John’s version of the arrest (18:3-11), the disciple who uses his sword is identified as Simon
Peter, and the servant’s name is said to be Malchus. (In the other Gospels they’re nameless.) John
quotes Jesus as saying to Peter, “Put your sword back into its sheath. Am I not to drink the cup that
the Father has given me?” So John’s focus is on the need to permit Jesus’ divine mission to continue
(which includes his arrest and crucifixion), not a specific opposition to violence per se. The contrast
with Luke’s version is remarkable.
Matthew’s version of Jesus’ statement is lengthier and more complex than the others (26:51-54):
“Suddenly, one of those with Jesus put his hand on his sword, drew it, and struck the slave of the
high priest, cutting off his ear. Then Jesus said to him, ‘Put your sword back into its place; for all
who take the sword will perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and
he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then would the scriptures be
fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?’” Note that Jesus gives at least two rationales in
Matthew against the disciple’s use of his sword. One sounds like a piece of prudential advice: if you
don’t want to be killed yourself, don’t use lethal weapons. (But then, wouldn’t the disciple respond,
“I’m perfectly willing to die to protect you”?) But the other rationale, like John’s, might be restricted
to this situation only: the disciple must not interfere with Jesus’ mission. We might also wonder,
though, how the legions of angel “reserves” are consistent with pacifism!
In light of this puzzling combination of texts, how did the early Christian community answer the
question of whether force could ever be morally justified? Many of them seem to have constructed
a dual ethic, one for Christians and another for the state. I’ll use Paul, Tertullian of Carthage and
Origen of Alexandria to illustrate this.
All three of those influential Christians interpreted Jesus’ teaching and example to prohibit all
uses of force by Christians, not only in personal self-defense but apparently even in defense of other
innocent people. Paul wrote to Roman Christians (ch. 12): “Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but
take thought for what is noble in the sight of all . . . . Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave
room for the wrath of God.” Over a century later, Tertullian wrote that when Jesus rebuked the
disciple who defended him at his arrest, in effect he disarmed every soldier.23 Tertullian explained to
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Roman rulers that Christians believe it is better for them to be killed than to kill.24 And he stipulated
that when soldiers convert to Christianity, they must leave the military.25 His contemporary Origen
also claimed that Jesus prohibited homicide, so Christians may never kill or use violence for any
reason.26
But all three of those early Christians, in spite of their apparently pacifist stances, also seemed to
think that God authorized the state to use lethal force for certain purposes. Paul wrote in Romans
13:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God, and those
authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad.
Do you wish to have no fear of the authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval; for it
is God’s servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not
bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer.27

Similarly, Tertullian said, “We [Christians] pray . . . for security to the empire; for protection to the
imperial house; for brave armies. . . .”28 And Origen claimed that although Christians won’t serve in
the military, they offer “prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous cause . . .
that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed.”29
Note that the combination of views I’ve cited from Paul, Tertullian and Origen is internally
inconsistent: It is not possible to rule out killing entirely, and then permit it on the part of the state.
But it is important to recognize that those authors—and possibly most early Christians—thought
strict pacifism to be the only acceptable ethic for followers of Jesus. In light of that, no contemporary
Christian should simply assume that Jesus clearly approved of the use of violence, even in defense of
the innocent. Killing enemies to protect one’s family, community or nation may be morally justified
(perhaps on nonreligious grounds), but doing so may well contradict the ethic of Jesus.30
A significant shift in Christian thinking about war occurred in the 4th and 5th centuries after
Emperor Constantine began to use the Roman state to support the Church. According to an
influential bishop named Eusebius, absolute nonviolence was from then on to apply solely to
clergy, monks, and nuns; lay Christians could now be obligated to defend the empire with force.31
Ambrose, another important bishop of that era, thought that Christian love entailed a duty to use
force to defend innocent third parties.32 He also shifted the focus of Christian moral concern from
the act of violence to the attitude of the agent: Christian soldiers should love their enemies—while
using deadly force against them!33
Augustine, who was influenced by Ambrose in many ways, recognized that Jesus had taught
things that seemed to entail strict nonviolence; but like Ambrose he believed that they applied to
dispositions rather than to actions. Christians in his view are not only permitted to use force in
defense of the community, they are obligated to obey such orders from higher authorities. Augustine
also came to accept the use of force against heresy, believing it to be consistent with a benevolent
desire of the Church to correct its wayward children!34
However, Ambrose35 and Augustine36 also believed that there should be moral limits on Christian
uses of violence. Even in cases where Augustine considered war to be the lesser of evils, he regarded
all killing as ultimately tragic, always requiring an attitude of mourning and regret on the part of
Christians. Partly due to his influence, throughout most of the medieval period, killing in war was
considered a very serious sin. If a Christian soldier killed an enemy soldier, even in a war that was
considered just, he would have to do penance for the killing, often by fasting and prayer for a year
or more.37
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We can also see Christian roots38 of the modern principle of noncombatant immunity develop
in the medieval period, when secular military ideals of chivalry combined with Christian decrees
of protection for clergy, peasants, women, and others who usually did not take part in combat.39
Thomas Aquinas added another important ethical consideration in stipulating that Christians may
only use the minimal force needed to save lives from unjust attack,40 an early version of the just-war
principle of proportionality.
But the medieval period also witnessed the emergence of total war in the name of Christianity.
First there was increasing glorification of the Christian knight, and identification of military courage
and honor with Christian virtue. Consider how this German poem draws on John’s story of Jesus’
arrest:
Then boiled with wrath
The swift sword wielder
Simon Peter.
Speechless he,
Grieved his heart that any sought to bind his Master,
Grim the knight faced boldly the servants,
Shielding his Suzerain,
Not craven his heart,
Lightning swift unsheathed his sword,
Strode to the first foe,
Smote a strong stroke,
Clave with the sharp blade
On the right side the ear from Malchus.41

(The glorification of Peter here is rather ironic, in that Jesus rebuked him for using his sword! But
the poem no doubt stirred its audience to imagine that if they had been with Jesus at his arrest, they
might have hoped to have the disciple’s courage and sense of moral outrage.)
Now by themselves, military courage and honor might help to reinforce limits on war conduct,
e.g., in protecting noncombatants from gratuitous harm. But many of the traditional restraints on
war advocated by the Church started to erode in the medieval period.
In the ninth century the Vatican declared that death in battle could be spiritually beneficial for
Christian soldiers: their sins could be erased if they died in defense of the Church, and they would
be guaranteed entry into heaven.42 (This is not unlike the assurances given to contemporary Muslim
suicide bombers by recruiters from Al Qaeda, Hamas, etc.)
In the year 1095, Pope Urban II launched what later came to be called the First Crusade, urging
European leaders to rescue the Holy Land from its Muslim occupiers. The Pope referred to Muslims
as a “vile race” and an “unclean nation” that had polluted Christian holy places, and called for
their destruction. Killing Muslims became in effect a way for Christians to obtain remission of their
sins.43 Moral rules governing the conduct of war were abandoned. No one was immune from attack
by Christian crusaders; whole cities were slaughtered. Even Jews in Germany were massacred by
crusaders on their way to Palestine.44 Thus, ironically and tragically, a religion that began with the
largely nonviolent teachings and example of Jesus evolved in its first millennium to the point where
Christians were waging total, indiscriminate war against heretics and “infidels.”
In the wake of a series of devastating wars in Europe between Catholics and Protestants, some
Christians like Francisco de Vitoria concluded that mere difference of religion should no longer be
considered just cause for war.45 Most Christians today would find total war morally repugnant, of
course, especially if waged in the name of God. Some even continue in the ancient path of pacifism
in obedience to Jesus’ sayings on love of enemies and non-retaliation against evil.46 But total holy
war against infidels also remains a continuing temptation for Christians.47
203

Islam.
The Qur’an, the most sacred Muslim text, repeatedly refers to God as compassionate and just.
It also insists that “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256), meaning that authentic submission
to God must be freely and sincerely chosen, not forced.48 (The word “Islam” means submission.)
The Qur’an urges Muslims to use “beautiful preaching” to persuade people to accept Islam, and to
“argue nicely” with Jews and Christians who are seen as worshipping the same God as their own
(16:125, 29:46).49
Those ideas taken in isolation might tend to preclude holy war, and perhaps even ground some
form of pacifism. In fact, the Prophet Muhammad was said to have practiced non-violence during
the first 12 years of his prophetic career, even in the face of serious persecution by polytheists in
Mecca.50 The Prophet’s stance during that early Meccan period eventually served as the model for
a nonviolent Islamic movement in 20th-century Afghanistan led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a friend
and admirer of Gandhi.51
But after the Prophet’s emigration to Medina in 622, he came to believe that God permitted and
even commanded the use of force in defense of his growing religious community. Qur’an 22:39-40
says, “Permission is given to those who fight because they have been wronged . . . unjustly expelled
from their homes only because they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah’.”52 Like the Hebrew Bible, the Qur’an
mandates capital punishment for certain offenses, though it also urges mercy and forgiveness in
other cases. Muhammad often urged diplomacy rather than war to resolve disputes.53
But certain verses in the Qur’an and other sayings of the Prophet seem to go beyond defensive
and retributive uses of force to permit offensive jihad to expand the territory of Islam. Qur’an 9:5
says, “[K]ill the idolaters wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for
them in every stratagem (of war).” Qur’an 9:73 exclaims, “O Prophet! Strive against the unbelievers
and the dissenters, and be ruthless with them.”
The word jihad, by the way, means struggle or effort. Jihad can refer to the struggle of the
individual Muslim to conform his or her will to Allah’s, or to a peaceful effort to persuade others to
accept Islam. But jihad can also mean holy war. In fact, there is a sense in which the only completely
just war in Islamic terms is a holy war, since it has to be approved by proper religious authorities
and waged to defend or promote Islam or the Muslim community.54
So in spite of the Qur’anic statement against forcing religion on others, Muslim leaders have
sometimes threatened to kill unbelievers if they did not accept Islam. Muhammad himself was said
to condemn Muslims to death if they abandoned their faith. Some of the early Muslim raids out of
Medina against trading caravans would be hard to interpret as strictly defensive. And although
Islam spread to some parts of the world like Indonesia mainly by means of “beautiful preaching,”
much of its expansion elsewhere was due to offensive war, first by Muhammad to unify Arabia,
then by his followers in conquering the Middle East, North Africa, and so on. In fact, for many years
the caliphs (Muslim political leaders) were expected to wage offensive jihad at least once a year!55
However, Muhammad and his successors did establish some important moral rules for fighting
holy wars: women, children and the elderly were not to be intentionally killed, though they could
be enslaved. Monks, nuns and the disabled were also to be spared from execution after a battle.
Muslim military leaders were able to draw upon some pre-Islamic principles of Arab chivalry against
killing defenseless people.56 In other words, Islamic holy wars were never supposed to be total
wars involving indiscriminate killing and scorched-earth tactics, in spite of what the contemporary
leaders of Al Qaeda, Hamas or Hizbollah might say to the contrary.57
On the other hand, Muslim leaders were explicitly permitted by Muhammad to kill all captured
soldiers, and most adult male civilians if they were polytheists, or even if they were Jews or Christians
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but had fought instead of paying the poll tax. So Islam traditionally did not uphold a comprehensive
principle of noncombatant immunity. Also, if civilians were likely to be killed in attacks on military
areas, Muslim ethics permitted that as regrettable but necessary “collateral damage”—in fact, the
moral blame rested entirely on the enemy leaders for putting their citizens in harm’s way.58
But many contemporary Muslim leaders strongly advocate noncombatant immunity, as well
as a duty to minimize harms to civilians in otherwise legitimate military attacks, i.e., in bello
proportionality. Such leaders have also condemned terrorism committed in the name of Allah,
including the 9/11 attacks against the United States. For example, Abdulaziz Al-Ashaykh, the chief
religious leader of Saudi Arabia, declared on September 15, 2001, “[T]he recent developments in
the United States, including hijacking planes, terrorizing innocent people and shedding blood,
constitute a form of injustice that cannot be tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes
and sinful acts.” Similarly, Muhammad al-Sabil, a member of the Saudi Council of Senior Religious
Scholars, stated a few months later, “Any attack on innocent people is unlawful and contrary to
shari’a (Islamic law) . . . . Muslims must safeguard the lives, honor and property of Christians and
Jews. Attacking them contradicts shari’a.”59
However, the contemporary challenge facing moderate Muslims to counter the misguided ethic
of Muslim extremists can hardly be overestimated,60 especially in regard to the bizarre distortion of
Islamic martyrdom in the growing cult of “suicide bombers.”61
Conclusions.
Tragically, some advocates of aggressive religious war can still be found today in all of the
world’s major religions. What they cannot legitimately claim, though, is that their position is the
authentic expression of their faith. Indeed, each of the traditions I’ve discussed contains ethical
principles that are incompatible with total war. Furthermore, in order for members of those faith
communities to continue to believe that God is compassionate and just, I think they must repudiate
claims and values in their own scriptures and traditions that are incompatible with those ideas.
It does not blaspheme or insult God to believe that God’s actions are limited by objective moral
principles. To say that God would never condone or command total war, cruelty, or the intentional
killing of innocent people does not represent a significant limit on God’s power.
Moreover, I think that people of many different faiths, as well as those of no religious faith,
might concur with the following ethical principles and rules, though some will not be acceptable to
strict pacifists:
1. All people have a prima facie right not to be killed. This right can only be forfeited if they
intentionally try to kill innocent people, or while they are combatants in war.62
2. Given the immense destruction and loss of life that war usually brings, all nonviolent means
of realistically achieving just objectives should be tried first.
3. War should only be waged when necessary to protect the rights and welfare of the innocent.
4. Innocent civilians should not be directly targeted.
5. Weapons and tactics should not be used against military targets in ways that are certain to
cause civilian casualties, unless that is the only way to protect one’s own soldiers or civilians. Even
then, harm to enemy civilians should be minimized.
6. Captured soldiers should not be tortured or summarily executed but treated humanely.
7. Each side should be held accountable for any atrocities committed by its military forces.
Similar principles and rules arose out of the western just-war tradition, and have been
incorporated into international treaties like the Hague, Geneva and Torture conventions. But as I
have tried to suggest in this essay, such principles are not unique to the West or to Christianity in
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particular: every major religious tradition has developed comparable ones. It ought to be possible
for people of all faiths to work in concert to implement such principles, without first having to agree
on which views of God are best.
The just-war tradition rejects strict pacifism as insufficient to protect the innocent from unjust
attack. But just-war rules, at least when applied in a careful and honest way, also guard against total
war waged in the name of religion or any other cause. Religious communities can help to ensure
that political and military leaders abide by these rules and inculcate respect for them in the training
and management of soldiers. But just as importantly, faith communities can nurture firmly rooted
habits and dispositions of compassion and nonviolence, reducing the likelihood and severity of war
by dispelling the ignorance, fear and hatred that too often inspire and escalate it.63
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CHAPTER 16
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER:
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY
Thomas W. McShane
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a
world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.
President George H. Bush

World events since 1648 have reflected the political, social, economic, and military aspirations
of people organized into sovereign states. Increasingly, they reflect the influence and authority,
both real and perceived, of international law, a development which has become evident since the
end of the Cold War but whose roots go back much further. Recent international interventions in
places as diverse as Kuwait, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, and Kosovo, conducted under the auspices
of the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, or by ad hoc coalitions, are shaped by
a large and growing body of treaties, practice, and custom collectively referred to as international
law.
Americans traditionally respect and support international law and have in fact been instrumental
in its development for more than a century.1 At the same time, they become frustrated when
international law restrains or limits the pursuit of national interests. This was vividly illustrated
in the debates and reactions surrounding American-led efforts to compel disarmament or regime
change in Iraq throughout 2002 and 2003. Regardless, its is essential that strategic leaders understand
the global environment as it exists today. International law constitutes an important element of the
geopolitical environment, one we ignore at our peril.
This chapter traces the development and evolution of international law, its principal components
and characteristics, and its relative influence on international politics and events over time. It
proposes that international law has evolved to a level where it competes with sovereignty as an
organizing principal of international relations. Although sovereignty is likely to remain a critical
component of the international system, it faces a growing threat from international organizations
and institutions that pursue international order and individual rights at the expense of traditional
rights enjoyed by sovereign states.
Conventional wisdom would hold that this phenomenon sprung to life after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1990. To the contrary, as this chapter will demonstrate,
the “recent” ascendancy of international law represents major developments in religion, philosophy,
and law over centuries, and is shaped by the cataclysmic wars and associated excesses of the 20th
century. Critical components of today’s international system matured in relative obscurity during
the Cold War as groups and nations sought self-determination, peace, democracy, and individual
freedoms. While it is easy for scholars and statesmen alike to overlook historical trends, we must
examine how developments in international law have subtly but certainly redefined sovereignty
and how states have adapted, or not adapted, to this reality.
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FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Search for Order.
Humans seek order in life. Religion traditionally reflects our search for meaning and purpose,
but social institutions also reflect this desire. In ancient times, families organized themselves into
tribes, then cities, states, and empires. Social order implies security and a sense of predictability.
Order promotes prosperity and growth—both individual and collective. At the same time, order
discourages destructive social behavior and competition for scarce resources.2 Order requires
a degree of cooperation and sacrifice, and by definition some inherent limitation on individual
freedom. The political process is the means usually used to create order and determine social rules
and mores. Laws are crafted to facilitate and support this process.
Order may be imposed within groups or nations or states. On occasion, international order
may be imposed by hegemonic powers, for example the Roman Empire, the British Empire at
its height in the 19th century, and by American power since 1945. But scholars typically describe
the international system as unstructured, or anarchic, in nature. States strive for supremacy, or
hegemony, over other states. International politics is a “ruthless and dangerous business . . . [t]his
situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic.”3 Others analyze the
international system in different terms: the dynamic of how states establish international order e.g.,
balance of power, bipolar, or hegemonic systems; the nature of state actors as determining state
behavior, e.g., democracies act one way, revolutionary states another, etc.; and the influence of
individual decisionmakers, e.g., great men drive events—Churchill, Hitler, etc.4
Rule of law is widely regarded as an independent basis of international order. The National
Security Strategy of the United States tells us that the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity”
include “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship;
equal justice; respect for women; religious tolerance; and respect for private property.”5 Establishing
the rule of law was a stated objective of international efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan,
among others. Efforts to establish rule of law in places such as Kosovo, and more recently Iraq,
illustrate the tensions between international law and sovereignty which we will examine in detail
later.
Defining International Law.
Law prescribes norms of proper behavior, or as Blackstone says in his Commentaries, “a rule of
civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”6 These rules may be
prescribed by the sovereign, but they are usually based on religious, cultural, and moral values. As
such, the law often depends upon voluntary compliance, or more precisely on social pressure to
conform. Sanctions may be imposed in cases where individuals will not or cannot comply.
Others feel that laws by definition require sanctions:
It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment
for disobedience If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands, which pretend
to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice. . . . 7

Regardless, law provides a foundation for order, stability, predictability, and enjoys general
acceptance by the population at large. Laws not generally accepted, perhaps because they do not
reflect widely-held beliefs or morals, or serve no constructive purpose, are often ignored, and prove
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particularly difficult to enforce.8 Lastly, law evolves; it is not static. Laws change regularly, and
considerably over long periods of time. While all this is true with respect to municipal or domestic
law, does it apply equally to international law?
International law has been defined as “the body of rules and principles of action which are
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another.”9 Critics question, and we will
examine later, whether international law can be “binding,” and the efficacy of its application
outside its Western European incubator—the so-called “civilized” states. Yet a closer look reveals
that international law plays an essential role in global trade and commerce, regulating disputes,
compensation, banking, and laws applying to a given transaction. It is indispensable to international
transportation, regulating sea and air routes, privileges and immunities, and claims for loss or
damage.10 International treaties establish standards for the sciences, health, and the environment.11
The law of war is most familiar to us as that branch of public international law regulating armed
conflict between states, and increasingly within states suffering from civil war, or intrastate conflict.
This body of law provided the foundation for the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo
following World War II, and later for the international tribunals organized to adjudicate war crimes
and crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even more recently, the Rome
Statute established the International Criminal Court, a standing, rather than ad hoc, tribunal which
recently became operational and whose jurisdiction may be unlimited.12
In most aspects, international law serves the same purposes as and shares common attributes
with municipal law: it provides a foundation for order, is founded on religious, cultural, and moral
values, serves to provide stability and predictability, and enjoys general acceptance among the
international community. International law protects rights of states and individuals alike. In one
important particular, however, the international legal system differs from municipal systems—
there is no sanction for noncompliance, if by sanction is meant imposition of penalty by a higher
authority. This theme recurs in any discussion of international law, although its relevance is often
overstated.13
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Classical Antecedents.
Historians refer to the “laws” of ancient Greece and Rome and their influence on modern western
institutions. Although recognizing that a sophisticated system of laws provided a foundation for
order and stability, as well as for a wide-ranging commercial system that stretched from Britain
to Asia Minor and ringed the Mediterranean, neither civilization understood the concept of
international law as we apply the term today.14 Ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese did not
customarily treat outsiders as their equals in an international system of equals. Greeks regarded
non-Greeks as uncivilized; The Roman Empire didn’t negotiate acquisitions, it simply took them.
The Chinese considered any group of peoples outside the “Middle Kingdom” as barbarians not
worthy of their full attention.15
Natural Law, Feudalism, and Westphalia.
Elements of modern international law existed before creation of the Westphalian system in
1648. Ancient philosophers, the Romans, and their heirs believed in “natural law,” a higher law
of nature that controlled all human endeavors, and to which all are bound, even kings and rulers.
An expression of this concept is found in the term ius gentium, meaning a principle of universal
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application that all follow because it has been independently discovered by application of reason,
a “natural law.” Our contemporary use of the phrase “human rights,” examined in this context,
becomes for us a form of natural law or ius gentium, and a fundamental principle of international
order.16
Other elements of international order evolved during the Middle Ages, particularly concepts of
property rights and loyalty to the sovereign, key elements of modern nation-states. Under feudalism,
property rights of the ruler shaped feudal society, and dictated a network of complicated, but wellunderstood relationships that provided stability and order. Feudalism depended upon loyalty up
and loyalty down the social hierarchy. All were bound by reciprocal responsibilities. While the
Catholic Church provided legitimacy and support of feudal institutions, these principles survived
the Reformation. The idea that states enjoy sovereignty and the right to control territory is a feudal
legacy.17
Finally, following the self-destructive upheaval of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries,
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 provided needed order, stabilizing borders and relationships.
Kings could dictate any religion they wished within their borders, but foreswore any rights to
interfere in the religious affairs of other sovereign states. This principle was frequently violated for
political, if not religious, reasons, but the Treaty achieved its purpose.
Once states became sovereign, a way had to be found for them to interact on a nominal basis of
equality. Guiding principles of relations between sovereign states rested on five basic assumptions.
States had the right to make laws, act independently in international affairs, control their territory
and people, issue currency, and utilize the resources of the state. Sovereignty thus became the
organizing element of modern history.
INTERNATIONAL LAW HIERARCHY
The sources of international law are divided into four categories, arranged in a hierarchy.18 At
the top are conventions, treaties, and agreements, such as the United Nations Charter or the Law of
the Sea Treaty. These represent contractual relationships between sovereign states, and states are
bound by their obligations freely undertaken.19
The second source of international law is the practice of states, referred to as customary
international law. No hard and fast rule governs customary international law. It reflects the
behavior of states over time, acting in accordance with what they believe to be the dominant rules
of international order. Customary law exists independently of treaty law, although treaty law may
help to shape customary law.20
The third source is principles of law recognized by the leading, or so-called “civilized” nations.
International politics help to define these principles, which are also shaped by the municipal law of
states.21
The fourth and final source of international law represents judicial decisions and the writings
of jurists and scholars. These include the opinions issued by the International Court of Justice, its
predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice, the European Court of Human Rights,
and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
Writings of scholars supplement these decisions, illustrating and explaining the state of the law
based on their experience and study. Changes in the law are often preceded by debate among
jurists and scholars over what the law should be. Their authority is persuasive and influential, not
substantive.22
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY—AN EVOLUTIONARY RELATIONSHIP
A Marriage of Convenience.
International law has never existed in a vacuum. It reflects existing norms and mores, and
illustrates the difficulty of constructing international order in a disordered world. The Westphalian
system has provided the fundamental framework for order for over three centuries and has greatly
influenced the development of international law. Over time sovereignty has ebbed and flowed,
as prevailing practices and international politics shaped the behavior of the leading states. To the
extent these practices and politics establish binding precedent, they help to define international
law.
This portion of the chapter examines how recognized principles of international law and sovereignty developed simultaneously over time. Although sovereignty has provided the dominant basis
for international order, it has consistently adapted to accommodate evolving concepts of government, freedom, human rights, and the quest for predictability and stability,23 the historical attributes of international law.
Sovereignty and the Divine Rights of Kings.
Early models of sovereignty were based on the prevailing form of government in 17th century
Europe—monarchies ruled by hereditary dynasties of kings or emperors. Consistent with historical
political and religious practice, individuals were subordinate to the state, represented by the King.
Other precedents existed, going back to classical Greece and its democratic ideals,24 but prevailing
norms made Kings absolute rulers of their states, and they exercised their authority with little regard
for the sensibilities of their subjects.
Contemporary writers described the nature of this relationship. Jean Bodin wrote in 1576 that law
comes from the King, who although not bound by his own laws, was not above the law of nature,
an important exception bearing on future developments.25 Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan: “It
appeareth plainly that the sovereign power . . . is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make
it.”26 Louis XIV of France, the “Sun King,” epitomized the classical sovereign—not merely the head
of the state, but its very embodiment, anointed by God to rule. Subjects owed unquestioningly
loyalty to the King, who might or might not act in their best interests. More precisely, the King’s
interests were the state’s interests. Hence the dynastic wars of Louis XIV, waged to expand the
glory of France and of Louis XIV, were the business of the King and his advisors, not the people of
France. As characterized in popular culture: “It’s good to be the King!”27
Not everyone regarded sovereignty this way. Hugo de Groot, also known as Grotius, is referred
to as the father of international law for his treatises on international law and the law of war. He was
also a proponent of the law of nature and reason. He saw excesses in unbridled sovereignty:
I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations
should be ashamed; men resorting to arms for trivial or for no reasons at all, and . . . no reverence left for divine
or human law, exactly as if a single edict had released a madness driving men to all kinds of crime.28

As the culminating act of the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War, the British throne of
Charles I fell to the reformist Protestant armies of Oliver Cromwell. In 1649, 1 year after Westphalia,
Cromwell had King Charles beheaded. Sovereignty was no longer coexistent with monarchy.29
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The Enlightenment and Age of Reason.
During the 18th century, philosophers, scholars and popular writers rediscovered the writings
of the ancient Greeks, combining them with Christian philosophy and natural law into a doctrine
of Enlightenment. Locke, Rousseau and Jefferson, among others, emphasized individual rights
and the obligations of sovereigns toward their citizens.30 Their beliefs were incorporated into the
Declaration of Independence and the American and French Revolutions.
The established order elsewhere did not change, but regime change in America and France,
replacing monarchies with democratically-based governments, was a harbinger of things to come.
It advanced the idea that sovereignty vested in the people, rather than in the government or the
ruler, and demonstrated the efficacy of a higher law, themes that would resurface periodically in
the 19th century and erupt in the latter half of the 20th. International agreements and treaties began
to recognize that individuals as well as states have rights.31
The Concert of Europe, Industrialism, and Colonialism.
Following the 25-year struggle to suppress Revolutionary France and Napoleon Bonaparte, the
major powers of Europe in 1815 sought to reestablish order, stability, and a balance of power. In
response to Napoleon’s imperial ambitions, the political leaders who met in Vienna created a system
firmly grounded in sovereignty and balanced so as to preclude a return to revolution. Under the
leadership of Prince Metternich of Austria and Lord Castlereigh of Great Britain, they succeeded in
establishing a framework for peace that would survive essentially intact for 100 years.32
Other influences shaped the 19th century. Charles Darwin’s scientific work on evolution
stimulated development of a social philosophy known as social Darwinism, extrapolating Darwin’s
theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest species into international relations and politics.
Those nations which were strongest were most likely and best suited to survive. Social Darwinism
heavily influenced political leaders such as Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt.33 Sovereign states
exerted a sort of muscular self-interest in their international relations, demonstrating their superiority
by economic growth and territorial acquisition. The last great era of colonialism was the result, as
France, Great Britain, and Germany competed to acquire overseas colonies. The United States too,
succumbed to temptation at the end of the century, acquiring overseas interests in Hawaii, the
Philippines, Cuba, and Panama, among others.34 The sovereign rights of underdeveloped, militarily
weak states counted for little in this environment.
Facilitating economic expansion in an era of relative peace were the modern technologies of
steamships, railroads, and telegraphs. The speed of communication and transportation caused the
world to “shrink,” as trade, commerce, and banking connected the continents, creating the first
era of “globalization.” The modern unified industrial state came into its own as the United States,
Germany, and Italy consolidated their territorial boundaries and joined the ranks of the great
powers.35 In many regards, it was the apogee of sovereignty.
At the same time other, largely unseen, developments reflected the dark side of unbridled
sovereignty and hinted at issues that would rise to prominence in the 20th century. The industrial
revolution prompted upward mobility and increased the size of the middle class in most western
nations, yet it also created a new urban underclass, with associated problems of disease, family
breakup, and child labor. Visible disparity in wealth and power in developed states caused
socialism to flourish, creating revolutionary pressures that threatened the established order. Karl
Marx promulgated his economic theories preaching class warfare. Modest political reform helped
to defuse tensions and postpone the final accounting for at least another generation.
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Public international law played an important role in international affairs, particularly through
treaties regulating trade, communication, and finance. Henri Dunant founded the International
Red Cross in Geneva in 1863 to mitigate the destructive effect of modern war.36 The first Geneva
Convention covering treatment of sick and wounded on the battlefield was signed in 1864.37 Based
largely on the Lieber Code of 1863,38 promulgating laws of war for Union armies in the American
Civil War, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 190739 attempted to prescribe means and methods of
warfare consistent with existing humanitarian principles. Concerns over certain acts in the recent
war with Iraq—use of civilian hostages, fighting from protected places such as hospitals or mosques,
combatants not wearing military uniforms—can be traced directly to the Hague Conventions.40
The 20th Century—Age of Conflict and Ideology.
The 20th century was marked by tremendous highs and abysmal lows. The best and the worst
of human nature were on public display, often at the same time. The era was marked by three major
world wars, two hot and one cold, and the clash of powerful ideologies. Socialism, Communism,
Nazism, and Fascism emerged fully-grown on the world stage, competing with Democracy for
primacy in the hearts and minds of nations. Tentative steps to form world government were
taken. Natural law resurfaced in the guise of anti-colonialism, self-determination of peoples, the
human rights movement, and demands for equality by the non-western world. Change accelerated
development, redefining political and cultural priorities. The second great era of globalization and
progress brought the world closer, yet left others even farther behind. The similarities between 1903
and 2003 are striking, as are the differences. The maturation of international law and sovereignty’s
accommodation to change is one major highlight of the century that we will examine more closely.
The Great War—Changing of the Guard.
The period immediately following World War I is essential to understanding the rest of the
20th century. The issues facing the allied powers in Versailles, and the choices made then and over
the next decade dictated the course of events for the remainder of the century. International law
emerged as a critical component of international order and would play a major role in international
politics.
World War I, The Great War, caused tremendous upheaval in the established order. The
victorious allies attempted to address these problems at Versailles in 1919. First was the unexpected
scope of violence and destruction, prompting calls for vengeance—war reparations to be paid by the
losers and trials of those responsible for the conflict. Second was the collapse of major empires—the
German, Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires on the losing side, and the Russian Empire
in 1917 on the allied side—and the emergence of the United States as the predominant military
and economic power.41 The third problem was the creation of new nation-states out of the former
empires. Lastly, lack of consensus concerning the goals of the war and what the allies had won
plagued the peace and designs for international order.
Revolutionary efforts to create a world government fell short—the League of Nations was a
start, but not a sufficient one. President Wilson’s visions for the postwar order clashed with the
national interests of the allies and frustrated effective, unified action. The Versailles Treaty became
a compromise. Complicating matters, Wilson failed to persuade the American public or the United
States Senate to ratify the treaty creating the League of Nations, and, without American participation,
the League proved too weak to enforce Wilson’s vision of collective security—peace through the
rule of law supported by military force when necessary.42 Wilson’s vision would be revived in 1945
and again in 1990 with relatively greater success.
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Attempts to try the Kaiser and others for War Crimes encountered similar problems. The allies
could not agree, and the Germans would not cooperate. Ambitious plans drawn up at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1920 called for some 900 war criminals to be tried, but allied disunity and
German recalcitrance prevailed. As a compromise, 12 German soldiers ranging from Private to
Lieutenant General were tried in German courts; six were convicted, with the most severe sentence
being four years.43
One encouraging development at Versailles was public debate over rule of law and ethics
superseding national interests and international politics. The conflict between these poles of
international order would continue throughout the 20th century and still exists. As Kissinger
characterizes it:
At the end of the First World War, the age-old debate about the relative roles of morality and interest in
international affairs seemed to have been resolved in favor of the dominance of law and ethics. Under the
shock of the cataclysm, many hoped for a better world as free as possible from the kind of Realpolitik which, in
their view, had decimated the youth of a generation.44

Efforts to enforce peace through rule of law continued for over a decade following Versailles.
Arms control agreements took the place of serious collective security enforcement. Examples include
the Naval Conferences at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930, regulating the number and size
of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, then considered the major strategic weapons of
the great powers.45 In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the signatory parties agreed to renounce war
as an instrument of national policy.46
In the end, sovereignty and national interests proved too strong for the Wilsonians. International
law became just another diplomatic tool as the great states rearmed themselves for World War II.
Former President Theodore Roosevelt, still a keen observer of world events, captured the essence of
power politics when he said: “As yet there is no likelihood of establishing any kind of international
power . . . which can effectively check wrong-doing . . . I regard . . . trusting to fantastic peace
treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing in efficient
force, as abhorrent.”47
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
World War II and the Search for International Order.
The world got a second chance in 1945 to recreate international order. The unprecedented
destruction of the second major war in a generation dwarfed that of 1914-18 and brought modern
war to the home front with a vengeance. Millions of noncombatants became casualties of war. The
discovery of nuclear fission at the end of the war threatened even greater destruction in any future
conflict. Sovereignty had to be checked, and international law was applied to the task. The problem
was neatly defined by one study:
A sovereign state at the present time claims the power to judge its own controversies, to enforce its own
conception of its rights, to increase its armaments without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to
regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such regulations upon its neighbors. These attributes
of sovereignty must be limited.48

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal
immediately following were watershed events that permanently altered the nature of the debate
regarding a state’s right to wage war and its treatment of its citizens. Together they announced
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to the world that aggressive war would no longer be tolerated and that individuals who commit
aggression and crimes against humanity will be held criminally responsible for their acts. It was a
sincere effort and a good start, enjoying almost universal support.
One of the United Nations’ early proclamations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,49
outlined fundamental human rights in terms reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence and
the Bill of Rights. It was intended as common standard for “all peoples and all nations.”50 Although
aspirational in tone and lacking an enforcement mechanism, it has served for more than 50 years
as a beacon for people in search of freedom and justice. Over the following decades, international
agreements outlawing genocide, recognizing the rights of minorities, and emphasizing humanitarian
concerns consistently advanced individual rights at the expense of state sovereignty.51
Collective security acquired new life after World War II with the creation of the United Nations,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS), and
other international and regional organizations. Although the Cold War provided the initial impetus
for NATO, it survives as a viable, productive organization. With expanded membership and new
missions, NATO today provides collective security while extending democracy and prosperity to
the nations of Eastern Europe, a development unimagined a generation ago.
The Rule of Law and Human Rights Center Stage.
The rule of law in international affairs is manifest in many ways: by actions of the United Nations
Security Council and other UN organizations;52 by NGOs advancing collective western values and
international humanitarian law; by treaties regulating strategic nuclear weapons, conventional
weapons, and chemical/biological weapons;53 by international agreement on global warming;
by creation of an international criminal court;54 and by the number of “coalitions of the willing”
contributing forces to intervene in intrastate conflicts.
A common misperception is that these developments emerged all at once in 1990 with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.55 The incorporation of international law
and human rights into international relations since 1945 stems from historical trends and events. It
reflects timeless values, classical and modern philosophy, and the common experiences of mankind
over centuries. Although it is true that the bipolar system and threat of great power veto limited the
ability of the United Nations Security Council to take effective action throughout the Cold War, the
quest for international order based on rule of law consistently influenced political developments
and discourse.
The struggle to end colonialism and promote self-determination of peoples following World
War II is illustrative. The UN Charter, firmly rooted in sovereignty, contemplated the end of
Western colonialism.56 The United States advocated renunciation of overseas imperial holdings and
supported self-determination.57 During World War II, in fact, our stance on this issue periodically
created rifts within the Anglo-French-U.S. partnership.58 After the war, at the same time we were
developing a Containment Policy against Communism, we were calling for an end to British and
French rule in Africa and Asia. When newly independent colonial states lapsed into Communism,
as happened in Vietnam, we suddenly found ourselves with a new problem on our hands, one as
much political as military in nature.59 The search for order, justice, and democracy stumbled on the
rock of great power politics. International law alone could not preserve the peace.
Cold War arms control agreements60 reflected not so much American and Soviet optimism as
they did global public opinion, uneasy over the prospect of annihilation at the hands of the two
superpowers. With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, mutual assured destruction
became a fact. With satellite technology, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. acquired the capacity to place
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nuclear weapons in earth orbit.61 Many states became fervent practitioners of international law for
purely parochial reasons, but the success of the international community, particularly non-aligned
states, in framing global debate demonstrated the force of western values and the rule of law. These
trends emerged in the 1950s, and acquired prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither the United
Nations nor the international community could force the great powers to take specific actions against
their interests, but this does not mean that the great powers, including the U.S. and USSR, were free
to do as they pleased. Pressures to comply with world opinion were subtle and often invisible, but
real nonetheless.
Contributing to the force of international law was the proliferation of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in the decades following World War II. NGOs pursued their own special
interests, but most had an underlying humanitarian agenda, advancing the cause of human rights
and promoting “International Humanitarian Law.”62 The International Committee of the Red
Cross is the oldest and best-known of the NGOs.63 Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Border,
CARE, and thousands of others effectively precipitated international intervention in what had been
considered previously the internal affairs of sovereign states.64
Two examples illustrate the power and influence NGO’s have acquired. The first is the UN
intervention in Somalia in 1992, under American leadership, to ensure delivery of relief supplies
and avert a humanitarian disaster forecast by NGOs and highlighted on television screens around
the world. UN intervention alleviated the immediate problem, but failed to address the underlying
problem of stability. When it did, too little and too late, it led to the battle of Mogadishu and eventual
withdrawal of U.S. forces.
The second example of NGO influence is the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.65 The preamble
to the Treaty states in part:
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for
a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban landmines, and numerous
other nongovernmental organizations around the world, Basing themselves on the principle of international
humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is
not unlimited, . . . 66

NGOs and international celebrities like Princess Diana of Britain actively participated in the
Conference process, dismissing security concerns raised by the United States. Humanitarian
concerns over civilians killed or maimed by abandoned land mines preoccupied the Conference
and carried the day. While not a party to the treaty, the United States has conceded substantial
compliance by policy.67
THE STATE OF THE STATE– SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Trends and Developments.
Trends evident in 2003 reflect the foregoing discussion. In advanced states, post-industrial society
has replaced basic industry and manufacturing, which has migrated to less-developed countries with
lower labor costs. Globalization draws nations and peoples closer, despite recent economic setbacks.
The World Trade Organization is a powerful international force that influences decisions of the
leading economic powers, including the United States.68 International labor organizations demand
basic standards and benefits for workers and workplaces. These trends undermine sovereignty and
reflect a tightly structured international environment that constrains even the strongest states to
behave in ways promoting international order.
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Human rights influence international agendas and domestic actions. International humanitarian
intervention, evident in Kosovo, East Timor, and possibly Iraq, is an emerging precedent that
demands attention. It is not yet customary international law, but lively debate on the subject tends
to re-define how we view sovereignty.69 This represents, ironically, the triumph of values advanced
by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles almost a century ago. The principles of the American and French
revolutions have become universal, though not all states concede that individual rights supersede
the welfare of the state, most notably China, the world’s most populous state.
Themes for the 21st Century.
International law will play an important role in addressing issues and trends likely to persist
for decades to come. The most important of these include: a globalized economy; urbanization;
intrastate conflict; clash of cultures; unequal distribution of wealth; environmental degradation;
transnational crime; collective security; multilateralism; and humanitarian intervention. Global
problems require global solutions; sovereign states cannot solve them, although they can address
symptoms within their borders. Most, eventually, will require international cooperation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS
International law challenges strategic leaders to think globally, not nationally. The positivist
approach to international law expressed in the S.S. Lotus case: “Restrictions upon the independence
of States cannot therefore be presumed,”70 is threatened by a new paradigm: “a law more readily
seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as a response to the social necessities of
States organized as a community.”71 United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan articulated this
new paradigm as follows:
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and
international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples,
and not vice versa.72

The implications of this principle are staggering. Yet Kofi Annan is no revolutionary; his
language is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s in the Declaration of Independence: “That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just power from the consent of
the governed.” States exist to promote and protect individual rights and freedoms. The challenge
for international leaders is what action the international community should take in those cases
where states deliberately and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens.73
None of this implies that sovereign states cannot guarantee, promote and advance human rights.
To the contrary, the American experience teaches us that individual rights and rule of law are
mutually supportive and thrive in a strongly nationalistic, democratic environment. Ironically, the
American experience also encourages internationalism in the promotion of democratic values. As
President Bush has stated in his National Security Strategy: “We will defend the peace by fighting
terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great
powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”74
This sentiment resembles Woodrow Wilson’s and, indeed, those of most presidents since 1918.
Kissinger portrays this as an essential element of American altruism motivating our actions abroad:
“Wilson put forward the unprecedented doctrine that the security of America was inseparable from
the security of all the rest of mankind. This implied that it was henceforth America’s duty to oppose
aggression everywhere . . . .”75
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The current world situation encourages debate over the scope and authority of international
law. Recent American actions in Iraq, taken contrary to international public opinion, without the
endorsement of the United Nations Security Council, and against the wishes of longstanding allies
such as France, Germany, and Turkey, support Mersheimer’s proposition that great powers behave
as their interests dictate.76 Perhaps sovereignty is alive and well after all. Unilateral action can, at
least in certain cases, achieve the same results as multilateral efforts.
Proponents of international order and rule of law argue that lasting order cannot be imposed
unilaterally. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, which created the “Concert of Europe,” was a collective,
multilateral effort, albeit predicated on sovereignty. But it took enormous cooperation to maintain
international order for a hundred years. Even the British Empire at its height in the 19th Century
realized its limitations and attempted to construct a favorable balance of power. John Ikenberry, in
After Victory, analyzes the rebuilding of international order after major wars. He says the diplomats
of 1815 created a “constitutional order,” which are “political orders organized around agreed-upon
legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power.”77
Ikenberry’s concept of “constitutional order” helps to explain how the current international
system evolved after World War II, and how it operates today. At its heart was the sharing of power
by the United States, by far the most powerful state in the world in 1945. The framework was an
extensive system of multilateral institutions, including alliances, which bound the United States
and its primary partners in Europe together.78 The Cold War may have accelerated this process, but
it did not create it.79
If this theory is correct, then the primacy of international law and institutions is no accident, but
instead the direct and expected result of efforts to create a framework of mutually supporting and
binding ties. As we have seen, these international institutions have performed as designed. It should
come as no surprise, viewing the international system in this way, that international organizations and
politics restrain the choices and actions of sovereign states. From this perspective, international order
displays many of the characteristics of municipal order.80 Ikenberry explains this: “if institutions—
wielded by democracies—play a restraining role . . . it is possible to argue that international orders
under particular circumstances can indeed exhibit constitutional characteristics.”81
THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND AMERICAN HEGEMONY
Who Owns International Law?
What is America’s role as the sole superpower in the current environment? How will the
international system respond to the threat of global terrorism? Can it maintain the security and
prosperity created by American leadership since 1945? Can the rule of law accommodate the national
interests of the great powers and protect the interests of weaker states threatened by demagogues,
genocide, civil war, and internal armed conflict? The remainder of this chapter will attempt to
suggest answers to these questions.
Dynamic, disparate forces challenge the international order. Globalization promises prosperity
and freedom, but failed states, disease, pollution, and rising birthrates hold large segments of the
world’s population hostage. Furthering individual rights and enforcing collective security requires
international cooperation, but depends at present upon the good will and determination of powerful
sovereign states.
A brief look at two recent developments illustrates the nature of the challenge and provides
insights as to possible courses of action. The first of these is the creation of the International Criminal
Court; the second is the American-led war on terrorism.
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an idea whose time has come. It fulfills the hopes
and aspirations of a majority of the world’s nations. Eighty years in the making, from Versailles in
1919 to the Rome Statute in 1997, it reflects a new consensus on international justice and the rule of
law. Recognizing that sovereignty protected rulers and their agents from accountability for crimes
ranging from aggressive war to democide,82 the ICC provides a permanent forum for prosecution
when state courts cannot or will not act. As of this writing, 139 nations have signed the treaty, and
89 have ratified it. The Court commenced operations on July 1, 2002, and according to its charter
enjoys almost universal jurisdiction.83 Its potential impact is enormous, even without United States
participation.84
At the same time, the United States leads international efforts to locate, isolate and destroy
international terrorist groups with global reach. These groups threaten international order and
prosperity. They promote extremist views and promise false hopes to states and individuals
left behind on the road of progress. While most states support and encourage American efforts
to eradicate this plague, the international system is not well-suited for the struggle. There is no
international agreement on terrorism, and none that even attempts to define the term. Several
treaties address individual terrorist acts—hijacking, murder, money laundering, illegal crossing of
borders, etc., but their solutions require state action—apprehension, extradition, and prosecution of
individual terrorists.85
To date, therefore, the international response to terrorism depends upon American leadership,
moral and physical. Coalitions are formed to fight terrorism, but they form and reform constantly
depending on where American efforts are focused. In Afghanistan a multilateral effort enjoyed
broad international support;86 in Iraq, another theater in this global war, the coalition fell short of
expectations, and the intervention remains controversial.87 The search for order and the rule of law
means different things to different states. America may lead, but others need not follow.
These events are closely related. They represent opposite poles of debate over how we are to
pursue Ikenberry’s “constitutional order” on a global scale. While most states agree in theory with
multilateral institutions, the utility of the United Nations, and the need for rule of law within and
among states, international law must contend with the “friction” of sovereignty.88 This uneasy
relationship is likely to continue. Ironically, some states and prominent individuals have called for
the ICC to investigate American intervention in Iraq as an “illegal” use of force in violation of treaty
law and customary law.89
Unilateralism: What Price Sovereignty?
This situation is unhealthy for international order. The new world order described in preceding
sections of this chapter is real, and it is here to stay. The ties that bind the international community
are strong and enduring, and international institutions enjoy unprecedented support and influence.
Perhaps the most amazing point of all is that American values and leadership were instrumental
in creating this environment. We are reminded once again that we have to be careful what we wish
for.
American actions are well-intended, although many people sympathetic to American interests
do not accept this proposition at face value. To the extent that American national interests must be
served, we can continue to make unpopular decisions and execute American grand strategy without
broad international support. But we cannot do so indefinitely. America may act unilaterally on a
case-by-case basis, weighing costs and benefits. We need to be honest with ourselves when we do
so, however. Others may perceive our actions as excessive and bullying.
The cost of military intervention can be high: proponents must establish a legal basis, a jus ad
bellum, for action; they must apply force consistent with the laws of armed conflict and possible
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mandates of the UN Security Council; the fighting must be controlled both in time and in space;
fallout and political reactions must be anticipated; and, lastly, those advocating intervention must
expect the unexpected. Murphy’s Law applies to all human endeavors. Given the national interest
in defeating terrorism and preserving international order, some degree of risk is normal and
expected.
THE ROAD AHEAD: SURVIVING IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
We do not operate in a vacuum. The international environment outlined in this chapter demands
our attention, if not our cooperation. It provides several useful lessons to guide our conduct in the
21st century.
First, multilateral action is preferred in most cases. America lacks the political and military
strength to go it alone in every instance. U.S. economic and military power provides the mobility
and ability to go anywhere, but coalitions provide additional resources, political support, and
legal justification and legitimacy for international operations. If international relations theorists are
correct, states that pursue hegemonic order motivate other powers to combine to frustrate their
efforts. Although such a backlash against American hegemony is not evident at present, no one can
guarantee that further unilateral adventures will not produce one.
Second, the United States has tremendous capabilities at its disposal without employing the
military element of power. Diplomatic, economic, and informational tools provide enormous
flexibility in formulating strategy and handling complicated problems as they arise. Infrequent
demonstration of American military power will suffice to remind opponents of military capabilities
while diplomats pursue peaceful resolution of disputes by other means. This approach will also
reassure friends, allies and critics alike of American intentions and demonstrates a willingness to
exhaust all reasonable alternatives before applying force. It will preserve valuable goodwill.
Third, every crisis does not require international intervention or the use of military forces.
Acknowledging the threat posed by global terrorist networks, most international crises are local and
have little impact on terrorism or global security. Many of them, we need to remind ourselves, may
be safely ignored and left to others to solve. Unless international stability is seriously threatened,
mobilizing the international community and its resources might prove counterproductive. We’ve
learned, since the heady days of 1991, of the great Gulf War Coalition forged by President Bush, that
the new world order promised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has
not come to pass, at least not in the way we imagined it. But there is a new world order, and states
have to live in it.
The fourth and final lesson we can draw from this analysis of international law and sovereignty
is that the international system as it exists (and as it was designed) reflects American values and
American visions for the future. It is a legitimate part of our heritage. When we presume that all
institutions oppose our interests because some do, or presume that all treaties are suspect because
some are, we deny that heritage. More often than not, international institutions and agreements
further American interests.
It is important for us to remember that democracies tolerate differences, and in fact thrive on
them. If the core of “constitutional order” in the world is Western democracy, then we must expect
that there will be disagreements and heated debate among states. We will not always agree on
everything. But in a constitutional system everyone must play; the rules don’t allow a state to
simply take its ball and go home whenever it doesn’t get its way. True, no referee will step in, blow
a whistle, and impose a penalty, but true international order, just like domestic order, depends
upon mutual respect and cooperation and responsible behavior. Those who claim global leadership
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within the system have the greatest responsibility to ensure the system works. It is time to reassess
America’s role and reclaim our rightful position as the leader of the world community. Struggling
against the ties that bind us, like a modern Gulliver, is counterproductive.
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CHAPTER 17
RETOOLING U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AS A STRATEGIC INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Marybeth P. Ulrich
The shape of the world a generation from now will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the
values of our society to others than by our military or diplomatic superiority.
			

Senator William Fulbright, 19641

Public diplomacy refers to U.S. programs dedicated to promoting U.S. interests, values, culture,
and policies within foreign audiences. The U.S. employs cultural exchanges, education programs
and foreign broadcasts to convey U.S. interests and ideals to foreign audiences.2 Public diplomacy
aims to facilitate the understanding of the United States people and its policies and to broaden the
dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.3
Joseph Nye’s introduction of the concept of “soft power” as an essential complement to “hard
power” captures the essence of public diplomacy. Nye wrote of the “soft power of attraction”
essential “to draw target publics into the U.S. web of influence.”4 The achievement of U.S. foreign
policy goals is greatly facilitated when more friends and allies share our interests and contribute to
their accomplishment. In the case of the War on Terror, victory is directly related to prevailing in a
battle of ideas, which public diplomacy tools seek to shape.
The 9/11 Commission called for action “to compete as vigorously on the ideological battlefield
as we do on the military and intelligence fronts.”5 The Department of State (DOS) Advisory Group
on Public Diplomacy, the General Accounting Office, the Heritage Foundation, the Council on
Foreign Relations, and the 9/11 Commission have all issued reports stating that a greater emphasis
is needed by the U.S. Government on public diplomacy.6
This chapter takes the position that current approaches to public diplomacy are flawed
and must be reconsidered and appropriately funded in order to acquire the public diplomacy
capabilities needed to win the War on Terror. Furthermore, public diplomacy must be integrated
into the policymaking process in the form of a comprehensive and coherent strategy. Specific
recommendations will follow from the evaluation of three criteria: national interests, costs, and
public opinion. The research method draws on extensive studies by government bodies and think
tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, the Congressional Research
Service, and the Pew Research Center, to cull the most essential findings and recommendations in
order to convince senior policymakers that more must be done to improve U.S. public diplomacy.
BACKGROUND
The Gulf War coincided with the end of the Cold War. In Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM, the U.S. assembled the greatest international coalition in history. America’s former
chief adversary, the Soviet Union, supported the U.S.-led initiative to push Saddam Hussein’s
troops out of Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush’s “new world order” became a moniker for
what was perceived to be a more benign international environment. U.S. political leaders, in turn,
called for the reduction of the Cold War-era force structure and deemphasized public diplomacy
as a Cold War relic.7 In 1999 between 50 percent and 83 percent of foreign populations polled held
favorable views of the United States, further mitigating the priority for public diplomacy funding.8
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In 1999 Congress disbanded the United States Information Agency (USIA), which had been the U.S.
Government agency dedicated exclusively to public diplomacy. USIA’s information and exchange
programs were integrated into the State Department under the new Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The broadcasting arm of USIA fell under a new independent entity,
the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).9 Meanwhile, the forces of globalization increased
the accessibility of information among people worldwide requiring the United States to adapt its
strategic communications to suit the needs of a global information society. The biggest technological
change has been the globalization of information via the internet.10
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), public diplomacy tools have been employed to influence Muslim
and Arab populations to combat terrorism. European and other friends and allies of the U.S. have
also been targeted in order to bolster coalition support for the War on Terror. The establishment of
a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to improve interagency coordination of public diplomacy
activities, increased funding, and new initiatives both within the Department of State, USAID, and
DOD point to the importance of public diplomacy as a tool in a long term struggle where the battle
of ideas is the center of gravity.
The areas of public diplomacy used to influence foreign target audiences are international
information programs, educational and cultural exchange programs, and international nonmilitary
broadcasting.11 Often included in a canvas of public diplomacy programs is the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED), which operates at arm’s length from the Department of State, but which
DOS principally funds. NED’s mission is to assist democratic movements worldwide by leveraging
its status as a private, non-profit entity primarily in the area of foreign elections.12
The primary agencies involved in these areas are the State Dept, the International Broadcasting
Bureau and the National Endowment for Democracy.13 Within the Department of State, the Office
of International Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs
(ECA) focus on strategic communications and international exchanges respectively. In addition,
the bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) administers the Voice of America (VOA)
and numerous surrogate entities such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio
Marti (broadcast to Cuba).14 Several new initiatives launched since 9/11 include Radio Sawa and a
24 hour news channel, Alhurra (the free one), broadcast to the Middle East. The newest State Dept
entry aimed at “Telling America’s Story” is a web site for foreign audiences, http://www.america.
gov.15
According to the Congressional Research Service, the $1.2 billion budgeted for public diplomacy
activities in FY07 is comparable in constant dollars to the amount spent in 1980 (actual dollars level
is about double).16 Since 2001, congressional appropriations for public diplomacy programs have
increased by 57 percent (in actual dollars) with an average increase of 8 percent per year.17 Later, I
will examine the debate over whether these levels are adequate to meet the threat.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), published in March 2006,
establishes two inseparable priorities: “fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting
freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair.”18 The NSS posits further:
From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against
the terrorists and against their murderous ideology…. In the long run, winning the war on terror means
winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent
victims.19

The diplomatic instrument of power is a critical component in the NSS’s objective to advance
freedom and human dignity through democracy as the long-term antidote for transnational
terrorism. Essential to this end is the continued reorientation of the Department of State toward
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transformational diplomacy.20 A key component of transformational diplomacy is the strengthening
of public diplomacy in order to:
advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching
and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding educational opportunities
for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in
the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners who share our
commitment to a safer, more compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing our
channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting propaganda quickly, before myths
and distortions have time to take root in the hearts and minds of people across the world.21

Since 9/11 there has been an increased focus on departments and agencies across the government
contributing to the mission of improving America’s image. Besides the NED mentioned above,
other U.S. Government agencies involved in de facto public diplomacy include the Peace Corps
and USAID. Both involve people-to-people communication in U.S. Government funded programs
in pursuit of U.S. policy interests, and as such both perform a strategic public relations function.22
USAID, in particular, is charged with publicizing U.S. humanitarian assistance.23 Additionally,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on initiatives to aggressively conduct foreign
communications. The much maligned Office of Strategic Influence was a short-lived effort that came
on the scene in the fall of 2001 and was later replaced by the Office of Strategic Communication,
which has the mission of coordinating and disseminating combat information. The DOD funded
contracts worth $300 million over five years to create media products aimed at improving the public
image of the United States abroad. The Joint Psychological Operations Support Element of the U.S.
Special Operations Command has been coordinating these efforts.24
EVALUATION
Next, we will evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy efforts according to three
criteria: national interests, costs, and public opinion.
National Interests.
In the aftermath of 9/11, one question weighed most heavily on Americans’ minds, “Why do they
hate us?” Public diplomacy in the Cold War was aimed at countering Soviet power and influence.
The primary objective now is to counter the influence of Islamic extremism in order to defuse the
root cause of terrorism.25 Policymakers and the public alike now share the realization that strong
negative opinions of the United States affect the propensity of friends and allies to be helpful in the
War on Terror and assist terrorist groups in their efforts to recruit new members.26
Furthermore, consensus is growing that public diplomacy can no longer be viewed simply as
a means of marketing or selling the “American brand.” Public diplomacy must be integrated into
the policymaking process at the earliest stages, because global attitudes increasingly determine the
success of American strategy. This is especially true in the war of ideas that is at the heart of the War
on Terror. In the Bush administration, U.S. strategic choices have been largely unconstrained by
international opinion.27 Shifting efforts toward shaping public opinion to enhance U.S. credibility
and the acceptability of U.S. policies will pay off in the long term.
There is an inextricable link between American foreign policy choices and public diplomacy.
Regardless of the correctness of the various policy choices, each policy decision has consequences
in terms of how it resonates abroad.28 Improving America’s image abroad is a specific foreign policy
goal but cannot be disconnected from the overall U.S. foreign policy agenda.29 Multiple analyses
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reiterate the conclusion that America’s image in the Middle East and around the world can only be
changed with good policies.30
So which policy goals are being helped and which are being hurt by the current approach
to public diplomacy? The first pillar of the March 2006 National Security Strategy is to promote
freedom, justice, and human dignity.31 Opportunities to provide humanitarian aid to populations
with poor perceptions of the U.S. have paid off and should be leveraged through greater spending
on foreign aid. The U.S. saw a spike in favorable opinion among Indonesians after the U.S. provided
disaster relief in areas hard hit by the December 2004 tsunami. Relief work in Pakistan after the
October 2005 earthquake had similar positive effects.32 These examples indicate that greater public
diplomacy payoffs could have occurred with an even quicker and more generous response to these
critical populations in the battle for ideas.
On the negative side, continuing to pursue national interests through a foreign policy that is
perceived as aggressive, unilateral, narrowly self-interested, and unconstrained will not result
in improving the U.S. global image.33 Effective public diplomacy is critical to winning the war
of ideas, but simply focusing on communicating a message that in policy terms is loathed by its
target audience will not sway public opinion. Polls show that Arab respondents understand and
respect American values, but they do not see American policy reflecting those values. The images
from the Abu Ghraib Prison and Guantanamo Bay detracted from American credibility and have
undermined even the best public diplomacy efforts.
Change must fall along two main dimensions. First, the U.S. must increase public diplomacy
capabilities through an integrated approach that transcends departments and agencies and even
the private and public sectors. Resources should be increased (this aspect is developed in the next
criteria). Funding should be commensurate with the potential for return on investment in the overall
strategy for winning the War on Terror. The U.S. also needs to address personnel issues in terms of
positions and training. Second, beyond building public diplomacy capabilities, the most significant
change needed is to integrate public diplomacy into the policymaking process in the form of a
comprehensive and coherent strategy. Such a strategy would consider the benefits of proactively
shaping public opinion as policy is being developed. A proactive approach would also take into
account the constraint that public opinion abroad may have on the achievement of foreign policy
ends, especially the ways through which they are achieved.
Costs.
Considering the important role public diplomacy plays in the overall success of U.S. foreign
policy, especially in combating the rise of terrorists bent on the destruction of the American way
of life, U.S. spending on public diplomacy is inadequate. The Department of State’s own Bureau
of Resource Management called the state of funding “absurdly and dangerously inadequate,”
especially in the Middle East.34 A team of Heritage Foundation researchers noted that the U.S.
spends $30 billion annually on intelligence gathering in an effort to find out what others around the
world are thinking, but only $1.2 billion per year on trying to shape these thoughts.35
The legacy of underfunded and uncoordinated public diplomacy programs can be corrected by
elevating funding to a level commensurate with its role as a vital component of U.S. foreign policy.
Current levels of public diplomacy funding represent only 4 percent of the international affairs
budget. In contrast, investing one percent of the nation’s proposed $379B military budget on public
diplomacy would result in a budget increase to $3B to $4B.36
A specific funding program that experts argue would dramatically enhance the overall
effectiveness of public diplomacy is foreign public opinion polling. Such spending would enable
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the identification of potential target audiences along a continuum of support. Gains could
subsequently be made by targeting moderate audiences and those who self-identify as “undecided”
or offering “soft support” for U.S. policies. Currently the “US government spends only $5 million
annually on foreign public-opinion polling, far less than the research costs of many U.S. senatorial
campaigns and only a fraction of the $6 billion spend for these purposes by American private-sector
organizations.”37
VOA and NED funding should be restored to and eventually exceed Cold War levels. In the
decade following the Cold War, Congress cut funding for international broadcasting by 40 percent.
Since 9/11, however, VOA’s budget increased 45 percent to the level of $652 million in FY 2006.38
New international broadcasting initiatives targeting the Middle East should continue to receive new
funding while programmers experiment with formats that effectively mix substance and “ratings.”
The bottom line is that U.S. public diplomacy must be funded at significantly higher levels—with
funding increases phased in over several years. The increased resources should be tied to specific
objectives and monitored closely for effectiveness.39
Increased spending, especially funding targeted at the areas outlined above, will improve the
effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. Real progress, however, depends on a sensible organization
that eliminates the legacy of stove-piping and enhances coordination within the State Department
and across the relevant government agencies. The development of a public diplomacy doctrine and
overall strategy laying out working principles, coordination procedures, and criteria for evaluating
the success of the strategy over time will also ensure that increased spending produces better
results.40
The cost of ineffective public diplomacy is already evident. Five years into the Iraq war, the U.S.
global image continues to slip, even among publics in countries closely allied with the US. Shortterm gains made through disaster relief in Indonesia and Pakistan have eroded to pre-disaster
levels.41 The final criteria evaluated below, public opinion, will elaborate on the most recent polling.
Coalition partners have steadily withdrawn troops and announced their mission in Iraq complete
in the face of weak public support for continued assistance to the US. Every effort must be made
now to improve the funding and execution of U.S. public diplomacy programs. The opportunity to
prevail in the battle of ideas may be slipping away.
Public Opinion.
The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey indicates that America’s global image
continues to slip while international support for the War on Terror continues to wane.42 However,
the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts is limited by the substance of American policies. As
former congressman Lee Hamilton observed, “public diplomacy can only present policies, it cannot
shape them.”43 For example, the 2006 Pew survey showed that the Iraq war continues to be a drag
on the U.S. global image, with majorities in 10 of the 14 countries surveyed responding that the war
has made the world a more dangerous place. In addition, favorable opinions of the United States
fell in most of the countries surveyed.44 The polling data indicates that U.S. public diplomacy efforts
are not making inroads into global attitudes toward either Americans or U.S. foreign policy.
Majority support for the U.S.-led War on Terror can be found in only two of the fifteen countries
surveyed, India and Russia, both of which have significant problems with domestic terrorists.
However, in the case of India, America’s favorability rating dropped 15 points in one year.45
Unfavorable attitudes persist in predominantly Muslim countries. By all accounts public diplomacy
efforts in the Middle East are a failure. For example, in Egypt, a country that has received more
U.S. aid in the past 20 years than any Muslim country by far, only 15 percent of Egyptians have a
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favorable opinion of the U.S.46 In the 2006 Pew survey the percentage of Egyptians supporting the
U.S.-led war on terror remained at 10 percent, where it has hovered since 2002.47
A 2006 GAO audit evaluating the effectiveness of the State Department’s public diplomacy
programs focused on a continued inability to engage Muslim audiences. While some resources have
been shifted to the Muslim world ranging from a 25 percent increase in the Near East to a 39 percent
plus up in South Asia, the number of authorized overseas positions in regional bureaus held steady.
Furthermore, the report concluded that human capital challenges, such as poor language proficiency
and short tours of duty, are compounded by security concerns at most posts in the Muslim world.
Consequently, public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world spent less time communicating with
local audiences than their positions require.48
The current mix of information programs, media programs, and cultural and educational
exchanges should be reconsidered with greater emphasis placed on cultural and educational
exchanges. Objective reports assessing the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy cited the cultural
and educational exchange programs as the most effective. The media programs have been perceived
as less effective due to the U.S. credibility problem in the target populations. While these perceptions
persist, the U.S. will benefit from investing in local moderate media operations and those of our allies
with common interests, but without the credibility stigma of the U.S. in the Middle East. Finally, an
underdeveloped aspect of the information programs is translating more English language texts into
Arabic. In the past century, only 10,000 English language books have been translated into Arabic.49
The current trends in the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy are poor.
In sum, the promise of America’s public diplomacy has not been realized due to a lack of political will, the
absence of an overall strategy, a deficit of trained professionals, cultural constraints, structural shortcomings,
and a scarcity of resources. Money alone will not solve the problem. Strong leadership and imaginative
thinking, planning, and coordination are critical.50

Policymakers are beginning to understand that the Cold War public diplomacy structure must be
retooled and appropriately resourced to make a more effective contribution to U.S. national security
interests. At a minimum, the conceptualization and execution of public diplomacy programs must
reach its full potential. The goal of spreading freedom and democracy throughout the globe is
unrealizable “unless America has a more coordinated, cooperative mechanism tailored for public
outreach.”51
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter argued that current approaches to public diplomacy are flawed and must be
reconsidered and appropriately funded in order to acquire the public diplomacy capabilities
needed to win the War on Terror. Evaluation of three criteria: national interests, costs, and public
opinion illustrated that the Bush administration efforts have fallen short in every area. A new public
diplomacy paradigm is needed that integrates public diplomacy into a comprehensive strategy
for winning the War on Terror. Such a strategy would recognize that improving America’s image
abroad is in and of itself in the national interest. Effectively communicating U.S. policies is essential
to building the coalitions critical to the policies’ successes and for dissuading potential terrorists to
do harm to U.S. interests. As the 2006 NSS asserted, winning the War on Terror is dependent on
winning the battle of ideas.52
Beyond this strategic reconceptualization of public diplomacy’s role among all national
instruments of power, much work can be done in the short term to improve the effectiveness of public
diplomacy programs currently underway. Attentive oversight, strong leadership, cultural literacy,
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and adequate funding will contribute to improving the U.S. image across the globe. Furthermore,
public diplomacy must be integrated into the policymaking process in the form of a comprehensive
and coherent strategy.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall Public Diplomacy Strategy.
1. Develop a comprehensive and coherent strategy for public diplomacy.
2. Incorporate public diplomacy tools into policy formulation to shift toward proactive vs.
reactive actions.
3. Create an independent not for profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy” to bridge the
gap between public and private sector initiatives akin to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB).
Improving Communications to Target Audiences.
4. Move toward two-way dialogue in place of one-way push-down mass communication.
5. Increase funding for broadcasts to Arab and Muslim populations and rebuild scholarship,
exchange, and library programs targeted at young people.
6. Use supportive indigenous, influential messengers whenever possible to help foster internal
dialogue and debate.
7. Recognize that the Muslim world, in particular, responds more favorably to U.S. values and
freedoms than it does to U.S. policies. (Messages that focus on Muslims “hating freedom” are
ineffective.)
Maximize Multilateral Approaches.
8. Maximize opportunities to engage in multilateral approaches to communicate Western
values and the benefits of modernity.
9. Coordinate strategic communications efforts with sympathetic allies that may be regarded
as more credible than the U.S.
10. Improve relationship with foreign press and increase access of foreign journalists to senior
U.S. officials.
Retool Public Diplomacy Instrument for Greater Effect.
11. Reconstitute the USIA or a similar entity with public diplomacy as its sole mission.
12. Invest in foreign public opinion research, recruiting, training, media studies, and expanded
field staffing.
13. Improve the language and cultural training of public diplomacy officers.
14. Increase opportunities for educational and cultural exchanges.
IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS
The first three recommendations focus on increasing the role of public diplomacy in the overall
strategy formulation process. Implementation requires a shift in bureaucratic mind-set, recognizing
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that public diplomacy must be part and parcel of policy involvement. All members of the national
security community should be involved, including those in the public sector.
Recommendations four through seven emphasize the message itself, and in particular, the
means through which the message is delivered. Implementation requires abandoning Cold War
structures and methodologies in order to employ more effective ways to deliver America’s message.
Recommendations eight through ten explore multilateral approaches. Too often the U.S. is perceived
as being the sole advocate for its message abroad, when the principles of freedom, democracy,
and human rights are shared by much of the world. Implementation requires the adoption of a
multilateral mindset and the initiation of public diplomacy campaigns to turn around negative U.S.
images in societies that largely share our values.
The final recommendations focus on retooling the public diplomacy instrument. Implementation
requires financial investment as well as revamping training policies. Restructuring DOS to separate
USIA or creating a similar stand-alone entity is also required. Recognizing that exchanges have
the greatest potential to contribute to the long-term national interests requires a shift in priorities
among current programs.
Many challenges face the U.S. as it seeks to reverse a steady decline in the world’s regard for its
image and policies. The beginning of a new presidential Administration in 2009 is a critical window
of opportunity to take concrete steps to regain America’s “soft power,” the power to attract the
world to U.S. values and culture. Public diplomacy should be regarded as a strategic instrument of
foreign policy and given resources and leadership commensurate with that role. Success in the War
on Terror will remain elusive absent such action.
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CHAPTER 18
A PRIMER ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FOR SENIOR LEADERS
Marybeth P. Ulrich
Civil-military relations describes a field of study as well as an arena of participation in the political
life of the state. As a field of study, civil-military relations is multidimensional and interdisciplinary.
Political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and historians, as well as national security practitioners
all bring their unique perspectives to the field. As an arena of political participation, civil-military
relations links the political and military components of strategy. The Prussian theorist, Carl von
Clausewitz, was clear in his view that war is a political act. “The political object is the goal, war
is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”1
It should come as no surprise then, that the civilian leadership and its generals are collaborators
in the arena through which state interests are advanced, especially when violence or the threat of
violence is employed. Consequently, any military activity is arguably a necessary object of political
determination.2
What distinguishes civil-military relations from general studies of politics or national security
affairs is its focus on the military as the actor of primary interest of study. The focus is generally on
the military leadership and its relationship with its political masters. Attention is also paid to the
military as an institution interacting with other national security institutions. A key assumption
of the field is that armed forces develop a unique set of institutional attributes stemming from the
power the state cedes to them to secure the state. The military is recognized as a distinct entity in the
political system and in society at large. How the military conducts its relationships with its political
masters and clients across the political and societal scenes reveals a state’s pattern of civil-military
relations.
Tension between the civilian and military spheres is inherent in their relationship. In the absence
of mature democratic institutions, these spheres vie for power and control over each other. Ensuring
civilian control, or more accurately “political control” of the military is a dominant theme in civilmilitary relations. While Samuel Huntington in his classic work, The Soldier and the State, depended
on professionalism as the best method of achieving civilian supremacy through “objective civilian
control,”3 Samuel Finer warned in his classic work, The Man on Horseback, that professionalism
“may lead [the military] to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government
in power.”4 Consequently, the study of professionalism, particularly the military’s institutional
preferences and norms regarding its relationship with its civilian masters is an important aspect of
the study of civil-military relations.
Even in the most advanced democratic systems, managing the participation and influence of the
military institution to maximize military effectiveness, sound strategy, and the democratic principles
of the state is an ongoing challenge. In the age of modern warfare the state’s civilian national
leadership is especially dependent on the expert knowledge resident in the military sphere as a
critical input for decision making. The military, however, is equally dependent on civilian expertise
to understand the wider political ramifications of their putatively military acts.5 Collaboration
between the two spheres is a necessity to craft and execute strategy effectively. Navigating this space
between political control and the provision of expert knowledge within specific societal backdrops
requires a firm grasp of civil-military fundamentals. It is essential that strategic leaders, civilian and
military alike, understand the key principles associated with the military’s role in the political and
social life of the state.
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Civil-military relations is a broad field of study with great relevance for national security
professionals. Developing professional competencies across its varied dimensions will yield great
professional pay-offs for strategic leaders and the states they serve. Recognizing that a civil-military
dimension is present in most strategy and policy issues will foster the ongoing process of developing
the civil-military competencies needed to carry out civilian and military roles in the national security
process.
The primer’s goal is to alert its readers to the scope of the field. The intent is to foster interest
in the additional competencies that civilian and military participants alike must acquire to fulfill
their responsibilities in the national policy process. The seven sections that follow introduce the key
principles and dimensions essential to gaining strategic level competency in this critical field.
THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IS SUPREME
Civil-military relations in a democracy are uniquely concerned that designated political agents
control designated military agents.6 Acceptance of civilian supremacy and control by an obedient
military is the most important principle of civil-military relations in democratic states. Indeed, the
concept of civilian supremacy transcends political systems.7 Military professionals in all political
systems share a mandate to be as competent as possible in their functional areas of responsibility
in order to defend the political ends of their respective states. However, military professionals in
service to democratic states face the added burden of maximizing functional competency without
undermining the state’s democratic character.8 Officers in democratic states serve societies that have
entrusted them with the mission of preserving the nation’s values and national purpose.
MILITARY-POLITICAL COLLABORATION REQUIRES DISTINCT ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Nearly all strategic level national security decisions occur in the civil-military nexus. This nexus
includes interactions between the uniformed military, elected officials, political appointees, and career
civil servants across the relevant government agencies and departments.9 Military-congressional
interactions, or their equivalent in parliamentary systems, are also important relationships to
cultivate. This could also include congressional staffers who often possess legislative expertise and
may be influential actors in their own right. Legislative bodies in democracies are empowered with,
at a minimum, some level of oversight, budgeting authority, and organizing power. They are also
crucial for their proximity to the people and the importance of sustaining legitimacy for particular
policies. This is especially true in wartime.10
In the case of the United States, constitutional sharing and separation of national security related
powers requires collaboration between the executive and the legislature. Military officials, uniformed
and civilian, have the responsibility to provide expert advice to their “masters” in both the executive
and legislative branches. Power sharing of some kind over the use of force and regulation of the
military institution is typical of all democratic systems. However, there are distinct differences in
the responsibilities of political and military agents in the policy collaboration process stemming
from differences in their constitutional roles.
Additionally, there are distinct differences in political and military agents’ political and military
competencies. Political agents are likely to have greater experience in the strategic and political
dimensions of national security policy, while military agents will be more rooted in the technical
expertise and operational knowledge related to the use of force.11 National security policy outcomes
are optimized when participants on both sides of the relationship commit their respective military

242

and political competencies to the task at hand and subsequently collaborate in the processes of
policy and strategy formulation, execution, and adaptation.
Ideally, the result is a carefully vetted policy that has benefited from the contributions of the
relevant military experts and also reflects the careful assessment of the civilian national leadership
cognizant of the domestic political and international strategic environments. Such collaboration
requires constant professional development for all national security professionals involved.
The advice of military actors will be on more solid footing if it stems from some degree of
understanding the strategic and political contexts that form the civilian leadership’s decisionmaking backdrop. Colin Gray argues that achieving effective dialogue between the civilian national
leadership and its generals can be difficult. “Politicians and generals tend to lack understanding of,
and empathy for, each other’s roles. It is not so commonplace to notice that politicians and generals
are often less than competent in their own sphere of responsibility, let alone in the sphere of the
other.”12 Developing senior officers with the ability to formulate sound military advice and civilians
capable of strategic thinking requires institutional support for appropriate career broadening
assignments such as opportunities for military officers and civilians to study and teach in the
military education system. Civilian graduate education is also important and should be recognized
in both the civilian and military promotion systems.13
Civilian leaders with greater familiarity of the military sphere will be better equipped to choose
among competing proposals and to perhaps suggest that a viable option is missing. A particular
military competency that would serve the civilian leadership especially well is mastery of the
strategic thought process14 that is the foundation of senior military leaders’ decision making. Military
actors, in turn, will benefit from exposure to the broader strategic and political environment. Such
experience will temper their military advice with important contextual knowledge.
However, the distinct responsibilities of military and civilian actors must always be maintained.
The responsibility for national policy decision making cannot be ceded to military actors, regardless
of the perception of the military leadership’s expert knowledge. Civilian national leaders, especially
the President, should be careful not to blur the vastly different scopes of political and military
decision making. Senior officers must keep in mind that they render advice to elected officials
responsible for the nation’s overall national policy. Such policy decisions must take into account
the feasibility and political sustainability of various courses of action.
Civilians should also recognize their responsibilities related to managing the civil-military
climate. As Richard Kohn noted, “civilian officials have every incentive to establish effective
collaborative relationships with the senior military leadership.”15 These norms governing civilian
participants’ behaviors focus on fostering trust and respect between the civilian and military
professional spheres. Civilians will benefit from taking the time to recognize the military’s unique
cultural attributes and values. Awareness of the military’s standards of professionalism such as its
preference for apolitical service, its expectation of accountability, and the military leadership’s role
to provide its best professional advice strengthens military-governmental collaboration.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DEVELOP NORMS GOVERNING CIVILMILITARY BEHAVIOR LIES WITH THE PROFESSION
Developing a widely shared set of norms regarding civil-military behaviors is the responsibility
of the military profession. Civilians also have a professional responsibility to promote a favorable
climate for civil-military relations. As noted earlier, first among the professional norms is acceptance
of the principle of civilian supremacy. Related norms govern principles for voicing military dissent
in the policy process, standards for participation in partisan political processes, and expectations
for the political behavior of retired members of the profession.16
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The Bounds of Dissent.
Collaboration between military and civilian national security professionals maximizes the
competencies of each. However, legitimate disagreement is common in any collaborative decisionmaking process. Civilian policymakers should encourage military professionals to offer their best
advice and not punish military participants who work within the established bounds of dissent in
the democratic national security decision making process. Military leaders should expect that their
professional military judgment is heard, but they must also recognize when their actions exceed the
bounds of dissent.
When acts of dissent take military leaders beyond their roles as advisers to the civilian leadership
to become political actors themselves, then the limits of dissent have been exceeded. When military
and civilian leaders have different policy preferences it may be possible for the military to, in effect,
achieve its desired preference through willful nonimplementation of the policy or by inappropriately
influencing the public political debate. Military professionals must guard their behavior when they
think their judgment is superior to the civilian agents, who have the authority and responsibility to
make policy decisions. In democracies, who makes such calls may be more important than the call
itself for the continued viability of the democratic process.
At the same time, military professionals must step up to their responsibilities to assert their
strategic expertise. Such inputs influence strategic deliberations and continue throughout the
process of strategy adaptation that may be necessary in the execution phase. Questions related to
the role of the senior military leadership in policy deliberations were prominent in H. R. McMaster’s
indictment of the Joint Chiefs in Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.17 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling raised parallel questions of
accountability to the current generation of general officers. His Armed Forces Journal essay criticized
senior military leaders for providing insufficient advice to the civilian leadership crafting Iraq War
policy.18 Yingling argued that such actions contributed to the war’s policy failures.
A robust civil-military curriculum would also include discussion of the role of resignation as
a form of dissent. As Richard Kohn and Richard Myers recently argued, “There is no tradition of
military resignation in the United States, no precedent—and for good reason.”19 Other analysts
have criticized the military for not playing the “resignation card” as a route to influence policy
and strategy outcomes.20 Members of the profession should explore these arguments and begin
to develop their strategies for expressing disagreement in ways that do not disadvantage their
subordinates and their profession, or infringe on civilian control.
Understanding civil-military roles in the policy process and effective leverage of military
expertise in civil-military interactions is a critical variable for successful policy outcomes. Managing
disagreement across the civil-military spheres is an important strategic leader competency that, in
turn, raises key ethical and professional questions.
The Perils of Partisan Politics.
The perception that the American officer corps has become increasingly “Republicanized” came
to the fore in the 2000 presidential election raising questions about the tradition of an apolitical
military.21 Limiting participation in politics to the military advisory role and balancing rights as
citizens poses a challenge for the military profession. A key element in this balancing act is the
management of society’s perceptions of the military as an institution. The ethic of the “policy
relevant nonpartisan” is a critical civil-military norm. At stake is the military profession’s servant
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relationship with society. Implications also exist for maintaining the legitimacy of the military’s
special status in society as “managers of violence.”22
Other Areas in Need of More Explicit Civil-Military Norms.
Expectations regarding the political behavior of retired senior officers continue to vary across
a broad spectrum. There was mixed reaction to what has come to be known in recent politicalmilitary folklore as “The Revolt of the Generals”—the April 2006 uncoordinated protests of newly
retired general officers calling for the dismissal of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over the
planning and conduct of the Iraq War. While some criticized these actions as undermining civilian
control, others lauded the retirees for speaking out, if belatedly.
Varied reactions among retirees in the profession indicated the lack of a professional consensus
regarding the continuing legal and moral obligations that retirees are expected to fulfill. What
norms should be established for retired officers serving as media commentators, especially with
regard to analyzing ongoing operations? In addition, the profession also lacks consensus on what
is appropriate regarding partisan politicking among the retired general officer ranks. Some have
called for prominent retirees to consider the effect that “taking sides” in political campaigns has on
the profession. The senior members of the profession still serving on active duty as stewards of the
profession’s norms can help to set expectations in these areas.
PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS VARY ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The study of civil-military relations is relevant across political systems. Advanced democracies,
authoritarian states, and the range of developing, failing, democratizing, and de-democratizing
states in between, all face the challenge of managing and leveraging the military as a political actor.
The different parameters operative in various political systems result in different patterns of civilmilitary relations.
Influence Advocacy Makes Policy Governs
(expertise) (policy veto) (limited arenas) (complete control)
Civilian CC undermined Limited Military Rule
Control (CC) Military Control

Figure 1. Spectrum of Military Participation in Politics.
Advanced democracies have the luxury of mature democratic institutions, the best barrier
to praetorian rule. Post-authoritarian regimes, such as the post-communist states of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former military regimes of Latin America, carry the burden of undertaking
transitions to democracy with legacies of authoritarian rule still operative across society and
the political system. States rebuilding or creating their institutions from scratch in post-conflict
scenarios such as Iraq and Afghanistan must be careful that institutional development matures in a
balanced fashion ensuring continued political control over the military.23 In countries struggling to
achieve greater standards of economic development, democratic institutions may still be weak and
governance poor, tempting the military to intervene.
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Understanding Military Rule and Praetorian Behavior.
Familiarity with the works of such giants in the field as Samuel E. Finer and Alfred Stepan24
would benefit strategic leaders interested in understanding the rise and fall of military regimes and
the often predictable patterns associated with them. Praetorianism refers to the overstepping of
accepted limits of military participation in the political process. The principle of civilian supremacy
is rejected in order to force the military’s prerogative to prevail in the political system. Such behavior
relies on military coercion as a means of short-circuiting the political process in order to achieve the
military’s short-term institutional interests. This may involve asserting power through a coup to
displace the elected government and install either civilian leadership more favorable to the military
or direct military rule. Exercising de facto policy vetoes behind the scenes through the threat of
force to ensure that the military’s policy preferences prevail over the civilian leadership’s is another
praetorian tactic.
Finer’s study of military regimes in Latin America and Africa led him to develop frameworks
useful for predicting the conditions under which military institutions exert political power, and in
some cases, overthrow civilian governments. He focused on the attributes of military institutions
that seem to be compatible with effective and efficient governance such as technical expertise, nonpartisanship, control of vast personnel and other military resources, discipline, and commitment
to the national interest. Such traits seemingly predict that military rule may often be successful. In
reality, when observers such as Finer tally the results, the findings point to the near certainty that
military rule will leave a state in worse shape than when the military first intervened. Here the
explanation also lays in the attributes of the military institution, this time those that are incompatible
with effective governance. Leading the way among these factors is the distaste for politics and the
political process, intolerance of dissent, which leads to repression and decreased legitimacy, and
lack of the broad expertise needed to effectively govern.
Praetorian behavior is possible in states with weak democratic institutions and weak civil
societies that are collectively unable to pose a sufficient barrier to military coercion. The subsequent
intervention inevitably further weakens democratic institutions and sets a precedent that is
often repeated, leading over time to underdeveloped states. The long-term potential for effective
governance is sacrificed as the military stunts the development of civilian capacities to rule while
offering instead its version of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule lacking the accountability
and expertise essential to good governance.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC CULTURE
There is also a strategic-cultural dimension to civil-military relations. Understanding the norms
governing the civil-military relationships in states as well as the varied interests of armed forces,
society, and the government is a prerequisite to understanding a state’s national security strategy.
Important questions to explore include, “Which actors dominate the process of formulating
national security policy and strategy? and, “How synchronous are the interests of the government,
the people, and the armed forces?”25 Furthermore, “Are the political institutions regulating civilmilitary relations mature or is the political system vulnerable to personality-based politics and/or
seizures of power as evidenced in praetorian politics?”
Past and present behavior of states in the international system cannot be fully understood
without some knowledge of the role of the military in the state. Authoritarian states prioritize
the importance of ensuring that the military and political elites’ interests are one, usually at some
sacrifice of military professionalism and effectiveness, in order to ensure civilian control. States with

246

a history of military rule or strong influence in politics will have this experience as a permanent
dimension of their political culture. For instance, Latin America has emerged in recent decades
from an era of near total military rule. Recent scholarship focuses on how these periods of military
rule have cast a shadow on current politics and explain different degrees of success in building
democratic institutions.26
On the other hand, some states, although still developing, such as India, have a strong tradition
of non-interference in political affairs. However, when Pakistan broke away from India in 1947, its
military established a tradition of continual influence in political affairs and long periods of military
rule. Many scholars argue that such interference has stunted the democratic development and
overall performance of subsequent Pakistani regimes. Indeed, at the time of this writing, national
security actors are trying to assess the continued role of the military in Pakistan as President Pervez
shed his uniform and appointed a new Army Chief to succeed him.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION
Military and civilian officials in the service of advanced democratic states may consider themselves
to be immune to the challenges of praetorianism. However, such officials serving abroad are likely
to find many opportunities to influence the civil-military relations of other states. Representatives
of states’ national security apparatuses often come in contact with each other through multinational
operations or various other engagement opportunities made possible through security cooperation
programs. These “military to military” meetings often involve interactions between defense
personnel from different types of political systems. Senior officers and national security professionals
in possession of sound civil-military knowledge can leverage these engagements to facilitate the
national security objectives of all parties. Increasingly, military professionals are engaging civilians
in the course of carrying out their strategic responsibilities. This is particularly true in post-conflict
stability operations and state-building missions.
It is in such opportunities that the linkage of military objectives and overall strategic political
objectives may come into play. For instance, military personnel from advanced democracies
assigned to build and train armed forces, as NATO and coalition forces are presently doing in
Afghanistan and Iraq, must be cognizant of their responsibility to foster armed forces steeped in the
values of governmental control and democratic military professionalism.27 Strategic leaders with
such responsibilities should be able to link their military-to-military engagement with the overall
strategic objective of building robust democratic national security institutions. Important questions
to ask include, “Are external trainers focusing exclusively on building military competencies to
the exclusion of political competencies? Are military personnel being taught the fundamentals of
interacting with the civilian national leadership? Is proper emphasis being placed on building the
relationship with society at large, to include the media?”
The military leadership of these nascent national armed forces, in turn, must set the example in
terms of loyalty to their constitution and commitment to fostering the development of democratic
national institutions. The overall strategic objective shared across the spectrum of actors, external
and internal alike, is building a democratic state with an armed forces capable of defending
its interests. Yet history bears out that military intervention is a great threat to the sustained
development of democratic institutions in developing countries. The record warns that once the
pattern of intervention is begun, restoring the state to the path of sustained democracy is more
unlikely.
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THE ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
The relationship between the armed forces and the societies they serve is a key concern of civilmilitary relations scholars. The worldwide trend away from conscripted armed forces to professional
militaries, favored by most societies that can afford them, has great implications for military-society
relationships. In this time of war, less than 1 percent of the U.S. population serves in the military.
This figure contrasts sharply with previous American wars in times of conscription. Four percent
of the population served during Vietnam, 12 percent in World War II, and 11 percent in the Civil
War.28 The reality of the lack of shared sacrifice risks the sustainability of the war effort for practical
reasons such as the lack of deployable troops over many rotation cycles. Also at risk is the war’s
political sustainability. Military sociologist David Segal has noted, “In a democratic society, the
army is a people’s army, a reflection of the popular will.”29 However, at present Segal warns, “The
military is at war, but the country is not. And the military resents that.”30
At issue is the notion of citizenship and national obligation. The resentment David Segal noted
stems from the reality of the growing gap between American society and those who choose to
serve it. Journalist Tom Ricks observed in his 1997 book Making the Corps that demographic data as
well as his immersion in military culture suggested that the military is increasingly no longer “of”
society, but becoming “separate” from it. The separate lives of America’s warriors and its citizenry
can spawn resentment, stereotyping, and even hostility across the civil-military spheres. With the
children of America’s policymaking elite virtually absent from the military ranks, and the children
of American families at both the extremely affluent and extremely disadvantaged extremes either
opting out of or failing to qualify for military service, what has come to be called the “civil-military
gap” is growing.
The media is an often underappreciated and misunderstood tool critical to managing the “civilmilitary gap.” The media is one of the chief links between the military institution and the society
it serves. Healthy interaction with the news media reflects both an understanding of the media’s
function to inform the public and ensure accountability of government institutions. Well managed
military-media relations can also highlight the military’s effectiveness and opportunities, drawing
more citizens to the military.
The experience of embedding reporters in military units in the Iraq War highlighted the different
cultures of the military and the media. “Members of the military are trained to do what they are told.
Members of the media are trained to challenge and question everything.”31 As one correspondent
noted, “What that means, in the end, is that we really have to develop strong relationships. One
of the most invaluable experiences I had was to learn who the men were … and to develop a
relationship and trust and honesty that developed through the several weeks that we were together.”
Furthermore, democratic military professionals should appreciate and seek to facilitate the press’s
function in a democratic society, and, at a minimum, refrain from actions that undermine the role
of the media in the American political system.
Yet another important civil-military competency to be honed, then, is the management of
the military-societal relationship. Military and civilian leaders have the responsibility to bridge
the civil-military gap. Their actions can be guided by first principles undergirding civil-military
relations in democracies, such as the desirability of having all segments of society participate in
military service. Professional militaries, dependent on the willingness of volunteers to serve, must
invest in robust outreach and public relations programs. Another essential principle is to embrace
the requirement to be transparent, accountable, and nonpartisan in order to make certain that the
military institution is “of” its society and focused on its role in achieving the national interest and
the democratic character of the state.
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Strategic leaders with a comprehensive understanding of civil-military relations in all its
dimensions are more likely to make effective contributions to effective national security outcomes.
Indeed, The Iraq Study Group Report pointed to improving civil-military relations in the policy
formulation arena as a critical component for restoring the U.S. military.
The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between the civilian leadership of the Department
of Defense and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which the civilian
leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully candid professional advice and the military serves
loyally with the understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed, and civilmilitary relations need to be repaired.
RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civilmilitary relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent
advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security
Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.32

Perhaps as important as enhancing the prospects of strategic success is the parallel goal of preserving
the democratic character of the state and the critical underlying dynamic between the government,
the people, and the armed forces. The range of civil-military competencies to be developed is
great. The first steps toward acquiring them are to recognize the professional imperative to do
so and the scope of the task at hand. The unique nature of the military profession places much of
the responsibility for the development of civil-military competencies and norms in the lap of the
profession itself. Gaining civil-military competencies must rank among the life-long professional
pursuits of strategic leaders.
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CHAPTER 19
NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEW CHALLENGE:
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN BORDER SECURITY
Bert B. Tussing
No one seems to underestimate the urgency of the requirement. Nor have they since before
September 11, 2001 (9-11).
The United States Commission on National Security/21st century, commonly known as the HartRudman Commission, recommended that the Executive Branch establish a “National Homeland
Security Agency.” Among other things, this agency would encompass the Customs Service, the
Border Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard in a synergistic environment to patrol U.S. borders and
police the flow of peoples and goods through hundreds of ports of entry.1 When the legislation
that led to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was penned, Border and Transportation
Security was one of the original five under-secretariats. When Secretary Michael Chertoff came to
town, he entered the Department with “six priorities”; the third of those was to “strengthen border
security and interior enforcement. . . .”2 The new Secretary would make his concerns clear as he
unveiled a new organizational structure that would remove bureaucratic layers between his office
and Customs and Border Protection as part of an effort to:
. . . gain full control of our borders to prevent illegal immigration and security breaches. Flagrant violation
of our borders undercuts respect for the rule of law and undermines our security. It also poses a particular
burden to those in our border communities.3

Institutionally, the requirement for a robust border security mechanism seemed clear.
Functionally, the requirement was even clearer. In the best of times, under the best of
circumstances, the need for diligence at the border is compelling.
On a typical day, more than 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians, including 635,000 aliens, over 235,000 air
passengers, over 333,000 privately owned vehicles, and over 79,000 shipments of goods are processed at the
nation’s borders.4

Taken together, every year U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes nearly half a billion
people, 130 million trucks and cars, and 20 million cargo containers through 325 ports of entry.5
Curiously enough, however, the immensity of the daily requirement is not the most compelling
factor among concerns over the security of the border. What is described above is the routine,
legitimate traffic. This allows for the free flow of visitors and commerce, keeping open the doors
of the “land of opportunity,” and coincidentally, sustaining much of the economy. The greater
concern for security lies beyond these factors in an accompanying flow that does not seek legitimate
opportunity, but criminal gain; that is not interested in sharing the American way of life, but in
undermining it and the institutions and values that sustain it. A report developed in the House of
Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security offers an interesting and potentially ominous
contrast:
During 2005, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 1.2 million illegal aliens [along the Southwest border
between the United States and Mexico]; of those, 165,000 were from countries other than Mexico. Of the nonMexican aliens, approximately 650 were from special interest countries.6&7
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The threat along the northern border, while far less publicized, is nevertheless cause for concern—
perhaps equal concern, perhaps greater. In 1988, U.S. Customs officials arrested three members
of a Syrian terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda in the process of entering the U.S. with explosives.8
Members of the terrorist cell that executed the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (who would
eventually train for the attack in Perry County, Pennsylvania) entered the U.S. from Canada, and
were planning to use Canada as a possible escape route. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam was
arrested crossing into the United States in possession of bomb making materials and plans that
would have played out in what became known as the Millennium bomb plot against Los Angeles
International Airport.9 Ressam would be characterized by the State Department as a textbook
example of someone who “capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration and asylum policies to
enjoy safe haven, raise funds, arrange logistical support, and plan terrorist attacks.”10
And the past, we have every reason to fear, may well be prelude, as pointed out by Dr. Todd
Hataley of the Royal Military College of Canada:
In the post 9/11 period Canada has continued to raise security concerns in the United States. U.S. security
officials believe that Canada is not only home to “sleeper cells” waiting for a chance to cross the border and
attack the United States, but also that crossing from Canada has become a favorite route for illegal immigrants,
drug smugglers, and potential terrorists.11

The Military in (Limited) Support.
Juxtapose this history against a northern border that stretches nearly 5,000 miles, and a
southwestern counterpart that runs another 2000, and the challenge confronting CBP is daunting,
to say the least. In October 2006 there were 11,000 agents assigned to watch and protect both sets
of borders.12 In May 2006, the Administration embarked on a plan to raise those numbers to over
18,000 by the end of 2008, increasing the total number to over 101% of the number that stood when
the President took office in 2001.13
Whether that number will be sufficient is debatable. Regardless, purposed increases do not meet
the current requirement. The challenges that inspired these increases will continue until the increases
can be brought about—if they can be remedied then. Accordingly, in May 2006, the Administration
launched Operation JUMP START, a deployment of over 6,000 National Guardsmen from 48 states
designed to “strengthen border security and encourage deterrence.”14 David V. Aguilar, Chief of
the Office of Border Patrol for CBP testified on the nature of the Guard’s mission before members of
the House Homeland Security Committee:
. . . National Guard units will assist DHS by executing missions such as logistical and administrative
support, operating detection systems, providing mobile communications, augmenting DHS’s border-related
intelligence analysis efforts, building and installing border security infrastructure, providing transportation
and training.15

It is important to note, however, that while the presence of the Guard will allow CBP agents to
return focus to law enforcement activities along the border, the troops will not join the agents in
those activities. At the same hearing, Chief Aguilar was quick to remind the Congressmen of one
clear distinction between the National Guard and the CBP mission.
However, law enforcement along the border between the ports of entry will remain the responsibility of Border
Patrol agents. The National Guard will play no direct law enforcement role in the apprehension, custodial care
or security of those who are detained.16
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This pronounced distinction in the roles that the National Guard may assume in border
operations may seem confusing. After all, the immediate requirement that caused the deployment
of Guard seems to invite additional manpower on the border to assist in surveillance, intervention,
apprehension, and arrest. DHS has celebrated the fact that 6,000 National Guardsmen allowed the
Border Patrol to return 350 agents to “traditional frontline duties.”17 If that is the greatest cause for
celebration, one might ask why the Guard could not be positioned on those “frontlines.”
Those slightly schooled in laws and regulations surrounding the issue of military support to
law enforcement agencies may be even more confused. The hub of much of the discussion on this
issue is the Posse Comitatus Act—legislation enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War that largely
prohibits the use of the active duty armed forces in enforcing the domestic laws of the United
States.18 Note, however, that the act only applies to federal forces. It does not apply to the National
Guard, unless the Guard forces in question have been federalized (in other words, mobilized under
Title 10 of the United States Code to perform a federal mission). Title 10, for instance, is the authority
under which National Guard units are serving overseas in support of the U.S. mission in Iraq. If
the Guard forces are either in a “state active duty” status, or serving under the provisions of Title
32 of the United States Code (a status that sustains the forces with federal funds but leaves control
with the state governors and their Adjutants General), National Guard forces may serve in a direct
law enforcement function.19 Given that, why the distinction and restriction in the ongoing border
operations? Perhaps even more to the point: Why restrict the military—active or reserve—from
directly supporting the law enforcement function of the border security mission?
Soldiers—Not Policemen.
The motivation behind the restriction is, perhaps, uniquely American, and embedded in the
national mindset. Simply stated, the people of the United States do not want their soldiers to be
policemen or their policemen to be soldiers. One can trace the philosophical underpinnings of this
aversion to the colonies of the pre-Revolutionary War. In those days, the colonists were repulsed
by oppressive measures like the Quartering Acts that cast the British forces in the role of overseers
and even oppressors.20 The same attitudes would emerge during Reconstruction following the Civil
War, when the federal military was used as an occupying force in the former Confederate states.
These historic examples—combined, perhaps, with persistent images of military oppression that
accompanied much of the country’s immigrant ancestry from overseas—help us understand our
citizenry’s aversion. Too much of a military presence for too long in their streets seems to rekindle
a dormant response in Americans. Consider, for instance, what may be thought of as the subliminal
reaction to the presence of the military in the nation’s airports following 9-11. Initially the sight of
soldiers along the concourses of O’Hare and Kennedy International kindled a sense of assurance and
accompanying goodwill. But people were soon asking themselves, “Why are these military people
here with those rifles and that equipment?” The truth is that Americans have conflicting attitudes
about the military. We appreciate their sacrifice. We acknowledge their dedication. We take pride
in their prowess and the virtue of their leadership. But we are dedicated to the proposition that
soldiers will ever remain the servants of the people and not their overseers.
Fortunately, no one is more sensitive about the military’s role than the military’s leadership.
The clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement and the military is
ingrained in the mindset of its generals. Any number of reasons could be cited for this sensitivity,
beginning with the fact that the country’s all-volunteer force is very much a military “of the people”
and therefore very much “for the people.” Moreover, the most senior leadership currently directing
our armed forces came of age as young officers in the Vietnam era. These, with their soldiers, sailors,
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airmen, and Marines, undeservedly bore the derisive brunt of much of a society turned sour on the
war. In the same time period, reports of the Pentagon gathering intelligence against anti-war groups
further broadened the divide between America and her military. Institutional assurances were put
in place in the 1980’s to prevent this type of surveillance from ever occurring again; but having
survived that era of distrust, the current uniformed leadership is keenly aware of how important
the support of America’s citizenry is to its soldiers . . . and how fragile.21
Nothing New in the Requirement?
Having said all that, Chief Aguilar reminds us that border security operations involving the
National Guard is not a unique requirement to the new century:
Let me first state that National Guard support and coordination with DHS and the Border Patrol is nothing
new. While this new infusion will be on a larger scale, the Border patrol has a history of nearly two decades
working with National Guard units to utilize their unique expertise, manpower, technology and assets in
support of our mission and as a force multiplier.22

In fact, recent history witnesses the U.S. military’s involvement in border security operations not
only by the National Guard, but by the active duty component as well. In response to a growing
connection between border security and counternarcotics programs in the 1980s, President Ronald
Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive that simultaneously described drug trafficking
as a threat to national security and authorized military involvement against it.23 In 1989, the military’s
Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was created to coordinate the expanding support for “the anti-drug efforts
of border region police agencies, including the Border Patrol.”24 As with the Guard’s current mission,
this task force would eventually play an important role in constructing physical barriers designed
to slow or channel the flow of illegal immigrants. Unlike the current Guard commitment, JTF-6 also
deployed aviation assets and ground troops along the border.25
Support for the military’s role along the border continued through the 1990s. In 1991, Congress
passed key legislation that allowed the Department of Defense (DoD) to support any agency of the
federal government with counterdrug responsibilities. More noteworthy yet, the legislation opened
the way for DoD to support state and local government law enforcement agencies toward the same
ends.26 And in 1997, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the
deployment of 10,000 additional troops in support of counterdrug operations along the southwest
border.27
Tragedy was to interrupt the final passage of that resolution. On the evening of 20 May 1997,
18-year-old Ezequiel Hernandez, Jr., was herding goats when he was mistakenly shot by the leader
of a Marine rifle team observing an area of the Rio Grande known for its illegal drug trafficking.
The Marines were members of JTF-6 and had been acting in support of the Border Patrol. They
had received no civilian law enforcement training or briefings on local conditions.28 They acted in
accordance with the standing rules of force, and were eventually found innocent of any wrongdoing. But the heartbreaking accident would change the nature of the operation decisively.
The outcry against the tragic occurrence would eventually subside across most of the social
landscape, but not from the perspective of the military. Returning to a degree of reticence that
surpassed its civilian masters, the Pentagon’s uniformed leadership withdrew its armed forces
from the border and levied new restrictions that would cast the military in a predominantly
technical-support capacity. In the future, JTF-6 would be redesignated Joint Task Force-North, and
the personnel-intensive, boots-on-the-ground support provided by the unit in the 1990s would be
replaced along the border with ground sensors, radar, airborne platforms, and thermal imagery.
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Deliberately postured in support of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities, the command’s
website notes that its technological focus has allowed for a reduction in manpower requirements.29
The most significant reduction came in terms of troops on the ground.
This would largely characterize the military’s role for both the active and reserve components
from the time of the tragedy in Texas until the calamity of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediate steps were taken to reinforce
the security of the nation’s borders. At entry points from both north and south, the President
commanded the deployment of roughly 1,600 National Guard troops for six months to support
federal border officials.30 New emphasis on maritime and aviation security along, within, and
through the approaches to the borders accompanied increased land border security, and were
formalized in interagency strategies.31
In the midst of these events, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established on
October 1, 2002 “to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense
efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.”32 The new combatant command,
primarily responsible for active service components’ activities within the domestic confines of the
United States, was charged in their mission statement to:
Deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests
within its assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, provide
military assistance to civil authorities, including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence management
operations.33

This mission statement instantly distinguished the new command from its counterparts overseas.
The first part of the mission was reasonably clear, if ominous. “Deter, prevent, and defeat” could
be realistically expected as part of a military mission anywhere around the globe. The U.S. armed
forces identify with this language and are fully prepared to do whatever is required to fulfill its
implications. But the second half of the command’s mission statement—euphemistically referred
to in the Pentagon as the “right of the semicolon” requirement—is less intuitive, and arguably
more complex than the first. The powerful segue, “as directed by the President or the Secretary of
Defense,” is indicative of a very measured approach to this part of the mission. Placing the military
in support of civil authorities will concurrently place them in activities normally conducted and
controlled by those authorities. And the closer the military comes to controlling civil activities, the
less comfortable it finds the mission.
A Shift in Focus: Counterdrug to Counterterror.
The military’s directives support its reticence. Civil support is characterized by the Department
of Defense as granted in response to domestic emergencies and “for designated law enforcement
and other activities.”34 However, the DoD directive regulating military support to civilian law
enforcement agencies specifically prohibits the use of the military for interdiction; search and
seizure; arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity. Likewise, it prohibits the use of
military personnel in the pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators,
or interrogators.35
As the new structure of NORTHCOM was designed to meet the threat, along with a new office
in the Department of Defense to oversee it, the support mission for the military along the border was
also changing.36 JTF-6, as previously noted, was redesignated JTF-North. This change in designation
would mirror a change in focus away from counterdrug operations to countering transnational
threats. Persistent, legitimate concerns about drug trafficking were being overshadowed by
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revelations of looming threats to our north and south. With respect to Canada, as early as 1998, the
Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence labeled the country
. . . a “venue of opportunity” for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise funds, purchase arms, and
conduct other activities to support their organizations and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the
international terrorist organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geographic location also makes Canada
a favorite conduit for terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which remains the principal target for
terrorist attacks worldwide.37

More recently, the same committee reported that “[a] relatively large number of terrorist groups
[is] known to be operating in Canada, engaged in fundraising, procuring materials, spreading
propaganda, recruiting followers, and conducting other activities.”38
To the south, there is growing concern over efforts to transplant elements of international
terrorist organizations among our closest neighbors. In May 2001, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, former
Mexican National Security Adviser and ambassador to the United Nations warned that “Spanish and
Islamic terrorist groups are using Mexico as a refuge.”39 General James T. Hill, former commander
of U.S. Southern Command, warned that the U.S. faces a growing risk, both from terrorist groups
relocating to Latin America and “homegrown” groups originating therein. He warned specifically
that Hezbollah and groups like it had established bases in Latin America, taking advantage of
nearly ungovernable areas like the tri-border region between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.40
Add to these viable concerns over Venezuela’s support to radical Islamic groups, and the security
concerns surrounding the well-being of the American people at home continue to grow.41
Unfortunately, as the military and the law enforcement agencies it supports along the border
have moved to confront this new concern, they can ill-afford to ignore the old concerns. As though
adding to the population of a snake pit, the arrival of terrorists has done nothing to thin out the
presence of drug traffickers among the cartels. Neither has it had an effect in reducing other
organized criminal activities like human trafficking, or diminishing the immigration of criminal
gangs through Mexico into the United States. A majority report from the House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security gave voice to these concerns, warning against “the triple threat
of drug smuggling, illegal and unknown crossers, and rising violence” facing our communities in
the southwest.42
Criminals involved in this activity have taken on an air of arrogance that should further spur the
nation’s concerns. The aforementioned House study validates frequent reports that the cartels may
be literally “outgunning” local law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border, possessing
military grade weapons, technologies and intelligence, and their own “paramilitary enforcers.”43
The enforcers usually restrict their activities to actions against rival factions, but not always. In 2005,
just hours after being sworn in as Nuevo Laredo Mexico’s Police Chief, Alejandro Dominguez was
killed. Dominguez came to office on the promise of cracking down on the cartels.44
The threat across the border should be enough, but there are growing concerns that it cannot
be contained there. Violence against U. S. law enforcement officials, from the Border Patrol to
local law enforcement agencies, is rising at an alarming rate. From 2004 to 2005, violent incidents
against Border Patrol agents on the Southwest border increased 108 percent. During fiscal year 2006
there were 746 violent incidents launched against these agents, including rock assaults, physical
assaults, vehicle assaults, and firearm assaults. In March 2006, the House Judicial Committees’
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims conducted a hearing addressing these
concerns, noting a growing concern over law enforcement agents literally being “outmanned and
outgunned” by criminal elements.45 In January 2008, a United States Border Patrol agent was run
down and killed near the Imperial Sand Dunes in Southern California, by men suspected of drug
and alien smuggling.46
258

General Barry R. McCaffrey, former director of the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy, commented on the disturbing partnership growing between crime and terrorism at the
nation’s door.
These groups are drawn together because of their complementary capabilities. Terrorists can create chaotic
circumstances that allow for illicit activities. Criminal organization have pre-established networks to move
and sell narcotics and launder money.47

To date, this partnership has not taken on a character that would prompt a traditional “defense”
response by the military. However, a recent report from Arizona indicates that concerns of that
sort might not be as far-fetched as one might think. Officials at Fort Huachuca, the nation’s largest
intelligence training center, changed security measures in May 2007 after being warned that Islamist
terrorists, with the paid assistance of Mexican drug cartels, were planning an attack against the post.
The plotters, up to 60 in number, were reported to be Afghan and Iraqi terrorists smuggled into the
United States through tunnels with high powered weapons, including anti-tank missiles, Sovietera surface-to-air missiles, and grenade launchers. The FBI will not elaborate on investigations
surrounding the threat. Neither will they comment on other reports suggesting the “plot” was a
Gulf cartel “plant” to bring the U.S. military in against a rival cartel. The bureau did acknowledge,
however, that the report “demonstrates the cross-pollination that frequently exists between criminal
and terrorist groups.”48
The immediacy of genuine defense concerns, as opposed to law enforcement concerns along the
border, is certainly open to question. Nevertheless, the evolving intersecting threats of organized
crime and terrorism, masked by the relentless challenge of illegal immigration across the nation’s
borders, clearly present federal, state, and local government officials a dangerous and perplexing
set of difficulties. Law enforcement agencies across all three levels of government have the lead in
addressing the difficulties. The military has been and continues to be in support. But is the current
role being played by the military—under the current circumstances, against the current threat—
appropriate?
Temporary, but Recurring?
As though hedging bets, all discussion of placing the military in support of border security
operations in the United States is consistently couched in terms of temporary requirements. Such
was the case in 2002; such was the case again in 2006. It is clear that the current Administration is
making an honest effort to retool Customs and Border Protection in terms of both technology and
“boots-on-the-ground” to meet the broader threat that has emerged since 9-11. The functions that
have characterized DoD support along the border—communications and logistical support, lending
and operating detection and sensor systems, augmenting border-related intelligence analysis efforts,
training, and so forth—are being reflected in the strategic plans of the Department of Homeland
Security. Specifically, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection strategic plan lays out an objective to
“maximize border security . . . through an appropriate balance of personnel, equipment, technology,
communications capability, and tactical infrastructure.”49 DHS is clearly intent on putting resources
behind its rhetoric, directing approximately half of its $5.4 billion information technology budget
for 2008 toward developing and modernizing CBP’s capabilities.50 Ostensibly, the intent is to enable
the organization to completely take control of that part of the mission the military has supplemented
up to now. The question is, “Can we reasonably expect them to do that?”
Is it reasonable, for instance, to expect the Department of Homeland Security to duplicate the
sensor capabilities that have been introduced in their support during this “period of transition?” Is it
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feasible and/or advisable for them to reproduce the communication suites that have supported their
operations along the southwest border since 2006? Is it fiscally responsible to match the engineer
assets that the military has introduced in support of the mission over the last few decades . . . and the
maintenance capability . . . and the training capacity? To be sure, DHS has means and capabilities to
address all of these functions to a degree; but does it have enough means and capabilities to meet the
requirement posed by the threat according to current assessments? And if it does, or shall soon, is it
fair to assume that DHS will be able to fully meet the evolving requirement to address the evolving
threat? Is it safe to make that assumption?
Planning for the Longer Term against a Variable Threat
I contend that it is not. The Department of Homeland Security’s current direction toward
strengthening border security will not be, and can never be the final solution. Trying to empower a
single federal agency with the ability to solve foreseeable challenges in this area is neither feasible
nor advisable. Expecting military forces to continue to “stand in the gap” in their present capacity is
also ill-advised—whether referring to the federal component (the active duty forces) or the “states
militia” whose strength resides principally in the National Guard. A closer approximation of a
solution to the evolving dilemma will begin with the realization that the border challenge must be
addressed as a problem that varies with a variable threat (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Variable Scale of Border Protection.
Experience has taught us that the lower end of that threat is embodied in massive numbers
of illegal aliens, albeit ones without malicious intent (indeed, a significant amount of the nation’s
concern in these regards is for the well-being of the aliens themselves).51 It is reasonable to assign
day-to-day cognizance over that end of the threat to Customs and Border Protection as the clear,
“lead federal agency.” As the threat moves further up the scale, introducing a frequently organized
criminal element that we have seen trafficking in both drugs and human beings, we may envision
a requirement literally calling for greater force. That force could begin with a concentration and
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coordination of other law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local). These, of course, would
be keyed to their requirement by integrated information and intelligence from across the federal
interagency. But they should also be served by mechanisms designed for intergovernmental
intelligence and information exchange—up and down the chain between federal, state, and
local authorities. The exchange would provide warnings and signals of the upper end of the
threat spectrum, manifested in the confluence of organized crime and international terrorism. As
suggested by Deborah Waller Meyers, the difference in responding to the variations of the threat at
our borders may parallel the difference between border control (protection against the illegal entry
of people and goods), border safety (protection against criminals, violence, smuggling, etc.) and
border security (protection against terrorists).52
Becoming bogged down by any discussion surrounding “responsibility” for the security of the
border is counterproductive, at best. Rather, federal, state, and local government must arrive at a
common understanding of what is needed to provide an acceptable level of security at the borders,
and then determine means to provide that security that is feasible, affordable, and acceptable to
the American people. Addressing the variable scale, therefore, begins in the federal government
with an interagency plan, led by the Department of Homeland Security. The impetus for border
protection that began with the consolidation in Customs and Border Protection must be continued
to harness the support of other agencies—including but not limited to DoD—that have vital roles in
meeting the complexities of the task. This will certainly include institutions like the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency, whose traditional operations along both
borders provide a background in both information and intelligence exchange with law enforcement.
Multiple sectors of the intelligence community, led by DHS’ own Under Secretariat for Intelligence
and Analysis, can provide the underpinnings of what the Department of Defense calls an “active,
layered defense.”53 In turn, they will provide for the security of the nation’s borders, ideally well
before the threat reaches them.
A stand-alone federal solution, however, will be doomed to failure. Governor Janet Napolitano
of Arizona begrudgingly acknowledged as much when she declared:
States are not responsible for operational control of international borders; however, due to the dire situation
that exists along the United States-Mexico border in Arizona, the state has had to act to preserve the rights and
bests interests of its citizens.54

Concerns mirroring those of Governor Napolitano in the states of Texas, New Mexico, and
California led to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between those states and DoD that
is the foundation of Operation JUMP START. Comparable shared concerns between the states of
New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the federal government led to similar agreements in the
initiation and execution of Operation WINTER FREEZE in 2004.55
Beyond these exemplary operations, a host of evolving mechanisms are being built to strengthen
cooperative efforts between the three levels of government that could be trained against concerns
for border security. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force offices located across the country (notably
including Phoenix, San Diego, and El Paso) could certainly be applied toward these ends, bringing
together representatives not only from state and local law enforcement, but agencies like the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and DoD. Likewise, State Fusion
Centers, financially sponsored by development grants from the Department of Homeland Security,
are already serving as a primary conduit for information exchange.
The military’s role in the solution set that will be required this combined interagency and
intergovernmental solution may be occasionally cumbersome for the services, but is inescapable.
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The expected transition described by the Bush Administration as the impetus behind Operation
JUMP START may begin to solve the immediate problem at the lower end of the variable scale,
but it should not be relied upon to address the middle and upper tier concerns. Even assuming
that CBP receives a significant infusion of resources that will provide technological solutions, that
infusion will not take place overnight. The equipment and expertise currently being provided by
the military will, at least for the time being, remain a requirement.
Moreover, technology can only serve to complement boots on the border; it cannot replace them.
Whether focused on interdicting the threat or—more ideally—deterring or preventing illegal transit,
it is the physical presence of people that will actually accomplish the desired function. Again, DHS
recognizes this reality and, along with the infusion of funds provided for technology along the
border, it is asking for an increase of $442.4 million to hire, train and equip 2200 new Border Patrol
agents.56 Again these planned increases will not translate into immediate reinforcement along the
borders. Moreover, when spread across more than 7,000 miles of border to our north and south,
the layer of protection provided by these 2,200 new agents may be exceedingly thin. Therefore—
even if only addressing the steady-state, lower-end requirement suggested by the variable scale—
sufficient numbers for accomplishing this mission may only be available if the military remains
actively engaged.
Keeping the military engaged and, as necessary, bolstering that engagement, will present a series
of questions. First, the nation’s leadership must decide which component of the military is best
suited to address the issue along our variable scale: the active duty forces, the National Guard, or
both? Next, the leadership will have to address the relative capacity of those forces to take on these
responsibilities. And finally, having addressed the feasibility of the requirement, we will have to
return to the question of whether such engagement is advisable and, most importantly, acceptable
to the American people.
Active Duty Forces.
Recent tradition shows that if an active component organization is involved in civil support, its
role is specialized, and its numbers are small. A good example is the United States Marine Corps
Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The CBIRF’s mission requires it to respond
to credible threats of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive yield incident in
order to assist local, state, or federal agencies.57 The unit lists an impressive array of capabilities to
include agent detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel decontamination,
and medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel.58 However, the unit is composed
of only 350 personnel, and its mission is focused exclusively on CBRNE (Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, or High Explosive Yield) incident response. The United States Northern
Commands Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) was also designed as a very specialized force
dedicated to planning and integrating consequence management support from the Department of
Defense to civil authorities following such an incident. However, the task force is essentially a
command and control entity without assigned forces or dedicated transportation. In the event of
an actual crisis, necessary personnel would be attached to JTF-CS to handle manpower intensive
requirements alongside the specialized requirements the unit is uniquely qualified to fulfill.59
Joint Task Force North, as already noted, is much more directed to matters associated with the
concerns of this chapter. The mission statement of the organization reiterates its relevance here.
As directed, Joint Task Force North employs military capabilities to support law enforcement agencies and
supports interagency synchronization within the United States Northern Command area of responsibility in
order to deter and prevent transnational threats to the homeland.60
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As is the case with much of the current National Guard mission along the southwest border, JTF-N
has frequently assisted law enforcement efforts by means of detection and monitoring missions
and by facilitating engineer support. JTF-N processes and prioritizes requests and then sources
them through appropriate active duty units.61 In addition to these roles, however, the task force
has played an important part in providing intelligence analysis and information sharing with
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; other federal interagency partners; military
units in support (from both the active component and the National Guard); and (when authorized
and appropriate) Canadian, Mexican, and other international partners.62 Beyond such support,
the task force has a history of conducting collaborative planning with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. This ability to plan for complex operations incorporating bi-national, federal,
state, and local stakeholders, highlights a core competency of the military that continues to prove
more-than-beneficial in civil support missions inside and outside the United States.
Placed reasonably along the variable scale, the role of JTF-N could be seen in support of the
Border Patrol in interdicting and arresting criminal elements. Moreover, it might provide support
in intercepting and/or deterring the flow of terrorists over the nation’s borders. While very
deliberately not involved in arrest and apprehension, the task force can support CBP as the primary
law enforcement agency charged with that responsibility. If statutes and regulations were amended
to allow JTF-N to join in those more direct functions, however, it is hardly configured to do so.
Possessing approximately 150 soldiers, the unit’s main contribution is in intelligence and information
sharing, and in facilitating the introduction of other military forces to accomplish specified ends.
Perhaps curiously, JTF-N may be the only standing force from the military’s active component
dedicated to an aspect of border security. Its ties to the mission are indirect, born out of a concern over
the illicit flow of drugs across our borders. Nevertheless, but the new transition from counterdrug
concerns to the newer concerns surrounding counterterrorism will no doubt assure the task force’s
continued association with the CBP and its partner agencies.
In the meantime, there are other units whose missions could be applied to these endeavors,
especially as focus shifts from border control to border safety to border security. The United States
Northern Command itself may serve a vital liaison function between the militaries of the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, ensuring transparency and encouraging cooperation through bilateral
and multilateral Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs). NORTHCOM’s Standing Joint Force
Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) is poised as a deployable command and control element about
which a Joint Task Force could be quickly configured in response to any number of homeland
defense scenarios.63 Predesignated Quick Response Forces in both the United States Army and the
United States Marine Corps could quickly fall in as the key components of those JTFs, if deployed.
But they are not, nor are they envisioned to be dedicated forces for border missions.
The National Guard.
Then again . . . neither is the National Guard. The Administration frames the current support
mission along the southwest border, like the 2002 mission conducted in the wake of 9-11, as an
anomaly. However, unless an unexpected turn of events lifts the threat from our borders or a
remarkable (some would suggest inadvisable) infusion of manpower takes place in the Border Patrol,
it is likely to be a recurring anomaly. Because in spite of understandable reticence surrounding its
use, no force recommends itself better to the mission than the Guard.
The thing that most commends the Guard as the military resource of choice in any civil support
mission is its traditional relationship with the civil authorities in need of that support. Recruiting
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offices across the country remind us of this relationship—an affinity based in the dedication of the
Guard to the people it serves, enhanced by its proximity. No one in the military is more attuned to the
border enforcement, safety, and security challenges facing Yuma County, Arizona than the Arizona
National Guard. No one in the armed forces is more aware of persistent concerns surrounding
Aliens of Interest passing through the Swanton sector of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York
than their Guardsmen. Likewise, no element of the United States military enjoys a closer working
relationship with the state and local government than those who dwell among them, exercise with
them, and plan to respond to emergencies alongside them.
Accordingly, logic continues to dictate that if greater forces are needed along the border, the
Guard is the “go to” solution. The same thought process that calls for closer integration between
federal, state, and local law enforcement extends easily to incorporating the local “state militia” in
support of those integrated efforts. By further extension, as regional state cooperative efforts like
the ones discussed here continue, cooperative, collaborative planning between the adjoining states’
National Guard will provide a synergy that could “close the seams” between states’ borders, while
simultaneously addressing the larger national border issue.
While the greatest urgency surrounding border security may exist in the states that constitute
those borders, the cost for providing that security is not theirs to bear alone. There are a number
of precedents that have been set since 9-11 that allow for greater federal support to those states’
immediate concerns. Notable among these are measures designed to fund deployment and
employment of the National Guard in missions that remain under state control. For instance, Title 32
of the United States Code authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide funds for National Guard
missions that remain under the authority of a state’s governor, as “necessary and appropriate”
in supporting “homeland defense” activities.64 Similarly, the potential exists for states’ governors
to fund National Guard activities undertaken in state active duty status through Department of
Homeland Security grant monies.65 Additionally, federal funding available to the states via 32
U.S.C. §112 for “drug interdiction and counterdrug activities” could logically be extended to a state
force whose mission is tied to the federal effort to interdict these illicit activities coincident with the
general policing of our nation’s borders.66
Funding issues, however, become secondary when viewed against the greater concern of how
the National Guard could afford the additional manpower demands implied in a recurring border
security mission. A partial solution to this “more immediate challenge” to the border states is to
continue to augment their efforts with National Guard units from other states. Doing so would
continue the pattern begun in 2002, revisited in Operation WINTER FREEZE, and currently being
exhibited in Operation JUMP START. Officials are quick to point out that military readiness
has not and will not be degraded by the Guard’s participation in this endeavor.67 Rather, the
Guard’s support has been portrayed as enhancing the engaged units’ readiness in engineering,
logistics, transportation, aviation, medical and maintenance. Given continued federal funding
and accompanying cooperation among the states through the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC), these are means that could be applied to the problem for some time.
One should understand, however, that this is only a partial solution, and one that may not be
sustainable. Indeed, rising demands on existing numbers in the Guard may make sustainability
the ultimate “deal breaker” in these discussions. The current strain being felt by the National
Guard due to its employment at home and abroad is well documented. Expecting it to accept
an increased burden by way of operations along the border amounts to what has been called “a
further strain on already overextended military resources.”68 What most people fail to realize is
that the National Guard has taken on these unprecedented demands, escalating from deployments
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the late 1990s through Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and
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ENDURING FREEDOM, with historically weakened manpower. Following the fall of the Soviet
Union, the Guard was charged with making force reductions that have never been recovered. In
1989, the end strength of the National Guard stood at 570,000 personnel. Buoyed by the prospect
of a “peace dividend,” that force was reduced by 20 percent to approximately 456,000, of which
350,000 are Army Guard.69 Balance reduced numbers against the increased operational tempo of
the National Guardsmen in the last 3 decades, and the picture becomes bleaker still. In the 1980s,
serving Guardsmen accounted for approximately 1 million man-days of duty per year. In the 1990s,
(with a shrinking force), that figure had grown to 12.5 million man-days. In 2003, statistics showed
that these figures had ballooned to 63 million man-days per year.70
It is beyond the intent of this chapter to suggest how many personnel are required to effectively
secure the borders of the United States. In 2005, the late Representative Charlie Norwood (R-GA)
sponsored a study that suggested 36,000 National Guardsmen and/or authorized “State Defense
Forces” would be required to assist the Border Patrol in securing the southwest border of the
United States.71 At one point before the activation of Operation JUMP START, the Administration
planned to deploy 10-12,000 troops in support of the border patrol, as opposed to the 6,000 that
were eventually sent.72 Whatever the case, the numbers and the need that inspire them are more
than appreciable. Combine our concerns to the southwest with the realization that our border with
Canada is twice its size—and that there are only 1/10 the number of border patrol agents as exist in
the southwest there to “protect” it—and the immensity of the requirement at hand becomes more
appreciable still.
Until now we have only examined numbers, without coming to grips with how those numbers
should be applied. It should be obvious that the 36,000-man augmentation envisioned in Congressman
Norwood’s study were not intended merely for surveillance, intelligence analysis, or engineering
functions. They were intended to be postured as the deterrent effect that can only be supplied by
boots-on-the-ground, standing in the gap, able to interdict and, as necessary, arrest and apprehend
the threat to our people. They were intended to augment law enforcement agents alongside of those
agents, occasionally providing peripheral support to their mission, but equally prepared to provide
direct support to policing requirements. Were the threats the country is facing still limited to those
unintentionally accompanying the “huddled masses yearning to breath free,” the necessity for this
augmentation would be significantly different. But, that is not the case, and the nation is obliged to
prepare for a greater menace.
We are faced in the center and upper levels of our variable scale with a requirement that fails to
fit comfortably in the realm of either law enforcement or national defense. Given the adversaries we
have encountered in what has been called the “seam of ambiguity” between the two, the best path
is for us to prepare to meet the trials of both environments. With all deference to the Department
of Homeland Security and especially to their Border Patrol agents, it is illogical to expect them to
be prepared for an upper end threat that may see them outgunned. Neither is it logical to expect
the American public to duplicate the assets and capabilities contained in the military to perform
a function it should be capable of fulfilling. The reticence of the armed forces to take on the more
direct involvement envisioned here is understandable—but perhaps wrongheaded. Beyond the
question of technology and manpower, of capabilities and numbers, the military requires a new
mindset in addressing the border security issue.
The spirit embedded in the Posse Comitatus Act and the laws and regulations that reflect it are
focused on reiterating the role of the military of the United States as the servant of its people. But the
preponderance of the concern along our borders does not have to do with the comings and goings
of the American people. Our concern is over the illegal entry into our country by those who may
wish to do us harm. The nation’s primary defensive focus, as always, remains outward against an
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external threat—but that focus must now begin on its shorelines and along its territorial boundaries.
The studied hesitancy of the leadership of the Department of Defense should be viewed against
how quickly border enforcement issues could become border safety issues, and finally reactive
issues of national defense. An organization that justifiably prides itself on a preemptive mentality
should bear no umbrage against employing itself as an obstacle to the threats envisioned here.
There is no doubt that this suggested change in the military’s paradigm will require a reexamination
of statutes, regulations, and directives. But 9-11 has forced many such reexaminations. Moreover,
the redirection envisioned here need not automatically alter the traditional relationship between
America and its military surrounding matters of domestic law enforcement. It will, however,
automatically and exponentially emphasize a message of deterrence along our borders, and bolster
the means of defending that border should that deterrence fail.
Conclusion.
Border security is not what it used to be. Over the last 3 decades, America’s concerns have
steadily escalated from what was once as much a humanitarian issue as a security issue, to concerns
over paramilitary violence, organized crime, and international terrorism. The requirements to meet
these concerns have likewise increased to the point that anything less than an interagency and
intergovernmental response will inevitably leave our citizenry vulnerable to a new and expanding
series of threats.
One would like to think that the new era of threats to our borders and our people is a temporary
condition, and that some day soon the nation will be allowed to settle back to a less demanding
posture of readiness. Unfortunately, reality does not accommodate those wishes. The “Long War”
our leadership forecasts for our nation and our allies cannot be expected to remain “over there.”
Mr. Craig Duehring, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, framed
the current state of affairs succinctly and with candor:
The nature of the mission has changed because of the Global War on Terrorism. The potential danger to
our country has increased dramatically. It’s not just a story of people looking for a better way of life. It is, in
fact, a great potential for increased damage to our country, threats to our citizens, to our way of life. That’s
something that needs to be addressed. We took the border mission for granted for too many years, and that’s
no longer going to be the case.73

The new threat portends a new challenge for the military, both active and reserve components.
From the United States Northern Command, through to the individual state’s National Guard, our
leadership will be required to revisit its thinking, motivation, and ethos in addressing this particular
“law enforcement” requirement. It will require our government to decide which entities from the
depth and breadth of its capabilities are best postured, best equipped, and best trained to meet
the trials that lay ahead. Once those means are selected, however, it will require an accompanying
commitment from our government to ensure that they are sustainable, in terms of equipment, in
terms of technology, and—most importantly—in terms of manpower.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 19
1. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report, “Roadmap for National
Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001, pp. 32-33, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf, accessed
December 20, 2007.
2. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six- Point Agenda for

266

Department of Homeland Security,” July 13, 2005, www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0703.shtm, accessed February 6,
2008.
3. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second Stage
Review Remarks, July 13, 2005, www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0255.shtm, accessed February 6, 2008.
4. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations, Securing America’s Borders at Ports of Entry:
Strategic Plan FY 2007-2011, Washington, DC: 2006, p. 2.
5. Ibid, “Message from the Commissioner.”
6. United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the
Threat at the Southwest Border, Washington, DC: 2006, p. 2.
7. “Special interest countries” are those designated by the intelligence community as countries that could export
individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.
8. Christopher Sands, “Canada and the War on Terrorism: The U.S. Challenge on the North American Front,” Canada
Focus, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 2001, www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,902/, accessed February 6,
2008.
9. James F. Powers, Jr., Director, Office of Homeland Security, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, interview with
author, Harrisburg, PA, November 6, 2006; Deborah Waller Meyers, “U.S. Border Enforcement: From Horseback to
High-Tech,” Migration Policy Institute Insight, No. 7, November 2005.
10. Fred Burton, U.S. Border Security: Looking North, STRATFOR.com, www.nixatron.com/StratT-bordernorth.htm,
accessed January 4, 2008.
11. T. S. Hataley, “Catastrophic Terrorism at the Border: The Case of the Canada-United States Border,” Homeland
Security Affairs, Supplement No. 1, 2007, p. 4.
12. A Line in the Sand, p. 2.
13. National Guard Bureau, Operation Jump Start Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, 2006, www.ngb.army.mil/features/
southwestborder/files/OJS_Fact_Sheet29Sept.doc, accessed February 7, 2008; Testimony of David V. Aguilar, Chief, Office
of Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee, National Guard and Border Security, May 24, 2006, p. 4.
14. Operation Jump Start Fact Sheet.
15. Aguilar, p. 3.
16. Idem.
17. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact Sheet, Operation Jump Start, www.asisonline.org/newsroom/051506operati
onjumpstart.pdf, accessed January 15, 2008.
18. The Act actually only prohibits the Army and, by extension, the Air Force that grew from it. It has been
subsequently applied to the Navy and Marine Corps by policy and legislative supplement. There have been, nevertheless,
both legislative and executive measures which have provided for rare exceptions in the military’s direct support to law
enforcement entities. For a complete discussion of the Act and its implications, see the Congressional Research Service
Report 95-964, The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: the Use of Military to Execute Civilian Law by Charles Doyle.
19. For an expanded explanation of Titles 10, 32 and State Active Duty statuses of the National Guard, see Timothy J.
Lowenberg, The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security, Vol. 2006, Washington, DC: National
Guard Association of the United States, 2005, pp. 2-3, www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000457/
primer%20fin.pdf, accessed January 31, 2008.

267

20. The first Quartering Act, May 1765, provided that Great Britain could house its soldiers “in inns, livery stables,
ale houses, victualling houses, and the houses of sellers of wine and houses of persons selling rum, brandy, strong water, cider or
metheglin,” and, if numbers required, in “uninhabited houses, outhouses, barns, or other buildings.” It further required any
inhabitants, or in their absence, public officials, to provide food and alcohol for the soldiers “without paying any thing
for the same.” A second Quartering Act, June 1774, was designed to restore imperial control over the American colonies.
This became part of what the colonists would refer to as the Intolerable Acts, See David Ackerman’s “The Tea Crisis
and its Consequences through 1775,” in Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American
Revolution, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999.
21. See, for instance, DoDD 5143.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; DoDD 5148.11, Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight; and DoDD 5240.01, Department of Defense Intelligence Activities. The
department’s attitude is clearly displayed in the latter, leading its Policy section with the declaration:
All DoD intelligence and CI activities shall be carried out pursuant to the authorities and restrictions of
the U.S. Constitution, applicable law, Reference, c, [Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
Activities, and Executive Order 13355, Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community], the
policies and procedures authorized herein, and other relevant DoD policies authorized by Reference,
b)[DoDD 5143.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence]. Special emphasis shall be given to the
protection of the constitutional rights and privacy of U.S. persons.(emphasis added)
22. Aguilar, p. 2.
23. Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes
Home, Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1996, p. 25.
24. Deborah Waller Meyers, US Border Enforcement: From Horseback to High-Tech, p. 4.
25. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992, pp.153-154.
26. Public Law 101-510, Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act of 1991
27. For further information surrounding these recommendations, see the Report of Chairman Lamar Smith to the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, titled
Oversight Investigation of the Death of Esequiel Hernandez, Jr.,” November 1998.
28. Robert Suro, “Report: U.S. ‘Failures’ Led to Border Death,” Washington Post, November 13, 1998.
29. Joint Task Force North, www.jtfn.northcom.mil, accessed January 21, 2008.
30. Stephen R. Viňa, “Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations and Restrictions, RS22443,” Washington,
DC: Library of Congress, 2006, p. 5.
31. The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, DC, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/
homeland/maritime-security.html; and The National Strategy for Aviation Security, Washington, DC, 2007, www.whitehouse.
gov/homeland/aviation-security.html, accessed February 6, 2008.
32. United States Northern Command website, www.northcom.mil, accessed January 21, 2008.
33. Scott Shepherd and Steve Bowman,“Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States
Northern Command,RS21322,” Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2005, p. 1.
34. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2005, p 5,
www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/homeland.pdf, accessed January 7, 2008.
35. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,” DoD Directive
5525.5, 1989.
268

36. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.
37. Canada’s Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, The Report of the Special Committee on Security
and Intelligence, Ottawa, Canada, 1999.
38. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report2004-2005, Ottawa: 2006, p. 2, www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en//
publications/annual_report/2004/report2004_e.pdf, accessed January 22, 2008.
39. Ramón J. Miró and Glen E. Curtis, Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002, Washington, DC:
Library of Congress, 2003, p. 43, www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/OrgCrime_Mexico.pdf, accessed February 6, 2008.
40. Andy Webb-Vidal, “Terror Groups Relocating to U.S.’s Backyard,” The Financial Times, March 5, 2003.
41. Idem.
42. A Line in the Sand, p. 3.
43. Ibid, p. 4.
44. Ibid, p. 13.
45. U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Border Security,
Immigration and Claims and the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Outgunned and Outmanned:
Local Law Enforcement Confronts Violence Along the Southern Border, March 2, 2006, Washington, DC, 2006, www.hsdl.org/
homesec/docs/legis/nps03-052406-10.pdf&code=d2664b6364f601e7446d60362694349c, accessed February 7, 2008.
46. Jerry Seper, “Mexico Arrests Suspect in U.S. Agent’s Death,” Washington Times, January 24, 2008.
47. General Barry R. McCaffrey and Major J. A. Basso, “Narcotics, Terrorism and International Crime: The
Convergence Phenomenon,” in R. D. Howard and R. L. Sawyer, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the
New Security Environment, Dubuque, IO: McGraw-Hill/Contemporary Learning Series, 2003, p. 323.
48. Sarah A. Carter, “Terrorists Target Army Base in Arizona,” Washington Times, November 26, 2007, www.
washingtontimes.com/article/20071126/NATION/111260034/1002, accessed February 7, 2008.
49. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Protecting America: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2005-2010 Strategic
Plan, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005, p. 24.
50. Jill R. Aitoro, “Border Security Dominates DHS Technology Budget Request,” Government Executive, February 5,
2008, www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid+39224, accessed February 6, 2008.
51. Fact sheets on Operation JUMP START from both Custom and Border Protection and the National Guard list
numbers of “Alien rescues” among their significant accomplishments.
52. Meyers, US Border Enforcement: From Horseback to High-Tech, p. 22.
53. U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
54. Office of the Governor of Arizona. News Release: “Governor, Legislators, Visit Border Communities to See
Effects of Operation Strong Border, Secure Arizona,” November 2, 2005, www.governor.state.az.us/press/2005/0511/
NR~110205~Bordervisit.pdf, accessed January 29, 2008.
55. Operation WINTER FREEZE was a designated National Special Security Event (NSSE) conducted by DoD
in support of Border Patrol operations in its Swanton sector, encompassing 295 miles of continuous border between
Canada and New York, New Hampshire, and Vermont. The sector had become notorious as the area with the largest

269

number of Special Interest Aliens intercepted in the entire country. Conducted from October 30, 2004 to January 26,
2005, the operation was initiated in partial response to the terrorist attacks in Barcelona, Spain, prior to their national
elections, and current intelligence data that highlighted the timeline between the Presidential election of 2004 and
Inauguration Day 2005 as a period of vital concern. Both active duty and reserve component assets were utilized in
support of the event, but by far the greater percentage of support came from the National Guard (93% of the Task Force
was Guard, hailing from 21 different states).
56. Katherine McIntire Peters, “Homeland Security Seeks to Bolster Management, Border Security,” Government
Executive, February 4, 2008, www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=39217, accessed February 6, 2008.
57. In addition, and unlike the National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST,
CBIRF) can also deploy overseas in support of the Unified Commands.
58. USMC Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, www.mnfwest.usmc.mil/public/iimefpublic.nsf/UnitSites/cbirf,
accessed January 30, 2008.
59. U.S. Northern Command, Joint Task Force Civil Support, www.jtfcs.northcom.mil, accessed February 7, 2008.
60. U.S. Northern Command, Joint Task Force North, www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/mission.html, accessed January
30, 2008.
61. Lieutenant Colonel William J. Barnett, Operations Officer, Joint Task Force North, telephonic interview with the
author, February 8, 2008.
62. Joint Task Force North Command Brief, Service to the Nation, September 2005.
63. U.S. Northern Command, “Standing Joint Force Headquarters North,” www.northcom.mil/About/index.html,
accessed February 9, 2008.
64. 32 U.S.C.§905. Cited in Stephen R. Viña, Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations and Restrictions,
RS22443, p. 6.
65. Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security, p. 4.
66. Viña, Border Security and Military Support pp. 5-6.
67. Testimony of Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee, National Guard and Border Security, May 24, 2006, p. 3.
68. Peter Baker, “Bush Set to Sent Guards to Border,” Washington Post, May 15, 2006.
69. Roger Allen Brown, Sizing the National Guard in the Post-Cold War Era, Santa Monica: Rand Institute, 1995,
www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7506/index1.html, accessed February 9, 2008; and Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne
OBryant, National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet RS22451, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2007, p.
2.
70. Christine E. Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III
Report, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006, p. 32.
71. Frederick A. Peterson III and John E. Stone II, “Results and Implications of the Minuteman Project: A Field Report
Submitted to The Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, Washington, DC, 2005, p. 4.
72. John E. Stone, Operation Jump Start: Failure by Design, Washington, DC: U.S. Freedom Foundation, 2007,
www,humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes&id=21993, accessed January 14, 2008.
73. Craig Duehring, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, quoted in Sergeant Jim
Greenhill’s National Guard Bureau Press Release, “Operation JUMP START a Success, Officials Say,” December 11,
2006, www.ngb.army.mil/news/archives/2006/12/121106-OJS_success.aspx, accessed February 11, 2008.
270

APPENDIX I
CONTRIBUTORS
J. BOONE BARTHOLOMEES, JR. (Ph.D., Duke University, 1978) is Professor of Military History in
the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is the course
director for the core course Theory of War and Strategy and a former holder of the Dwight D.
Eisenhower Chair of National Security Studies. He is a retired Army colonel and the author of Buff
Facings and Gilt Buttons: Headquarters and Staff Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865.
He edited The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2004 and the 2d
edition published in 2006.
MARTIN L. COOK (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1985) is Professor of Philosophy at the United
States Air Force Academy. He previously taught at the U.S. Army War College, Santa Clara
University, the College of William and Mary, and numerous other educational institutions. Among
other works, he is author of The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military, New York:
SUNY Press, 2004.
COLONEL JAMES A. HELIS (Ph.D., Tufts University, 2006) is the Chairman of the Department
of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and former Director of Military
History and Strategy in the same department. He is an infantry officer and has served in command
and staff positions to include the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York.
FRANK L. JONES (MPA, State University of New York at Albany, 1978) is Assistant Professor of
Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College. A retired member of the Senior Executive Service
with more 30 years of government service, he served in several positions within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Policy and Support, and as Principal Director for Strategy, Plans and Resources in the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. From 2006-2007, he was a fellow at the
Homeland Security Institute, the Department of Homeland Security’s federally funded research
and development center, where he worked on national response planning and maritime security
issues. He has written several book chapters and journal articles on such subjects as national security
policymaking, homeland defense, and terrorism.
PAUL REXTON KAN (Ph.D., University of Denver, 2000) is an Associate Professor of National
Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He is the former Deputy Director of the Center
for China-United States Cooperation where he coordinated professional exchanges with the policy
institutions linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of State Security, and the People’s
Liberation Army. He has published articles on the links between irregular warfare and criminality
in Small Wars and Insurgencies, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Air and Space
Power Review, and Defense Intelligence Journal. He was recently awarded the U.S. Army War College’s
General George C. Marshall Faculty Research Grant to complete his forthcoming book, Drugs and
Contemporary Warfare (Washington, DC: Potomac Press).

271

JANEEN M. KLINGER (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1990) is Professor of Political
Science with the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. She taught
previously at the Command and Staff College of Marine Corps University and at Franklin and
Marshall College. She also worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, specializing in
issues related to international political economy.
WALTER H. “HARRY” LEACH (M.S., Johns Hopkins University, 1991) is the Director of Aerospace
Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy and the Director of the U.S. Army War
College National Security Seminar. He is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a helicopter pilot. He
commanded an airlift squadron and also served in staff assignments in force structure planning,
arms control, and the Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program.
In addition to his current instructor role, Colonel Leach taught undergraduate mathematics. He is a
1982 graduate of the Air Force Academy and is also a graduate of the College of Naval Command
and Staff and the U.S. Army War College.
GABRIEL MARCELLA (Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1973) is Professor of Third World Studies
and has served as Director of the Americas Studies in the Department of National Security and
Strategy of the U.S. Army War College. His government experience includes service as International
Affairs Advisor at the United States Southern Command. He has written extensively on Latin
American security issues and U.S. policy, as well as the interagency process and national security.
He is a consultant to the Departments of Defense and State. His current research focuses on the
Colombian conflict and U.S. strategy.
THOMAS W. MCSHANE (J.D., Pepperdine University, 1977) was Director, National Security
Legal Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College.
He retired as a colonel from the Army in January 2006. His Judge Advocate General experience
includes service with the 101st Airborne Division in the Gulf War and as Staff Judge Advocate for
the Southern European Task Force during NATO’s Kosovo campaign. He taught criminal law and
procedure at the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, has written articles
for Parameters and The Army Lawyer, and addressed military and civilian audiences in the U.S. and
overseas.
RICHARD M. MEINHART (Ed.D., George Washington University, 2004) is currently serving
as a Professor of Defense and Joint Processes at the U.S. Army War College in the Department
of Command, Leadership and Management. He is a retired Air Force colonel who has served
on the Air Force Staff, Army General Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as at three different
overseas locations. His research and writing interests are in the areas of strategic leadership and
management.
R. CRAIG NATION (Ph.D., Duke University, 1976) has served as Professor of Strategy and Director
of Russian and Eurasian Studies with the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army
War College, since 1996. His most recent major publication, a history of the Balkan conflict of the
1990s, is entitled War in the Balkans, 1991-2002.
DAVID L. PERRY (Ph.D., University of Chicago Divinity School, 1993) is Professor of Ethics in the
Department of Command, Leadership and Management, and holds the General Maxwell Taylor
Chair of the Profession of Arms. He teaches courses on ethics and warfare, strategic leadership,
and U.S. defense policies, planning, organizations, and processes. He also is the primary author
272

for core-course lessons on ethical reasoning and professional military ethics. His 40+ publications
include articles on ethics in war, espionage, interrogation, and covert action. Prior to joining the
U.S. Army War College faculty, he taught medical ethics and business ethics for 10 years at Seattle
University and Santa Clara University.
ALAN G. STOLBERG (Ph.D., Temple University, 2007) is Assistant Professor of National Security
Studies, Director of the National Security Policy Program, and holds the Henry L. Stimson Chair
of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College. A retired Army colonel, he served in a variety of
intelligence and policy and strategy positions as a European and Eurasian Foreign Area Officer, to
include Soviet/East European Political Military Planner for the Joint Staff J5 during the time of the
fall of the Berlin Wall, American liaison officer to UNPROFOR during the siege of Sarajevo in 1995,
and Chief of the Europe/NATO Division in USEUCOM J5 during the Kosovo conflict and the first
year of the Global War on Terror. He was also the Division G2 and a battalion commander in the 3rd
Infantry Division. Current research focuses on policy and strategy making, European and Eurasian
security, security cooperation, and the U.S. Government interagency.
JOHN F. TROXELL (MPA, Princeton University, 1982), is an Associate Professor in the Center for
Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College, and holds the General George S. Patton Chair
of Operational Research and Analysis. Prior to assuming his current position, he was the Director
of National Security Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army
War College. He has also been a faculty member of the Department of Social Studies at the United
States Military Academy. He is a retired Army colonel and has served in a variety of operational
and staff assignments to include the Department of the Army War Plans Division and as a force
planner for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. He has published
articles and monographs with the Strategic Studies Institute, Parameters, and Military Review.
BERT B. TUSSING (MNSSS, U.S. Naval War College; MSS, U.S. Army War College) is the Director
of Homeland Defense and Security Issues in the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic
Leadership. He joined the U.S. War College faculty in 1999 after 24 years in the United States
Marine Corps where he served in operational assignments in Grenada, Beirut, Somalia, and BosniaHerzegovina. He is a senior fellow of George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy
Institute; a member of the Board of Experts for UC-Irvines’s Center for Unconventional Security
Affairs; a member of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness Advisory Council; on the steering committee of the Homeland Security/Defense
Education Consortium Association; and a senior fellow of Long Island University’s Homeland
Security Management Institute.
MARYBETH P. ULRICH (Ph.D., University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, 1996) is Professor of
Government in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She
has also taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy and at the Naval Postgraduate School. An experienced
navigator on KC-135Q refueling planes, she served 15 years in the active USAF and is a lieutenant
colonel in the Air Force Reserve. She has written extensively in the field of strategic studies with
special emphasis on civil-military relations, national security democratization issues, and European
security. Among her numerous publications is a book, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases
of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, 1999.

273

ANTHONY WILLIAMS (MA, University of Virginia; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Virginia) retired
with over 30 years experience as an intelligence officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, during
which time he held various senior positions with the agency, the U.S. Intelligence Community and
in other departments of the U.S. Government. Before retiring, he served as the Representative of the
Director of Central Intelligence to the U.S. Army War College, and held the Walter B. Smith Chair
of National Intelligence Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy. He is a Ph.D.
candidate in Russian and European History at the University of Virginia.

274

APPENDIX II
GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION
Strategy is an art. It is also somewhat scientific, in that it follows certain patterns which require
a common understanding of terminology, adherence to certain principles, and disciplined, albeit
creative, thought processes. Remember that these strategy formulation guidelines are not formulas.
Strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time, place, and personalities
involved. Nevertheless, these guidelines offer an approach to address the complexity of strategy,
and are intended for strategists attempting to achieve the coherence, continuity, and consensus
that policymakers seek in designing, developing, and executing national security and military
strategies.

Figure 1.
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NATIONAL PURPOSE
This is the starting point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the
national purpose represent the legal, philosophical, and moral basis for continuation of the American
system. From the nation’s purpose—as well as an understanding of the nation’s domestic and global
needs—the United States derives its enduring core national interests. The strategist should return to
these considerations in terms of risk assessment at every derivative level of strategy formulation.
CORE NATIONAL INTERESTS/ENDS
There are four generally agreed upon core U.S. national interests: physical security—defined as the
protection against attack on the territory and people of the United States in order to ensure survival
with fundamental values and institutions intact; promotion of values; stable international order
and economic prosperity. These core interests are translated into three grand strategic objectives:
preserve American security, bolster American economic prosperity, and promote American values.
All administrations focus on these objectives, but depending upon the assessments of threats
and opportunities, as well as other variables such as personal beliefs and unique circumstances,
Presidents establish different strategic visions of America’s role in the world, often causing them
to choose to emphasize one objective over the others. For the Carter administration, the initial
emphasis was on human rights; for the Reagan administration, it was security; and for the Clinton
administration, it was the economy. Security is once again the top priority, but in an increasingly
globalized world populated by nonstate actors with possible access to weapons of mass destruction,
achieving physical security paradoxically may require an equal emphasis on promoting democratic
values and generating global economic prosperity.
GRAND STRATEGY/STRATEGIC VISION
At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve U.S. core national interests are based
on the national leadership’s strategic vision of America’s role in the world.
Throughout America’s history, this vision has ranged from isolationism to global engagement,
containment of communism to American primacy. In order to be effective, each new administration
has had to express a vision for the U.S. role in the world that doesn’t outrun the experience of the
American people, and thus lose the decisive authority or domestic consensus to implement the
strategic vision. Is the vision, in other words, suitable and acceptable?
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, had to act carefully prior to World War II as he
moved the American grand strategic vision from isolationism to one of global engagement. And
within 5 years after the end of that war, the perception of external threat allowed President Harry
S Truman to gain support for the grand strategic vision of containment—focused on containing the
Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass.
Grand strategic means involve careful consideration of America’s national elements of power
at the broadest level. Given the state of the international and domestic environments and the scope
of the administration’s strategic vision of the U.S. role in the world, a key consideration is the
feasibility of employing sufficient U.S. national power to achieve core objectives.
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NATIONAL POLICY
Based on grand strategic decisions, U.S. political leadership provides national policy in the form
of broad guidance concerning America’s global role in pursuit of core national objectives. This
policy is the start point for strategy formulation at the national level. National policy is conveyed
in many iterative and cumulative forms ranging from formal national security directives and
pronouncements in presidential and cabinet-level speeches to presidential replies to press queries
and cabinet-level appearances on current affairs television shows.
STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS
General.
Inherent in this more detailed strategy process is an appropriate degree of analysis designed to
illuminate alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties. A general outline for this phase of
the strategy process follows:
(a) Identify U.S. interests.
(b) Determine level of intensity for each interest.
(c) Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) in regard to interests.
(d) Determine objectives (ends).
(e) Consider alternative concepts (ways) that utilize available or needed resources (means) to
achieve objectives.
(f) Determine the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the strategic options.
(g) Conduct a risk assessment.
(h) Present policy recommendations.
The analysis must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful, it must examine and explain
which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected. The analysis should seek to identify opportunities
and threats to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the strategic analysis will not only be influenced by
current national policy, but will help identify recommendations to change existing policies or create
new ones. The analysis should address most—if not all—of the following questions:
(a) What is the current U.S. policy or precedent?
(b) Who are the other critical actors?
(c) What are their interests and/or policies?
(d) With whom does the U.S. have convergence or divergence of interest/policy?
(e) What are the other feasible options to employ the U.S. elements of power to implement the
policy options under consideration?
(f) How will the policy be sustained?
The strategy formulation guidelines delineated above can apply equally to all formal national
security documents (i.e., National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military
Strategy, theater military strategy, etc.). The strategist must be able to develop strategies employing
all of the elements of power. Students at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) will develop and
practice these skills in NSPS, elective courses, and the Strategic Decisionmaking Exercise. Remember,
the formulation of strategy at any level employs the strategic thought process based on the balancing
of Ends, Ways, and Means.
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National Interests.
During the strategy formulation process, the strategist moves beyond the core grand strategic
interests to more specific national security interests derived from those core interests in accordance
with national policy. These national security interests provide more detail to the nation’s needs
and aspirations, in terms of the relationship between the foreign and domestic aspects of national
security, and are thus the start point for defining strategic objectives for national security related
strategies.
As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the nation, and written as
desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. For example, U.S. national
interests might be stated as:
(a) Access to raw materials – (not “Protect sources of raw materials”).
(b) Unrestricted passage through international waters—(not “Secure sea lines of
communications”).
The USAWC groups national interests into three categories derived from the four core interests
of the United States. Categories help to organize interests. Keep in mind the breakdown is normally
artificial. Thus, while “Unrestricted access to Persian Gulf Oil” as a U.S. national interest has a
primary category of “Economic Well-Being” for the U.S. and its allies, it also ties into the other two
categories of national interests used by the USAWC. The three categories are:
(a) Security of the Homeland: protection against attack on the territory and people of a nationstate in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact.
(b) Economic Well-Being: attainment of the conditions in the world environment that ensure the
economic well-being of the nation.
(c) Promotion of Values: establishment of the legitimacy of or expansion of the fundamental
values of the nation such as democracy and human rights.
Determining the level of intensity helps to determine priority of interests, recognizing that
without prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative objectives and the consequent
mismatch of those objectives (ends) with resources (means), which are always finite. The degree
of intensity of an interest, in particular, should be determined before a detailed analysis of threats
to those interests. It is important that interests not become a function of a particular threat. If a
government begins with a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may
react to a threat with major commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that
intensity. Rational cost-benefit analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest. The
three USAWC degrees of intensity are determined by answering the question: What happens if the
interest is not realized?
(a) Vital: if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for core national interests.
(b) Important: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect core national
interests.
(c) Peripheral: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national
interests.
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Ends-Ways-Means.
Strategic objectives are derived from national policy and from a detailed consideration of U.S.
national interests by category and intensity against the backdrop of issues, trends, and challenges
(threats and opportunities) that affect those interests. Based on these objectives, strategists then
consider alternative concepts and courses of action for the use of the national elements of power.
Note the primacy of the objectives—strategy should be ends-driven, not resource-driven, in order
to ensure maximum opportunity to achieve the objectives.
Defining the objective (end), therefore, is a critical first step in the strategy formulation process.
If the objective is too vague or poorly understood, no amount of resources or careful consideration
of ways to employ those resources will ensure success. On the other hand, defining an objective too
narrowly may restrict the ways and/or means available. Finally, understanding of the objective is
critical to determining success or failure of any particular strategy.
Once the desired end is identified, strategists consider the range of resources (means) available,
then examine potential ways to employ these resources in pursuit of the objectives. While strategy
should remain ends-focused, ways are necessarily resource-constrained. Unless a state has nuclear
weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be adopted in developing its security strategy
(there is no “mutually assured destruction”). Therefore, the state must find alternative ways to
enhance security or deter attack by a nuclear-capable adversary. Potential alternatives include
establishing alliances with nuclear capable countries (i.e., NATO), or securing security assurances
in exchange for not pursuing attainment of (or eliminating existing) nuclear weapons (i.e., Cuba).
If, however, deterrence is perceived to be the only viable option, the state must either work to
attain nuclear weapons (i.e., North Korea) or to develop alternative forms of deterrence (chemical
or biological weapons, perhaps?).
Feasibility, Suitability, and Acceptability.
Once potential strategy options are identified, each option must be examined to determine its
feasibility (Do we have the means to execute the ways?), acceptability (Does it have domestic and
Congressional support? Is it legal? Ethical? Worth the cost?), and suitability (Will it achieve the
desired ends?). This evaluation process enables to strategist to evaluate the likelihood of success for
each option and to select that strategy deemed most likely to attain the desired ends with available
means and in an acceptable way. Before a final strategy is recommended or adopted, however, each
option must also be subjected to a risk assessment.
Risk Assessment.
Strategies at any level normally lack resources or the ability to employ resources in a manner
sufficient for complete assurance of success. As a result, a final and essential test is to assess the
risk of less than full attainment of strategic objectives, as well as the risk of second and third order
effects that implementation of the strategy could have (i.e., effects on the economy, relationships
with allies, etc.). Living with risk is part of the strategist’s business in the modern world, and being
able to articulate its character and extent is the first step in reducing its impact. Where the risk
is determined to be unacceptable, the strategy must be revised by either reducing the objectives,
changing the concepts, increasing the resources, or some combination of these actions. In the
deterrence example described previously, the state’s decision about whether to pursue attainment
of nuclear weapons rather than entering into an alliance or accepting a security assurance pledge
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will depend, in part, on the extent to which it is willing to accept the risk associated with each
option. If the risk associated with relying on the good faith of its allies and/or potential adversary is
unacceptable, then the state will likely try to attain nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the risks
associated with attempting to acquire nuclear weapons (i.e., economic sanctions that might cripple
the economy) are too great, the state may have little choice but to pursue other options.
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